







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ARTICLE I.

THE GERMAN REFORMED CHURCH.

BY REV. E. V. GERHART, D.D., PRESIDENT OF FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL
COLLEGE.

THE present form of theology and state of practical religion in the German Reformed Church of America, stand connected with the internal forces and external circumstances of every period of her history. Each period has exerted a determinative influence on the succeeding one; and, all together are the factors of the final result as it meets us at this time. Hence an isolated statement of prevailing theological opinions, disconnected from the process to which they belong, would be comparatively meagre and unsatisfactory. It could afford, at best, but a narrow conception of the character and condition of the church.

We propose, therefore, to follow the order of time, and furnish a historico-theological monograph, in which the various causes, influences, and associations of the past shall be allowed, as far as possible, to appear in their true relation to the present.

TWO ORIGINAL TENDENCIES.

The German Reformed church of America is an unbroken historical continuation of the Reformed church of Germany and Switzerland. As the final result of the deep reviving work of Christ going on in the Roman Catholic church during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the great Reformation began simultaneously in Zurich and Wittenberg, and from these centres of light extended its power rapidly over Europe,—the movement meeting a prompt response from the felt moral and spiritual wants of all classes of the people. Zuingli and Luther, the principal organs of the Reformation in its incipient stages, though of one mind in their opposition to the errors and corruptions of Rome, yet differing in temperament, psychological organization, moral character, education, and political as well as social relations,—became the types of two tendencies in theology, worship, church government, and practical life. These tendencies, Reformed and Lutheran, one as to their life-principle, developed their points of difference from the beginning, giving rise to two Protestant confessions which, with various modifications, have been perpetuated down to the present time. The difference is general rather than particular. It lies in the genius, or spirit, pervading the whole character of each confession, rather than in peculiar dogmas, ecclesiastical organization, or forms of worship. The most satisfactory view is obtained, not by reading the theological controversies, or looking at the peculiarities of external manifestation, but by a thorough study of the entire history of Lutheranism and Reform.

Yet the difference, as it appears in the sphere of theology, may serve as an index to the general character of the two confessions.

REFORMED DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

The most prominent question in controversy pertains to the presence of Christ in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Both confessions unite in affirming the ordinance to

be twofold: first, a commemoration of the sufferings and death of Christ; and, secondly, the medium of a life-communion of Christ, the head of his mystical body, the church, with believers, the members of his body; by which the new creature is nourished, by the body and blood of Christ, unto eternal life. Both reject the theory of transubstantiation as taught by the Roman Catholic church: namely, that the substance of the bread and wine is transmuted, by the consecrating act of the priest, into the substance of the body and blood of Christ; the form, color, taste, etc. of the symbols remaining the same notwithstanding. Both reject the opinion that communion with Christ in the Lord's Supper is only moral, consisting in pious reflection on the passion of our Lord, accompanied with sincere penitence for sin, and an earnest resolution to lead a holier and more devoted life; and that the communion of the believer is not with the human nature, but only with the divine nature of Christ. They agree in maintaining a communion with the entire divine human Christ, or with him by his body and blood. There is a real participation in the life-giving virtue of the human nature of Christ, supporting a process of invigoration of spirit, soul, and body, which is consummated in the resurrection and final glorification of his people.

But they differ as to the mode. The Lutheran church teaches that, while the symbols, bread and wine, remain bread and wine, the veritable flesh and blood of Christ are locally present, being in, with, and under the consecrated bread and wine; and that communicants, unbelievers as well as believers, partake of the human nature of Christ with the mouth; the one class of persons eating and drinking damnation to themselves, not discerning the Lord's body, and the other class, eating and drinking unto sanctification and everlasting life.¹ The Reformed church, on the contrary, teaches that the divine-human Saviour is present,

¹ "De coena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuuntur vescentibus in coena Domini; et improbant secus docentes." — Art. X. Conf. Aug. "De sacramento altaris sentimus panem et vinum in coena esse verum corpus et sanguinem Christi, et non tantum dari et sumi a piis, sed

not locally, or carnally, but spiritually ; that is, by the Holy Ghost: not in, with, and under the consecrated elements, but in the entire sacramental transaction, including the formal institution, the administration by the minister, and the actual receiving, in faith, of the consecrated bread and wine by the communicant ; and that Christ communicates himself, not to the unbelieving and unconverted, but to believers only, who are partakers of his true body and blood, not by the mouth, but by faith. "To eat the crucified body and drink the shed blood of Christ, is to become more and more united to his sacred body by the Holy Ghost, who dwells both in Christ and in us ; so that we, although Christ is in heaven, and we on earth, are notwithstanding, 'flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone;' and that we live and are governed, forever, by one spirit, as members of the same body are by one soul."¹ The same view is taught in the Geneva Catechism, composed by Calvin, and first published, in Latin, in 1545.² *Solamne eorum, quae dixisti, beneficiorum significationem habemus in coena, an illic reipsa nobis exhibentur ? Cum Dominus noster Christus ipsa sit veritas, minime dubium est, quin promissiones, quas dat illic nobis, simul etiam impleat: et figuris suam addat veritatem. Quamobrem non dubito, quin, sicuti verbis ac signis testatur, ita etiam suae nos substantiae participes faciat, quo in unam cum eo vitam coalescamus.*³ Again: *Ut in summam colli-*

etiam ab impiis christianis." — *Articuli Smalkald., Pars 3, Art. 6, 1.* "Quid est itaque sacramentum altaris ? Resp. Est verum corpus et sanguis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, in et sub pane et vino per verbum Christi nobis Christianis ad manducandum et bibendum institutum et mandatum." — *Luther's Larger Catechism, V. 8.* "Decimus articulus approbatus est, in quo confitemur nos sentire, quod in coena Domini vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus, quae videntur, pane et vino, his qui sacramentum accipiant." — *Apol. Conf. Art. X.* Vid. also the seventh article of the *Form of Concord.* Quoted from "*Die Symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche,*" edited by J. T. Mueller. Stuttgart, 1848. Acknowledged to be the best edition of the symbolical books of the Lutheran church.

¹ Heidelberg Catechism, Q. 76.

² The Latin is a translation by the author from the original French which appeared in 1541. Vid. Koecher's *Katechetische Geschichte der Reformirten Kirche.*

³ *Cat. Gen. V. De Sacramentis.* Vid. Niemeyer's *Collection of Reformed Confessions.*

gamus quae dixisti : duas in Coena res esse asseris : nempe, panem et vinum, quae oculis cernuntur, attrectantur manibus, percipiuntur gustu : deinde Christum, quo interior animae nostrae, tanquam proprio suo alimento, pascuntur. Verum, et eo quidem usque, ut corporum etiam resurrectio illic nobis, quasi dato pignore, confirmetur : quum et ipsa vitae symbolo communicent. Similar quotations could be made from other Reformed confessions ; but as the Geneva and Heidelberg catechisms acquired more authority than any others, it is not necessary or important.

The Reformed church, in all her catechisms and confessions, has always *affirmed* that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper consists of two inseparable parts, each equally essential to its integrity : the visible signs, the bread and wine, and the invisible grace, the body and blood of Christ ; the one being the external, sensible form, and the other the internal, supersensible substance or matter of the ordinance ; that it represents and commemorates the sufferings and death of Christ for the sins of the world ; that in the sacramental transaction of eating the broken bread and drinking the cup, there is a real communion of the believer with the body and blood of Christ, communion with the human nature, being the condition of communion with the divine nature ; that, while the body of Christ is in heaven and we are on the earth, the communion is effected by a mysterious and wonderful power of his Spirit : "cui difficile non est sociare, quae locorum intervallo alioqui sunt disjuncta ;"¹ that, while the communicant receives the external signs, bread and wine, by the mouth, he sees and partakes of Christ only by faith, the organ of the spirit, wrought in the heart by the Holy Ghost ; that the communion nourishes the new, spiritual life of the believer, — the life of the entire man, soul and body, — the full benefit of which will appear in the final resurrection from the dead, in the perfected image of Christ ; and that the energy or power by which these spiritual benefits are conferred, although faith is the condition of actual participation, is, nevertheless, not in the believer, but in the

¹ Cat. Gen. V.

external sacrament itself, an objective institution, ordained by Christ as the principal means of promoting growth in grace. With equal clearness and emphasis, the Reformed confessions *deny* that the sacrament is only a memorial¹ of the atoning death of Christ; that the consecrated bread and wine become, substantially, the true body and blood of Christ, or that, consubstantially, the true body and blood are locally present in and under the bread and wine; that there is any communion with Christ merely by the external act of eating and drinking; that the observance of the sacrament confers any spiritual benefit on the unbelieving and unconverted; that the believer communes directly with God, without the medium of Christ's humanity; that the objective efficacy of the sacrament depends on the faith, or any frame of mind, of the communicant; or that the spiritual benefit which the believer derives from communicating, consists only in the pious feelings, reflections, and purposes excited by the time, place, and other circumstances attending the solemn celebration.

Whatever fluctuations of doctrine the German Reformed church has experienced in the course of her past history, and they have been great, yet these are the views of the Lord's Supper which, for substance at least, obtain at the present time. There are variations, however, at certain points, of which we will speak in another place.

¹ With this statement the earlier theory of Zuingli is in apparent conflict. See his Seventy-seven Articles, announced in 1523. He says: "Ex quo colligitur missam non esse sacrificium, sed sacrificii in cruce semel oblati commemorationem et quasi sigillum redemptionis per Christum exhibitae." The conflict, however, is *apparent* rather than real. As Zuingli's Articles originated in his controversy with the errors of the Romish church, he naturally laid stress on that aspect of the Eucharist which was ignored and set aside by the mass. According to Ebrard his positive views were homogeneous with those of Calvin, though not so fully developed. It must be borne in mind that Reformed theology passed through a formative process, in which two periods may be distinguished. In the first, Zuingli and his coadjutors were the most influential men, and the side of the truth directly opposite to Romish errors was prominent. In the second, the towering genius of Calvin possessed commanding power, and the positive contents of the sacrament were discussed. Rightly understood, Zuingli does not contradict the established doctrine of the Reformed Church.

REFORMED DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

As the Lord's Supper possesses central significance in the economy of salvation, a difference of opinion, broad and clearly defined, concerning it, involved divergent views on all, or nearly all, other points, theoretical and practical. The person of Christ, the sacrament of baptism, the law, sin, grace, faith, good works, and other points in theology, stand differently in the two systems.¹ Were it consistent with our design, it would be interesting and profitable to compare the doctrines of Lutheranism and Reform on all the facts belonging to the Christian religion. But we shall confine ourselves to a brief notice of the person of Christ; merely remarking, that no error of church history is more fatal to a true appreciation of the important question at issue, than the assumption that, deplorable as were the evils of the great Protestant schism, the rupture was brought about by the stubbornness and arbitrary will of Luther, Zuingli, and Calvin, and their prominent coadjutors respectively, and was not the result of different tendencies of religious life, deeper, broader, and more potent than the influence of any single man.

Both churches, Lutheran and Reformed, maintained that Jesus Christ is true God and true man, in one person, in the sense of the ancient ecumenical creeds. Special stress was laid by the Reformers, belonging to both confessions, alike on the proper divinity and the proper humanity of our Lord, rejecting with equal decision and firmness, on the one side, ebionitic, and on the other, docetic or gnostic errors. But the sacramentarian controversy lead to different views concerning the *relation* of the human to the divine natures; not so much, however, as regards the place and action of the human, in the incarnation by the Holy Ghost and the life of Christ on earth, but rather as regards the place and action of the human in the ascension and glorified state of Christ, in the mystical union, and in the holy communion; the Lutheran view being in the line of the ancient Eutychian, and the

¹ For a complete scientific delineation of these differences, see Schneckenburger's *Unterscheidungslehre*.

Reformed in the line of the ancient Nestorian method of thought; though it would be unjust to charge either confession with holding the corresponding ancient heresy. The Reformed predicated the essential attributes of humanity of the human nature only, and the essential attributes of divinity of the divine nature only, thus emphasizing especially the difference of the two natures, though affirming them to be inseparably and eternally united in one person. Before the ascension, the human was located on earth, and after the ascension it was located at the right hand of God, and nowhere else, being excluded from the earth and limited to the place of exaltation in heaven.¹ The Heidelberg catechism inquires, in the forty-seventh question: "Is not, then, Christ with us, as he has promised, unto the end of the world? Answer: Christ is true man and true God. According to his human nature, he is now not upon earth; but according to his Godhead, majesty, grace, and Spirit, he at no time departs from us." Q. 48. "But if his human nature is not present wherever his Godhead is, are not the two natures in Christ separated from one another? By no means; for, since the Godhead is incomprehensible and everywhere present, it must follow that the same is both beyond the limits of the human nature he assumed, and yet none the less in it, and remains personally united to it." The same view appears in a clause of the answer to the seventy-sixth question: "so that we, although Christ is in heaven, and we on earth, are notwithstanding flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone"; and in the answer to the eightieth question: "who, according to his human nature, is now not on earth, but in heaven, at the right hand of his Father, and will there be worshipped by us." One passage more, from Calvin: "*Ita Christum corpore absentem doceo nihilominus non tantum divina sua virtute, quae ubique diffusa est, nobis adesse, sed etiam facere, ut nobis vivifica sit sua caro.*"²

¹ Quod autem nobiscum habitat, idne de corporis praesentia intelligendum? Non. Alia enim ratio est corporis, quod in coelum receptum est (Luc. xxiv. 51, Actor. i. 11); alia virtutis, quae ubique est diffusa. — Cat. Gen. I. et al.

² Defence against Westphal, p. 68 (Hagenbach's Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II. p. 341. Leipzig).

The question arises logically : since the humanity of Christ is limited to the right hand of God, and believers on earth commune, in the Lord's Supper, with the flesh and blood of Christ no less than with his spirit,¹ how is this communion established and maintained ? In opposition to the ubiquitarian theory of the Lutherans, the Reformed theologians replied : By the mysterious agency of the Holy Spirit, elevating the hearts of believers to Christ in heaven, who feeds and nourishes them with the life-giving power of his flesh and blood. In his Defence against Westphal, from which we have just quoted, Calvin says : “ Neque enim simpliciter *spiritu suo* Christum in nobis habitare trado, sed ita *nos ad se attollere*, ut vivificum carnis suae vigorem in nos transfundat.” And in his *Conf. Fidei de Eucharistia*, he says : “ nullis tamen finibus limitata est ejus spiritus efficacia, quin vere copulare et in unum colligere possit, quae locorum spatiis sunt disjuncta.” The doctrine did not originate with Calvin ; he only gave definite expression to a view which can be traced in the writings of Zuingli and other early Reformers, both of Switzerland and France, but had before not taken so clearly defined a shape, in the consciousness of the church, as his acute and logical mind gave to it.

The Lutheran antithesis was developed from the Lutheran theory of the sacrament ; and involved the communication of divine attributes to the human nature of Christ (communicatio idiomatum) ;² in virtue of which his human nature was not limited to heaven, nor to any one place at a time, but, like the divine nature, was present in all places at the same time where the sacrament of the altar was instituted and administered, as the true aliment of the believing communicant. Luther says :³ “ Wherever you put God (or

¹ “ Itaque cum de communione, quam cum Christo fideles habent, loquimur, non minus carni et sanguini ejus communicare ipsos intelligimus quam spiritui, ut ita totum Christum possideant etc.” — Calvin *Conf. fidei de Euch.* 1537. (Henry's Life of Calvin, Appendix, Vol. I. p. 516.)

² See Herzog's Encyclopaedia by Dr. Bomberger, Vol. I. p. 746.

³ We give a free translation. The original runs thus : “ Wo du mir Gott hinsetzest, da musst du mir die Menschheit mit hinsetzen : sie lassen sich nicht sondern und von einander trennen ; es ist eine Person worden und scheidet die

affirm him to be), there I require you to put the humanity also ; they cannot be divided nor sundered. There is *one* Person, and he does not lay aside the humanity, as a man takes off his coat and lays it by, when he wishes to go to sleep. . . . The humanity is more closely united to God than skin and flesh, nay, more closely than body and soul." In the course of time, the ubiquitarian theory acquired symbolical authority. We find it stated in its antithetical relation to the Reformed doctrine, limiting the glorified body of Christ to heaven, in the Form of Concord (Formula Concordiae), published as an authoritative confession of faith in 1580 : "Postquam Christus non communi ratione, ut alius quispiam sanctus, in coelos ascendit, sed ut Apostolus (Eph. iv. 10.) testatur, super omnes coelos ascendit, et revera omnia implet, et ubique non tantum ut Deus, verum etiam ut homo praesens dominatur et regnat, a mari ad mare, et usque ad terminos terrae." The right hand of God is not a position in heaven, but it is everywhere : "non est certus aliquis et circumscriptus in coelo locus, sed nihil aliud est nisi omnipotens Dei virtus, quae coelum et terram implet." The Lutherans, intensifying the *union* of the two natures to such a degree as to invest the human with the attributes of the divine, seemed, in the judgment of the Reformed, to destroy the integrity of Christ's humanity, and thus bring in the ancient Eutychian heresy ; while the Reformed, intensifying the *difference* of the two natures to such a degree as to circumscribe definitely the human, seemed, in the judgment of the Lutherans, to destroy the reality of the hypostatical union, and thus bring in the ancient Nestorian heresy ; each at the same time regarding the theory of the other as incompatible with the idea of real communion with the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper. It must be observed that the question of later times, whether the worthy communicant does, or does not, eat and drink of the body and blood of

Menschheit nicht so von sich, wie Meister Hans seinen Rock auszeucht und von sich legt, wenn er schlafen gehet Die Menschheit is nacher vereinigt mit Gott, denn unsere Haut mit unserem Fleische, ja nacher denn Leib und seel." — Hagenbach's Dogmengeschichte, II. p. 362.

Christ, was not at issue in the sixteenth century. On this point, Reformed and Lutherans were agreed. The controversy assumed both the fact and the necessity of being fed and nourished by real communion with the humanity of our Lord.

THE GERMAN REFORMED CHURCH.

These wide and clearly defined differences of opinion on fundamental questions in theology, extending by necessary logical consequence to all the more important doctrines of Christianity, developed two distinct confessions, separated in theory and practice, in feeling and modes of thought, separated also, for the most part, by difference of location ; and indicate two really different or specific tendencies of the general Protestant religious life of the world. Allied indeed they are, and really one generically, yet opposite and even antagonistic. They are two majestic streams, rising in the same fountain, and flowing in the same direction, through the fields of time, both fructifying and beautifying the ages ; but they run in different channels, now approaching each other, then driven far apart, and again moving on in parallel lines ; yet they do not touch and mingle their waters in one broad, peaceful current.

A correct view of the relative position of the Reformed and Lutheran confessions, on the continent of Europe, is necessary in order to account for their relative position in America. Free from the dictation or interference of the civil government, and left to the spontaneous impulses of religious life, it was natural, considering the vital antagonism of their previous history, running through more than two hundred years, when, in the first half of the last century, they emigrated in large numbers to the new world, to organize Reformed and Lutheran churches, side by side, and perpetuate from year to year each its own genius, faith, form of ecclesiastical government, and mode of worship. Anything less would have argued a cold indifference to the truth, or a wilful surrender of it ; for the extremes of rationalism and fanaticism, which characterize the last century, do not allow

us to think of a true reconciliation of fundamental differences on the basis of a principle that would incorporate organically the truths, and eliminate the errors, belonging to both confessions.

The Reformed church takes its name, not originally by way of distinction from Lutheranism, but from its relation to the church of Rome. It is the Roman Catholic church *reformed* of its errors and corruptions. The name originated in France, and at first designated the true church of Jesus Christ, including both branches of Protestantism. When the *Lutheran* church assumed this distinctive title, it divided itself openly from the other confession, which was thus left in exclusive possession of the original general appellation — the *Reformed church*.¹

The Reformed church appearing in various parts of the Christian world at the same time, it was convenient to distinguish its different sections by the addition of the national appellative. Thus we get the Reformed church of Switzerland, or the Swiss Reformed church, the Reformed church of France, of Germany, of Holland, of the Netherlands, of Hungary, of England and Scotland ; all being distinguished by the same general characteristics from the Lutheran church, yet each branch modified by language, nationality, civil government, and other circumstances peculiar to the character and history of the nation. Each section, too, formed its own confession or confessions of faith ; for several had more than one, occasioned by the course of the controversy with Roman Catholicism and the progress of knowledge in the bosom of the Protestant church. Yet they were all pervaded by the same spirit ; and affirmed the same belief on all the leading questions which divided Protestants from Roman Catholics, and Reformed from Lutherans.

THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.

The *German* Reformed church arose in the Palatinate¹

¹ History and Genius of the Heidelberg Catechism, by J W. Nevin, D.D., p. 13.

¹ “ The title Palatinate, in German *Pfultz*, belonged formerly to two adjoin-

on the Rhine, which, under the direction of the Elector, Frederic the Third, surnamed the Pious, passed over from the Lutheran to the Reformed confession. The transition became complete by the formation and adoption of the Heidelberg Catechism¹ — the ripest fruit of the mature theology and vigorous spirit of the Reformed church of the sixteenth century. It was first published in the year 1563; and in the

ing provinces of Germany, which were distinguished as *Upper* and *Lower*. The first, *Oberpfaltz*, bordered on Bohemia and Bavaria; the other, *Unterpfaltz*, was situated on both sides of the Rhine, touching on different sides Mayence, Württemberg, Baden, Alsace, and Lorraine. It is frequently styled the *Palatinate of the Rhine*; and, in spite of the horrible devastations to which it has been subjected in different ages from the ruthless hand of war, is known as one of the most fertile and productive sections of Germany. Down to the year 1620, the two provinces belonged together; but when the Elector, Frederic V., was put under the ban of the empire, after the battle of Prague, the Upper Palatinate was made over to Bavaria. In consequence of the great changes that took place in Europe after the French Revolution, the country which formerly constituted the Palatinate on the Rhine is now possessed by Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, etc. It is not easy, of course, to identify it on a modern map.” — Nevin on the Heid. Cat. p. 19. Compare also two learned articles on the Palatinate by Prof. A. L. Koeppen, *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI. 1859, pp. 140 and 271. The largest and best work on the Palatinate with which we are acquainted is Dr. Lewis Häuser’s *Geschichte der Rheinischen Pfaltz*. 2 vols Heidelberg. 1856.

¹ At the instance of the Elector Frederic III., who succeeded Otto Henry, 1559, and espoused the Reformed faith in 1560, the catechism was prepared in the German language, by Caspar Olevianus, born at Treves, August 10. 1536, and Zacharias Ursinus, born at Breslau, July 18, 1534, the former being accordingly but twenty-six, and the latter, who is reputed to be the principal author, twenty-eight years of age. The principal sources were a smaller and larger catechism, previously prepared by Ursinus, the *Divine Covenant of Grace* by Olevianus, the *Emden Catechism* by John de Lasky (or Lasco), and the *Genevan Catechism* by Calvin. First published in January, 1563, three editions followed each other in rapid succession before the close of the year, each one varying from its predecessor. The third edition, issued in November (1563), became the fixed and standard text by which all subsequent editions have been regulated. The catechism was translated into Latin by Joshua Lagus, a minister in Heidelberg, and Lambertus Pithopoeus, a skilful school teacher, and published in the same year. The work “has Lutheran inwardness, Melancthonian clearness, Zuinglian simplicity, and Calvinistic fire, all fused together.” See an Article on Heid. Cat. by Dr. Harbaugh, *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI. 1859, p. 47. Perhaps the most valuable source of historical information, from which later writers have chiefly drawn, is J. C. Koecher’s *Catechetische Geschichte der Reformirten Kirche*.

course of a short time acquired greater and more general authority in the Reformed church than any catechism or confession that had previously been adopted. To understand fully the nature of the transition of the Palatinate, it would be necessary to consider the religious posture of Protestant Germany and the condition of the Palatinate itself, divided on the sacramental question by three religious parties, ranged under the names of Luther, Zuingli, and Calvin or Melancthon; but the design and limits of our Article forbid us to enter this field of inquiry.

The religious history of the Palatinate and the genius of the Heidelberg Catechism, give character to the faith and worship of the German Reformed church in America. The one is the key to the knowledge of the other. Of all branches of the Reformed confession which the course of history has transferred to the new world, and perpetuated, the German is the only one which has continued, and still adheres to, the Heidelberg Catechism as its formulary of faith, to the exclusion of all others. And at the present time, more than at any other period in the last hundred years, does the ministry study diligently the history of its formation and the peculiar type of its theology; inculcate faithfully its doctrines upon the children and youth in the Sunday school and catechetical class, and upon the adult membership from the pulpit; and seek to appropriate, and diffuse among the people, the deep spirit of earnest devotion to Jesus Christ and his kingdom, which breathes in its simple and beautiful language.

THE GERMAN REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA.

The present theological status, however, of the church, its mode of worship, its customs and practical life, have been modified by the religious life of America; on the one side, by the doctrinal thinking of Puritanism, and on the other, by the enthusiastic zeal of Methodism; by the later philosophy and theology developed on the continent of Europe; by the teaching and moulding influence of its own colleges and seminaries; and by the controversies of the last twenty years,

with Lutheran, Methodist, Congregational, and Presbyterian churches, on measures for the promotion of true practical religion, on the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, the person of Christ, the mystical union, the rule of faith, and other correlative questions. To understand and appreciate this status, theological and practical, a brief review of these events is necessary.

The history of the German Reformed church in America divides itself naturally into *three* periods: the first, is the period of formation, of immediate connection with and dependence upon the church of Holland, and extends to the year 1792; the second extends to the year 1825, and may be characterized as the period of confusion and retrogression; the third commences with the establishment of a theological seminary, and may be called the period of revival, consolidation, and of internal and external progress.

I. *The First Period* — 1710 — 1792.

The church owes its origin in America to the large immigration of Germans, mostly from the Palatinate, Switzerland, and certain provinces of France, which began as early as 1682, and continued, in increasing numbers, through the whole of the last century.¹ They settled in Maine, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia; but the liberal policy of William Penn, granting equal protection to all sects, made Pennsylvania the central point of emigration. Many even who had first settled in New York, removed, on account of bad treatment by the civil authorities, from that state and settled in Pennsylvania. In 1730 the Reformed population numbered about *fifteen* thousand; and in 1746 they had increased to *thirty* thousand.

The first church was a log building erected in Skippack, Montgomery county, Pennsylvania, in 1726; and the first minister, the Rev. George M. Weiss, who landed in com-

¹ For valuable statistical and historical facts respecting the emigration of Germans to America during the last century, see the General Introduction to a Collection of Thirty thousand Names, edited by I. Daniel Rupp.

pany with four hundred Palatines, at Philadelphia, Sept. 21, 1727, and settled in Skippack, where he organized the first German Reformed church, near the close of the same year.¹ The most prominent man of this period is the Rev. Michael Schlatter, of St. Gall, Switzerland, who was commissioned, by the North and South synods of Holland, to take charge of the whole German Reformed interest in America. He arrived at Boston in August, 1746; settled in Philadelphia; visited all the settlements and congregations in New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia; organized new congregations and charges; superintended the settlement of pastors; induced a number of Reformed ministers of Germany and Switzerland to follow him to the new world; called for and received large contributions, in Bibles and money, from England and the continent,—the Bibles for distribution among the people, and the money for the support of pastors and school teachers; and by these means bringing order out of confusion, he effected a somewhat uniform organization of all the churches. As the result of his explorations, he reported forty-six congregations.²

On his arrival, Schlatter took immediate steps towards the organization of a synod. A preliminary meeting having been held the year before, the first synod,³ or coetus as it was called,

¹ Harbaugh's *Life of Rev. Michael Schlatter*, pp. 36, 39, et al. This work contains the fullest and most satisfactory history of the German Reformed Church of America during the eighteenth century, in the English language. Weiss was sent as a missionary to the German Reformed in America by the upper consistory, or classis, of the Palatinate, and assisted on his way by the classis of Amsterdam. Vid. also Harbaugh's *Lives of the Fathers of the Ger. Ref. Church in Europe and America*, Vol. I. p. 265.

² Of these, *thirty-eight* were in Pennsylvania, *four* in Virginia, *two* in Maryland, and *two* in New Jersey. Vid. *Min. of Synod Ger. Ref. Ch.*, 1817, containing a report on the origin and progress of the synod, drawn up by a committee, consisting of Rev. Messrs. William Hendel, D.D., Henry Hoffmeier, and Caspar Wack.

³ The synod of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church was organized in New York, with the consent and approval of the classis of Amsterdam, on the 14th of September, 1747, just fifteen days previous to the organization of the German Reformed synod.—Harbaugh's *Schlatter*, p. 56. The synod of the Lutheran Church was organized in Philadelphia nearly a year later, August 14th, 1748. See Hazelius's *Hist. of American Luth. Ch.* p. 66.

was held in Philadelphia, Sept. 29, 1747, subject to the authority and supervision of the synod of Holland. There were present five ministers and twenty-six elders. This subordinate relation to the Reformed church of Holland continued until 1792, a period of forty-five years. The proceedings were annually transmitted to the mother synod, and approved or disapproved. New cases pertaining to order and discipline arising, they were in like manner referred, and process suspended until instructions were received. It was the court of ultimate appeal on all judicial questions. In return, the synod of Holland provided the German churches of America with well-educated ministers and teachers, and supported them by regular annual appropriations; sent to them Bibles, catechisms, and hymn-books; and fostered them, from year to year, in the spirit of a kind and tender parent. They constituted, in fact, the American mission of the Reformed church of Europe, and the synods of Holland were an efficient missionary society,—the thing without the name,—sustaining a relation to the American churches somewhat like that of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the churches established by its missionaries.

The natural result of such a dependent condition was the continuation of a purely *German* church on American soil, in the midst of different nationalities. Separated by ecclesiastical and social customs, and especially by difference of language, the laity, who were generally poor and devoted to agriculture, and the clergy, the large majority of whom served from four to eight and sometimes a dozen congregations, which were scattered over a whole county, or over several counties, remained in an isolated state, reflecting the scholarship, culture, theology, worship, piety, and social life of the Reformed church in the mother country.

II. *The Second Period.* — 1792–1825.

The *second* period in the history of the church in America begins with the dissolution of the connection and regular correspondence with the synods of Holland, 1792. The

church of Holland ceased to have direct supervision and control over the German Reformed synod; it was now left to its own limited resources and to the deteriorating influences of isolation and great spiritual destitution. Educated ministers, duly accredited by ecclesiastical officers, were no longer sent over, from year to year, to supply vacant congregations, which were annually increasing in number by the natural increase of population and the continued influx of German emigrants. Missionary support was withdrawn. The necessity of industrious toil, of frugality and economy, added to the natural desire of acquiring property, was not favorable to the cultivation of liberality among the people. The salary of ministers, in many cases, was not increased in proportion to the loss of foreign appropriations; and they were constrained, not only by the prevailing spiritual destitutions, but also by pecuniary considerations, to extend their labors over a large scope of territory. In some instances, the growing family of the pastor rendered manual labor necessary. He had to till the ground or pursue some other calling. The tendency was to secularize the mind of the ministry. The greater part of their time on horseback, travelling from church to church, situated from ten to fifty, or more, miles apart, in the conscientious performance of ministerial duty, preaching, catechizing the young, and officiating at funerals, and when at home required to superintend the cultivation of a small farm, — there was evidently but little time for reading and systematic study. Those laborious and self-sacrificing servants of Jesus Christ deserve high commendation and profound gratitude from those succeeding them, who reap the fruits of their toil; yet we cannot overlook the tendency and effect of the circumstances of their position. Gradually they lost somewhat of their interest in theological science and general literature, and even, in some cases, in the general prosperity of the church, and with it also a lively sense of their value and importance.

Other causes operated to the injury of the church. Some excellent men, orthodox, learned, and pious, coming from the fatherland, were added to the ministry. But the number was

comparatively small — by no means adequate to the growing wants of the church. There was also a door open for the ingress of another class of foreigners. Some possessed learning without piety; some, piety without learning; and others possessed neither learning nor piety. Yet many of them found access to vacant congregations; some with, and others without, the sanction of synod.

Another class of ministers came from the bosom of the American church. Of these a few, since there was no German Reformed theological seminary in existence, acquired a theological education in the seminaries of sister denominations, and of course were moulded by a system of thought differing from, or more or less foreign to, that of the Heidelberg catechism. Some prosecuted a course of study privately, under the direction of synod or of individual ministers. Among the more prominent of the latter class, who may be regarded as pastoral professors of theology, appointed by common consent, were the Rev. Christian L. Becker, D. D.,¹ of Baltimore, Rev. Frederick L. Herman, D. D.,² of New Hanover, Pa., and Rev. Samuel Helffenstein,³

¹ Born in Anhalt-Coeten, Germany, November 17, 1756. At eighteen entered the University of Halle, and remained four years. Spent fourteen years in Bremen as *Candidatus Theologicæ*, when he embarked for America, 1793. Pastor successively in Northampton county and Lancaster, Pa. Accepted a call to Baltimore, 1806, and continued to the time of his death, 1818. Possessed a strong mind brought under strict scientific discipline. An acute, logical thinker. A preacher of impassioned eloquence. He prepared from twelve to fourteen young men for the ministry. (Harbaugh's *Guardian*, Vol. IX. p. 305.)

² Dr. Herman was a regularly educated man, having received his classical and theological training in the University of Halle. He instructed his students, of whom there were from two to six at a time, in Latin, Greek, History, Moral Philosophy, Theology, etc. He gave them his own carefully-written lectures to transcribe, and afterwards examined them on the different subjects; but these examinations were not regular. No formal lectures were delivered. From sixteen to eighteen young men are known to have been prepared by him for the ministry. (Letter from Dr. B. S. Schneek, a pupil.)

³ Dr. Helffenstein still survives, in the eighty-eight year of his age, and is blessed with a considerable degree of mental and bodily vigor. He is the oldest minister, in office and in years, of the German Reformed church. He was educated by the direction of synod, which placed him, from 1792 to 1796, under the instruction of Mr. Melsheimer, Rev. Mr. Stock, and Dr. Hendel. While pastor of the Ger. Ref. Ch., Race Street, Philadelphia, he prepared more young men for the ministry than any other clergyman.

D. D. of Philadelphia, who had, each, from two to four, and sometimes six, young men at a time under their tuition. They studied from two to four years. Living in the house of their preceptor, he heard their recitations at his convenience, or as inclination prompted. In turn the young men, during the last year of their studies, assisted the pastor in the discharge of his parochial duties.¹

Two evils followed, unavoidably, from this method of training ministers of the gospel. One was, the lowering of the standard of ministerial qualification. The first ministers were, for the most part, graduates of the gymnasiums and universities of Europe, and therefore well qualified to impart instruction to others. But with the duties of a large pastoral charge resting upon them, it was possible to give but little time and attention to their pupils. The advantages of students being so limited, and the course of study short, the discipline of mind and the knowledge of theology which they obtained, compared with that of the earlier ministers, could not but be defective. In the course of time some of these, in turn, became pastoral professors; and being less qualified than their predecessors, their pupils possessed still fewer advantages than they had enjoyed. Synod made strenuous efforts to maintain a high standard of ministerial qualification; yet from the operation of these causes, the tendency was necessarily downward.

The other evil was the introduction into the church of discordant elements. As instructors the pastors were not subject to the control or supervision of synod. Though receiving the Heidelberg Catechism as an authoritative exponent of the sacred scriptures, yet they were at liberty to put upon it each one his own interpretation, which in one case was Calvinistic, in another Arminian; in a third, it

¹ After the establishment of a theological seminary (1825), this system of training ministers had, in a great measure, to give way. Yet it was continued for many years, particularly among the original opponents of the seminary enterprise. The system is still in vogue; not, however, so much from opposition to the seminary, as from motives of convenience and economy, and sometimes from defective views of theological education.

might be rationalistic, and in a fourth fanatical. Each instructor impressed the type of his own theology upon his pupils, and his peculiar views concerning measures for the promotion of practical religion. The consequence may easily be imagined. The whole number of ministers was small, in 1817 not more than forty-two;¹ yet there were divergent tendencies actively at work, which hindered the prosperity of the church, and even rendered its existence problematical.

The church was drifting. Nominally the Heidelberg Catechism was the confession of faith and the book of instruction in the catechetical class for the entire synod; but not in fact. Some did not swerve. They adhered firmly to the catechism. They loved the old. Others desired something else. By the authority of synod, an abstract, prepared in Europe, was sanctioned and introduced. But it was really another catechism. Constructed on a different theory of Christianity, it retained indeed very much of the matter of the old; but its parts were transposed, and a spirit was infused that was new and foreign to the original genius of the church. It bore the name of the Heidelberg Catechism, but was not the thing. The evil, however, did not end here. Some prominent men prepared catechisms *de novo*. One was good; another not. Yet neither breathed the spirit of the Reformation symbol of faith. Entire charges, each composed of several congregations, thus sundered their connection with the true life of the church, and were perpetuated in ignorance of the faith of their fathers. So deep did this evil strike its roots into the soil, that it has not been wholly eradicated to the present day. There are still some ministers who persist in their refusal to teach the Heidelberg Catechism.

The operation of these various causes enfeebled the general life. The people suffered intellectually as well as spiritually. Very few congregations had public worship once a week, or even regularly once every two weeks. The rule was once in four weeks. All, however, were not so highly favored.

¹ And ten licentiates.

Some had to be satisfied with the services of a minister once in eight weeks ; others, even, once in twelve weeks.¹ What else could be done ? Having charge of from six to ten, twelve, and fifteen churches, and some of them situated many miles apart, a faithful shepherd could do no more. The alternative was, to divide his time among all, and preach to the people as often on Sunday and during the week as was possible ; or, to limit himself to two or three flocks, and permit the rest to be destroyed by prowling wolves. Ministers generally elected the former alternative ; and the subsequent prosperity of the church has demonstrated the wisdom of their choice.

Catechetical instruction, instead of occupying six months in the year, had, in these circumstances, to be reduced to seven weeks in two or three years ; and young persons were admitted to the holy communion by the rite of confirmation, who were wanting both in knowledge of the gospel and genuine Christian experience. The schools retrograded, because good teachers were not generally accessible, and the people, no longer appreciating properly the importance of an elementary education, lowered the wages of teachers and sent their children to school only two or three months in twelve. Few German books were in circulation. The Bible and catechism, the hymn-book, Starck's Gebetbuch and Arndt's Wahres Christenthum, which were to be found in the majority of families, nourished the lambent flame of Christian devotion ; but, the language and literature of the country being English, a language which they neither spoke nor understood, nor, with few exceptions, desired to learn,

¹ Many settlements and scores of congregations could not be supplied at all. During the first quarter of the present century there were a number of congregations in New York, New Jersey, North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, which were visited by a missionary sent by synod, only at long intervals, who would preach several times, administer the sacraments, and then return. In 1820, according to the records, there were twenty-eight in North Carolina, eight in South Carolina, and eight in Tennessee, how many in the other states named we are unable to state, as the records are silent. But for want of ministers all these have long since been broken up, those in North Carolina and several in Western New York only excepted.

the people as a body were not in the main current of American progress, but pursuing their peaceful avocations in the rural districts, were content to circulate in the eddies of life under the banks.

In consequence of all these disadvantages, the language of the people deteriorated. Speaking a German dialect, comparatively pure at first, it became more and more corrupt. Many good and necessary words became obsolete. Nameless articulations, and English words and phrases, took their place. An unmusical, nondescript jargon came thus into vogue, that was neither adapted to the pulpit nor to the catechetical class, and could only serve as a poor medium of ordinary intercourse in the common affairs of life. The minister employed the *German* language in the pulpit, nor did public opinion allow him to condescend to the use of a dialect less sacred and dignified. But the language he employed the people never spoke, and the youth and less intelligent could but imperfectly understand it. Only the older and more earnest portion of the membership, who read their Bibles and devotional books regularly, were qualified by language properly to appreciate a sermon.

Taking a general view of the church, there has been vast improvement and progress during the last thirty years; yet the evil as to language has, in one respect, become greater instead of less. German schools have nearly all become extinct; and English schools have everywhere taken their place, not only in German communities speaking English, but also in populous districts where the Pennsylvania dialect is the only living language. Children and youth learn to read and write the English language, but cannot speak it. They read a language which they do not understand, and speak a language which they cannot read. Not unfrequently is it the case in some sections, mostly of Pennsylvania, but also, to some extent, of Maryland and Ohio, that the school teacher, in order to be understood, must converse in German with the children to whom he teaches English; and the pastor, in order to impart religious instruction in the catechetical class, is required to expound the *English* cate-

chism in the *German* language, — a great practical evil, for which, though diminishing slowly, there seems at the present time to be no remedy. No one born and bred outside of the American German population, can form a just conception of the character and seemingly tardy onward movement of the German Reformed¹ church, who is ignorant of, or chooses not to consider, this complication of downward forces, which, strictly speaking, the church is not responsible for, but which have been superinduced by the spirit and course of the age. Those portions of the church which have successfully accomplished the transition from German to English, are indeed relieved of the great disadvantages arising from the poverty of the Pennsylvania dialect and the difference of language; but they have been exposed to the action of a foreign element, no less dangerous in its nature and influence upon its original genius and order; of which, however, we shall speak hereafter.

What with the small number of able ministers, a defective education of the rising ministry, the introduction of unworthy men, the partial removal of the ancient formulary of faith, the composition and use of new catechisms, the large pastoral charges and unfrequent preaching of the gospel, the unavoidable loss, in a great degree, of regular catechetical instruction, the deterioration of the Pennsylvania dialect, the want of good teachers and good schools, the scarcity of German books, and the bringing in of the English language, neither spoken nor understood by thousands of the people; — the masses unconsciously sunk into religious ignorance and spiritual lethargy; the church as a whole, while the number of ministers and members was gradually increasing, retrograded intellectually, theologically, and morally; and many abuses pertaining to order, discipline, and customs, came to prevail, notwithstanding all the efforts of devoted and godly men to prevent them.

In 1792 the church had *nineteen* ministers. We have no

¹ The same evil prevails also in large sections of the Lutheran church. The two confessions are established side by side, and in numerous instances worship alternately in the same building.

means of determining the number of members or congregations. In 1825, *thirty-three* years later, and *eighty-seven* years after the meeting of the first synod, the ministry had increased to *eighty*. On the basis of the statistical table annexed to the Minutes of Synod for 1824, which, however, is very defective, the number of communicants may, we think, be safely estimated at *eighteen thousand*.

III. *Third Period, from 1825. — The Theological Seminary.*

The need of institutions of learning had been deeply felt by leading men among the ministry and laity for many years. To this feeling "Franklin College,"¹ chartered by the Legislature of Pennsylvania in March, 1787, and located at Lancaster, owes its existence. It never, however, rose to the position of a regularly organized college, and rendered but little service to the church in the way of promoting classical and theological education. Another institution was required. Initiatory steps were taken to found a theological seminary as early as 1817, and each succeeding year the question occupied the attention of synod; but what with the indifference of some ministers, the opposition of others, the

¹ The occasion and design of the institution appears from the preamble to the act of incorporation, which endowed it with ten thousand acres of public lands: "Whereas the citizens of this state of German birth or extraction have eminently contributed by their industry, economy, and public virtues to raise the state to its present happiness and prosperity: And whereas a number of citizens of the above description, in conjunction with others, from a desire to increase and perpetuate the blessings derived to them from the possession of prosperity and a free government, have applied to this house for a charter of incorporation, and a donation of lands for the purpose of establishing a college and charity school in the borough of Lancaster: And whereas the preservation of the principles of the Christian religion and of our republican form of government in their purity, depend, under God, in a great measure, on the establishment and support of suitable places of education for the purpose of training up a succession of youth, who, by being able to understand the grounds of both, may be led the more zealously to practise the one, and the more strenuously to defend the other. Therefore," etc. The board of trustees was composed one third of Reformed, one third of Lutherans, and the remainder of persons from other denominations.

² A sermon preached before the Alumni Association of the theological seminary of the German Reformed church, 1853, by Rev. Amos H. Kremer, gives a succinct and full history of the origin and progress of the institution. The only history extant.

prejudices of the people, the want of a suitable person to fill the professorship of theology, and the want of funds, seven years elapsed before the project became a reality. Finally, the synod of Bedford,¹ 1824, located the seminary at Carlisle, and elected the Rev. Lewis Mayer, D. D. professor of theology, who opened the school in March, 1825. This event marks the most important epoch in the history of the German Reformed church in America. It introduced a new element of power, which has revived its energies, developed its resources, restored its theology, established its character, extended its influence, and supplied its destitutions with able and efficient ministers.

In 1829 the seminary was removed to York. A classical department soon became necessary. It was established in the fall of 1831. At the meeting of synod at Frederick, 1832, Rev. Dr. Frederick A. Rauch² was chosen principal of the classical school and professor of biblical literature in the seminary. In November, 1835, the classical school was removed to Mercersburg, a village in Franklin county, the theological students remaining at York to complete their course of study under professor Mayer. He resigned in 1837. The seminary then followed the classical school to Mercersburg, and for the time being the theological students were placed under the direction and tuition of the professor of biblical literature, Dr. Rauch.

The classical school was erected into *Marshall College* by the legislature of Pennsylvania, in March, 1836. Dr. Rauch was chosen President.

In 1838, synod re-elected Dr. Mayer professor of theology.

¹ As illustrating the internal condition of the church, it is worthy of note that when the vote was taken on the resolution to establish a seminary in connection with Dickinson College, the best and most practicable proposition that had been made, the result was a tie. The president, Rev. Wm. Hendel, D. D., a most earnest supporter, amid much persecution, of the project, then gave the casting vote in its favor. To one man belongs the responsibility and the honor of inaugurating the institution that for seven years had been struggling to come into existence.

² Son of a minister of the Reformed church, Kirchbracht, Hesse Darmstadt, where he was born, July 27, 1806.

He removed to Mercersburg and taught one year, when, being in very feeble health, he again tendered his resignation.

Dr. Mayer had not received a regular classical education, nor had he pursued a course of study in a theological seminary, but was, in a great measure, what is called a self-made man; yet he attained to eminence as a preacher, scholar, theologian, and author. His principal teacher was Rev. Daniel Wagner, then pastor in Frederick, Md. By close application he mastered the classic languages and Hebrew. "His acquaintance with various systems of philosophy and theology, both in this country and Europe,—in Germany especially,—was very extensive. His mind was peculiarly adapted to the study of biblical antiquities, hermeneutics, exegesis, and didactic, polemic and pastoral theology. In these studies he excelled."¹ To his labors and influence as pastor, and his industry, perseverance, zeal, and ability as professor, the church is perhaps more indebted than to any other man for the origination and permanent establishment of its theological seminary. The title of doctor of divinity was conferred on him by Rutgers College, New Brunswick, in 1829.

The vacant professorship was filled by the unanimous election of Rev. John W. Nevin, D. D.,² then professor of oriental and biblical literature in the theological seminary of the Presbyterian church, Alleghany, Pa., in January, 1840, at a meeting of a special general synod convened in Chambersburg. He accepted the call, and was inaugurated as professor of theology on the 20th of May ensuing.

Dr. Rauch died in March, 1841. Two offices were vacated by his untimely death: the presidency of Marshall College, and the professorship of biblical literature in the seminary. The first office Dr. Nevin was chosen to fill, in the same

¹ Life of Rev. Dr. Mayer, by Rev. E. Heiner, prefixed to Mayer's History of the German Reformed Church, Vol. I.

² Dr. Nevin is a graduate of Union College, Schenectady, and of the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. On closing his theological course, 1826, he acted for two years as Dr. Hodge's substitute, while he was in Europe, in the department of Oriental and Biblical Literature. To this same department he was called in the Western Seminary at Alleghany, in 1829. Before he left there, the department of Ecclesiastical History fell also to his charge by the withdrawal of Dr. Halsey.

year, and from this time on he labored in the twofold capacity of president of the college and professor of theology until 1853, when Marshall College was removed to Lancaster, and, in virtue of a new act of incorporation, passed in April, 1850, united to Franklin College. He resigned the professorship of theology and the presidency of the college in 1852.

The professorship of biblical literature continued vacant for more than three years. In January, 1843, synod elected Rev. Frederick William Krummacher, D. D., then pastor of the Reformed church of Elberfeld, Prussia, and transmitted the call to him by two commissioners, Rev. Drs. T. S. Hofeditz and B. S. Schneck, who were instructed, in case the professor elect should decline the call, to make inquiry after a man qualified, by character and scholarship, to fill the professorship. The commissioners failing to secure the services of Dr. Krummacher, Dr. Philip Schaff,¹ lecturer in the university of Berlin, was elected unanimously, on the recommendation of Dr. Neander and Dr. Hengstenberg of Berlin, Dr. Tholuck and Dr. Julius Mueller of Halle, Dr. Krummacher of Elberfeld, and many other eminent professors and divines of Germany. Dr. Schaff accepted the call and was inaugurated in the city of Reading, Oct. 25, 1844.

We have grouped these historical facts together, because they are closely inwoven with the religious and theological development of the church during the last thirty years; and it is difficult, if not impossible, properly to appreciate the present status without some knowledge of the process which has determined it.

Dr. Rauch.

The views of Christianity prevailing in the German Reformed church are intimately connected with the philosophy taught in her institutions. Nor is the fact singular. The science of revealed truth can never be sundered from science

¹ From the Reformed Church of Switzerland, Canton of Grisons, educated in the Universities of Tübingen, Halle, and Berlin, and the author of works on the "Sin against the Holy Ghost" and "St. James." He has since written various works on Church History, on Germany, America, the Principle of Protestantism, Hymnology, etc. Vid. Appleton's New American Cyclopedia.

in general. A generic method of thought must underlie and determine the formal character of particular branches or departments of science. •

The labors of Dr. Mayer waked up the attention of the church to the necessity of a higher standard of intellectual and theological culture. But Dr. Rauch gave the first impulse to the prevailing system of thought. Possessing a mind of the finest mould, a graduate of the university of Marburg, a student of philosophy and theology in Giessen and Heidelberg, and subsequently professor of philosophy successively in these two celebrated universities, he came to this country a finished classical scholar, an erudite theologian, and a philosopher at once acute, profound, and Christian. Philosophy was his favorite sphere of study. "He was at home in the philosophy of Great Britain, as well as in that of Germany, and knew accurately the points of contact and divergency by which the relations of the two systems of thought to one another, generally considered, are characterized."¹ Becoming acquainted with American life and American modes of thought, he aimed, as president of the college, at the development of an Anglo-German philosophy,—not the simple transfer of German thoughts into the English language, but the living reproduction of the manifold truths of German systems in an English form, on the basis of a valid principle organically unfolded, and in the light of supernatural revelation.² To this end he devoted his untiring energies as a student, a teacher, and an author;

¹ Eulogy on Dr. Rauch by Dr. Nevin, *Mer. Rev.* Vol. XI. 1859, p. 459.

² His work on Psychology, published the summer before his death, was the beginning of what he had it in contemplation to attempt for the interests of literature in this way. This was to be followed by a work on Christian Ethics, and another on Aesthetics; all taken together were designed to form a complete whole. To his Christian Ethics he had given a great deal of time and study. "The plan of the work," he says, in a letter from Saratoga to Dr. Nevin, written several months before his death, "lies now before me, the whole with all its connections and parts clear and distinct, like a transparent crystal." For his views of the Person of Christ, and the doctrines of Christianity in general, see Rauch's *Inner Life of the Christian*, a memorial volume, consisting of seventeen discourses, selected from his manuscript sermons. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1856.

and succeeded in moulding the institution to a method of thinking, which, modified and perfected by his successors, it has retained to the present time, and developed in its legitimate bearings upon psychology, theology, and the entire circle of the sciences.

Anglo-German Philosophy.

In general, we may say that the philosophy taught in the institutions of the church is neither rationalism nor pantheism, neither sensationalism nor transcendentalism in any false sense, but really Christian. The spirit it instils into mind, and the character it gives to all metaphysical reflection, is subservient and favorable to orthodox scientific theology and true practical religion.

A full statement of the system we cannot, of course, attempt. We must content ourselves with a specification of its leading characteristics.

The method of thinking may be characterized, first and foremost, as *objective*. Mind and matter, in all their forms and relations, exist and continue to be, as to their constitution, in no relation of dependence upon human consciousness and human will, but in virtue of God, the Creator, who has not unfolded himself in the universe, but has spoken it into being by an act of his will informing the word of power, he continuing to be the absolute personality, after as before the creation. Law is not the conception of a uniform order of antecedence and consequence, not the formal utterance of authority, nor in any sense the result of a series of experiments, of comparison or intuitive knowledge; but it is the form of the divine will in a person or thing, determining its nature and various relations to be what they are, and receives different names according to the different classes of objects respectively which it informs. A principle is not invented nor originated by profound thinking, — not a true proposition, nor a notional idea. It is in a single object, or class, and may be discovered and predicated of it by thought. Relations are not made; they are not because affirmed, nor do they cease to be because denied; they are the necessities

according to which part demands and answers to part in the constitution of an object, or class, or division, or the universal whole of being. Scientific knowledge originates neither in thought, nor in objects as such, but is a totality—a resultant in which both thought and its objects are complementary factors. Determined, as to form, by the categories and laws of the reason active spontaneously, not by volition, inclination, or caprice; and, as to contents, not by *a priori* ideas, but by the in-being of the object; science, if valid and legitimate, is the pure reproduction, by thinking, and the ideal existence, of its object. Philosophy has its own laws and conditions, which determine its spirit and order, and may not be violated by the reason, which is but its organ.

The activity of a person or thing is normal when governed by its own law. The human will is free when determined by *its* law, which is not in itself only, but also in its proper object, which is God. God utters himself in his will. His will is the objective truth for the human will, and answers to it as light does to the eye, or as a pure atmosphere to the lungs. Moral action, like knowledge, has two elements, formal and material; the one is given by the human will; it may resolve for or against an object; the other, the substance or truth of a moral action, is given by the moral law. The internal union of both is human freedom. The human will is not free when the substance or contents of its action is given by any object other than God; for it then comes under the power of an object which is foreign to its inherent demands.

The opposite method is *subjective*. The essence of objects cannot be known: only its phenomena. On the assumption that the phenomena of an object differ from its intrinsic nature, the determinative force of that nature is not allowed a place in science. Science becomes a collection and classification of phenomena, the classification being an arrangement formed by thought and will. Experience and consciousness are the measure of entities, laws, relations, forces. The human will is determined by itself; not by the objective law of right. Freedom is choice. The form of freedom

is substituted for its substance, the controlling power of the objective truth being ignored.

The tendencies of the age are regarded as subjective. The general mind failing to distinguish clearly between being and the idea or conception of it, is predisposed to resolve things into notions. The English language no longer has a name for that which is not in any sense subjective; the proper one, *object*, being employed commonly as equivalent to *end*, *design*, or *purpose*, namely, a conception which the mind sets before itself and seeks to reach or actualize.

The method of thought may also be characterized as *organic*, its opposite as *mechanical*; as *concrete*, its opposite as *abstract*; and as *necessary* and *internal*, and its opposite as *arbitrary* and *external*.

For want of space, we must, contrary to our design, omit a further delineation of these general characteristics.

The Transition of Dr. Nevin.

Dr. Nevin was associated with Dr. Rauch at Mercersburg only for one year, the last year of his life. But this was sufficient to establish a bond of living fellowship between the first and second president of Marshall college, and perpetuate Anglo-German philosophy with undiminished power. A sense of dissatisfaction with Scotch philosophy and Calvinistic theology, as taught in the seminaries of the Presbyterian church, joined with great respect for the German mind, German science and literature, and the German character, predisposed Dr. Nevin to regard favorably, and sympathize cordially with, the theology of the Reformed church and the philosophy taught in Marshall college. His thorough scholarship, earnest character, and ability as a strong, comprehensive and profound thinker, soon won the confidence, regard, and affection of Dr. Rauch. In turn, Dr. Nevin found himself attracted to his colleague from the start; and further acquaintance only served to strengthen and confirm the first impression. In a short time he learned to regard him, to use his own words, as "one of the very first minds

in Germany.”¹ A close and intimate connection was at once formed, not only of friendship, but especially of thought and life. Prepared as Nevin already was for the change, this connection aided and facilitated a real, inward transition to the very bosom of the new element of theological thinking and moral sentiment in which he was now placed. And when he was chosen president, he became the successor not only in name, but in spirit also, to Dr. Rauch.

In his new sphere of labor, Dr. Nevin became a close student of the genius and history of the Heidelberg Catechism ; of the theology in general of the Reformation ; of German systems of philosophy ; and of modern German theology as related to the faith of the primitive church and to the status of American Protestantism, considered theoretically and practically. As a result of his studies and his own observation, he was convinced that the churches of the Reformation, transplanted to American soil, had, in great measure, given up their original faith, had come under the power of a spirit foreign to the Reformation symbols, and were really, unwelcome as was the charge, drifting on the broad current of rationalism. The German Reformed church, with others, influenced by the circumstances already described, had also, in a great degree, forsaken its own original denominational character, and subjected, in the absence of a counteracting force sufficiently strong, to the power of Puritan and Methodist modes of thought, was rapidly undergoing a transformation into the image of a foreign system. Regarding such a surrender as a great moral wrong and a spiritual loss, he felt constrained to speak and write freely on the general issue and various particular points of difference. The old life, theology, and doctrines of the Reformation period he reproduced, in bold contrast with the reigning unsacramental theology and subjective practical religion, condemning these in unsparing terms as contrary to the sacred scriptures and the faith of our fathers, as exhibited in all the Reformed confessions, and as prejudicial to the progress of the church and the spiritual interests of men.

¹ Nevin's Eulogy, *Mer. Rev.*, Vol. XI. p. 456.

The Theological Controversies.

As was to be expected, the utterance of such views excited opposition in and out of the church. It inaugurated a succession of controversies on new measures, the sacraments, — first, the Lord's Supper, then Baptism, — the person of Christ, the mystical union, modern Protestantism, the rule of faith, and liturgical worship. The question of Protestantism was discussed as underlying all the other issues, yet it came prominently into view at one time more than at another. With but short intermissions, these earnest controversies have agitated the church, and sometimes convulsed it, down to the present time. It was, and still is, not a conflict of single disconnected ideas, but a conflict of systems of thought and systems of faith; and involves the fundamental questions in metaphysics, and the entire range of Christian doctrine. The theology of the church incorporates its philosophy; and the philosophy depends upon its theology. The theology asserting itself and seeking to obtain a firm footing, is the application of an objective and organic mode of thinking to the facts of divine revelation; and the philosophy moulding the mind of the church is governed by, and dependent upon, the principle of faith, a principle which is both natural and revealed, a primary element of our being, and an obligation imposed by authority of Jesus Christ. The questions in controversy, accordingly, are not many, but one. They are bound together internally by the force of one central truth, and touch the general thinking of the age no less than particular doctrines.

These controversies have carried the mind of the church through a process of intense thought, the final result of which is the revival of the old theology in a new form; a process, however, that was not forced upon the church mechanically, or, as it were, by external pressure. No violence was done to the general mind. It was a life process, free and natural; excited indeed by external occasions, and conducted chiefly by a few individuals, but sustained and animated by the warm pulsations of the German Reformed heart.

A portion of the ministry had, all along, been deeply

imbued with the genuine spirit of the Heidelberg Catechism. Their theology was cast in its mould. They had been silently protesting against the unsacramental and unchurchly tendencies at work around them. Others, possessing less earnestness, nevertheless studied and taught the catechism. Though not animated consciously by its theological life, they were yet controlled more by it than by any other system. The seminary had been in operation for eighteen years, and the greater number of the younger portion of the ministry had gone forth from its halls. These had enjoyed educational advantages superior to those of many of the older ministry. The pupils of Dr. Mayer adhered to the customs of the church, and, as a body, faithfully defended her order and doctrines against opposing theories. The pupils of Dr. Rauch had received a thorough training in Anglo-German philosophy, which arrayed them in conflict with subjective and abstract views of Christianity. Though some of them were for a while borne along by the tide of religious enthusiasm, it was with deep inward dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, and painful apprehension of the consequences. The same thing is true of others who were betrayed into unchurchly measures. Those portions of the church which had quietly laid aside the Heidelberg Catechism and adopted another in its stead, had nevertheless maintained a firm opposition to the theory of a twofold decree, election and reprobation, and to Methodistic revival measures; and continued to hold elevated views of the spiritual value and necessity of the sacraments. Divergent tendencies indeed there were of a threatening character; and a great deal of lifeless formalism in some portions of the church, while the fires of fanaticism were burning in others; yet there was an undertone of thinking and feeling which was in full harmony with the genius of the catechism. Its vigorous spirit was alive in many hearts; in others, it slumbered; but it was nowhere utterly extinct.

Still the theology of the catechism had not asserted its peculiar character in opposition to the contrary tendencies of the age. The points of contact and divergence had not been

defined. Nor was the church, to any extent, properly conscious of the real issues. Conservative and radical elements were working confusedly. The destiny of the old faith and order was trembling in the balance. At this solemn juncture the controversies began; and the bold negations and affirmations concerning educational religion, the sacraments, and the mystical union, evoked at once a heartfelt response. Fears and hopes, doubt and confidence, hesitation from a sense of danger, and a ready yielding from anticipation of good, combined to agitate the general mind to its very depths, indicating a state of preparedness to consider, earnestly and intelligently, the vital questions at issue, and a readiness to adopt principles of faith and practice that were grounded in the Reformation period. The exponent and defender of the old theology and customs, Dr. Nevin became also, in a sense unknown to himself, the organ of a slumbering vitality which awoke at the sound of his deep-toned voice, and of latent possibilities which were developed into conscious faith and manly action. This state of the general mind of the church accounts for the freedom and facility with which the clergy and laity accepted and defended his theological views as their own.

The New Measure System.

Following the order of time, we will first consider the issue taken in the anxious-bench controversy, which opened in 1843; the anxious-bench being regarded as the representative and type of the American revival system.¹ This system has well-defined and distinctive views of conversion and personal piety. Personal religion is a certain spiritual frame of mind and state of heart. The understanding is enlightened by the Holy Ghost, the will is governed by the law of God, and the affections are fixed on Christ. The condition is true faith in the vicarious sacrifice of Christ for sin. With-

¹ Represented in Finney's *Lectures on Revivals*, Sprague on *Revivals*, Davis's *Plea for New Measures*, Denig's *Strictures*, and the *Lutheran Observer*, 1842, 1843, 1844, edited by Rev. Benjamin Kurtz, D. D. The entire system of New Measures is reviewed in a small work, entitled, *A Tract for the Times: The Anxious Bench*, by John W. Nevin, D. D. 2d ed.. Chambersburg, Pa. 1844.

out such a spiritual state of the person, Baptism is an empty rite and bestows no grace, and the Lord's Supper has no efficacy. Conversion is the change from the natural to the spiritual state. To bring it about, means are necessary to excite in the sinner a sense of guilt and danger, to beget a sincere purpose to forsake sin, to submit to Christ and follow him. These means are various : the word of God, the preaching of the gospel, a word fitly spoken, a startling event, an incident, death, etc., — but all are made effectual only by the Holy Ghost. A most important means is the anxious-bench, a front seat, in presence of the assembled congregation, where the awakened sinner is to sit to receive instruction, or kneel for prayer ; or some measure which is its equivalent. The sacrament of Baptism is no such means of grace. Practically all turns on a change of purpose, an act of will choosing the service of God, instead of sin and the world. The sinner can will to come or not to come to Christ. If he could not will thus, there would be no obligation to repent and believe. Ability is the measure of obligation : *non posse, non obligare*. Hence appliances are to be used to effect a right act of will. Faith is such an act of the will, surrendering to God, and reposing sincere trust in the atonement of Christ for salvation. There are special seasons when the Holy Ghost descends in great power, and many are made willing and converted. They come and pass away at irregular intervals, according to the good pleasure of God. They come also in answer to prayer, and would be much more frequent, if not continuous, if Christians were sufficiently prayerful. They are the hope of the church. The church is an assembly or society of converted persons ; and derives all its power for good from the spirituality, the devout and consistent lives of its members. Christ has established the church by revealing the principles on which such a spiritual society is to be organized and conducted ; and he perpetuates the society by the agency of his Spirit, who converts sinners that they may be qualified to become members.

Against this theory of practical religion, which we have

endeavored to state correctly, in as few words as possible, Dr. Nevin set his face. The theory is, at bottom, Pelagian. The fallen will has no power to determine itself against sin and for Christ. Religion does not consist in doing our duty with the help of the Holy Ghost. Nor is it a frame of mind, nor a state of the heart. Conversion is not, in one shape or another, the product of the sinner's own will. Personal religion is, strictly speaking, a new creation in Christ Jesus, — a new life, of which Christ is the principle and the sustaining power, lodged not in the will and affections, but in the core of his being, and manifesting itself in right views, purposes, feelings, and actions. This involves an inward vital union with Christ as real as the bond by which he is joined, in the first instance, to Adam. All turns on the action of Christ, by the Holy Ghost, in the church, by whom the sinner is thus apprehended and made a member of himself. Hence comes salvation. Salvation flows from Christ, who is the "true vine," into the members of his body, who are the branches. The subject of grace lives not, properly speaking, in the acts of his own will separately considered; but in the power of a vast generic life that lies wholly beyond his will, and manifests itself through him, as the law and type of his will itself, as well as of his whole being. "As born of the Spirit, in contradistinction from the flesh, he is himself spiritual, and capable of true righteousness. Thus his salvation begins, and thus it is carried forward, till it becomes complete in the resurrection of the great day. From first to last it is a power which he does not so much apprehend, as he is apprehended by it, and comprehended in it, and carried along with it, as something infinitely more deep and vast than himself."¹ Faith is the organ of the new creature, as the eye is of the body. As in the order of the first creation, the natural birth of the child into the world precedes the act of seeing and communing with the parent, so in the order of the second creation, the spiritual birth into the kingdom of heaven precedes the act of believing in Christ, and all conscious and voluntary communion with him.

¹ Nevin's *Anxious Bench*, p. 125.

Personal salvation begins in baptism, according to the ordinary method. Baptism is the act of Christ introducing the subject into the covenant of grace. Spiritual growth is maintained by parental instruction and prayer, by the spirit breathing in the daily life of a Christian family, by catechetical instruction, public worship, the preaching of the gospel, but mainly by the holy communion. In these means of grace the Holy Ghost abides (John xiv. 16). He does not abide and operate, savingly, in nature, in providence, in the pursuits of the world, and social life outside of the church. Being always present with equal power, the faithful use of the means of grace effects the conversion of the children of the covenant, and produces a regular, normal growth of all the Christian virtues. The true progress of the church is organic. It proceeds from and is supported by an internal principle, active according to the law of life in Christ Jesus. Want of faith in the ordinary means, calls for the use of extraordinary measures. These spring from Pelagian and unchurchly theology, and produce spasmodic excitements, which, by the law of reaction, must always be succeeded by seasons of listlessness and spiritual stupor, that will be baneful in the degree that the enthusiasm was intense and extended. The system of American revivals is hurtful in its influence upon personal piety and the interests of the church.

The unreserved utterance of such views fell upon the community like a flaming brand into a magazine. The excitement was intense and general, the larger portion of the church arising immediately to the decided support of them, whilst another portion as decidedly cast them out as evil. The most vehement and persevering opposition came from the part of the Lutheran church represented by the *Lutheran Observer*. Rev. Dr. Kurtz and Rev. Reuben Weiser¹ may be named as among the more prominent defenders of the new-measure system. In the course of a few years,

¹ Dr. Kurtz, as editor of the *Lutheran Observer*. Mr. Weiser is the author of a tract on the subject, entitled: "The Mourner's Bench, or an humble Attempt to vindicate New Measures."

however, it came to be generally seen and felt, in the German Reformed church, that the principle for which Dr. Nevin was contending, was the principle of the Heidelberg Catechism. He was the defender of the old faith and practice of the church.

We do not affirm that all the opinions which Dr. Nevin advanced during the controversy are held by a majority of ministers and laymen; but the central truth which he vindicated has become the principle of practice, with perhaps single exceptions, throughout the eastern synod of the German Reformed church; and, to a very great extent, also, in the western synod. The bench, inquiry meetings, protracted meetings, and periodical excitements,¹ are not in vogue. They are deprecated. A series of services is held, preparatory to the administration of the Lord's Supper, for several days. The principal festivals are generally observed,—Christmas, Good Friday, Easter, Ascension-day, and Whitsunday. Many churches hold daily services during passion-week. All the pastors gather the baptized youth of the church, and as many others as can be brought in, into the catechetical class,² which meets once or twice a week for three, four, or six months, and in

¹ "A firm faith in Christ, as the head and life of his church, renewing and sanctifying men by the Holy Ghost through the means of grace, begets satisfaction with the ordinary operations of the Spirit, that is, with his operation according to the established order of the Church. Our ministers labor in more cheerful obedience to the economy of the kingdom of Heaven. There are comparatively but few lamentations in the reports of the classes over the want of, what are called, unusual manifestations or extraordinary outpourings of the Holy Ghost. This ought to be regarded as an indication of real progress in vital godliness, and a source of great encouragement; for it is the common operation of the Holy Spirit which is deep, resistless, abiding, and productive of the most abundant spiritual harvest."—Report on the State of Religion, Synod of Ger. Ref. Ch. 1856.

² "We may sum up the reports of the classes as highly favorable under the following points. . . . A disposition to indoctrinate the membership in the great fundamental truths of the scriptures and of our catechism. It is felt that this is the only way to preserve them from the tide of lax opinion, infidelity, new theories, and isms disseminated by an unsanctified desire to bring down all subjects to the most superficial judgment. . . . There has been, consequently, a disposition to sanctify the intellect by proper religious instruction from the Word of God, as is made evident by the attention given to confirmation and the necessary previous catechetical instruction. Nor has this been done at the sacrifice of personal piety in the least, as it is felt that no experience can be solid which is not based upon truth, and that both head and heart must be

some cases for nine months in succession. The members of the class commit and recite the creed, the ten commandments, and the Lord's prayer, and as much of the catechism besides as is possible. The pastor expounds its truths, illustrates and enforces them upon the heart and conscience; the whole exercise being designed to promote repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ. In due time, as many as have sufficient knowledge of Christ, and give evidence of true faith in him, and of an earnest purpose to walk in newness of life, are, upon careful examination in presence of the elders, received into the full communion of the church by the rite of confirmation. This consists in the public *profession* of the Christian faith before the congregation, and in the solemn *introduction* of the catechumens into full membership of the church, on the ground

sanctified by a current of religious life which is deeper than either." — Rep. on State of Religion, Synod Ger. Ref. Ch. 1858.

"In proportion as the true nature of baptism is appreciated, will catechetical instruction be valued. All the classes testify that interest in this duty and privilege of the church is decidedly on the increase. Not only are pastors and parents awake to it, but there is on the part of the young a growing willingness and desire to accept its advantage; and the consequence is, that, in the language of one of the reports, 'The number of those who are received into the church by the solemn rite of confirmation is not only larger, but, what is better, they are being better fitted for church membership.' Another classis — and one most isolated in its geographical position from the traditional spirit and customs of the church, and most surrounded by the pressure of other views and feelings than those peculiar to our church — says: 'The catechization of the young, and their instruction in the truths of the catechism and the scriptures, have received a large share of the attention and constituted an important part of the work of the brethren during the past year; and it is an encouraging fact, that catechetical instruction is growing more and more with the membership, and especially with their children.' — Report, 1859.

"The spiritual training of the young, as also of the old, has apparently kept steady pace with the outward enlargement of the church. Many of the reports [of the classes] speak with great assurance of the good that has been accomplished in this way. If the statements there given are to be relied on, the brethren have learned the meaning and import of the great commission, as requiring them to go forth and make disciples of all nations, 'baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' and then completing this discipleship by teaching the baptized ones to observe all things whatsoever Christ has commanded them. These two things must always go together. Both word and sacrament are necessary to realize the idea of God's kingdom." — Report, 1861.

of their Christian profession and experience, by the *laying on of hands* and *prayer* of the minister.¹

The Rule of Faith.

The different questions at issue in these controversies sustain a logical relation to each other, and to the idea of the church, considered as the mystical body of Christ, who is the head. This idea is fundamental in its determinative influence, giving unity and specific character to the whole theological movement. But at present we are following the historical order as nearly as it is practicable, and therefore proceed to consider the rule of faith which was brought prominently into view by the discussion arising (1844) on the publication of the *Principle of Protestantism*,² by Dr. Schaff.

After showing the catholic union of the Reformation with the previous history of the church, he unfolds the positive principle of Protestantism as *material* and *formal*; the one being the *justification of the sinner before God, by the merit of Christ alone, through faith*, and the other, the *word of God*, as handed down to us in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, *the pure and proper source, as well as the only certain measure, of saving faith*.³ The formal principle bears a relation to *tradition* which is three-fold, *ritual, historical, and dogmatic*. As regards all these forms, protestantism affirms their *historical necessity*, while at the same time it places them neither *parallel* with the scriptures nor *over* them, but *under* them only, and measures their value by the extent of their agreement with this standard.⁴ *Ritual* tradition is equivalent to what Bellarmine styles ecclesiastical traditions. It obtains in the Romish church, and is unwarranted. *Historical* tradition, the testimonies of the Fathers to the genuineness and integrity of the sacred books, is of

¹ Schaff's Catechism for Schools and Families, p. 111.

² Originally his Inaugural Address, delivered in the German language, at Reading, October, 1844. Subsequently enlarged, and published in both languages. The English edition is a translation, with an Introduction of twenty-five pages, and a sermon on Catholic Unity appended; all by Dr. Nevin. Chambersburg, Pa.: Kieffer & Co. pp. 215.

³ Principle of Protestantism, pp. 54 and 70.

⁴ Ibid. p. 82.

great value, but not infallible nor binding. *Dogmatic tradition*¹ is two-fold. *material*, doctrines referred to Christ or his apostles, but not found in the scriptures, and *formal*, the contents of scripture itself as apprehended and settled by the church against heresies. The former must be rejected, while the latter is absolutely indispensable.²

Here Dr. J. F. Berg,³ and others, joined issue. The scriptures reveal truth immediately to the individual, who is the final judge; he is bound by the ecumenical creeds, and the confessions of the church, only in as far as they are supported by his private interpretation of the Bible. Put into the hands of any person who will study it prayerfully, the

¹ Principle of Protestantism, pp. 84 and 86.

² The offensive passage occurs in the following paragraph. We quote the whole, as it is a comprehensive statement, in a few words, of the author's opinion on the disputed point: "Quite different, however, in the second place, is the case of the *formal* dogmatic tradition. This is such as has not for its contents something different from what is contained in the Bible, but forms the channel by which these contents are conducted forward in history; the onward development thus of church doctrine and church life, as comprehended first dogmatically, in the so-called rules of faith, above all, in the Apostles' Creed, and then in the ecumenical creeds, that of Nice and the Athanasian; and, still further, as orally carried forward, apart from all written statement, through the entire course of church history, so that every one, before he wakes even to self-consciousness, is made involuntarily to feel its power. Tradition, in this sense, is absolutely indispensable. By its means we come first to the contents of the Bible; and from it these draw their life for us, perpetually fresh and new, in such way that Christ and his apostles are made present, and speak to us directly, in the spirit which breathes in the Bible, and flows through the church as her life's blood. *This tradition, therefore, is not a part of the divine word separately from that which is written, but the contents of scripture itself, as apprehended and settled by the church against heresies past and always new appearing; not an independent source of revelation, but the one fountain of the written word, only rolling itself forward in the stream of church consciousness.*"—Principle of Protestantism, p. 87. Exception was taken also to the whole tone and scope of the work by zealous representatives of modern Protestantism, on the score of its supposed Romanizing tendency, simply because the author spoke of some of the merits of Romanism and some of the demerits of Protestantism. Yet it is, in truth, a vigorous plea, and a triumphant vindication of the Reformation. Compare a review of it by Dr. Nevin, *Mer. Rev.* Vol. I. 1849, p. 83.

³ Then pastor of the German Reformed church, Race Street, Philadelphia, and editor, first of the "Protestant Banner," a weekly periodical, and afterwards of the "Protestant Quarterly"; at present Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Protestant Dutch church, New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Bible itself is sufficient to give him just views of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and lead him to the exercise of saving faith in Christ. The authority of the church is subordinate to private judgment.

Dr. Schaff, sustained by Dr. Nevin, held the reverse. The Christian church was established and organized before the books of the New Testament were written. These were addressed to the churches already existing, and not to the world. They were adapted to the instruction and consolation of believers, not of the unconverted and unbelieving. To the world they are adapted, relatively and indirectly. Those who receive the truth which she teaches, and submit, in baptism, by a true faith, to the authority of Christ, who is the head and life of the church, possess the word of God as a lamp to their feet and a light to their path; but not the world as such, in its state of unbelief and sin. The baptized child comes to an intelligent apprehension of Christ only by the teaching of parents, of the pastor, and other Christians. Before reflection and the exercise of judgment are possible, the substance of faith is already determined. The unconverted sinner is utterly disqualified, by his posture of unbelief, to understand or interpret the Bible; as much so as the man who would study differential calculus or Kepler's laws, and yet reject the idea of quantity and the axiomatic truths of mathematics. Real submission to Christ is the absolute condition of a true knowledge of him. Living faith and a true knowledge of him are the absolute condition of a safe and profitable reading of the Bible. While the exercise of private judgment by the Christian is both a privilege and a duty, yet as a historical fact, necessitated by a principle of sound theology, it is subordinate to the authoritative teachings of the Christian church. As for the unconverted sinner refusing to comply with the terms of the gospel, there is no room whatever to speak of any exercise of private judgment on matters of Christian revelation (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). The attempt involves presumption, delusion, and folly.

The principle announced in the *Principle of Protestantism*, and illustrated more fully, afterwards, in the progress of the

controversy, underlies the relation of the apostles' creed to the universal church and to the Heidelberg Catechism, and the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism as the confession of faith of the German Reformed church, to all her individual members. The acknowledgment of the catechism as an authoritative exponent of the scriptures, which every member is bound to receive in good faith, is incompatible with the contrary theory of private judgment. This was soon understood and felt. Dr. Schaff was sustained by the almost unanimous voice of the church; and there has been no division of sentiment since.¹

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

The theory of practical religion to which the anxious-bench system belongs, undervalues the sacraments as means of grace. The subjective state of the individual is the pivot on which acceptable worship and the favor of God turns. It gives efficiency to the observance of divine ordinances. The catechetical system, on the contrary, proceeds on a totally different theory. The sacraments are divinely-ordained means by which Christ imparts grace in a real way to those who observe them properly. Hence the progress of the controversy led, naturally, to a discussion of the Lord's Supper and Baptism; the Lord's Supper being the more prominent from the beginning, and Baptism at a somewhat later period.

The Reformed view of the Lord's Supper is immediately connected with the doctrine of the mystical union of the believer with Christ. They include each other. The Lord's Supper presupposes such a union, and is the chief means by which it is confirmed and invigorated. Yet it may be well to consider the topics in succession.

Dr. Nevin felt constrained to take ground against what he regarded as the prevailing rationalistic view of the eucharist, first in a number of papers published in 1845, in the *German Reformed Messenger*; the year following, in a work entitled "The Mystical Presence: a Vindication of the Reformed or

¹ See Minn. of Synod, 1845.

Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist;"¹ and afterwards in the numbers of the *Mercersburg Review*, first issued in 1849. In opposition to Dr. Hodge,² Dr. Berg, and Dr. Kurtz, who were the most prominent in the controversy, he denied that the eucharist was merely commemorative, representational or suggestive; that the presence of Christ was only spiritual or real spiritual; that the communion of the believer was only one of faith, thought, and feeling, or with the divine nature of Christ's person by the Holy Ghost; and that the sacrament derives any efficacy or power, as the principal means of grace, from the penitence and faith, the prayers and holy frame of mind of the worthy communicant. On the other hand he denied, with equal clearness and emphasis, the Romish figment of *transubstantiation*, and the Lutheran hypothesis of the sacrament, technically distinguished by the title *consubstantiation*. The sacrament is indeed an affecting commemoration of the bitter passion and death of Christ; but it is also a real communion of the believer with the whole person of Christ, who is truly present by the Holy Ghost. The sacrament communicates grace; and the invisible grace communicated is the substantial life of the Saviour himself, particularly in his human nature.³

The primary design of Dr. Nevin was to exhibit the Reformed doctrine (which we have given in the first part of this monograph) as taught by Calvin, by all the Reformed reformers in France, Germany, England, and Scotland, and by all the confessions of the different branches of the Reformed church, in its distinction from the Romish, the Lutheran, and the modern Puritan theory of the Lord's Supper; and arrest earnest attention to the fact that the American church, particularly the Presbyterian, Congregational, Low church Episcopalian, Lutheran, and Reformed churches, have fallen away

¹ Compare Mer. Rev. Vol. II. 1850, p. 421, A historical reply to Dr Hodge, designed to answer the question: What is the faith of the Reformed church, as distinguished from Romanism and Lutheranism on the one side, and Rationalism and false Spiritualism on the other?

² Vide a review of Dr. Nevin's "Mystical Presence" in the Biblical Repertory for April, 1848, attributed to Dr. Hodge.

³ Mystical Presence, p. 62. Comp. pp. 178-185.

from the faith of the Reformation concerning the sacraments, the person of Christ, the vital relation of Christ to his people, the idea of the church, and in truth the nature of Christianity itself. His own mind repudiated the modern theory as in principle rationalistic, and embraced the old Reformed doctrine for substance as the truth, because supported by the faith of the primitive church and a legitimate interpretation of the scriptures. Calvin, however, fails to distinguish between the idea of the *organic law* which constitutes the proper identity of a human body, and the material volume it embraces as exhibited to the senses; he does not insist, with proper freedom and emphasis, on the absolute *unity* of what we denominate *person*, both in the case of Christ and in the case of his people; and he makes no clear distinction between the individual, personal life of Christ, and the same life in a *generic* view.¹ Hence while Calvin emphasizes the *absence* of the humanity of Christ from the earth, the *elevation* of the soul to him by the power of the Holy Ghost, and a real participation of his *flesh*, by which the believer is mysteriously nourished to eternal life, Dr. Nevin emphasizes the *presence*² of the humanity of Christ in his church on earth, — that is, of the vivific virtue of the human, hypothetically one with the divine nature — the *self-communication*

¹ Mystical Presence, pp. 156 – 163.

² “The word *real*, however, was understood ordinarily to denote a local, corporal presence, and on this account was not approved [by the Reformers]. To guard against this it may be qualified by the word *spiritual*, and the expression will then be quite suitable to the nature of the doctrine, as it has been now explained. A *real* presence, in opposition to the notion that Christ’s flesh and blood are not made present to the communicant in *any* way. A *spiritual* real presence, in opposition to the idea that Christ’s body is in the elements in a local or corporal manner. Not real simply, and not spiritual simply; but real, and yet spiritual at the same time. The body of Christ is in heaven, the believer on earth; but by the power of the Holy Ghost, nevertheless, the obstacle of such vast local distance is fully overcome, so that in the sacramental act, while the outward symbols are received in an outward way, the very body and blood of Christ are at the same time inwardly and supernaturally communicated to the worthy receiver, for the real nourishment of his new life. Not that the material particles of Christ’s body are supposed to be carried over by this supernatural process into the believers person. The communion is spiritual, not material. It is a participation of the Saviour’s life; of his life, however, as human, sub-

of his life in the sacramental transaction, and the participation of the believer in the *entire humanity* of Christ, the soul no less than the flesh and blood; the truth held in common being, first, a *real* communion with the person of Christ, by the Holy Ghost—that is, a communion with the humanity of Christ, the proper spiritual food of man, not with the divine only, but with the divine and the human, and with the divine by the human; and secondly, the *objective* grace of the sacrament, a power not derived from, nor dependent upon, the moral and spiritual character of the communicant, but present in the ordinance itself, to nourish the believing communicant spiritually, just as the nutritive element is present in bread to nourish a man naturally.

The vindication of these truths, so clearly taught in the Heidelberg Catechism, and latent in the mind of the German Reformed church, though not living in its general consciousness, touched a deep responsive chord. The old Reformed doctrine was in a great measure restored; and is now, perhaps in a modified form, the prevailing view throughout the church. No stress is laid on the *limitation* of the humanity of Christ to the right hand of God, nor on the *elevation* of the soul, by faith, to Christ, in order to hold communion with him, nor on communion with the *humanity* of Christ in the sacramental transaction; although these views live in the actual faith of the church. Stress is laid rather, generally, on the *presence* of the person of Christ by the Holy Ghost, and on communion, by faith, with the *divine-human* Saviour as the proper food of the soul, leaving the manner of communion indefinite. Yet, on the one hand, some ministers go further, and affirm, unequivocally, a participation in the humanity of Christ as the condition and medium of communion with his divine nature; and others, on the contrary, affirm only the fact of real communion with Christ, and hold

sisting in a true bodily form. The living energy, the vivific virtue, as Calvin styles it, of Christ's flesh is made to flow over into the communicant, making him more and more one with Christ himself, and thus more and more an heir of the same immortality that is brought to light in his person."—Mystical Presence, p. 60.

the humanity in abeyance. There are no tendencies towards either the Romish or Lutheran theory of the sacrament, nor have there been at any time in the progress of the controversy. Dr. Schaff has taken no prominent part in the sacramental controversy, but is known to be of one mind on this subject with Dr. Nevin, believing neither more nor less.

The Mystical Union.

As real communion with Christ in the eucharist supposes a vital union of the believer with him, the question of the mystical union possesses central significance. A large part of the *mystical presence*¹ is, accordingly, devoted to the discussion of the subject. According to Dr. Nevin, who reproduces the doctrine of Calvin, the union of believers with Christ, is not simply that of a common humanity, as derived from Adam. The union is not simply *moral*, or *legal*, but *vital*. By the incarnation, our fallen humanity is exalted again to a new and imperishable divine life. The Christian salvation, as comprehended in Christ, is a *new life*, in the deepest sense of the word. The new life, of which Christ is the source and principle, is in all respects a true human life. The life of Christ passes over to his people, thus constituting the church. Joined to Christ, we are *one* with him in his *life*, including necessarily a participation in the entire *humanity* of Christ. The life of Christ in us, extends to the totality of our nature, to the body no less than the soul, which in their ground are but one, and governed by the self-same organic law. But there is no material, actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people. Nor does the mystical union involve the ubiquity or idealistic dissipation of his body; and it requires no *fusion* of his personality with the persons of his people. This life-union is more intimate and real than any union known in the world besides. It is wrought by the

¹ Chap. I. Sect. 1; Chap. III. Sect. 2; and Chap. IV. Comp. also the Sermon on Catholic Unity, appended to the "Principle of Protestantism"; Art. on Incarnation, Mer. Rev., Vol. II. 1850, p. 164; and Art. on New Creation, Mer. Rev., Vol. II. p. 1, et al. Also an Article by Dr. Schaff, Bib. Sacra for August, 1848.

power of the Holy Ghost. The life of Christ is apprehended, on the part of his people, only by faith. The new life of the believer includes degrees, and will become complete only in the resurrection.¹ The symbols of it are the human body, the vine and its branches, and marriage. The generic life of the body pervades the arm. Differing in form and function, they are yet one. The life-principle in the vine supports the branch. Without an internal organic oneness, light, air, heat, and other influences would destroy the branch, instead of promoting its growth. A force deeper than will, understanding, or feeling, unites husband and wife — a mystic life-bond. Mystic, because deeper and stronger than the understanding can fathom or calculate. Such is the union of the believer, by the Holy Ghost, with the divine-human Saviour. Internal, most intimate, without which no knowledge, purpose, or sensibility can promote salvation, its nature, mode of action, and relations are mysterious; not accessible to the logical understanding, but a matter of supernatural revelation, and therefore an object of faith. Hence the use of the term *mystical*.

The Incarnation.

The mystical union implies the old doctrine of the incarnation, as being the *principle* of Christianity. The Son of God did not assume human nature in appearance merely, nor as an expedient to teach and make an offering for sin, nor for a time only. As by the fall the virus of sin was in the nature of mankind, salvation involved the necessity of a new creation of that nature;² for the regeneration of the individual is impossible unless the generic whole, or human life as such, in which the individual inheres, is first created anew; just as the natural birth of the first child was possible only after the existence of Adam and Eve. The general always goes before the particular as its ground. Without the general, the particular is not, and cannot be. The creation of human nature in Adam is the condition of the natural

¹ *Mystical Presence*, pp. 164–177.

² *Vid.* *Cur Deus Homo?* by Dr. Nevin, *Mer. Rev.*, Vol. III. 1851, p. 220.

birth of the individual, according to the law of natural generation ; and the new creation of human nature in the person of Christ, the second Adam, by the miraculous power of the Holy Ghost, is the condition of the new or spiritual birth of the individual according to the law of the Spirit. Being a new creation, the humanity of Christ is a necessary, organic, and eternal constituent of his personality — the condition of the church, of individual salvation, and of all real communion of man with God.

The Nature of Christianity.

It follows that Christianity is not a system of *doctrine*, nor an *example*, nor a *rule* of moral conduct ; but it is a new life in Christ, and in his mystical body, the church.¹ He meets and overcomes sin, suffers under it, bears the curse of the law, and removes it by his death on the cross ; is carried, by the law of sin, into the grave and into hades, and prevails against its gates in his triumphant resurrection from the dead ; and then ascends, in the new-created, perfected, glorified humanity, as head over all things unto the church, to the right hand of God (John i. 18 ; v. 21, 26 ; xiv. 6, 9 ; xi. 25, 26 ; 1 John i. 1, 2 ; v. 11, 12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 23 ; Eph. i. 22). Sharing his life by a new birth of the Holy Spirit, his people are members of his family ; the partakers of his nature (2 Pet. i. 4), as children are of the nature of their parents ; and follow him, not only in thought or feeling, nor by the formation and execution of holy purposes, but also in a real way, meeting and overcoming sin in his strength by faith (1 John v. 4), partaking of his sufferings (2 Cor. i. 7 ; Col. ii. 24), bearing the curse of the law in death and burial (2 Cor. iv. 10), triumphing over sin and death in the resurrection, and ascending up far above all heavens to possess the glory which the Son had with the Father before the world was ; all done in virtue of the new life, which is nourished by the means of grace, and hid with Christ in God, according to the working of the mighty power of God, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.

¹ Compare two Articles on Early Christianity, by Dr. Nevin, Mer. Rev. Vol. III. 1851, pp. 461 and 513, and a third Article Vol. IV. p. 1.

Such views of the mystical union, the person of Christ, and Christianity, expressed with great force, were seen to be in broad conflict with the theological and religious opinions common in America. Dr. Hodge charged on Dr. Nevin a resuscitation of the old exploded Eutychian heresy, and the introduction of the pantheistic philosophy of Germany; Dr. Berg reiterated the same charges, and raised a warning voice against unmistakable evidences of Romanizing tendencies, while a score of editors saw a brood of abominable errors overrunning the blooming fields of Christ's kingdom. Dr. Nevin replied, charging on the puritan Calvinism of the American churches a dualistic philosophy, gnostic theology, and a subjective, divisive, self-destructive Protestantism, that must run out into bald rationalism and infidelity. The storm was heavy and loud; the little ship was tossed upon the rolling waves, and in seeming danger of being wrecked on the rocks.

A controversy so exciting and earnest, mixed with no little misapprehension, misconstruction, and acrimony, served to intensify the interest of the German Reformed church in the momentous questions. The mental agitation was deeper, the attention given to the study of theology more absorbing, and the development of Christological ideas more rapid among ministers and people, than would have been caused by direct theological teaching, without the stimulus of polemical friction. In these circumstances, — considering the animus of the Heidelberg Catechism, the moulding influence of Rauch's philosophy, the ability with which Nevin and Schaff conducted the discussion theologically and historically, and the previous history of the church, — it should surprise no one to be informed that, among the more thoughtful, the reaction from subjective to objective, from abstract to concrete, from mechanical to organic views of Christianity and the church, was decided and deep, intelligent and general.

The Church.

In all these discussions, the church question was central. What is the church? What is its relation to Jesus Christ?

to the Holy Ghost? to the Bible? to the individual Christian? to the world? What is the relation of the Protestant to the primitive and Roman Catholic church? These points were involved in the entire series of controversies; Dr. Nevin discussing rather the theological, and Dr. Schaff the historical, side of the general issue.

The church of Christ is not merely an association of professing Christians, nor the invisible communion of the faithful, nor an external organization. A number of unbaptized persons accidentally cast upon an island, who are awakened and become penitent and believing by reading the scriptures, do not make a church by the forming of a religious society. Our Lord Jesus Christ has not simply made an atonement for sin, and taught the general principles by which the organization and management of the church is to be regulated. The Holy Ghost does not operate efficaciously on the hearts of men, and establish real and full communion with Christ, outside of the church. The Bible is not the principle nor life of the church. The individual Christian is not such by a subjective act of faith in a conception of redemption by Jesus Christ, without the intervention of divinely instituted sacraments and ordinances as the medium of real fellowship with our Lord. A man of the world is not converted and saved merely by reading the Bible, refusing at the same time to submit to the head of the church in holy baptism. *Extra ecclesiam, nulla salus.* The Protestant church is not based *immediately* upon Christ and his apostles; nor is Protestant theology drawn *immediately* from the holy scriptures. Protestantism is not a transfer, by means of thought and reflection, of primitive or early Christianity. It does not begin, nor revive absolutely, a valid ordination and a valid administration of the sacraments *de novo*. While we may distinguish between the visible and the invisible church, yet the invisible cannot be where the visible is not.

On the contrary, the Christian church is a divine-human constitution in time and space, — divine as to its ultimate ground and interior life, and human as to its form, — brought into existence by the miraculous working of the Holy Ghost on the

day of Pentecost, who is sent by Christ as the bearer of his incarnate life and salvation, in order to continue and develop this life and salvation, according to the law of the Spirit, in its membership down to the end of time uninterruptedly. As such, it is not a collection of units, but an objective organism that has a principle, a unity, a law, organs, and resources of power and grace which are in it and its own absolutely.¹ Supernatural, because its origin, being, order, and end are above the resources of the first creation; spiritual, because organized, animated, and perfected by the agency of the Holy Ghost; and divine, because not of man, but of God in Christ. The idea of the church embraces, first of all, our Lord Jesus Christ himself, who is its head and all-pervading life, the apostles and evangelists, the confessors, martyrs, and saints of every age, all united by the Holy Ghost into one living, spiritual body (Rom. xii. 4–8). A conception excluding Christ and his apostles, is radically false (Eph. ii. 18–22; iii. 4–6). Thus viewed, the church has produced the Bible, and is its pillar and ground (1 Tim. iii. 15). The Bible is a book, infallible indeed, because plenarily inspired, yet only

¹ “The church is really and truly a constituent part of Christianity, the necessary form of its existence or being in the world.”—Nevin’s *Thoughts on the Church*, Mer. Rev., Vol. X. 1858, p. 189. “The church is of the essence of Christianity, the necessary form of its presence, the only medium of its grace, the true organ of its power, in the world.”—*Ibid.* p. 191. The creed makes the church “to be a mystery, the presence of a supernatural fact in the world, which men are required to acknowledge as a *necessary part of the Christian faith*. It is made to be this, moreover, in such a way as to carry along with it, in its own place, the full power of the Christian salvation.”—*Ibid.* p. 193.

The church “is an institution established by God through Christ, for the glory of his own name and the salvation of men. It is the bearer of all God’s revelations, the channel of Christianity, the depository of all the life-powers of the Redeemer, the habitation of the Holy Ghost. The apostle styles it in several places, the body of Jesus Christ, and calls believers the members of this body. His meaning in this is, that Christ dwells in the church as an organic unity of different personalities and powers, as the soul in the body; and that he acts through it as his organ, just as our soul by means of the body shows itself active, and exerts an influence on the world.”—*What is Church History?* by Dr. Schaff, p. 31. 1846. Compare Schaff’s *Catechism*, p. 99. 1862.

“The church, like Christianity itself, of which it is the vehicle, is a supernatural principle, a new creation of God through Christ, far transcending all that human intelligence and will can produce.”—Schaff’s *History of the Apostolic Church*, p. 13. 1853.

an authoritative record of the truth in human language, and not the being of the truth itself. As the *body* of Christ, a real supernatural constitution in the world, the church is, not a thought or an arrangement, but divine-human *being*; of which, not language, but only a person, Jesus Christ, can be the principle. A person becomes a Christian by union to the church, effected objectively by the Holy Ghost working in the means of grace, and subjectively by repentance and faith; not a union in form only, but in form and spirit. As a person comes into natural being by becoming, in the act of birth, a member of the human race, so does he come into the sphere of the new creation in the act of being born of water and the Spirit; thus becoming a member of the body of Christ. The Protestant church is connected, by inward, historical process, with the apostolic period. It is based, indeed, on Christ, but *mediately*, all the successive stages in the history of the catholic church necessarily intervening; just as the present generation of men come from Adam, through all the intermediate generations, in lineal succession. Protestant theology presupposes all the theological conflicts and attainments of the church, in her past history, as its basis; and must be regarded as an actual advance of the religious life and consciousness of the church, by means of a deeper apprehension of God's word.¹ The Reformation was not a revolutionary separation from the Catholic church. It is rather the greatest act of the catholic church itself, — the full, ripe fruit of all its better tendencies.² Protestant ordination and Protestant sacraments are valid because received from the church immediately preceding. The invisible and the visible church are one, two aspects of the one body of Christ, the invisible being the internal life, and the visible the external form pervaded by that life. A member of the one is a member of the other. A branch may be externally connected with the vine, yet be dead. But a branch, unless both internally and externally united to the vine, cannot live and bear fruit.

¹ Schaff's Theses. Principle of Protestantism, p. 181; 30.

² Ibid. p. 181; 31, 33.

We have endeavored to set forth the gist of the controversy, in its negative and positive aspects. The statement gives the general position of Drs. Nevin and Schaff,¹ and a large portion of the church. Another portion, both in the eastern and western synod, would modify some of the negative as well as positive forms of expression. Yet we believe the general tendency to be towards an adoption, in the main, of these views of the church.

The Sacrament of Baptism.

The sacrament of Baptism has been a less prominent theme of discussion than the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; and on the whole there may be less maturity of thought and belief in regard to it. We all agree in saying that it is not merely a form or sign of grace, but really confers grace, whether the subject be an infant or an adult; though we do not concur in defining the grace conferred. Those who, as we think, develop the Christological principle logically, hold baptism to be, not regeneration, but the sacrament of regeneration,—the means by which the subject passes from the state of nature into the covenant of grace; the covenant being, not an agreement existing in the mind of God and the mind of man, but a spiritual institution, in which God remits sin and bestows salvation on those who comply with its conditions. There are others, represented by Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., of Philadelphia,² who teach that the child of believing parents is somehow interested in the atonement of Christ, and assured of salvation from the curse of sin

¹ A Catechism for Sunday Schools and Families, in Fifty-two Lessons, with Proof Texts and Notes, by Philip Schaff, D.D., lately published, contains an outline of popular theology. The work combines the advantages of a historical with those of a merely doctrinal character, and clearness and simplicity of style with fulness of matter. We refer the reader to it for the author's theological views.

² See an Article on the Old Doctrine of Christian Baptism, by Dr. Nevin, *Mer. Rev.*, Vol. XII. 1860, p. 190; an Article on the Efficacy of Baptism, *Ibid.* Vol. X. 1858, p. 1; and an Article on the Doctrine of Christian Baptism, by Dr. H. Martensen, translated by Dr. Harbaugh, *Ibid.* Vol. IV. 1852, p. 305.

³ Editor of a condensed translation of Herzog's Encyclopedia. See his work on Infant Salvation and Baptism. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

without baptism ; that baptism is nevertheless necessary as signifying and sealing the salvation of Christ, and confers a spiritual blessing, but this spiritual blessing is not defined.

Throughout the church, great stress is laid on the importance of observing the ordinance. Baptized infants are members of the church. As such, they are taught and trained in the nurture of the Lord, with more or less fidelity and success, according to the character of the parents and the zeal and ability of the pastor. Many of our charges being still composed of three, four, and even six congregations, the instruction of children must be entrusted chiefly to parents and the Sunday school. But so soon as they arrive at the age of sixteen, or fourteen, or even twelve, they are assembled in catechetical classes to receive regular systematic instruction in the great truths of Christianity ; the grace of baptism being regarded as the basis of Christian nurture, and the warrant of God for the belief that faithful tuition will result in a surrender, from the heart, to Christ, in confirmation. As expressive of the general sentiment of the church, we quote a passage from the report on the state of religion, adopted by synod in 1859 : “ The growing estimation of covenant relations, and the love of holy baptism and catechetical instruction as necessary results, work favorably upon the family. Parents see how the church includes the family, as well as themselves, in its warm bosom ; they feel a support beneath and around them stronger than their own individual faith and exertions ; they are led to regard their baptized children as young Christians, already admitted into the Christian church, and distinguished from the children of infidels and unbelievers ;¹ they see their work to be to train them up in the Lord, as well as into the Lord ; in grace, as well as into it ; they see that it is their privilege and comfort to assure their covenanted children that the covenant is the sure basis of their hopes, and feel free to encourage them to accept fully what is already theirs by the covenant of a faithful God, and to assure them that they have the surest and best warrant, as children, for claiming all the promises

¹ Heidelberg Catechism, Q. 74.

and all the grace which they need in order to grow up to the stature of Christians. They can teach them, what it is their joy and comfort to learn, that, from their washing in baptism may and does begin the renewing of the Holy Ghost,¹ and that it is only by wickedly despising and wilfully wandering from this grace that they finally perish.”²

If the phrase *baptismal regeneration* is ever used, it does not mean that baptism, regarded simply as an external transaction, is regeneration; but that, regarding its interior substance, it is the means of regeneration by the appointment of God. Such a power is never predicated of the external act of washing with water in the name of the Trinity. The *opus operatum* theory, taught by the Roman Catholic church, is entirely discarded. Regeneration is wrought by the Holy Ghost only; but in the sacrament of baptism the internal grace and the external sign, the Holy Ghost and the element of water, are indissolubly conjoined. Otherwise the ordinance would not be a sacrament; for this consists in the *union* of the invisible to the visible, of the supernatural to the natural. It is the Holy Ghost, then, who, in the outward transaction, begets the subject of baptism anew in the life of Christ.

¹ Tit. iii. 5.

² “In relation to the sacraments there is remarkable unanimity of sentiment, resulting, no doubt, from the system of the catechism being better understood and appreciated by ministers and people generally. Baptism is the act of Christ, by which he, through his ministers, introduces the unconscious and sinful infant into the eternal covenant of grace. He does not only signify that his death is a full atonement for sin, but also assures us by this outward and solemn transaction, which is the form under which he confirms this promise by an oath, that it is as certainly washed by the blood and spirit of Christ from all the pollution of the soul as it is washed externally with water. (Heid. Cat. Q. 69.) Thus transferred from a state of nature into a state of covenant grace, a child is the proper subject of Christian nurture. The tender plant set in the garden of the Lord possesses the warrant of God, that, nourished by the rich soil in which it stands, and trained diligently and in faith, it shall grow up into the light and beauty of the Sun of Righteousness.” — Report on State of Religion, Synod of Ger. Ref. Ch. 1856.

“We must also notice the encouraging fact, that during the past year, the number of the churches members has been greatly increased. Some eight or nine thousand souls have been added to the infant membership of the church by baptism — receiving thus the sign and seal of the covenant of grace and the pledge of an immortal life.” — Ibid. 1861.

The term "regeneration," however, is not used in the sense of *conversion*. The two are widely different. Conversion is the voluntary act of the soul consciously embracing Christ in faith; while *re-generation* is a second creation, wrought by Almighty God. As an infant is passive in the act of natural birth, so is a person passive in the act of spiritual birth. In conversion a man is necessarily active. Any one who fails to make this distinction, will misapprehend the idea intended to be conveyed by calling baptism the sacrament of regeneration.

Modern Protestantism.

The controversies concerning so many fundamental truths of Christianity, involved, from the start, a severe criticism and exposure of the present posture of modern Protestantism. In a series of papers on pseudo-Protestantism, published in the *German Reformed Messenger*, 1847, in a small work entitled *Antichrist*,² and in various articles of the *Mercersburg Review*,² Dr. Nevin charged a serious defection from the confessional standards of the Reformation. Dr. Schaff did the same thing, but from a different point of view, in his *Principle of Protestantism*, and in another work on *Historical Development*.³ Their opponents, going on the presumption that the admitted change is legitimate progress instead of a defection, charged on Nevin, Schaff, and the German Reformed church, a renunciation of Protestantism and a return to Rome. The real issue raised was rarely met; the point, on the one side, being *original* Protestantism, and on the other *modern* Protestantism; the one condemning as false what was contradictory to the Protestantism of the sixteenth century, and the other condemning what was contradictory to the Protestantism of the present day. In these circum-

¹ See two Articles on the Sect System, Vol. I. 1849, pp. 482 and 521. Article on Anti-Creed Heresy, Vol. IV. 1852, p. 606.

² *Antichrist, or the Spirit of Sect and Schism.* By John W. Nevin, D.D., President of Marshall College. New York: John S. Taylor. pp. 89.

³ *What is Church History? A Vindication of the Idea of Historical Development.* By Philip Schaff. Translated from the German. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1846. pp. 128.

stances, there was abundant room for misapprehension and misconstruction. Great injustice was done to the church and its representatives. The lapse of more than a decade of years has demonstrated that, while the church is receding from prevailing theories on fundamental points of theology, she is returning, not mechanically but freely, to a clearer and fuller apprehension of the confessional standards of the Reformation, and is firm in her adherence to the great principle of Protestantism, both as to matter,—the doctrine of justification by faith in the person of Christ,—and as to form, the normal authority of the scriptures; opposing, with equal decision and perseverance, the rationalistic and Romanizing tendencies of the age.

Schaff's *Principle of Protestantism* is a masterly vindication of the great *truth* developed by the Reformers; and the tract on *Historical Development* is an equally forcible justification of the *re-formation* of the church catholic, on historical grounds. After exhibiting and setting aside the orthodox and rationalistic historiographies,—the one embracing the historical method of Roman Catholicism and of the older Protestant orthodoxy, the other the pietistic method and the proper rationalistic method of history,—he unfolds the modern historiography, or the view of organic development, the principle of which is stated satisfactorily in a few words: "Christianity, in itself and objectively considered, is complete in Christ, in whom dwells the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; as also in his word, which is exhibited in the holy scriptures of the New Testament, in a pure, original, perfect, and absolutely normative form, for all times. Subjective Christianity, on the contrary, or the life of the God-man in his church, is a process, a development, which begins small and grows always larger, till it comes, at last, to full manhood in Christ; that is, till the believing human world may have appropriated to itself, both outwardly and inwardly, the entire fulness of objective Christianity, or the life of Christ."¹

On this principle it is not necessary to despise one age in

¹ *Historical Development*, p. 81.

order to exalt another, or to anathematize one tendency of thought in order to honor its opposite; but justice is done to all ages of the church as being alike possessors of the life of Christ, and to all tendencies and systems as being important factors in the subjective process by which humanity is transformed into the image of our Lord; while the great rupture of the sixteenth century, accompanied as it was with many irregularities, can be successfully vindicated against the aspersions of the hierarchical system of Rome, as good, necessary, and legitimate; and modern Protestantism may be criticised and condemned for its theoretic and practical subjectivism, yet revered as the true bearer of the Holy Ghost, for its deep practical earnestness, and its zeal for personal piety.

Liturgical Worship.

The German Reformed church is liturgical. Zuingli, Calvin, Bucer, and even John Knox, as well as Cranmer, Latimer, and Ridley, were all in favor of a settled order of worship. Liturgies have always been in use in Switzerland, France, the Palatinate, and indeed in all parts of Germany. They were in use also in Scotland, for at least a century after the Reformation. To this day the Protestant churches of Germany make use of prescribed forms in every service, in connection with more or less extemporaneous prayer.¹

The liturgies contain offices for the regular service of the Lord's day, for the administration of the sacraments, for confirmation, and the ordination of deacons, elders, and ministers, for the solemnization of marriage, burial of the dead, etc.; and embody the creed, the Lord's Prayer, confession and absolution, the "Gloria in excelsis," "Te deum," the litany, and responses; though no one book unites all these elements. They vary very much, and are excellent in many respects, yet none can be said to be equal in depth, fervor, and power to the Heidelberg Catechism.

The number and variety of Reformed liturgies has pro-

¹ See a complete history of the new liturgy of the German Reformed church, by Dr. Schaff, *Mer. Rev.* Vol. X. 1858, p. 199.

duced some confusion in America. The missionary fathers of the last century brought with them the liturgies of those sections of Germany, Switzerland, or Holland from which they emigrated. These continued in general use, in our German congregations, until 1840; and in some of them they hold their place to the present day. As our congregations introduced the English language, the free-prayer system became common, partly for want of an English liturgy adapted to our wants, and partly on account of the anti-liturgical spirit prevailing in the surrounding English churches. It became the custom to extemporize not only the regular service of the Lord's day, but also the offices for the holy communion, baptism, the ordination of elders and deacons, marriage, and the burial of the dead. But there existed a very general dissatisfaction with this state of things; and a loud call for a liturgy came from every part of the church. As early as 1820, synod appointed a committee to revise the church *Agenda*, with a view to publication in the English and German languages; yet, though the subject was under discussion from year to year, nothing tangible was accomplished until 1840, when the liturgy prepared by Rev. Dr. Mayer was adopted. For various reasons this book never took root. The revival of Christological theology during the ensuing decade of years, intensified the general feeling of want. There was a demand for a liturgy answerable, in tone and spirit to the Christological, churchly, and sacramental ideas which had been revived in the church. In answer to this demand, a committee was appointed in 1849, which was modified at subsequent meetings of synod.¹ Specific instructions² were given in 1852; in accordance with which

¹ "The committee on the liturgy, as it finally stood, since October, 1855, and is alone responsible for the work as actually prepared and published, consisted of ten ministers and four elders, namely: Philip Schaff, John W. Nevin, B. C. Wolff, J. H. A. Bomberger, Henry Harbaugh, Elias Heiner, Daniel Zacharias, Thomas C. Porter, E. V. Gerhart, Samuel R. Fisher, and elders William Heyser, John Rodenmayer, George Schaefer, and George C. Welker."—Schaff's Article on New Liturgy.

² We quote several of these instructions: 1. "The liturgical worship of the primitive church, as far as it can be ascertained from the holy scriptures, the

the New liturgy was prepared, and reported in 1857. The report was adopted and the book was submitted to the churches for *trial*. Every congregation was left to settle the question for itself, how far it would accept the new book, or whether it would accept and use it at all. Synod sanctioned it merely as a *provisional* liturgy; and has, up to this time, neither adopted nor rejected it.

The new liturgy at once excited opposition. A controversy began which has been going on, with more or less earnestness for five years, though in the spirit of Christian charity and forbearance. Dr. Bomberger, the principal representative of the opposition, does not object to prescribed forms of public worship, particularly not to offices for Baptism, the Lord's Supper, confirmation, etc.; he has even very warmly defended liturgies,¹ against the usual objections preferred by the Presbyterian and Congregational churches; and in 1849 was the chairman of a committee which presented to synod a report² vindicating liturgical forms of church worship, and recommending immediate measures to be taken to prepare such forms as would be generally acceptable. On this point we are not divided. But he and others resist the adoption of the New liturgy mainly on account of its *responsive* services, which, it is alleged, involve a departure from the customs of our fathers, and would radically change the established mode of worship. Here the controversy hinges.

oldest ecclesiastical writers, and the liturgies of the Greek and Latin churches of the third and fourth centuries, ought to be made, as much as possible, the *general basis* of the proposed liturgy; the more so as they are in fact also the source from which the best portions of the various liturgies of the sixteenth century were derived, such as the forms of confession and absolution, the litanies, the creeds, the *te deum*, the *gloria in excelsis*, the collects, the doxologies, etc. 2. Among the later liturgies special reference ought to be had to the old Palatinate and other Reformed liturgies of the sixteenth century. 3. Neither the ancient Catholic nor the Reformed liturgies, however, ought to be copied slavishly, but reproduced rather in a *free evangelical spirit*, and adapted to the *peculiar wants of our age and denomination*; inasmuch as these liturgies themselves exhibit to us a considerable variety with essential unity, and every age of the church has the promise of the Spirit and a peculiar mission to fulfil." — Minutes of Synod, 1852.

¹ See Mer. Rev. Vol. II. 1850, p. 91.

² The entire report is quoted in Dr. Schaff's History of the New Liturgy.

The question is not — liturgy or no liturgy ; but, a liturgy *with* or *without* responses ; or rather, a *pulpit* liturgy or an *altar* liturgy. Shall we have a book of forms to guide and aid the minister in performing the offices of the sanctuary, or a book to be placed, like the hymn-book, in the hands of the people and of the officiating clergyman alike, that, as in praise, they may unite also, with heart and voice, in prayer and supplication before God ?

It would be premature to express an opinion as to the issue. Whatever action may be taken, however, one thing is certain : the church will not adopt a liturgical form of worship to the exclusion of free prayer ; nor will it fall back on the free-prayer system to the exclusion of liturgical forms.

The classes, with but few exceptions, approve the general plan and substance of the provisional liturgy. Some objections are urged to the strong language of the book concerning baptismal grace and the powers of the church ; but the objections lie rather against the phraseology, which may be understood in a sense which it does not convey when properly interpreted, than against the idea which the committee design to express.

Only a few congregations have introduced the new liturgy fully. But parts of all the offices are in use in a majority of them. The present order of worship obtaining in our congregations generally, does not differ from that which prevails in the Congregational and Presbyterian churches ; though the custom of sitting during prayer is not in vogue.

Unity of the Movement.

Though we have pursued mainly the order of time in portraying the theological progress of the church, yet a little reflection must reveal the fact that the movement has not been a succession of controversies on isolated or disconnected topics. The essence and form of doctrine asserted in each case, is determined by its internal relation to a fundamental truth. That truth is the person of Christ. In the incarnation, the Son of God has taken fallen human nature, sanctifying it in the act of assumption, into real, organic, and eternal

union with himself. Thus created anew in him, human nature is the medium and form of the revelation of God, of his will, and of all the acts of Christ which, following each other according to the law of the natural order of being, constitute the objective verity of the Christian salvation. The glorified humanity of Christ continues to be the only medium of gracious communication from God to mankind, and of all real approach on the part of man to God, and fellowship with him.

From this general idea of the person of Christ, there follows, logically, a distinctive theory of the church, as being the organic continuation of the divine-human life of Christ in time for the salvation of men; of the Holy Ghost, as the bearer, through all the ages, of Christ, the true life, and the condition of the helpless sinner participating in his grace; of the sacraments, as the organs of the church, or means of grace, by which men are made sharers of the life of Christ; of regeneration, as the inception, by divine power, of the new life in the act of transition from the state of fallen nature to the sphere of the new creation; of conversion, as the voluntary act of the conscious subject, acknowledging and submitting, in contrition of heart, to the authority of the spiritual kingdom in which he is by baptism; of justification, as the act of God, by which the believing sinner is made righteous in Christ; of worship, as the common act of the congregation of believers offering themselves, in union with Christ's glorious merits, on the altar of the gospel, in sacramental acts, in confession, prayer, and praise; of hades, as an imperfect state, intermediate between death and the resurrection; and of the resurrection, as the consummation of the regenerated life, in the triumph of the entire man, soul and body, over sin and all the powers of darkness.

The whole movement is Christological. It was not philosophical. Not of philosophy in general, nor of any particular system, was it born. Neither the system of Schleiermacher, nor of Hegel, much less of Kant, produced it. Philosophy disciplined the mind to a method of thought that was homogeneous with the theological process. It did

no more. Nor was the movement merely historical. It did not originate in the study of the general history of Christian doctrines, nor in the study of any particular period. It was not designed to be the reproduction of the theology of the church fathers. This was rather a justification and support. Properly speaking, it was not designed at all. There was no plan thought out previously, and deliberately determined upon. Dr. Rauch taught Anglo-German philosophy from the love of it. Dr. Nevin did not anticipate the position he would ultimately occupy in relation to the entire circle of Christian truths. He was himself borne along by a deep tide of faith and thought. Nevin and Schaff were the organs of a self-moving, self-ordering process of development, starting in one great idea. The idea was given in the Heidelberg Catechism. It presented itself in a learned, thorough, and comprehensive exegesis. With special force did the idea announce its presence in the apostles' creed, which is the basis and governs the structure of the catechism; and informs the theology of the post-apostolical period. Once truly revived, it became a potent internal force that impelled and carried forward the mind of the church organically from point to point. Admit the old idea of the incarnation, and all the other doctrines follow by necessary consequence. The opposition differs not at single points; it does not hold another theory of one part of Christianity, and harmonize fully in regard to other parts. But the difference is principiant and generic. It runs, like the sap of a tree, through the entire Christian organism, at every point ruling a view answerable to its character. The opposite theology is the product of logical reflection starting with some metaphysical idea, as the will of God or the will of man; and rejects Jesus Christ as the *principle*, substance, and end of supernatural revelation. He becomes the wonderful expedient only by which an almighty Sovereign fulfils his purposes, and the blessed medium by which sinners may be reconciled to God and attain to the felicity of heaven. His divine nature overshadows and sets aside the human. The human is but a temporary condition of the work of redemption; not an es-

sential constituent of his personality. It has no necessary place in the work of the Holy Ghost; it is not an element of practical religion; nor is it an actual condition of communion with God. The result is, on the one hand, a religion of reflection, of definite intellectual apprehension of doctrines; and, on the other, a religion of emotion, of states of feeling and frames of mind. Though seemingly exclusive, these two forms of religion are nevertheless alike as to general character, and flow together in experience and practice. Both spring from a metaphysical idea, instead of from him who is God and man; and deal rather with abstractions, human notions of divine things, than with divine-human realities, the immediate objects of faith and devotion.

The one thing by which, more than by anything else, the theology of the German Reformed church is distinguished from that of New England, consists in the person of Christ being held firmly as the *principle* of a scientific system of faith, of the theory of worship, of practical religion, and of all philosophical thinking. This formative principle impresses distinct features on every doctrine, features which we cannot characterize more correctly in a word than by calling them *Christological*,—a fact which no one can fail to perceive who will investigate and compare the systems candidly.

SUMMARY STATEMENT.

The present condition of the German Reformed church, considered socially, intellectually, morally, and theologically, is the resultant of all the forces, internal and external, which have been molding her past history. The German national life is still predominant. It determines her psychical traits of character; and causes deep sympathy with German, in preference to Scotch, modes of philosophical thinking. The original Protestant schism continues to rule her position in relation to the distinctive spirit and doctrines of Lutheranism. The civil commotions and the theological conflicts in the midst of which the Heidelberg Catechism originated, have impressed upon it a character which is intermediate

between certain extreme and one-sided tendencies of the Reformation. This character distinguishes her theology and piety now in relation to the extreme and one-sided tendencies of the present age. The great disproportion between the number of ministers and congregations during the first and second periods of her history in America, necessitated the formation of large pastoral charges. The evil, at first unavoidable, became a custom, and was perpetuated for many years; hence the difficulty of dividing pastoral charges at the present time as rapidly as the numerical strength of the ministry would warrant. A state of entire dependence on Holland and Germany for forty-five years, seems to have disqualified the church to take prompt and energetic measures to establish literary and theological institutions. It is one reason why the theological seminary was not founded before 1825. The want of educational institutions, the lowering of the standard of ministerial qualifications, laxity of discipline, and the confusion of theological opinions, during the second period, opened the way for some abuses, which crept in and took deep root, and still embarrass the church in various ways. They cannot be eradicated at will. The exciting religious and theological conflicts of the third period quickened the latent Christological ideas which had been begotten and nourished by the catechism, and explain the rapid and vigorous development of what is known by the name of *Mercersburg Theology*. All these facts must be weighed intelligently and without prejudice, in order to form a correct judgment, in all respects, of the German Reformed church in America.

In reviewing the controversies, we have stated the opinions of those who have been most prominent in sustaining the professors of the seminary; not the views of the whole church. Some among us would dissent on several points. To forestall misapprehension, and exhibit received opinions in a more logical order, we will recapitulate in brief the results of the controversies.

The German Reformed church *denies* that the will of God, or the will of man, is the principle of theology; that

Christianity is merely a system of doctrine, or a rule of moral conduct; that the covenant is only a compact between God and man, or between the Father and the Son; that there is a twofold eternal decree, electing some unto salvation and others unto damnation; that the election of God unto eternal life in Christ becomes effectual outside of the economy of grace; that the humanity of Christ, or the incarnation, is an expedient in order to make an atonement for sin; that the church is an association of converted individuals; that the Bible is the foundation of the church; that the relation of the contents of the Bible to the individual is immediate; that the authority of the church is subordinate to the private judgment of the individual Christian; that holy Baptism is only a sign of the covenant and the washing away of sin, and confers no grace; that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is only a solemn commemoration of the vicarious sacrifice of Christ; that communion in the sacrament is exclusively with the divine nature of Christ; that the flesh and blood of Christ are after a carnal manner, or locally, present in the ordinance; that the unconverted and ungodly may commune; that justification consists in a forensic act of God, imputing the righteousness of Christ, *ab extra*, or that it is realized by an act of faith in the imputed righteousness of Christ; that the faithful use of the ordinary means of grace is inadequate to the wants of the church and the world; that the church of Rome is a *total* apostasy; and that Protestantism has its ground *immediately* in the sacred scriptures.

On the contrary, the church *affirms* that the divine-human person of Christ is the true principle of Christianity and of sound theology; that Christianity is a new creation, and therefore a new life; that the humanity of Christ is an essential constituent of the new creation; that the church is a divine institution, the mystical body of Christ; that the Bible was written by members of the church under plenary inspiration of the Holy Ghost; that private judgment is subordinate to the general judgment of the church, particularly as expressed in the ecumenical creeds; that the word

of God is the only ultimate rule of faith and practice, and is above all creeds and confessions; that the individual comes to a right apprehension of the contents of the Bible through the teaching of the church; that the election of grace unto life is effectual in and by the established economy of grace; that justification is by an act of faith in the person and work of Christ, and consists both in the imputation and impartation of Christ and his righteousness; that holy Baptism is a sign and seal of the covenant, and confers grace; that the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is both a commemoration of the passion and death of Christ, and a communion of Christ with the believer, whereby his spiritual life is nourished, and he is more closely united by the Holy Ghost to the person of the Saviour; that believers only hold communion with Christ in the Lord's Supper; that extraordinary measures and human expedients are not necessary to advance the kingdom of Christ; that the ordinary, divinely-ordained means are adequate to all the needs of the church and the world, and, if faithfully applied, do not fail to promote a steady and vigorous growth of the church; that although the church of Rome holds many articles of faith, and approves and perpetuates many customs which are not warranted by the scriptures and are wrong, she is nevertheless a part of the church of Christ; and that Protestantism is an historical continuation of the church catholic, in a new and higher form of faith, organization, and practice.

We think three fourths of the ministry and intelligent membership, perhaps four fifths, would unite in denying and affirming the foregoing propositions. A large part of the church, however, how large we cannot say, perhaps only a minority, would go a step further, and *affirm* that the humanity of Christ, or the mystery of the incarnation, is the only medium of real communion of God with man, and of man with God; that the Christian church is a real constitution in the world, divine and human, supernatural and natural, an organic continuation in time and space of the life-powers of the new creation in Christ Jesus; that the

covenant is an order or institution of grace, spiritual and real; that communion in the Lord's Supper is with the glorified humanity of Christ, and with his divine nature through his humanity; that Baptism introduces its subject into the covenant of grace, and is therefore the sacrament of regeneration,—regeneration being the transition from the state of nature to the state of grace, as natural birth is the transition to the natural world; that regeneration, succeeded by conversion and sanctification, completes itself in the resurrection from the dead, inasmuch as regeneration and salvation pertain to the entire man, the body no less than the soul; and that extraordinary measures and human inventions are only apparently a good, reveal an unhealthy and retrogressive condition of the church, and always prove themselves to be a great evil.

In drawing this summary of faith, we have had in our eyes chiefly the eastern synod,¹ which comprises three fifths of the ministry and four fifths of the membership of the whole church. Of the western synod² the proportion is smaller that would concur in the negative and both sets of affirmative propositions. Fifteen or twenty years since new measures were more generally introduced in the West than in the East, and the catechetical system was in a corresponding degree set aside. But there has been a strong reaction going on for ten or twelve years against anti-reformed doctrines and measures, and in favor of the old ideas and ways of our fathers.³ There is no conflict of philosophy

¹ Corporate name: The Synod of the Ger. Ref. Ch. in the United States.

² Corporate name: The Synod of the Ger. Ref. Ch. of Ohio and adjacent states.

³ At the meeting of the western synod, held at Dayton, in May last, the following action was taken in reference to the Provisional Liturgy: "Whereas the synod of the German Reformed church of North America has prepared a Provisional Liturgy, with the intention of making it the liturgy of the entire Reformed church in this country; and whereas said provisional liturgy has been referred back to the original committee for revision; and whereas said committee, in their published report, ask of the church instruction as to the kind of liturgy wanted; therefore, *Resolved*, That it be the sense of this synod that we desire the liturgy now before the church to be so modified as to omit the responsive part as it has respect to the people in the ordinary service of the church, and such

and systems of thought between Heidelberg College¹ and Franklin and Marshall College, and no conflict of faith and scientific theology between the theological seminary, Tiffin, Ohio, and the seminary at Mercersburg. Dr. Kieffer, Professor of Theology at Tiffin, would not differ,² on the principal and essential features of our theological system, with Dr. Wolff³ or Dr. Schaff. Differences of opinion on subordi-

phrases as may be in conflict with generally received doctrines of the German Reformed church."

There is no opposition to a liturgy, as such ; none to prescribed forms of prayer, nor to offices for special occasions ; and none to the doctrinal character of the provisional book, properly interpreted. The objection lies mainly against the responses, not against all the responses, but the responsive part "in the ordinary service." A modification of certain "phrases" will remove their liability to misconstruction, yet preserve the original sense. The action of the synod, rightly understood, shows that the East and West are not divided as to principles and tendencies.

¹ The professors are alumni of Marshall College.

² In proof, we quote a few passages from Dr. Kieffer's Inaugural Address, published as an Article in the *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. VIII. 1856, p. 478 : "In the commencement Christianity made its appearance in the world as a new life, in the totality of its own being and in the unity of its own elements, all symmetrically united and blended in the common centre of its Author's own person." Speaking of Christianity as a dogma and moral law, he says, that "neither of these forms is, abstractedly considered, perfect or complete." Doctrine is essential, yet "Christianity does not consist in doctrine alone, however good and however true." The gospel, as redeeming power, "brings man into a saving relation to God in Christ Jesus ; but not by any means in an outward or abstract way, but in the form of an internal, real, spiritual life-union with the person of the Saviour." If this union be not real, "the sacraments are merely signs, and not seals." "For without this real union, the feeding on Christ's body and blood, truly and really, in the sacrament is not possible, which is, nevertheless, the doctrine of the scriptures and of our catechism." Again, "The religion of mere doctrine is at best a cold intellectualism." "The religion of mere ceremonial forms and observances is like the marble statue." "The religion of abstract spiritualism, which makes but little account of doctrines and none whatever of forms, is like the mist and vapor of morning, that vanish into air." Christianity "redeems man in the totality of his being, both soul and body." "Hence its true idea involves more than doctrine or precept ; yea, even more than faith, as receiving power and grace ; it is life and spirit flowing over to us continually from the fulness of him who filleth immensity with his presence, while at the same time he is formed in the heart of every believer as the hope of eternal glory." These quotations are an index to the leading ideas of the inaugural. Dr. Kieffer is an alumnus of Marshall College, and a pupil of Dr. Rauch.

³ Professor of Theology at Mercersburg. He was born in Martinsburg, Va., December, 1794 ; studied theology in the seminary while located at York, under

nate points exist, as a matter of course; but the spirit of the colleges and the seminaries is the same. Hence the combined influence of the institutions serves to strengthen and direct the reaction, both in the East and West. The present course of things looks towards complete internal and external harmony and consolidation.

Rauch, Nevin, and Schaff.

This general status has been reached by a peculiar combination of mental and moral forces in the persons of the principal professors of the seminary—a combination undesigned and unforeseen by the church. Rauch came without a call. Becoming obnoxious to government by an expression of rather too liberal political sentiments, he escaped to America, and presented himself to synod for examination and admission. Synod recognized in the man a gift from God, and forthwith placed him at the head of her infant institutions. At the instance of one or two clergymen, Nevin was called from the Presbyterian church. At first he hesitated; but the influence of the patriarch, Dr. Alexander, and others turned the scale. The church called Krummacher, but Europe sent Schaff; and he was received by the unanimous voice of the church. Not to any prescience or keen insight into character, much less to any

Dr. L. Mayer; and, in 1833, was ordained and installed as associate pastor with Rev. Thomas Pomp, of the Ger. Ref. church at Easton, Pa., where he labored twelve years, and became distinguished as an able preacher and an active and efficient pastor. In 1845 he accepted a call to the pastorate of the third German Reformed church of Baltimore. Here he continued until, in November, 1854, he was inaugurated as professor in the seminary. Dr. Wolff did not take a conspicuous part in conducting the theological controversies, but he was, from the start, in living sympathy with the teachings of the seminary and college; and in his pastoral charge, and on the floor of classis and synod, he has always been an earnest supporter and unfaltering advocate of the Christological movement. As a member of the liturgical committee from its first appointment, he has sustained the interpretation of synod's instructions which the provisional book embodies. He favors the responsive service, and in general an altar, in preference to a pulpit, liturgy.

For a clear and full statement of the question at issue in the liturgical committee and in the church, respecting worship, see "The Liturgical Question," a small book of 72 pp. by Dr. J. W. Nevin. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blackiston.

design or plan, is it due that these three men became associated in the seminary. It must be attributed to the special ordering of Divine Providence. What Dr. Nevin says of Dr. Rauch in his eulogy, we may say with equal propriety of himself and his colleague: "I could not but look on it as a strange and interesting fact, that the infant college of the German Reformed church should have placed at its head, there in Mercersburg, — without care or calculation, or consciousness even, on the part of its friends generally — one of the very first minds of Germany, which under other circumstances might well have been counted an ornament and honor to the oldest institution in the land."

No three men, coming together from different parts of the world, could well be more like each other. Rauch and Schaff, both born in the Reformed church on the continent, enjoyed all the advantages of early training which the best schools and gymnasiums afford, and completed their education in the most celebrated universities, and under the tuition of the most powerful and best disciplined minds of Europe. And both at an early age received the highest honors which these universities confer. Dr. Nevin had similar advantages for thorough culture in the best institutions of America. The fact, that upon finishing his course of theological study he was immediately appointed to teach temporarily, in the place of Dr. Hodge, in the oldest and most distinguished seminary in the Presbyterian church, and then called to the seminary at Alleghany, demonstrates the confidence of his teachers and of the Presbyterian church in his learning and ability.

They are alike also in their *generic* psychological character. Naturally averse to superficial and arbitrary speculation, to mechanical and inconsequential philosophizing, and especially to all intellectual activity that breaks with faith in first truths; they move according to the laws of thought, each one in his own sphere, governed by one central power, which informs their labors and binds them into unity. That central power is the Christological idea. The same fundamental idea is developed by the same method of thought, but in different departments of knowledge.

No three men, however, could well be more unlike. Rauch is a German; Nevin, Scotch-Irish; and Schaff a Swiss. Rauch is a philosopher; Nevin a theologian; and Schaff a historian. But each one is at home also in the special departments of the others. Rauch was learned in theology, conversant with the whole field of biblical literature, and devoted to the study of the fine arts. Nevin is familiar with all systems of metaphysical speculation, and learned in history generally. Schaff, as a historian, surveys the whole current of the world's life, including philosophy and theology. Rauch is theologico-philosophical; Nevin is philosophico-theological; and Schaff logico-historical.

They differ also psychically. Rauch thinks synthetically, or rather genetically; his mind invariably unfolding an idea in the order of natural growth, and infusing into it the freshness and beauty of life. The genesis develops itself into blossoms and fruit. Rauch is not satisfied unless the general runs into its particulars as consequences. His production must be an organism, all the branches growing from a germ, and no branch wanting. He would be complete as well as thorough.

Nevin produces. He lays hold of a comprehensive principle, and considers it in its organic relations. He comes to particulars by an effort, not because he does not see or appreciate them, but because the manifold relations of a principle open out broadly before him, which he would unfold and exhibit before touching the singular. He is pre-disposed, however, simply to indicate particulars and consequences. Blossoms and fruit being of less account, may in due time come to view of themselves. The deepest, all-pervading law of an object is with him the absorbing theme. He is thorough and comprehensive, rather than complete.

Schaff reproduces. No less thorough and philosophical, he sees the manifest facts of science and life in their fundamental and reciprocal connections. Apprehending and penetrating the whole, he constructs, with great facility, an organic unity in aesthetic proportions. Truths and events take their place in life-like order, as if by the law of instinct.

Blossoms and fruit catch his eye; but he studies them in their relation to the life-principle of the organism. Schaff is a scientific artist, who is loth to lay down his chisel so long as one shade of thought is too deep or too faint.

Nevin and Schaff are complemental. Rauch, preceding them in time, unites, in a great degree, peculiar psychical qualities belonging to both. Specifically different, these three co-workers are generically one—different as to psychical characteristics, but one in principle, in life, and organic method; thus constituting a triune educational force, under which the church has been growing, not by accretion, but by a manifold or many-sided process of development.

Ecclesiastical Government.

The principles of government are Presbyterian. A congregation is governed by a consistory, which is composed of the pastor, elders, and deacons. No congregation is without either elders or deacons. They are chosen by the communicant members for a term of two, three, or four years, generally only two years, and ordained by the laying on of hands, and installed. When the term expires, the administrative power ceases, but not the office. The officer is an elder or deacon without administration. If re-elected, installation is repeated. The consistory is subject to the classis, which consists of the ministers, and an elder from each pastoral charge, within a given district. The classes are subject to the synod, which consists of a delegation of ministers and elders from all the classes. The eastern and western synods are united in a general synod. The consistory answers to the session in the Presbyterian church, classis to presbytery, synod to synod, and general synod to general assembly.

The tendency to presbyterian government has been characteristic of the German Reformed church from the beginning. In the sixteenth century it was fully established in the Rhine provinces; more so than in Switzerland or France; and in advance of the organization of the Reformed church of Scotland. But the form of government

was not made a fundamental article, as in the Scotch Presbyterian church; nor do we find the same bitter antipathy to Episcopacy. In this respect the German Reformed church holds an intermediate position between the English and Scotch Reformation. Luther did not endeavor to establish a form of government; the Lutheran church being from the beginning more closely allied to and dependent upon the state. Subsequently opposite extremes arose. In Sweden the government of the Lutheran church is episcopal; in America it is congregational.

The origin and progress of representative government, or self-government by elders, in the Reformed church on the continent, form a very interesting and instructive chapter in church history.

Conclusion.

The founding of the theological seminary in 1825 constitutes, as said before, the most important epoch in the history of the church. It gave an impulse to intellectual culture, theological science, practical piety, and external growth. In connection with the college, it is the power which has quickened the latent life, reproduced the old faith, and restored the catechism of the church. The church has been recast in the mold of its own original genius. There has been no going back mechanically, or in a slavish spirit. Much less has there been a revolution, or a violent breaking with the past. The change has been an organic process. Holding firmly the ancient *symbolum apostolicum* and the great fundamental principle of the Reformation, the church has advanced by legitimate development to a stage of life and faith, which is different from the past, yet not contradictory to it, but in full harmony with its truth.

The western synod is subdivided into eleven classes; and has 168 ministers, 411 congregations, and 21,311 members. During the year ending in October, 1861, there were baptized 3,319 persons; confirmed, 1,740.

The eastern synod is subdivided into fifteen classes; and has 253 ministers, 711 congregations, and 79,676 members.

During the year ending in May, 1862, there were baptized 8,575 persons ; confirmed, 3,895.

Total: 1 general synod, 2 synods, 26 classes ; 421 ministers, 1,122 congregations, 100,987 members ; 11,894 baptisms, and 5,635 confirmations. The congregations are located principally in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and Virginia.

ARTICLE II.

ENGLISH LEXICOGRAPHY.¹

BY REV. NOAH PORTER, D.D., PROFESSOR, ETC., YALE COLLEGE, CONN.

TIMES have somewhat changed with the English people since the tradition concerning the elder Pitt was quoted and received with a look of wonder, "that he had actually read Bailey's Dictionary twice through in course." 'Indeed! and what could have been his motive? What possible interest could a man of his genius feel in a task so irksome?' The

¹ 1. On the Study of Words. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D. New York: Redfield. 1857.

2. On the English Language Past and Present. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D. New York: Redfield. 1859.

3. A Select Glossary of English Words used formerly in Senses different from their Present. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D. New York: Redfield. 1859.

4. Rambles among Words: Their Poetry, History, and Wisdom. By William Swinton. New York: Charles Scribner. 1859.

5. An American Dictionary of the English Language. By Noah Webster, LL.D. Revised and enlarged by Chauncey A. Goodrich. With Pictorial Illustrations, Appendix of New Words, Synonyms, etc. etc. Springfield: George and Charles Merriam. 1859. pp. 1750.

6. A Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Boston: Hickling, Swan, and Brewer. 1860. pp. 1854.

7. Proposal for the Publication of a New English Dictionary by the Philological Society. London: Trübner and Co. 8vo. pp. 32.

8. Lectures on the English Language. By George P. Marsh. Revised and enlarged edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 1862. 8vo.

reply was always given, that he wished in this way to enlarge his vocabulary. Thus, in order that his ready mind need never be at a loss for the precise word which he needed, and his facile tongue never trip in uttering it, he had imposed on himself a discipline of the driest and most tedious of all kinds of reading. At that time the readers of dictionaries were esteemed the most stupid description of people, save one, and they were the makers of dictionaries. These last were looked upon as a necessity indeed, and therefore to be tolerated in the field of letters; literary drudges, for the convenience of the thinkers and speakers whose genius could turn to splendid account the materials which they collected with so great pains—"stone-breakers," as we once heard them called, who prepared the highways and byways through the fields of knowledge, for the more luxurious and respectable to walk in. But now the study of words has become invested with an almost poetic interest. For we have learned that, as we trace out the history of words through the tortuous and dusty labyrinth of the past, we are confronted at every turn with the men and women, the manners and usages, the clothing and armor, the houses and fields of the times when this or that antiquated meaning was full of life and significance.

But, as we have said, all this is recent. It is not long since Coleridge, in the preface to his *Aids to Reflection*, declared it to be one object of that work "to direct the reader's attention to the value of the science of words, their use and abuse, and the incalculable advantages attached to the habit of using them appropriately, and with a distinct knowledge of their primary, derivative, and metaphorical senses." He thus addresses his reader: "Reflect on your own thoughts, actions, circumstances, and — which will be of especial aid to you in forming a *habit* of reflection — accustom yourself to reflect on the words you use, hear, or read; their birth, derivation, and history. For if words are not *things*, they are *living powers*, by which the things most important to mankind are actuated, combined, and humanized." The thought of Coleridge was not new; but

it was uttered at the right time, by one who was able to transform common truths into seed-thoughts; his genius giving them the charm of novelty; and his ardor imparting to them germinant life. It was received by that large and miscellaneous school of thinkers who acknowledged Coleridge as in some sense their master. Its germination was also favored by other circumstances. It speedily sprung into life, and is now bearing abundant fruit.

During these latter years, comparative philology has been perfecting its results. On the European continent the study of words has been prosecuted in the spirit of an enlarged and elevated philosophy, with the enterprise and perseverance that is fostered by sound and varied learning. The modern languages of Europe have been grouped in their proper family relations, and traced to their original stock, and the pedigree of individual words has been followed up and down, forward and backward, this way and that, with all the keenness and persistency characteristic of the entire genus of genealogists. As the consequence of these investigations, immense stores of knowledge have been gathered, to illustrate the etymology of the living languages of Europe, while the history of each and all has been ascertained, with a good measure of certainty and success. The results are also beginning to be seen in the improved vocabularies of these languages, both in their present form and in the ancient and mediaeval dialects from which they have emerged. It is equally interesting to recognize the more rational views which are now taken of language itself. Whereas it was once regarded as the accidental embodiment of thought, it is now known to be its necessary and natural product; and so intimately connected with the spirit which gives its life and shapes its forms, that the study of language is and must be a study of thoughts. It is true this had been asserted here and there before, by some daring etymologist or eccentric word-hunter, who was sure to be laughed at for his pedantry. Horne Tooke ventured to prefix to his presumptuously entitled *Diversions of Purley*, the more presumptuous phrase, *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*, thus claiming for words a winged life;

though he sadly clipped and soiled the wings of certain sacred and venerable terms, by his shallow sophistry. But now no one hesitates to admit for language, as a study, claims far more exalted than any which Tooke dreamed of asserting; and the pursuit of philology is acknowledged both to require and to favor the most profound and elevated philosophy. It now excites no marvel to hear from two scholarly men of genius the question and answer, which is quoted by Mr. Swinton as the motto to his spirited volume: "What do you read, my lord?" "Words — words — words."

But what fruits have already been gathered for our English tongue from this newly-awakened zeal in word studies? and what may we expect and require as the product of investigation? This question suggests the thought, that there is no subject which is of less interest to English scholars and the English people, than the scientific study of their own mother-tongue. No language ought to be more attractive than ours to scholars; for none is more multifarious in its composition, more diversified in its elements, more arbitrary in its orthography, more abnormal in its spelling, or more complex in its history. Each of these features is a standing invitation to men eager to determine an unsolved problem. Yet how few have been the English scholars who have sought to master one of these problems! Where has been the man of philological genius, with the requisite knowledge, who has given his life and his learning to the history, development, and structure of the sweet and stately English tongue? German philologists treat of the English *en passant*, along with half a score of Teutonic dialects; and from these researches, conducted aside from the special object of illustrating the English language, its student can gather richer harvests than from any single treatise written by an English philologist on his own tongue. The English universities have graduated many men of the requisite taste and genius for such researches,—men not averse to the needful toil,—as has been shown in what they have done in Greek and Latin philology. The dialects of these languages have been mastered, in all their evanescent peculiar-

ities. Their particles have been tossed to and fro by discussion, till forced to give up the most attenuated shade of signification which in any connection or by any possibility they could bear. The whole library of Greek and Roman authors extant, has been read, reperused, and winnowed like wheat, to find a new word, or an old word with a new meaning. And these philologists belong to and constitute a multitude, an organized commonwealth, of scholars. But the students of Anglo-Saxon and the provincial dialects of England, have never been numerous enough, in any one generation, to constitute the smallest fraternity; and the few that have chosen such departments, have been regarded as men of strange and unaccountable literary tastes. And now that the great Philological Society of England finds it necessary to take measures to hunt old words or old meanings among the early English writers, its enterprising secretary presses some scores of volunteers into the service, each taking a single book or writer; whereas an ardent devotee of such a speciality, upon the continent, would gather the whole library about himself, in a small closet some ten feet by twelve, and in a few years of working at nothing else some fourteen hours a day, would exclaim, *Le voilà* — the work is done!

Not only has the English nation failed to furnish a sufficient number of philologists for the special scientific study of the origin and history of the language of which they are so proud, but the direct study of this language, as an instrument for use, has been by no means prominent in our courses of education. In the English universities, as it is well known, the student learns to write English by practising the writing of *Latin*; and he learns to write English so well, that we do not know that any argument against the method can be drawn from the defects of its results. In the classical schools, writing Latin is still the only writing that is enforced or criticised; and so the well-educated Englishman finds himself in possession of a manly and idiomatic English style, without knowing by what method or system he acquired it. And yet he has attained this possession.

His style is, as it were, a part of himself—so easily does it glide in the narrative, so compactly does it gather and condense itself in the despatch, so proudly does it soar in the apostrophe, and so fiercely does it charge in the appeal or the invective. He is not formally put to the study of its powers and resources in his matchless literature. He may have never—in the majority of cases he never has—read a history of English literature, or analyzed the style of a single distinguished English writer—untwining, as it were, the sinews of his strength, and tracing out the secret of his power. Much less will he be likely to have studied the growth and development of this literature in a philosophic spirit, and learned to apply to each writer, as seen in and as formed by, his age, all the critical formulæ “for such cases made and provided.” And yet, he will read for the hundredth time his Milton or his Shakspeare, and is quite at home in the prose of Dryden and Burke, of Bacon and Jeremy Taylor. But as to commentaries, and philosophical criticisms upon his favorite authors, in these he has but little interest: he had much rather enjoy the poets, than speculate about them. He would vastly prefer to be lifted and refined by their power, than to ask, wherein lies the secret of their strength.

On the continent, the education of every young gentleman, and even of every young miss, would be considered as greatly neglected if he or she had not been carefully drilled to the correct use and the nice proprieties of their own language; and not to have studied a finished philosophical course of French or German literature, would indicate almost barbarism or rustic neglect. The well-educated German is captivated by Faust, its daring speculation, its touching pathos, and its matchless style; but he is certain also to have read more than one of the scores of commentaries and lectures that have been written about him by philosophical critics.

This English neglect of the critical study of his own language and literature, is but a special example of the influence of that practical spirit which characterizes the

nation. Language is to them a means, and not an end. Hence they study it enough to use it with effect, and to improve it by all the new applications which it must be made to serve. Literature is in their view a means to splendid achievements, or to the noblest enjoyments ; and literature is cultivated in this spirit—for what it is in itself, and not because it gratifies a speculative curiosity that is chiefly curious to inquire how its effects are produced.

In their dictionaries, and in dictionary-making, the English have been true to their instincts and traditional spirit. The first English dictionaries did not attempt to define or explain the words of ordinary use, in life or literature. The first collections of English words were made in connection with, and for the use of, dictionaries of foreign languages. The earliest English dictionaries proper, were chiefly designed to explain the hard words of the language. The first of these — published first in 1616 — contained in the eighth edition, of 1688, only five thousand and eighty words ; and professes in its title to give only “the interpretation of the hardest Words, and the most useful Terms of Art used in our Language,” etc. The “New World of English Words,” prepared by Edward Phillips, Milton’s nephew, promises “the Interpretation of such hard words as are derived from other Languages, whether Hebrew, Arabick, Syriack, Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, British, Dutch, Saxon, etc., their Etymologies and perfect Definitions.” This contains only about thirteen thousand words. It impresses us with the defects of the literary apparatus in earlier times, and our own advantages, to reflect that the settlers of Boston and of Hartford, and the founders of Harvard and Yale could have had no better dictionaries than these. Even the justly celebrated and much-used dictionary of Nathan Bailey, at least in its earlier editions, is principally made up of careful definitions of the hard or, so called, dictionary words in the language ; and either entirely omits, or very briefly defines, those words which are in fact the most important — the so-called common words, which every one is supposed to understand, but which no man can easily define — words

which, at the first aspect, seem to have but a simple and that a very generic and vague signification, but which are found to answer to a score or two of diverse, specific applications. It deserves to be noticed, in these days of pictorial dictionaries, that Bailey's edition of 1730 is "illustrated with near five hundred cuts, for giving a clearer idea of those figures not so well apprehended by verbal description."

The much celebrated dictionary of Dr. Johnson, was published in 1755. It cost its author seven years of constant labor, in which he was aided by several copyists and assistants; for all of which he received fifteen hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling. The publication of this dictionary forms an era in English lexicography, in the following particulars. It was, in the best sense of the word, an original work. The words were either collected by the author from his own reading, or verified by that reading. Johnson employed his own time in reading the best English writers, with reference to the selection, the definition, and the illustration of his words. The passages marked by him were copied by his clerks. As many as were required were transferred to the dictionary at once, to suggest and illustrate its signification by examples of its actual use. From the special reading of years, and from Johnson's exact and abundant memory, which so well retained the treasures of his previous studies, there was gathered an immense number of words which Bailey had overlooked; so that Johnson's was in fact the first dictionary with anything like a complete vocabulary. This vocabulary, however, represented the language of books more perfectly than that of common life. Books were preëminently the world in which Johnson lived, and with which he was familiar. Beyond this region he could not conveniently, nor would he willingly, go. For he would encounter difficulties similar to those which he so characteristically describes as likely to attend the search after the technical terms that each trade and workshop had created for itself: "What favorable accident or easy inquiry brought within my reach, has not been neglected; but it had been a hopeless labor to glean up words by courting living

information, and contesting with the sullenness of one and the roughness of another." The early English he does not give. "I have fixed Sidney's work for the boundary, beyond which I make few excursions." Had he wrought the soil with faithfulness up to this boundary, there had been less reason to complain. But though he may have omitted few words used by the Elizabethan writers, it was by no means true that he gave all the peculiar senses in which these earlier writers employed their words. Even the writers of a century later, as Barrow, South, and others, employ not a few words in certain antiquated meanings, which Johnson was not careful to notice, and which certainly he did not note. The reason is obvious enough. Johnson wished to define the language as, in his opinion, it ought to be, or could properly be used. For such proper use of words he was willing to give an authority; but if the authority vouched for certain uses which he did not like, he quietly omitted to cite him.

The definitions of Johnson, aside from the illustrative quotations, have no striking merit. They are often given by single words, which are really no definitions at all. If the defining word is an exact synonyme of the term defined, then the only reason why it is to be preferred, is, that the signification may happen to be more familiar to the mind. But when this familiar or better-understood term is itself to be defined, nothing else can be done than to explain this in its turn by the word which is less familiar. The only proper definitions are propositions; by which we mean an ampliative or explicated phrase, that may be or is predicated of the word defined. It may be objected, that the defining propositions must consist of words the meaning of which must be supposed to be known. It is true we cannot escape beyond the domain of words. In all our defining, we must ever suppose the meaning of some words to be already known. But what we seek to do, even in defining what seem to be well-known words, is to expand the dim conception which is suggested by the word itself into that fullness of import which can only be expressed by a sentence.

If the word is literally unknown, it is even never necessary that its significance should be fully developed into a full enumeration of the constituent elements of the conception for which it stands. Even the names of what are called simple ideas, of which it is so often said we are unable to give any definition, can be so fully described that the great object of defining shall be accomplished, which is to awaken or suggest to the mind what the meaning is. This can be effected only by some descriptive phrase which sets forth the circumstances under which the action, being, or relation appears, or by some concrete example which enables us to determine and identify, or in other words fully to recognize, the object defined. Any other idea of a definition than this, must of necessity mislead and confuse. If no two words have precisely the same meaning, — and that they have not is well nigh demonstrated by the circumstance that two in *fact* exist, — thento define one by the other, is to confues rather than to enlighten the mind; it is to blend objects that ought to be kept apart, rather than to define them, i. e. to bound them off by distinct lines of demarcation. This is both assumed and conceded in the attempt to explain words that are miscalled synonymous. Every such effort is a tacit confession that the more nearly the meaning of words is alike, the more important is it to distinguish between them, and that this can only be effected by means of minute explanations and dexterously selected illustrations of their use.

It is clear from the observations in Johnson's Preface, that he had thought earnestly on the nature and ideal of a just definition, and was sensitively alive to the various difficulties to be encountered and overcome. It does not appear, however, either from his principle or his practice, that he had matured his views into any settled convictions, or that he was very careful in all cases to apply the principles which had suggested themselves to his thoughts. As we have already said, he relied very much upon his quotations to suggest the definition, and thus to satisfy the mind. The selection and arrangement of these quotations, it is true, indicate the solid

sense and the vigorous judgment of the great critic. Every explanation which is given, and every thought expressed, has a robust aspect, and leaves a weighty impression.

We notice also in Johnson the tendency to define technical terms at great length with which English lexicography began, aiming to exhibit in this way the science of the times. Thus under *animal*, Johnson copies Mr. Ray's schemes or tables of classification, occupying more than a quarter of a folio page, and adds a quotation from Arbuthnot, thus: "Vegetables are proper enough to repair *animals*, as being near of the same specific gravity with the animal juices, and as consisting of the same parts with animal substances, spirit, water, salt, oil, earth; all which are contained in the sap they derive from the earth." Under *anemoscope*, we have the following curious piece of information: "A machine invented to foretell the changes of the wind. It has been observed that hygrosopes, made of cat's-gut, proved very good *anemoscope*; seldom failing, by the turning the index about, to foretell the shifting of the wind." Under *crystal*, we have a rather curious definition, and more curious quotation. Under *nitre*, instead of a definition we have a dissertation half a page long, upon its nature, mode of production, etc., taken from Hill's History of Fossils, at which a modern chemist would be appalled. The botanical dissertations are somewhat extended, and intermingled with occasional hints on the cultivation of plants, and good farming in general. Occasionally gruff Sam Johnson speaks out, with a well-satisfied twinkle of the eye, and a manifest inward chuckle, as in the well-known definition of *excise*: "A hateful tax levied upon commodities, and adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches, hired by those to whom excise is paid." *Oats* excite him to the following utterance, which he doubtless penned with sardonic satisfaction: "A grain, which in England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports the people."

The dictionary of Johnson was received with favor. Some over-nice and captious critics discovered faults and urged objections; but it was so immeasurably superior to every

dictionary before it, that it was speedily acknowledged as the standard of the language. It fixed the orthography in great measure, though some of the modes of spelling recommended by the author were not received. But as a whole, Johnson's dictionary so well represented its author, and its author so well represented the English people, that for three fourths of a century it held undivided sway. Johnson through his dictionary spake dogmatically, as was his wont when alive: 'For all the practical exigences of the population of Great Britain and the colonies, the dictionary is amply sufficient; and the upstart who shall have the audacity to dispute its authority, or the presumption to conjecture that he could compose its superior, deserves to be rebuked for his pretensions, and chastised for his insolence.' To this decisive declaration, all England responded in consenting acquiescence. Nay, in this faith not a few intelligent Englishmen remain to this very day. From Johnson to Webster, there was no lexicographer worthy of special notice, although a large number of dictionaries were prepared and published. The most of these were spelling dictionaries, very compendious—designed to serve as manuals, to be consulted by children and shopkeepers, etc., when at a loss to know how to spell a word correctly. Sheridan began the series of pronouncing dictionaries, which was designed for the special object indicated by their appellation. Perry, Ashe, and others deserve to be mentioned with honor for original contributions to the vocabulary and definitions of words. The vocabulary collected by Johnson was enlarged from one work to another, and as new words were inserted, new definitions were framed, such as they were. One of the most important contributions of this sort was furnished by Henry John Todd, who, in 1818, issued his first edition of the work so familiarly known as Todd's Johnson's Dictionary. Todd added many thousand words to the then collected vocabulary, and his definitions were acknowledged to be good.

In the year 1828, Dr. Noah Webster published in two quarto volumes his *American Dictionary of the English*

Language. The preparation of an original work of this character by an American scholar, at that time, when all the literary appliances for such an undertaking were far more scanty than at present, and when the opportunities for leisure and research were immeasurably fewer than they now are, would of itself deserve to be named with honor, even if the merits of the work were far less than they really were. The publication of a work so expensive and bulky, is honorable to the zeal and enterprise of the publisher; and the sale of the first edition at the high price of twenty dollars the copy, was, when we consider the population and condition of the country, most creditable to the American people. When we consider, also, that it was the product of the untiring labor of twenty-seven years, spent in original research, reading, and thought, at a period when there was scarcely a living man in England or America who was animated by a similar spirit, and only here and there one to be found to give its author a word of sympathy or encouragement, and not an individual on whom he could rely for substantial aid, we cannot withhold from this man of tenacious purpose and unflagging zeal, our most profound respect. To qualify himself for his work, he gathered dictionaries and grammars, and plunged into the driest studies, that he might gather the material for wide inductions; thus striking out for himself the plan, and prosecuting the labors, such as since his time have issued in the modern science of comparative philology. It ill becomes the scholars who enter into the labors which two generations of inquirers have placed at their disposal, to despise the researches of the American pioneer, who, with only Horne Tooke, Skinner, Menage, and Jamieson to excite him, conceived the possibility of a wider comparison of languages, and a more subtle analysis of their radicals, in order to illustrate their application, derivation, and mutual dependence. The relation of the Indo-Germanic languages to the Sanskrit, and to one another, had only then been dreamed of, not demonstrated. The principles of syllabic changes, and of the interchange of letters, had not been derived by comprehensive inductions.

The results of these great and fundamental discoveries had not been placed at the command of the student in digests and special dictionaries, from which a competent and dexterous compiler can so easily glean and gather so many felicitous and novel illustrations to English etymology. Let any man, with these facts in view, carefully study the introduction to the quarto dictionary, and he cannot avoid feeling the highest respect for the scholar-like aims and labors of its author, as well as for the sagacity and profoundness of many of his results. It was inevitable that some of his conclusions and conjectures should be superseded by the advance of the very science to which he gave so important an impulse. It is not surprising that some of his etymologies, especially the Semitic and African, should not be sustained when the line should be sharply drawn between the different families of languages. Dr. Webster was impelled by the faith common to most of the Christian scholars of his time, that the Semitic languages were to be regarded as the original stock. It is no matter of wonder that he should have been misled by comparisons founded on this presumption. Rather are we surprised that he was so often correct, and that his etymological researches yielded so much fruit that will remain.

His other contributions of new words, and of new or improved definitions, were most important, and what is more to the purpose, they were the product of original research and reflection. It is true he had Johnson before him, and he constructed his definitions with those of Johnson in his eye. Many of the illustrative passages quoted by him had been selected by the old lexicographer. But it is also true that, in defining, he made great improvements upon Johnson. And these improvements were so various and important as justly to entitle his work to be considered original. Many significations which had been overlooked by Johnson, were supplied by Webster, showing therein thoughtful labor upon every important word. His distinguishing peculiarity was, that he defined by carefully studied propositions, and not by so-called synonymes or equivalent terms, as Johnson so often

did, or by loosely constructed phrases, in which Johnson frequently indulged. Nothing but a defining phrase can be a definition; and Johnson, in not attempting, in every case, to construct such phrases, shows how greatly he failed to conceive the real nature of his work. In a multitude of cases, as we have already remarked, it is obvious enough that he relied upon his quotations to suggest the full meaning of the word as used in a particular connection, by the author from whom he cites. Had Webster done no more than attempt a more philosophical method of defining, he would deserve much credit for the effort only. But his success was marvellous. To estimate it, one needs take only a score of words and endeavor to express their meaning in concise and felicitous assertions, being careful that his proposition is not so wide as to cover the conceptions denoted by a half dozen words besides, or so narrow as not to meet half the cases to which it may be applied. Supposing that a single meaning only is to be thus expressed, the task will be sufficiently difficult. But if we add the many senses — literal, tropical, and transitive, — which pertain to the most important words, the burden will be greatly increased; and before our enterprising and confident novice has completed his task of defining twenty words, he will be quite ready to resolve that he will never undertake another. By this time also, he will be qualified to judge of the labor, and to appreciate the service rendered by an independent worker in this department of science. “The writers on logic, in the middle ages,” says Whewell, “made definition the last stage in the progress of knowledge,” and with justice; for the power to define implies the actual knowledge of all the relations of the things and thought, which a word expresses, the capacity to summon these to mind when the word is to be explained, as well as the power to express them in well-chosen language, by a compact and clearly uttered proposition. We do not consider Webster perfect as a definer. He often failed in his ideal, and oftener in the realization of his own conception. But he deserves more credit than he always receives for the important advance which he made upon Johnson and Johnson’s editors.

Webster was not a profound philosopher. He had not reflected, with any special insight or scientific reach of thought, upon the nature of language or the requisites of a perfect definition; but he was a close observer, a clear thinker, and a precise writer, and he knew enough about definitions to be perfectly aware that they ought to distinguish the object defined from any and every other thought or thing. He had also a decidedly practical understanding. He kept in his eye the persons for whom he wrote, and he aimed to satisfy common minds by clear and plain language, even at the expense of elegance or delicacy. He had little respect for mere authority, having sufficient self-reliance and pertinacity of his own to enable him to maintain his own clear judgment against the *prestige* of the greatest names in letters. His remarks in the introduction to his dictionary, upon the various writers of note who had preceded him, indicate that he had a fair share of the *nil admirari* in his character. But he had a plain common-sense, acute, if not subtile, discrimination, untiring industry, an unquestioned love for his work, and a conscientious love of exact knowledge and plain speech. To these qualities of the man is to be ascribed the great superiority of his definitions.

Webster not only greatly enlarged and improved the definitions of the words which Johnson and Johnson's editors had collected, but he collected many thousand words from his own reading and that of his friends. He was an extensive and careful reader all his life. After he conceived the project of his American dictionary, he read many of the standard English and American authors, with pencil in hand, noting the words and senses which were not already found in Johnson. He was not an indiscriminate collector of all the things called words, which he found in books and newspapers. He was rather precise and fastidious on this point. If he discovered a word which did not suit his fancy, or please his taste, he was rather slow to accept it, even from the highest authority, or to yield it a place in his dictionary. On the other hand, if a word had been long in use, especially in the use of common life, and was a part of the speech of

plain country-folk, he did not care how homely it was, but readily acknowledged it to be English though homespun. His contributions of words that had been overlooked, and yet that were neither new-fangled nor compounded, were not inconsiderable.

His attention to scientific and technical terms was quite characteristic. Since Johnson, all the sciences known in his time had become greatly enlarged in their terminology; and the terms themselves, both new and old, had acquired a far more precise and definite meaning. The sciences also, which, in Johnson's time, were just in their infancy, had been developed into a mature and perfect life. Others, like chemistry and mineralogy, and the elements of geology, had come into being; the first with a very precise, and beautiful, and copious nomenclature. The terms of all the sciences, as well as the technical names of the various arts and professions, were carefully collected, and no pains were spared to find their special and exact signification. Upon these terms of art, Webster bestowed a still more careful attention than had been the fashion with any of his predecessors, though all of these had made these hard words the object of their special regard. To satisfy his inquiries, he consulted not books only, but also men; and recorded all that he could learn, with accurate and painstaking scrupulousness. So desirous was he to give knowledge, that he would often add a little special information, which he thought might be of use; as though the thought had struck him: 'it is a pity that the man who turns to this word to learn its meaning, should fail of this additional bit of information.' Occasionally he gives a hint in agricultural or domestic economy, or adds a fact of geographical or general interest, as Johnson had been fond of doing before him. More frequently he appends some useful thought of practical or religious wisdom that is quite fatherly or pedagogical; and we find not a little good advice, as well as weighty moral truth, scattered along his pages.

He called his work an American dictionary of the English language. But why did he use the word *American*? This

question has been often asked, and to this day remains unanswered to many minds. As long as it is unexplained, it may be made the ground of unfavorable judgments respecting the modesty or the good taste of Webster. To understand his reasons, we must go back to the times when the plan of the dictionary was conceived and the first edition was published. We find that so entire was the acquiescence in the perfection of Johnson, and its complete adequacy for the wants of the English people and of English scholars, that it would have been deemed an intolerable stretch of presumption for Webster to justify his aim solely on the ground that a new dictionary was needed for the English people; and that therefore he chose to justify himself in part, by the consideration that a new dictionary might be and was needed for the Americans, in consequence of the new words and the new meanings of old words which had grown out of their institutions. In connection with this unquestioned fact, Webster very properly urged that the best American writers used the English language with as great propriety, purity, and force as their brethren across the water; and that their authority might as properly be cited to illustrate and justify the use or meaning of a word. This was a second reason given by Webster for making a new dictionary, and for calling it an American dictionary.

Those who live in these times, when Webster has so far been acknowledged by the English people as to furnish the chief material out of which some half dozen dictionaries, large and small, have been worked up for the English market, cannot easily conceive the state of public opinion when Webster was forced to seek so great a variety of excuses for his presumption in asking for his dictionary the leave to be. It was, in those days, an act of presumption to question the infallibility, and the perfect sufficiency, of Johnson for all the uses of the most accomplished English scholar; as it has not altogether ceased, in these days, to be somewhat presumptuous, to differ from some indefinite though variable English standard of pronunciation and orthography.

If any of our readers are curious to understand and esti-

mate the strength and character of this feeling, they have only to consult the very able and candid review of Webster's quarto dictionary, published in Vol. XXXVIII. of the *North American Review*. The author of that critique was one of the most truth-loving, and yet one of the most sensitive of the scholars of New England. Especially was he sensitive in respect to any innovation which concerned the purity of the English language. He would have shrunk with a disgust which amounted to abhorrence, from justifying any American deviations from English usage because they were American. The daintiest and most refined of those whose predilections or associations have been shocked by Webster's innovations, could not be more sensitive to any upstart pretensions of American confidence. But while he was, in all his associations, thoroughly deferential and English, he was also a keen discerner of the truth, and had an honest respect to the claims of truth and the authority of reasoning. He abhorred all shams—the sham of American impudence in reform, and the equally transparent sham of American Anglo servility.

It is interesting to those who knew the author, to trace, in this review, the evidence, on the one hand, of his sensitiveness to the strong prejudices which he knew that Webster was certain to encounter, and the equally obvious indications of his convictions that there was ample reason for the publication of a new dictionary. One or two of his remarks we quote, not merely because they were eminently characteristic of the writer, but because they have been so strikingly fulfilled. "One proof that this dictionary contains improvements, will probably soon be furnished in the use that will be made of it in compiling others. The author must prepare himself, if he is ever so greedy of praise, to be complimented in this way, to his entire satisfaction. No new English dictionary will hereafter serve, either at home or abroad, for popular use, which does not contain many of the additions and corrections of this."

But while Webster was justified, in his own view and in that of his friends, in calling his work an American dictionary, he insisted with the utmost pertinacity that the English

language had not been corrupted in this country, but that it was spoken and written with as much precision and purity among us as it was in England. The contemptuous use of the term "Americanism," and the charge implied in it, he carefully sifted, and demonstrated to the satisfaction of truth-loving men, that the majority of the so-called new Americanisms were good old popular English, which were still to be found in the common speech of the country-folk in the mother-land. Later researches by the English themselves, since attention has been given to the spoken and provincial dialects, have demonstrated that his opinion was just, and that many of the so-called Americanisms are of the earliest and the most idiomatic English. Webster never, for a moment, justified or rejected a word or phrase simply because it was American. If we have institutions and customs peculiar to ourselves, he contended we must have peculiar words, and these words must be current in our speech and writings. For the adoption and familiar use of such words, we need make neither excuse nor apology.

Webster's views of pronunciation occasioned some offence at the time his dictionary was first published. Walker had been much in vogue in parts of our country, and a somewhat affected and artificial method of pronouncing certain consonants, and of accenting certain syllables, had extensively prevailed. It is now generally conceded that Walker's extremes did not represent the usage of the truly cultivated portion of the English people, — neither their usage now, nor their usage then. Webster insisted upon this with great pertinacity, and thereby greatly offended those teachers in colleges and schools who had followed Walker, and also those professional gentlemen who had piqued themselves on great nicety in this particular. Against all these affectations, our somewhat positive and perhaps narrow New Englander set himself with no little energy of displeasure, first taking care to assure himself by positive information, concerning the actual practice of the English public speakers and gentlemen. He insisted that Walker's extremes represented the rhetoricians and the actors only. In this he was right, and

we are not a little indebted to his positiveness that the prevailing tendency to follow Walker did not sweep over the country, and become fixed as the habit of our people. It would have been especially unfortunate had this been superadded to our other American peculiarities and provincialisms.

He differed, also, from the practice, introduced by Walker, and since extensively followed, of indicating the pronunciation of words by spelling them anew, or by any very minute notation, intended to indicate the less obvious *nuances* of vowel sounds. These, he contended, could not, by any such method, be conveyed to the eye so as to be fixed for the ear; for the most of these arise naturally from the connection in which they occur, whether with this or that consonant, or before or after a syllable, as accented or unaccented. In this judgment he was directed by the austere simplicity of his own tastes, and the practical singleness of his aims, which prompted him to reach his end by the simplest methods possible. There are some very striking remarks in vindication of Webster's views upon these points, in the review from the late Professor Kingsley, to which we have already referred.

Dr. Webster's orthography also, was, in some respects, novel, and gave serious offence at first. We do not propose to discuss this much vexed question over again, as we are not committed to all his peculiarities, and care too little for it to dwell upon it at all. We are quite content with the very just and candid observations on this subject which Webster's first critic has published in this review. If these had been regarded with candor, much of the needless asperity and recrimination would have been spared, which have been occasioned by the orthographical controversy. It was natural for a student of English, like Webster, to propose some changes in our confessedly anomalous and variable orthography. Such changes have actually been proposed by one and another distinguished writer and critic, with and without general acquiescence. Other changes have made or found their way into general use, without the

formality of a recommendation by any dictionary maker or critic, simply from considerations of convenience and analogy. The great majority of those urged by Webster have some show of reason in their favor. But on such a point it is not to be expected that reason, but custom, should decide. A few that were obviously suggested by reasons which would only have weight with an etymologist, naturally found no response in the minds of the mass of educated men, and cannot and ought not to be urged.

In 1829, an abridgment, in octavo, of the quarto dictionary was prepared by Mr. J. E. Worcester and Prof. C. A. Goodrich. This dictionary gives the definitions very much abridged, and omits the illustrative quotations and the extended etymologies. It was designed to serve as a dictionary for the uses of all those who could not afford the expense of the larger work. It was received with great favor, and had an extensive circulation, and soon became the popular dictionary of the country. In this edition, certain extreme peculiarities of Webster, in respect to orthography, were not insisted on.

A few years after, a reprint of the quarto was effected in England, under the supervision of Mr. E. H. Barker; but neither the title, *American Dictionary*, nor the reputation of its editor, recommended it to general favor. Though Webster's improvements were acknowledged to be important, yet the prestige of Johnson had not been weakened, and the new zeal for the study of English philology had not been kindled. The merits of Webster as a definer were acknowledged by the English, by borrowing liberally of his materials to construct dictionaries of their own.

In 1841, Dr. Webster published a second edition of the large dictionary in two royal-octavo volumes. A large list of new words was appended to the original, with brief definitions. Some special labor was bestowed in revision, but the work was not greatly altered nor much improved.

In 1848, an entirely new issue of Webster, as revised by Prof. C. A. Goodrich, was published in a single crown octavo or small quarto volume. Great pains were bestowed

upon this edition by the editor and publishers. The matter of the two previous editions was carefully revised. Many new words were added. New definitions were given to explain new senses of old words, and to fix more precisely those which had already been current. Nearly all the matter of the original edition, with very much that was new, was compressed into a single handsome volume, and brought within the reach of almost every citizen. To avoid all reasonable objections on the score of orthography, the words, the spelling of which had been most complained of, were spelled in the two methods. The publication of this edition of Webster, was a memorable event in the history of lexicography in America. Mr. Worcester's dictionary, in large octavo, had been published the year previous, and an earnest and somewhat acrimonious controversy arose between the publishers and friends of the two dictionaries, which has continued, with some abatements, till the present time. Simultaneously with this issue of the original unabridged dictionary, appeared a revised edition of the octavo abridgment, with the addition of groups of synonymous words, without definitions.

In 1859, the large dictionary was again issued, in what is called the pictorial edition. Some fifteen hundred handsome cuts were furnished in an appendix, the most of which illustrate to the eye objects that cannot be described to the ear, in conformity with a suggestion originally given by Locke, and followed to a limited extent by Bailey. An appendix of some ten thousand new words, with carefully considered definitions, was also added. An appendix of synonyms, newly defined and discriminated, by Professor Goodrich, was also added, which give a special value to this edition. Without committing ourselves to the accuracy and justness of all these distinctions, we think it is no more than true to say, that, for compactness, convenience, and general usefulness, it is the best dictionary of English synonyms to be found in the language.

We have already quoted from Prof. Kingsley the prophecy written in 1829, that "no new English dictionary will

hereafter serve, either at home or abroad, for popular use, which does not contain many of the additions and corrections of Webster." This prophecy has been fulfilled, as the schoolmen would say, *in sensu eminentiori* — far more widely and emphatically than could have been anticipated. Since that time, every defining dictionary published in England has borrowed liberally from Webster. Even Smart's enlargement of Walker, though designed chiefly as a pronouncing dictionary, has taken words and definitions from this source. The most important dictionaries published since Webster's, are Boag's Imperial Lexicon, 1848; Craig's Etymological, Technological, and Pronouncing Dictionary, 1849; Ogilvie's Imperial Dictionary, English, Technological, and Scientific, 1850; and Wright's Universal Pronouncing Dictionary and General Expositor, 1855. Of these, the largest, the most expensive and the best, is Ogilvie's Imperial Dictionary, which is published in two volumes, with a supplement. It is handsomely printed, and was the first of modern dictionaries to introduce a second time the fashion of illustrating by cuts, which Bailey had original introduced. This dictionary has taken at least three fourths of its matter from Webster, with few alterations. Some additions have been made, and some improvements. Craig is excellent and original in his definition of technological terms, and in this particular is deserving the highest confidence and respect; but the impression of Webster is seen on every page. Wright is Websterian throughout; and Boag, which is an inferior book, has also taken liberally from Webster. Even the supplement of Ogilvie is largely indebted to Goodrich's revision of Webster in 1848. So entire, obvious, and acknowledged are the transfers from Webster in Ogilvie, that it cannot be reprinted or imported into this country, under the law of copyright.

But notwithstanding these attestations to the excellence of Webster's as a defining dictionary, we are far from believing that it is perfect even in this respect. The defects of Webster as a definer, are, first, that he has not always exhibited the various senses of words in the order of their

actual growth and historical development. Dr. Webster, in noticing the principal faults of Johnson's Dictionary, very justly observes: "There is a primary sense of every word, from which all the others have proceeded; and whenever this can be discovered, this sense should stand first in order." We observe that in the arrangement of his own definitions, Webster aims in general to follow this rule; but he does not do this invariably. Occasionally, we may say not unfrequently, a secondary meaning is given first of all, and afterwards the primary. Again, Webster does not seem clearly to have fixed in his own mind which is to be regarded as a primary meaning; whether the generic or general meaning, as philosophically conceived, or the physical, sensuous use, to which in the order of time it was first applied. The last is often indicated by the etymology; and it would seem that, whatever be the principle of arrangement adopted, it should be followed with uniformity and rigor, so that the mind should follow, from one meaning to another, aided by the natural development of the thoughts.

Again, Webster often gives as a distinct meaning, that which is simply a special application of a meaning already defined. His numbered meanings are far too numerous, and the attempted definition of each of these, tends to confusion and embarrassment. The eye runs down a long list numbering ten, twenty, or thirty so-called meanings of a familiar word. If one half or one third of those are in no sense distinct conceptions, but only particular applications of a meaning already defined, the mind is thrown out of harmony with its own sense of order. In obedience to its author's guidance, it seeks to find a difference where there is none, and gaining no satisfaction, is confused, bewildered, and disgusted. This fault is not peculiar to Webster, but was adopted by him from Johnson. It was in strict accordance with the theory of constructing definitions on which Johnson acted; namely, the theory that the meaning was to be suggested by quoting a passage from an eminent author, rather than explicated in a comprehensive and clear proposition. Webster's theory was different from that of John-

son, so far as either had a theory ; but Webster was greatly influenced by the practice of the great lexicographer ; and while he would fain introduce a new element, he was not always true to his own better method, if indeed he was distinctly aware of what his method was.

Webster is untrue to himself in another particular. We often find that he appends a string of words to a clear and well-announced definition, as though any effect could follow from such a course except that of bewildering the mind. It is as though a man should treat you to the sight of a picture sharply drawn and finely colored, giving you time to take from it a clear impression, and should then thrust hastily before your eyes some half dozen somewhat like the original, which rude and badly-colored drawings you see but imperfectly for a moment, and then they are gone.

Again, Webster is sometimes over-diffuse, pedagogical, telling what everybody knows, and which no one needs or cares to hear. Sometimes he is excessively homely, and his plainness and preciseness of speech lead him to violate neatness and good taste, in choosing his words and constructing his sentences. Yet, with all these abatements, he is so thorough and exact, so comprehensive and clear, so painstaking and precise, that, as a defining dictionary, the dictionary of Webster, as a whole, stands foremost in the language. We mean the dictionary in its present form. For we trace in its several editions that constant and steady progress which is the result of faithful consultation of the best authorities, both books and men, and a careful consideration of the thought and language of the new matter which leads to the recasting of borrowed definitions by independent thought. Some of the old matter may be rough in its form, and diffuse in its language ; but, taken together, the old and the new furnish more valuable stores of knowledge, and a better discipline of thought, than can be derived from any other dictionary. We may be amused at Webster's elucidation of the doctrine of *boots*, and his careful enumeration of the several species of that very convenient article. We may laugh outright when told, under

sauce, that "sauce, consisting of stewed apples, is a great article in some parts of New England; but cranberries make the most delicious sauce"; and feel disposed to add, in the strain of friendly admonition so often assumed: 'but at the present price of the fruit, it cannot be recommended for general use.' So too we may enjoy the dry satire with which he defines a *dandy*, to be "a male of the human species who dresses himself like a doll, and who carries his character on his back." But, viewed in another light, these are examples of that striking individuality which has impressed itself upon the body of his definitions, and made them to be so often the fresh and living thoughts which are adapted to take root in the soil of an inquisitive and earnest spirit, and to bear fruit and grow.

It ought also to be remembered that Webster, as we have it now, is the fruit of a half century of labor from a single mind, and has been quietly appropriating to itself the thought and knowledge of scores of superior men, with whom its author and editors have come in contact. Like an old growth of any kind, it bears marks of earlier times. But, though old, it has not ceased to grow, and its newest wood is fresh and vigorous, while many of its fruits are both fair and mature.

In the year 1839, Dr. Charles Richardson published the first edition of his *New Dictionary of the English Language*. The reader of the Introduction would gather from its somewhat confused and pedantic exposition of the author's plan and principles, that he was about to furnish a philosophical dictionary of the language, developed from its etymology. He contends, with great earnestness, that a word has but a single proper meaning, and fortifies himself by the authority of Scaliger, who says: "*Unius namque vocis una tantum sit significatio propria ac princeps.*"

But he does not inform his readers what he means by the proper meaning of the word, whether the original signification of its root, so far as that can be traced up to a sensuous origin, or that generic meaning which is rarely explained in dictionaries, and of which the so-called different senses of a

word are only specific and subordinate conceptions, made special by the *differentiae* that its various uses develop. The illustrations given of his doctrine would lead us to conclude that he means the first, for he quotes from Locke the oft-repeated example that *spirit* originally signified *breath*, and that the several senses of spirit are to be explained by a reference to its origin. But he leaves us still in doubt whether this original sense is the single and proper sense of the word. His own practice in defining does not relieve our embarrassment. We consult his pages and select at random word after word, expecting to find that his method of defining will illustrate his principles of definition. But we are disappointed in finding no method at all. It is true he arranges groups or classes of words about the root-word, or the word which is nearest the root. The signification of this primitive, he seeks to derive from its etymology. But this sense is often not clearly and vividly given ; and when it is distinctly given, it is not made the starting point of a series of well-developed and historically arranged secondary significations, but these significations are huddled together with little order, with no felicity of expression, and scarcely a trace of that lucid arrangement which, of itself, indicates the history of their growth. The definitions are usually not by propositions, but by words or phrases. Many important senses are not stated. The significations appropriate to the noun, the verb, the adjective, and adverb belonging to a common group, are rarely separated, and never distinctly considered, each in their place. A few terms, having more or less appropriateness to the root-word and its derivatives, are hastily huddled together, and the work is laid aside as complete. We know of no work of such pretensions in which the performance so wretchedly belies the promise, and the attainment is such a mockery of the aims, as does this dictionary of Richardson. Its chief value consists in its quotations, which, being selected in so great measure from the earlier English writers, present to the eye the history of many a word, as it glances down the well-arranged series of sentences that illustrate the progress and changes of its

meanings. These quotations, to the philosophic student, do, of themselves, supersede the necessity of formal definitions in a great measure; and hence, to the critic of English literature, Richardson's dictionary is a most instructive and delightful book; and the philosophical and curious student of words will find mines of wealth in its well-stored pages. But there are few that understand its value, or are interested in its contents. For the ordinary purposes of a dictionary of reference and consultation, it is simply worthless, and it stands upon the book-shelves, or lies upon the table of many a well-furnished library, simply as a necessary incumbrance or an ornamental piece of literary furniture, for which there is no imaginable use or possible application.

In the year 1846, Mr. J. E. Worcester gave to the public his *Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language* in large octavo. It had the largest vocabulary of English words, and words called English, that at that time had been collected for any English dictionary, and was in all respects creditable to the industry, taste, and judgment of its author. Unfortunately for its widest circulation, it soon encountered a formidable rival in the unabridged Webster, which was published the year after, and which was offered at so low a price as to attract public attention. The points in which superiority was claimed for Worcester were, the conformity of its orthography to actual English usage, its careful notation of the pronunciation of each vowel sound, the complete historical exhibition of the several methods of pronunciation adopted by all the eminent orthoepists, given in a very compact form, and the general excellence and accuracy of its definitions. In one of these particulars, its superiority cannot be questioned. Its historical account of the various modes in which every word has been pronounced, is complete, and, to those curious in such matters, is interesting and instructive. The definitions were necessarily, to a great extent, expressed by single words. They could not be given by propositions, within the limits of an octavo volume. As in the great mass of English dictionaries, these are thrown together with little or no arrangement according to their

history or development, and are held together by few threads of connection. Upon its claim to superior merits as a standard of orthography and pronunciation, we express no opinion. The question would, in any country but ours, be dismissed as unworthy of popular discussion. The differences would be regarded as trivial, in comparison with other points, and a greater liberty would be accorded to the preferences of individual philologists and scholars than our very knowing but tyrannical democracy are disposed to allow.

Encouraged by success, Mr. Worcester devoted himself for years to the enlargement of his octavo edition, and with the aid of accomplished assistants, in 1860, issued a very large quarto volume; the latest, but we presume not the last, of the series of American dictionaries. It is a beautiful volume; the library edition being, in binding, paper, and type, altogether unexceptionable. The page is one on which the eye rests with entire satisfaction, which, as we notice the variety of its letter and the judicious skill shown in the distribution of its paragraphs, rises to positive delight. The vocabulary is enormous, presenting over one hundred thousand words. In orthography and pronunciation it is substantially like the octavo, there being no occasion to enlarge it in these particulars. In etymology and definition it is so greatly altered as to be an entirely new work. In both these respects it is a compilation from all accessible English authorities not founded upon Webster, and has been executed with taste, accuracy, and skill. Besides, there are distinct traces of original research bestowed here and there upon single words, which show the hand and sagacity of a genuine word-hunter, and make us wish that the whole work was less a compilation and more an original. We are sorry that the author was shut off from the use of Webster's labors, in the original and the English copyists, for otherwise we should have had from him a *dictionnaire des dictionnaires*. We think, however, Worcester has quite too often relied upon other dictionary makers, especially in his treatment of *special* or *quasi-technical* words. In many such cases we would rather have the mature opinion of

Mr. Worcester himself, formed by the aid of his authorities, than the definitions which he quotes in their words. For example, in defining *chemistry*, Mr. Worcester, like Dr. Webster, quotes from authorities, neither of them giving an original definition. Unfortunately the best definition quoted by Worcester from *Brande*, is inferior to the best quoted by Webster from *Ure*, and the definition of neither comes up to our present conceptions of the science. What we need and what we require is, not that the dictionary maker should surround himself with authorities, and cull the best fruit which they offer, but that he should, with the aid of authorities, work out an independent product of his own. Under *imagination*, *nature*, *idea*, which are very richly illustrated, we gain more information from the materials cited from authors of mark, than from the conceptions elaborated by the author himself. Again, it is to be remembered that dictionary makers, even the makers of special dictionaries, are often men of second-rate ability and of superficial research, and that so-called authorities are therefore anything but authority. Even such books as Taylor's *Elements of Thought*, and Fleming's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, should both be used with caution, and need that to them the consulter "bring a judgment equal or superior." We regret that Mr. Worcester did not avail himself of Heyse's *Fremdwörterbuch*, for he would have found him most serviceable and trustworthy in interpreting more satisfactorily a large class of words of foreign origin. For example, in seeking an exact explanation of *brocard*, a word used by Sir William Hamilton, we found no satisfaction in Worcester, but were completely answered in *Heyse*.

In his etymologies, Worcester exhibits the results of industrious compilation, in respect of words of which the derivation is tolerably well settled; but there is little evidence of special research beyond that of the compiler. He spares us the fanciful and fantastic conjectures of Webster, but he is not so full in giving the kindred words and roots in other languages. Nor do his etymologies serve to stimulate to this kind of study. The history of the word's derivation is

not so distinctly indicated as it ought to be; the successive forms it has assumed since it left the root, in the different languages and dialects through which it has passed, should be given in all their fulness, and arranged in the exactest order. This can be done most successfully in those words which have originated in the Romanic languages, a class of words of which Mr. Worcester's etymologies have been less thoroughly wrought. Much remains to be done in this department. The new veins which have been worked by the comparative philologists on the continent, can be made to yield far richer and more satisfactory results for our English etymology than have yet been given to the English reader. We have before us better and more satisfying etymologies than Worcester has given to the following words: *crawl*, *crayon*, *creak*, *creance*, *crease*, *creat*, *creel*, *creese*, *creole*, *crest*, *crimp*, *crimson*, *crude*, *crust*, *cry*, *cubeb*, *cucking-stool*, *cuckold*, *cudden*, *cuddy*, *cuirasse*, *culdee*, *cullion*, *cullis*, *cumber*, *curd*, *daint* and *dainty*, *dairy*, *dais*, *dame*, *damp*, *damsel*, all occurring within twelve pages.

The definitions of Worcester are given, to a good degree, in propositions; and these are numbered, and often accompanied with illustrative passages from the best authors. The number of special definitions is generally less than in Webster, who, as we have already observed, is, like Johnson, quite too fond of making distinctions where there are no differences. We have noticed occasionally that Worcester omits an important signification given by Webster. In respect to fulness and precision, he falls below Webster in general, though in some words he surpasses him greatly. In respect of neatness and taste he is rarely open to exception, which is more than can be affirmed of Webster. He has to a far greater degree the same fault which we have already noticed in Webster, of following a clear and good definition with a string of quasi-synonymous words, which in such a connection should always be spared, tending only to vagueness and confusion. In respect of that prime requisite, an orderly development from the primary sense to the secondary, and so on to the more remote, that *lucidus ordo*

which by the force of juxta-position causes a train of light to flash along a line of what would otherwise be dead and abstract propositions; in respect to this prime requisite of a perfect dictionary we discern no improvement upon his predecessors.

We ought not to omit the illustrative cuts, which though not so numerous nor so large as those in Webster, are far more convenient for use, being inserted upon the page, and at the word which they illustrate. The synonyms, also, have been carefully compiled from the highest English authorities, and though they are not as thoroughly wrought, nor as invigorating as those of Goodrich, are a very valuable feature of the edition. The notes, often given as postscripts, frequently convey much useful and pertinent matter.

The advocate of Worcester would insist, very properly, on its general excellence as a whole, and on the uniform good taste, correctness, and trustworthiness which characterize every feature. The advocate for Webster would, on his part, recommend Webster for the greater fulness, thoroughness, sprightliness, and thought-awakening power which belong to its definitions, and to the various excellencies which can only be secured by the labor and care of years.

But comparisons are said to be always odious, and we know that in this case they will be especially so, as they will be little likely to satisfy the ardent partisans of either dictionary: "*Non nostrum tantas componere lites.*" There are points of superiority which are peculiar to each. For special purposes, each has the advantage. In certain particulars each suffers under serious defects. They are both most honorable to the scholarship of our country.

But while we show, in these dictionaries of Webster and Worcester, what America has done for English lexicography in the past, the mother country is in the field with an imposing project for the future. The newly-formed Philological Society of London has issued proposals for the co-operation of English scholars, at home and abroad, in a thorough reading of all accessible English literature, so that every word ever used by any English writer and its meaning may be devel-

oped from, and illustrated by, some passage in which it occurs. The project is very comprehensive, and if it is thoroughly executed must lead to the collection of a vast mass of materials for the use of some body of competent elaborators, if such a body can be found. It is obvious that, after all this reading shall have been done, and its products returned to the head bureau, and even after these shall have been properly arranged, indexed, and transcribed, that then the proper work of the dictionary maker will commence. He must look through the various passages cited, eliminate from the frightful masses that present themselves in connexion with single words, all those which repeat and illustrate the same meaning, arrange those retained, after some principle of development and order, and then begin to think about them. Let us suppose the process to be successfully achieved, and each word to have been decomposed by the solvent of analysis, and recomposed and arranged by some master of the architechtonic art. The result will be an immense, voluminous thesaurus of old English literature, exhibiting the uses of myriads of half-formed and unformed English words, that are now disused altogether; among which there are here and there to be seen the germs of our developed English speech. What a contribution of words, meanings, and illustrative quotations will such a book as Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* present! What massive and resplendent stores will the writings of our affluent and golden-mouthed Jeremy Taylor pour forth! We say nothing of quaint John Donne and a score of divines who, like him, rioted in their own creative energy.

We wish this project success. Whatever comes of it, whether little or much, will be good, and can only tend to good. It is most refreshing to observe in it a sign of awakening interest in the language itself. As the result of it, the studies of our younger scholars will be directed to English philology, and the ardor which might have been expended upon fields more remote and less promising, will be kindled at the prospect of throwing new light upon the derivation and syntax of the dear old English. The study of comparative

philology now so fascinating, and soon so likely to be generally prosecuted, will be pursued with special reference to the illustration of the origin and meaning of our household words. The history of this complex and conglomerate structure, called the English language, will be traced out step by step, so far as extant books and records will allow, and English scholars will no longer be forced to confess, with shame, that foreign students can give them lessons in their mother tongue.

But while we are waiting for the fruits of this complicated scheme of coöperative labor, that will certainly be cumbrous in its movements, and perhaps doubtful in its results, we may express the hope that a better English dictionary than any we have yet seen, will sooner or later be at the service of the educated men of our country, and will lend its plastic influence to the training of our youth. We ought not to be content with what Webster and Worcester have done. However high may be our opinion of the value of their labors, and however hearty our gratitude for their unthanked perseverance and fidelity, we cannot but be aware that our neighbors on the continent are provided with better dictionaries than the best of our own. We have at hand the very common German dictionary of Heyse; and to give an example of the way in which he develops the meaning of a word, we translate the following :

‘ *Seele* (*the soul*), from the same root with *see* (Goth. *saiws*); therefore the original signification is, moving power. 1. The original ground or faculty of life and sensation; or that spiritual substance which gives life and motion to every living creature, in contrast with body (even animals have *souls*, but the *soul* of man only is rational). In the case of man (*a*), in the widest sense, the whole spiritual substance endowed with reason and will, including the intellect and heart (hence we say, etc.); (*b*) in a narrow sense the capacity or seat of the sensations and feelings, and the consequent emotions, inclinations, etc., in contrast with the thinking power (as when we say, etc.). 2. A being endowed with a rational soul; a man or person (as when we say, she is a

good *soul*; the city numbers ten thousand souls, etc.). 3. Improperly, i. e. by transfer, the element of anything that gives life, efficiency, or activity; also the constituent that is preëminent, most important, or essential (as, for example, he was the *soul* of the company; love is the *soul* of the Christian virtues, etc.). 4. The interior or inmost part of a body, particularly if it is hollow, or filled with loose, transparent material (as, in firearms, the hollow space of the barrel; the pith of a quill, etc.). 5. A kind of fish. (Then follow the various compounds).'

This may serve as a single example of the management of a word requiring a brief explication. The life and spirit in this case, depends in a great degree on the illustrations, of which we have given but a small portion.

We might refer our readers to Freund's Latin Lexicon, as edited by Andrews, also to Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, for examples of definitions that are superior, in completeness and especially in order and development, to the majority of those found in our best English dictionaries.

We have made these extracts and references to show that we may and ought to expect a more perfect dictionary of the English language than has yet been furnished. Whether this dictionary is to grow out of the investigations set on foot by the Philological Society and the materials which will in this way be gathered, or whether it shall come from a recasting of Webster or Worcester, or of both combined, or whether it shall be the product of the life-labors of some veteran philologist and his helpers, it will certainly come; for it is demanded by the wants of our scholars, and, sooner or later, it will appear in answer to that demand.

What ought to be its vocabulary? On what principles should its words be selected or rejected? Should all the words that have ever been used by any English author be included, however obsolete or antiquated, however foreign or fantastical? If any words are to be rejected, at what date shall we begin, and what principle of elimination shall we adopt? It is easier to ask than to answer these questions. One or two principles can only be indicated. How-

ever desirable it would be to have a complete vocabulary of all the words ever used by any English author, a *Thesaurus totius Anglicitatis*, the attempt to attach one to a dictionary adapted for common use even of scholars, would fail by reason of its own bulkiness. Such a vocabulary would require extended explanations and references, and it must necessarily leave in the shade the more modern English words and their definitions. There seems to be no escape from this difficulty, except by having two dictionaries: one of *Archaic*, and the other of *Modern English*. But how shall we fix the limits between the old and the new? Perhaps the period fixed by Johnson is as appropriate as any at which to draw the line: only it should be understood that every antiquated or disused meaning of what are by this rule determined to be modern words, should be carefully explained; and the more carefully, if it throws any light on the history of the word, or carries us a single step nearer to the sensuous meaning of its root. To all such significations, special prominence and the fullest explanations should be accorded, in order to secure spirit and intellectual interest. Then, again, if the new English word is clearly traceable to the older forms, which occur in Tyndale and Chaucer, all these older forms should be given, in their historical order, as a part of the development of the etymology of the word in question. If this is thoroughly done, much of the old English would in fact be incorporated in the lexicon of the new, and in the way in which it is interesting to an ordinary scholar, by illustrating the history of the words with which he is familiar.

Especial pains should be taken to collect and trace out the language of common life, even its homeliest words and its most familiar phrases. Wherever these are to be found, whether they linger in the remoter districts of old or New England, or can be detected in the outlandish dialect of neglected families and unvisited hamlets; whether they are preserved in the ballads or stories of other generations, or have vexed the critics of the older writers of plays, they should all be incorporated in the vocabulary. These are all

worthy objects of the quest of the hunter of words. The botanist penetrates into the darkest swamps and the most hidden glens, that he may find a new moss or track out an unnamed fern. The entomologist casts his net at evening twilight in all by-places and low valleys, that he may entangle some mote that has before been unobserved, or ensnare some insect that has been so unhappy as not to be arranged in his appropriate company, and to be designated by some unpronounceable name. Surely the object is as worthy, and should be prosecuted with equal zeal, when we seek to find an old but lost word or phrase which has been current in other generations, which gave a more pointed expression to every day wisdom, or vividly spoke some striking thought or warm emotion, or which casts new light upon the outer or inner life of our forefathers. It has been too much the custom with the makers of English dictionaries, to overlook this class of words, as altogether unworthy of their notice; and to consider the so-called language of books to be alone sufficiently dignified to command their attention. The general opinion of scholars now inclines in the opposite direction: and with good reason; for it is believed that in the common speech of common men much of pure and idiomatic English can either be detected or accounted for. Surely it is of far greater importance that words of this class should be carefully gathered up, than that the vocabulary should be ambitiously swelled by words which have emerged from the addled brain of some affected scribbler to fall dead at the moment of their birth; and which, having never passed into the common life of the language, would be forgotten forever, if the author of the dictionary did not set up a monument to their memory. It is a pity also that it should be so often his painful duty to bestow so much space that might be better employed, upon long rows of compounded words which explain themselves, and which propagate faster than they can be written down.

It is a more difficult question to answer, whether terms strictly scientific should appear at all in a dictionary which has for its chief end to exhibit and explain the language of

common life and literature. We have observed that the earlier dictionaries were devoted especially to the explanation of the more uncommon words, and that Johnson was very copious upon all the scientific terms of his time, so that his dictionary was in some sort a miniature encyclopædia. Webster also took great pains to collect and define the scientific terms of the newer and older sciences, and to define them with the exact and technical precision which professors and text-books require. Worcester has followed the example of Johnson and Webster.

We question somewhat whether it is wise to attempt to include all the terms of science and art in a dictionary for common use. It is far easier to collect such terms than it is the words of common life and of common books; for they are easily found in technical dictionaries and scientific treatises, and it costs less effort to find and arrange a score of them, than it does to develop a single special signification of a so-called common word. It is comparatively easy to define them with exact precision, and in most learned phrase, for the work of science consists in making definitions, and she records and indicates her progress by these formal petrifications. Hence dictionary makers are tempted to expend much space and zeal upon them, and to enlarge greatly on the importance of having at hand the ready means of explaining the technical and scientific terms which occur in our reading. But here the question presents itself: in what kind of reading? If it be the reading of common books, then it is reasonable to provide the explanation. Such words as *polarization* and *polarized*, are supposed to be so generally used and known that almost any author would not hesitate to employ them, if he had occasion. But when the terms are not so far popularized that they would be freely used—when they would not be likely to occur, except in writing or discourse that is properly scientific, they seem to be out of place in a dictionary for general use. Every science and art has its glossary, dictionary, or encyclopædia. Definitions severely scientific can only be given in technical language, and hence, cannot readily be

understood by the very persons for whom the definition should be given in a dictionary, if given at all. To introduce such terms and definitions beyond the limits prescribed, seems to be an affectation. The effect must be to occupy a large and still larger portion of the space which might be better used, and to leave little room for the results of a more faithful consideration and a more copious illustration of what are properly English words.

On the other hand, wherever the words of conversation and literature have technical as well as general meanings, whether these be legal, military, or maritime, etc., or a more special and limited signification, as in the moral or political sciences, the rule which we have given would require that these technical meanings be indicated and defined.

But if we suppose the words to be selected, the next question is: What shall we do with them? We reply, first of all we must ascertain whence they came, and what are the changes which they have undergone—the metamorphoses through which they have passed—since they came into being. To trace the history of a word from the beginning, through the various phases it has assumed, is to give its etymology. Sometimes the root lies far back in the past, and can be traced through the Romanic dialects, by a regular succession of changes, to the Latin, and thence still further. Sometimes the word is taken from the Latin or the Greek by direct transfer, as is the case with a multitude of terms in law, science, and art. Sometimes the root is out of sight, and cannot be unearthed, but shows its being and its fruitfulness by the cognate and similar growths which reveal unmistakably a common origin, as is the case in the great number of words of the Teutonic family, where the root may not be reached, but the sprouts are seen to come from one centre of life. The use of these etymological researches, when they carry us out of the domain of our own language, are manifold to the scholar. On these we need not here enlarge. To the common man they are of little interest, except their results are so exhibited as to throw light upon the meaning of the word, and waken a

more vivid apprehension of its real import. This result is most effectually accomplished, when the sensuous origin of a word or thought or feeling is developed, and our apprehension of its meaning becomes thereby intensely real and startling.

If the word has sprung up within our own soil, and undergone important changes of form by contraction or composition, the explication of its history, if it be properly so-called, or its etymology, as we usually say, has a fascinating interest for all classes of men. Many of the etymologies which Trench so happily illustrates, are of this character; and the interest with which his volumes have been received, is an indication of how important it is that this part of every dictionary should be fully treated. It is to be remembered, also, that a very considerable portion of those who use an English dictionary, may be supposed to know something of one or more languages besides their own. All these comprehend something of the doctrine of the derivation of words, and are capable of following with interest the history of a word to its radical, and of finding instruction in the several phases which the common root assumes in different languages and dialects.

Whether the etymologies be given for any or all of these classes, it is essential that they be given in the most complete and thorough manner possible. It serves no purpose whatever, except to make a show of learning, to give the root-word, or a few cognate forms, if no thought or history is either suggested or derived. The rule should invariably be observed, to give the whole of what may be called the underground existence of the word which the recent philology has been able to track out, to give every part of it in historical order, not omitting a single phase or step in the progressive growth. Let all the offshoots and side-growths into other languages be given, so far as any purpose of instruction or convenience can thereby be suggested. Especially let the strange and capricious formations which have sprung up within the English soil, be as thoroughly sought out and explained as the means of the student will

allow. Above all, let all the etymological researches and conclusions be so conducted and exhibited as to throw the clearest and happiest light upon the meaning.

This leads to the *Haupt-Sache* in the dictionary — the definition. We have insisted abundantly that this should not, because in ordinary cases it cannot, be given by a single word. It must be expressed by a phrase; or, in more technical language, a sentence-form which fully explicates or unfolds all the distinctive qualities, attributes, and relations which are implied or unfolded in the conception denoted by the word. Without discussing the metaphysical question whether there is or can be more than a single meaning to a word, and whether it is possible to express this, we accept the commonly received notion that one word has several senses. If this be assumed, it may also be taken for true, that the word did not have all these meanings at the outset, but that they were developed one from the other by historical growth. This is indicated by the actual history of a multitude of words, which can be traced backward, step by step, from the tropical to the literal sense, from the transitive or derived to the primitive or original. If there were any need or occasion, this progressive development could be demonstrated to be necessary, from the laws of the mind itself, and the processes by which the intellect builds up its conceptions; advancing from the sensuous to the spiritual, from the near and simpler to the remote and complex. What the mind of the individual must do in forming its conceptions, that the mind of the race has done in developing the meanings of its words.

It is the duty of the definer, first, to be well assured that he has collected all the senses of his words; then, that he has expressed them in well-thought and adequate phrases; and then that he has arranged them in the order of their development and historic growth. The last duty is of equal importance with either of the others. The successful discharge of this duty will contribute quite as much to the value and the instructive interest of his work, as the satisfactory performance of the other two. Nay, it will do more

than anything besides to elevate the dictionary from being a dry and lifeless aggregation of unorganized matter to a living and organized product that is animate itself, and can quicken to life in others. The mere arrangement of well-chosen definitions, in such an order, must be a discipline of thought to the dullest intellect. Even if it cannot see the the relations after which the arrangement proceeds, or the principle which gives it beauty and order, it cannot fail to be impressed by the order and beauty itself, and to feel itself taken up and carried forward from one sense to another by an energy that it can feel, but cannot explain. But more can be done than simply to arrange the meanings in the order of their history. The development of one from another can be explained by a word or a phrase. It can be shown how and why one meaning has followed another; how a word which signifies one thing at one time, has come, by an unlooked-for yet not a violent transition, to mean something very unlike. A single phrase, or connecting clause, will often explain some of these capricious changes by which a word takes a sense directly the opposite to that which it ought properly to bear. Indeed, there is scarcely any limit to the light and interest which a few brief words, rightly disposed and uttered in the right places, might diffuse over the otherwise dreary pages of the dictionary. Were due attention given to this single requisition, the dictionary, instead of being a stupid and repulsive book, might even become one of the liveliest and the most attractive. If this rule were observed, it would follow of course that the order of definitions would, in every case when it was possible, be drawn from its etymology. Starting from the sensuous image, of which every word, even the most unsensuous, is the "faded metaphor," it would proceed to the next remove, and then to the next, till all the senses—the real, spiritual, literal, tropical, the obvious and natural, the transitive and the capricious—had been developed; and the whole should be so presented as to form a naturally developed and symmetrical unity; the whole series should seem, as it were, to grow before the eye. Then following

backward the word, through the history of its root, the growth of this organic whole beneath the ground and out of sight, would seem to be as natural and as beautiful as that which had been traced in its developed significations. Etymology and definition would be seen to be bound together, by one law, into one life, as are the root that grows beneath the soil and the stately tree that towers in the sky. The definer should not stop here, nor be content if he can add anything besides that will impart knowledge or awaken thought, provided it be *apropos* to his great objects. The variety and fulness of Webster, in efforts of this kind, is greatly to be commended, though it led him to an occasional error of judgment and taste.

The definitions should be illustrated by quotations, showing the actual use of the word in a given meaning by a writer of authority, when such a quotation is required to substantiate the legitimacy of the word, or to explain and enforce its signification. Indeed such quotations are often required to impart a concrete and living interest to what would be otherwise an abstruse and abstract explanation, or to serve as an example guiding to the full apprehension of the real meaning and proper use of the word. Words are made for sentences; they have their life and meaning from their connection; and it is only as seen in living and connected discourse that their import or use can be fully understood. By all means, then, let us have illustrative quotations, given freely and variously, from authors new and old, high and low, wherever quotations are needed; but let them not be introduced for the sake of the form, where the meaning does not need to be sustained or illustrated in this way. We scarcely need say that some regard should be had to the literary value of the quotation itself, in addition to its value for the use of the dictionary. It were desirable, certainly, that the pages, which are usually somewhat dull, should sparkle, occasionally with a pithy proverb, a lively simile, or a stirring truth.

Quotations are often and properly introduced as authorities for the proper use and proper definition of a word.

Ought authorities to be given for new words or new meanings, when no quotation is made? Should the name of an author be given in whom the word happens to be found, or the name of the person or the author be stated, to whom the maker of the dictionary is indebted for a definition? In certain cases this may be done. If the word is a novelty, and its legitimacy is likely to be questioned; if the inquiry be started whether it has ever been sanctioned by an author of repute, it is well to refer to the author by name; though, in such a case, it were better to quote the passage also. But if no question about the word is likely to arise, then it seems a mere affectation to name an authority. This is especially apparent when the word has passed into very general use, and when the names of fifty authors could as readily be given for it, as the name of one. The same remark will hold good of the definitions. We do not care to be referred to some antediluvian or mythical personage called an encyclopaedia, as voucher for the correctness of a definition, or to be confronted, at every turn, with some dictionary or personage, known or unknown, as the responsible originator of an unquestioned definition, even though it be scientific and technical. If there be a difference of opinion as to the appropriate definition of a term or word, or if the phraseology used be matter of question, then it may be proper to indicate the one preferred, and the authority. One objection to the continued reference to authorities for the form's sake, is, that it is merely a form, and means nothing, while it seems to have great significance. We have another objection which is more serious; and that is, that the practice sinks the responsible author or editor into a mere collector of the opinions of other men, who distrusts his own judgment so far as not to be willing to be held accountable for his own thinking. We do not expect him to be *an courant* with all science and literature, but we desire him to assume the attitude of a man who is able to judge of the correctness of his definitions, or of the competence of those authorities, living or dead, books or men, from whom he derives them. Any other attitude than this, however modest or

deferential it may seem, is likely to sink the maker of a dictionary into a mere collector of things of doubtful trustworthiness, and to train him to think his responsibility is fully discharged, when he has cited some sort of a dictionary or encyclopaedia. We do not object that the author should give due credit, in his preface, to any sources from which he has derived assistance, but we would prefer that a dictionary might seem to be the work of its author, as it ought to be in fact, and that we might have the comfort of believing in its infallible authority, without being reminded at every turn, of the poor mortal who furnished the meaning, and being obliged to ask "Who is he?" or, what is still worse, without being referred to some antiquated dictionary, that we more than suspect is of second-rate or doubtful authority. We know that Johnson set a bad example in this direction; but the example is a bad one for all that, and we wish it might be abandoned.

But our reader will by this time be ready to exclaim: 'Enough, thou hast convinced us that a perfect English dictionary can never be produced.' We beg pardon; the inference is not warranted by the data. Rather should we infer, if Johnson, Webster, and Worcester have done so much to improve our English lexicography, and if the lexicography of other languages has been so nearly perfected, we may certainly hope to see, at some time, an approximation to the ideally perfect English dictionary.

ARTICLE III.

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS VALUE OF OUR
NATIONAL UNION.

BY REV. B. SEARS, PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

THOUGH it is not the usual practice of this journal, devoted to theological sciences, to turn aside from its main purpose to discuss topics connected with passing events, there is something so extraordinary and so momentous in the state of public affairs at this moment, that we cannot well refrain from giving it the consideration which, from its great importance, it deserves. We propose, therefore, in the present Article, to hold up to view, and to present in various lights, the subject of the moral and religious value of our national union.

Preliminary to all other inquiries on the general topic, is this fundamental one: What are we, the people of these United States, *historically*? What, in respect to us, are the tendencies of all past history?

We are too apt to consider our history as beginning with the landing of the Pilgrim fathers. We must go far back of that event, if we would apprehend our history in all its vast extent. For the existence of this nation there were preparations in the past, too distant in the view to be seen even by the wisest of the founders of our National Union; and there were reserved for the future, developments affecting the destiny of our country which no human wisdom could foresee. Our present remarkable condition is owing more to the great laws of historical development, than to the designs of men. The force of the accumulated wisdom and experience which moves the great mass of humanity in its progress, advances also individual nations in their career, unless they put themselves out of the line of progress. Not only the present age in general, but the present position of our country in particular, is a result which it required all the

past to produce. Our government, which may be regarded politically as the purest and truest exponent of what is peculiar to modern civilization, could never have come into existence but for the elaboration, by all the historic nations that have preceded us, of those processes for advancing the race which it was their province severally to work out. We could not have attained to what we now are, without the preliminary work of the primeval ages, and the industrial improvements inaugurated by the great empires of the East; without the treasures of literature and art bequeathed to us by Athens and Rome; without the renovating and invigorating influence of primitive Christianity; without the tumult, the strife, and the fermentation of the Middle Ages; without the great Reformation of the sixteenth century; without the maintenance of the Protestant faith in England; and without that remarkable training and discipline which made the English colonists of North America so different in character and influence from the Spanish colonists of South America. When the glory of the classic nations of antiquity was passing away, Christianity saved the world from absolute decay, by supplying a moral basis for the perpetual existence of society which had been wanting before; and when, by the revival of learning and by the Reformation, ancient civilization was resuscitated and placed on a Christian foundation, the elements of modern civilization were for the first time combined. The Protestant faith and the Saxon race were brought into contact by a Providential arrangement; and these together have produced a national character never known before in history. From such a lineage, temporal and spiritual, did our Puritan ancestors descend. They brought with them to this country those traits of national and Christian character, and those ideas of government, which they shared in common with the best portion of the English population, leaving behind them what was faulty in the English government and institutions: the aristocratical remains of earlier feudal times. This constitutes the chief difference between the English and American nationalities and governments of the present day.

It was the peculiar province of Greece first to develop the idea of *liberty*, founded on the supreme dignity and authority of the individual soul; and of Rome to develop that of *law*, restraining liberty and keeping it within just limits from a consideration of the higher authority of the state. These two elements of all good government, which were never combined in due proportions in any ancient state, have, under Christianity, the inspirer of a truer liberty and a juster system of law, been united and held more nearly in equipoise in modern times. But even now, in the most favored countries of Europe, this equipoise exists much more extensively in the theory of great political writers than in practice. Even in the British empire, the best governed of any country in Europe, there are disabilities on the one hand, and hereditary privileges on the other, which abate much from the true theory of liberty. In France, neither law nor liberty is what it should be: the one has too much of arbitrary power; the other, if it be allowed any existence at all, degenerates immediately into licentiousness. On the rest of the continent of Europe, if we except one or two petty states, there is little else to be found but law without liberty. Ours is the only great nation in all the world where the modern doctrine of liberty has an unqualified recognition.

To sum up in a few words the results of our historical position as a nation on this continent, we were at the outset British colonies; but not like other colonies, made up of adventurers and outcasts. Our fathers brought with them the high intellectual qualities, the religion, the learning, and the arts of the English people, in the flowering period of their growth and vigor. We were enjoying the spring-tide of Christian civilization when we began our career. On the first day of our colonial existence, we stood, in respect to all that makes a people truly great, where other colonies stand only after centuries of prosperity. The ideas of reform in church and state which our fathers cherished in common with their English brethren, were brought with them, and were planted at the beginning, in a virgin soil, as

the seeds of better civil and religious institutions in time to come. While the process of germination was going on, it was, no doubt, well that the ocean separated us more completely from Europe than it now does from Asia. Hereby a watchful Providence was making provision for the spontaneous growth and unrestrained development of civil and religious freedom, and the institutions growing out of them. Such was the infancy of our nation, itself the select product of the most perfect form of European civilization and social organization, and designed to introduce into the world a new political era. We hold it to be a self-evident truth that, while we owe everything to our English descent, it was just as important that our progenitors should leave England in order to carry out their principles, as it was to be born and educated there. There were home influences, not a few in number, nor unimportant in character, to be thrown off. There were dead weights and clogs to social progress from which it was vitally important that they should set themselves free. There was the incubus of a proud aristocracy, and of a state church, then and still withering the strength and destroying the beauty of the social system of the the mother-country. All these were to be dropped; and only those parts of the English constitution and laws which were sound and healthy were to be adopted and maintained in the new world.

The experience of the colonies under the British rule, the degree of liberty and independence secured to them, partly by their charters and partly by their distance from the governing power, gradually prepared them for the part they were to act, when, by the laws of nature quite as much as by the misgovernment of the mother-country, they were summoned to assert their independence, maintain it through an arduous struggle, and lay the foundations of a government which should give expression to the advanced ideas of a new age.

Just at the time, in a later period, when our government was well consolidated, the ground-work of our national character substantially laid, and our political experience properly

matured, the great natural barriers to intercourse which had hitherto kept distant nations asunder, and which especially separated us widely from the old world, were removed, and a great and salutary change was made in our position and relations to the rest of the world. This and other radical changes, wrought by the discoveries of science and their applications to art, were just what the world at that time most needed as a means of progress. But no part of the world was more benefited by them than our new and enterprising country, where there were such vast undeveloped resources. The great enterprises which have of late so distinguished the American people, could not have been carried on without these discoveries. Nor could we, without them, have had that intimate connection with the older nations of Europe, now so safe, and at the same time so necessary for the largest and most liberal culture of our population. Under all these favoring circumstances, the productions of our soil, so extensive and so rich; of our mines, so inexhaustible; our manufactures, aided by an abundance of the raw material, and by rare natural facilities for converting them into articles of use; our internal trade, carried on by means of our numerous and great rivers, canals, and railroads; our coast trade and fisheries; our foreign commerce, already rivalling that of the most prosperous commercial nations; the intelligence of our population, educated under our admirable system of public schools, so as to render us the most reading people in the world; the religious culture, growing out of our voluntary system of supporting churches; the love of country, and of the form of government under which we live; — all these means, we say, and evidences of national prosperity, have been so marvellously developed in our country within a single generation, as to make our national career a subject of wonder and of profound interest to thoughtful observers in the old world.

In immediate connection with this, another stupendous change, no less influential upon our destinies, has taken place. By one of those adjustments of Providence which

make wants and supplies correspond to each other, the excessive population of one continent, and the deficiency existing in the other, caused a tide of emigration to rise in the east and set westward, which is a marked feature of the present age. Such is the depression of the industrial classes in several of the European states, — arising in part from the necessity of supporting an overgrown aristocracy, whose chief occupation it is to squander what others earn, and partly from the swarming population, which makes labor unproductive and the means of living both scanty and uncertain, — that the leading publicists and political writers of those countries admit that, in the present organization of society, there is no remedy to be found but in emigration. It is not possible, say they, to make any provision, as things now are, by which all the people shall be able to earn a living that is both comfortable and respectable.

Meanwhile, our country was in want of settlers to cultivate all the unoccupied lands between the Mississippi, in its whole length, and the Pacific. Of foreign immigrants to this country, not less than five millions arrived in the period of ten years, from 1850 to 1860. Though this great accession to our population threatened, for a time, to interfere with the homogeneousness of the people, the effect of residence and education here, even upon the first generation, has been such as to show that when their descendants, born on this soil and educated from infancy among us, come to maturity, they will consider themselves, not as foreigners, but as Americans; and will proudly speak, not of their ‘adopted,’ but of their native, country, and will bravely contend for the maintenance of its institutions. We are now in the present war going through the process of fusing the nation together, in a manner that must be as gratifying as it is surprising.

Whatever evil tendencies there may be among us, — and they are many and great, — there is evidently an increasing spirit of philanthropy among the people, and a more profoundly ethical view of society and government. A Christian sentiment, more or less genuine, is infused into the public mind; and the ideas of right and wrong are applied

to many questions which were once discussed on the ground of interest. Man, society, and government are now viewed not only in the light of nature, but of Christianity. The deistical age, which drew its ideas of social rights and duties from what it was pleased to call "a state of nature," has passed away; and its shallow philosophy, learned from Rousseau and Voltaire, has yielded to one drawn from conceptions entertained of Christ and of his religion. While in some things there is a departure from the elevated patriotism of our Revolutionary fathers, there is, on the other hand, a wide-spread tendency to put beneath the fabric which they so wisely and so nobly reared, a more distinctively Christian foundation. As the age of the Revolution is receding from our view, the wisdom of Washington rises, and that of Jefferson sinks, in our estimation. The sceptical philosophy of the latter, drawn from his French teachers, seems doomed to pass away with theirs, while the faith of the Father of his Country reaches down to a permanent foundation on which rests all that is stable in society.

Such, in rude outline, do we conceive the present historical position of the American people to be. Whatever is not included or implied in this, is, as we believe, a negative and not a positive element; something that is incidental and temporary — refuse matter floating upon the surface of the great current which is to carry us forward in the course marked out for us by Providence.

And here other questions arise, of great moment and solemn interest at the present time. How far have we, as a people, a right to what is so clearly pointed out by history as our national inheritance? And how far is it our duty, as citizens, and as Christians, to assert and maintain that right?

In the first place, every nation has a right, given of God to, its nationality; provided it be developed in harmony with the laws of history and of Christianity.

The doctrine of the modern philosophy, now generally received by political writers, is, that every human being is equally a human being, and that all are equally entitled to

what belongs to man as man. The essential principle involved in this statement, is that of personality. Every human being is a *person*, and not a *thing*; and ought, consequently, to be treated as a person — never as a thing. To a given extent, he has within himself an end for which he exists, and ought never to sink to the rank of a mere means to ends to be realized in others. A brute may be (humanely) used exclusively for the benefit of man. A human being cannot properly be so used by his fellow-man.

The right to exist as a person, implies the right to develop, in a legitimate way, one's individuality. A man's own nature, powers, tastes, and facilities are to dictate the kind and manner of his activity. No other being has a right to interfere with his individuality, which, for wise and good purposes, was given him by his Creator, so long as the action growing out of it is conformed to the law both of his individual and social being. It is by means of such individual freedom, properly limited and guarded by society, that men most properly fulfil the end of their being, both with reference to themselves and to others.

The same is true of a nation. There is in their descent, whether they are of one race or mixed blood, in their history, in their immemorial usages, in their political attachments, in their hereditary or acquired ideas, something that gives them peculiar aptitudes and tastes; and so long as the national spirit, growing out of all these circumstances, is exercised in a natural, normal, and moral way, the right to cherish and follow it is one of the most sacred rights of humanity. It signifies nothing to be told that, in some other way prescribed by a superior foreign power, the people shall be made comfortable, that they shall be mildly governed, that they shall enjoy facilities for acquiring wealth, and even honor. They will still claim the right to be themselves, to enjoy their own nationality, to cherish as sacred the recollections of their ancestry and their former history, to have an unbroken continuity of national existence. These are the dearest objects of earthly affection. Attachment to them is as strong as to kindred; and for their preservation

kindred will be given up to hallow their native soil with their blood, if necessary. Whatever doubts and difficulties may exist in extreme cases, surely where a people is large enough to constitute a powerful nation, and occupies a country that has its natural boundaries separating them from other nations, and has, moreover, a history, giving it a legitimate place among the nations of the earth, and in addition to all this is progressive under the influence of great moral ideas tending to the good of all mankind, that people has a right to its continued nationality, as clear as if it were written upon tables of stone by the finger of God.

In the second place, the interests of all are best subserved when the governing power of a nation issues directly from the better elements of the national character and spirit. If different nationalities actually exist, and are as much founded in nature as the individualities of persons, then, unless nature has utterly failed in her intentions, the welfare of society requires their preservation. There is no such thing as man in general, except in thought. There is no one type of humanity which ought to be, or can be, impressed upon all mankind. The natural diversities of man, whether in individuals or in nations, ought to be preserved and cultivated, because they are natural. Forcibly repress these, or attempt to modify them beyond what is required by culture, and you weaken the power of those in whom they reside. No one could make a good Roman of a Greek, or a good Greek of a Roman. Neither would prosper under the rule of the other. The old English kings, who struggled so long and so fruitlessly to extend their dominion over France, could, if they had succeeded, at most, but have destroyed French nationality, and with it the peculiar power which France, under her own independent rule and free development, has exerted, intellectually and socially, upon the other nations of Europe. If Napoleon could have subdued Germany, and united it permanently to France, the effect upon the character of the Germans may be inferred from the decay of the German spirit in the short-lived kingdom of Westphalia, and in old Alsatia, on the Rhine, from the day of its an-

nexation to France. What has Poland been since it has ceased to be Poland? Who can tell how much Italy has suffered from its dismemberment, and the crushing of its nationality for long ages? Suppose France had succeeded in getting possession of the British colonies on this continent; is it probable that the English colonists would have developed themselves as well under a French government as they did under the English? We will say nothing of the expediency of the union of Scotland and Ireland with England. Their individual weakness and their near proximity to each other may have rendered the union necessary for the sake of peace with one another, and the common safety. But how is it with the genuine traits of the old Scottish and Irish character since the loss of its nationality by each? Would not the same amount of labors and expenses for their intellectual and moral improvement, if applied to develop rather than to suppress their nationality, have produced a greater effect? The common progress of the race demands the peculiar contribution which each nation can best make in its own way. Will any one attempt to say that the obliteration of England, France, or Germany, and the absorption of it by either of the others, would have advanced Europe beyond where she now is in power, wealth, science, philosophy, literature, and art?

Ours is a new phase of society, a new variety among existing nationalities. It is less exclusive than any one of those named. English in its basis, it is largely modified by climate and soil, by free institutions, by a mixture of races, and by the more progressive and cosmopolitan tendency of its civilization. We have no hereditary hatred of the French making us abominate whatever they do or think or approve; no aversion to the German mind, nor disposition to disparage its labors in the walks of abstruse science or antiquarian learning, in history, poetry, and art. It is the native tendency of the American mind "to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good," instead of despising all other nations, institutions, persons, and things, and holding fast to our own. It is for the interest of mankind

that this great, natural, and safe experiment upon the structure of society, upon free government, spontaneous development, universal industry, universal intelligence, and universal philanthropy, be fully, fairly, and satisfactorily made, especially as in so doing the American people contribute their full share to the inventions and improvements, to the productions and commerce, of the world. We are not living upon the charities of others, nor do we receive from any nation under heaven more than we give.

And what is there in our national union that should render its perpetuation disadvantageous to the just interests of any of the nations of Europe? We cannot suppose the people of England desire that the nation which, by its example and influence, is doing most to promote the freedom for which they themselves are sighing and struggling, should be enfeebled by dismemberment. Such an event could not fail to retard materially the steps by which they are achieving their own liberty, and even to hazard the permanence of those reforms which have, by great effort, been carried through parliament during the present century. The failure of our government would be held up as a warning against all measures tending to increase the power of the people.

It is not long since a distinguished body of statesmen and scholars entered upon the execution of a great and noble plan for delivering the common people of England from the wretchedness and degradation to which prevailing ignorance had doomed them. It is incredible that these same people, after having tasted the sweets of knowledge, and risen to political importance, should desire a reaction, that would put them back where they were before the existence of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Nor can the projectors of that scheme, or others who have warmly espoused the cause of national education, but be grieved at the prospect that their American brethren, who have such great advantages over them in the work of popular education on account of their free institutions, should be discouraged and embarrassed by the overthrow of the

government which afforded such facilities for common-school education.

Can the case be otherwise with the great body of English dissenters? Surely it might be supposed they had suffered enough of humiliation and oppression to wish well to their brethren, who crossed the ocean and dwelt among savages that they might obtain for themselves and for their posterity "freedom to worship God." They cannot be so blind as not to see that the dissolution of the only government in Christendom that grants to its subjects unconditional religious freedom, would tend to put off to a distant day their own deliverance.

The laboring classes, too, who in poverty and rags, give their life-blood to the support of a landed aristocracy and beneficed clergy, can hardly be indifferent to the success of an experiment which shall demonstrate to the world that government can be administered quite as well without an aristocracy as with it; and that the people can be quite as well instructed in religion by pastors chosen and supported by themselves as by those placed over them by an unsympathizing, costly, and lordly establishment. Their hope of disenthralment must, in no small degree, be founded on our success. That their deliverance from spiritual tyranny can come only from an imitation of our example, and would be defeated by any reactionary movement in their country, consequent upon our fall, is so plain as to require no argument.

We say nothing of the historical position of England among the great European powers, as the professed friend of all the oppressed, and the representative of free constitutional governments. If she is true to her past history, and to the boasts of a long line of her great statesmen, she will find a more natural ally in our government than in any other. Either she must drift away in the direction of the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian monarchies, with France sometimes for her, sometimes against her; or she must stand up bravely for the right and for constitutional freedom, relying upon her own power and moral influence, upon the justice of her cause, upon the sympathy of the people of Europe,

and upon the cordial friendship of the whole western continent.

Whatever may be true of the French government, the interests and natural sympathies of the French people are largely with us. The liberty which they so often win and forfeit, and which loses none of its value for being so often snatched from their grasp, must, in the long run, rise or fall with our own. If their oft-repeated experiments fail, and our experiment, thus far the best illustration of a free representative government, also fails, what will there be in history to which they can refer as substantiating their theory of liberty?

That the people of the various German states feel a deep interest in free government, and regard themselves as having a large stake in our continued national existence, is sufficiently proved by the unanimity with which they choose to emigrate to this country rather than to others. No one who has lived in Germany, and been conversant with the people there, can be ignorant of the fact, that political oppression and a longing for liberty have had more to do with their emigration to this country than any other cause.

In all these countries there may be temporary causes of irritation. The disturbed state of our commercial relations may bring temporary distress upon millions; and, under the pressure of their sufferings, they may forget their principles and their true interests. But upon more mature reflection, and with a truer knowledge of the nature of the conflict that has been forced upon us, they will, in the end, come to form a right judgment.

We trust there are not a few high-minded men, men of large knowledge, of philosophic habits, and of philanthropic principles, who, in contemplating this great subject, will look beyond all partial and temporary interests, and consider by what means each successive age can be made better than the preceding in respect to all the interests of humanity. Without any national prejudices, without being enslaved to theories, they will ponder carefully the eternal laws by which all the problems of history are worked out. They will see

an Almighty hand so evidently shaping the order of affairs in America, that they will look with scorn and indignation upon the paltry attempts of party politicians, corrupt capitalists, and paid writers to make the world believe a lie, and to induce men to commit outrages upon justice and humanity, that they themselves may the more effectually compass their selfish ends. Truth is great, and will prevail. Justice is everlasting, and will shine forth all the more gloriously when the tempest of passion shall have subsided. Men of the character here described, have already appeared; and they, and others like them, the teachers of mankind, will, in the end, speak with an authority which will awe kings and cabinets. The man of the closet will hold the field, and the vile partisan will be remembered only to be cursed.

With our brethren of the Southern states, it may be thought that the case is different: that they have rights, duties, and interests which no foreigners can have. What rights, then, let us inquire, have they? They have, or rather had, when they were living in peace with us, subject to the laws of the land, rights in common with us to all that is guaranteed in the Constitution, the only pledge of our national existence, and bond of our national union. Their political rights in respect to slavery were as clearly defined as rights generally are, or as other rights are in that instrument. The decision of the question whether slavery shall exist in the states, is left with themselves. Doubtful and debated points are referred to the supreme court, with whose decisions the South has no cause to be dissatisfied. The extension of slavery beyond the slaveholding states is, and always has been, subject to the action of Congress, as is also the admission of new states. People north and south may or may not be pleased with the doings of Congress. The Constitution promises nothing in this respect, except that, in a constitutional way, the majority of the people, represented in Congress and in the President of their own election, shall rule. When the will of the people, on points referred to them by the Constitution, is fairly expressed, the

popular will, so expressed, is authoritative until it shall be modified by a subsequent exercise of the same power, in the manner provided for by law. If any state legislature, north or south, passes acts inconsistent with what is guaranteed in the Constitution, that is a matter for the general government, in its wisdom and best discretion, to control. Has the government of the United States ever denied these rights, or any one of them, to the seceding states? Has it been partial to the Northern or Western states, in any of these respects? Has the general government ever given just cause for the present revolt and attempt at separation?

It is said that the anti-slavery policy advocated by northern politicians, is the cause of the separation. But this same policy existed when the Constitution was framed, not only at the north, but to a great extent also in the south. The compromise which was mutually entered into then, has been adhered to undeviatingly, ever since by the government; and never have the northern representatives in Congress complained, or desired it should be otherwise. Neither statesmen nor moralists have, as a general thing, ever proposed to violate the Constitution in this respect. And if the whole history of congressional legislation were examined, and the tenor of the debates of northern and southern members compared, it would probably appear that there are quite as many evidences of a design to turn the whole machinery of government into a means of propagating slavery, and giving it a preponderance which it had not originally, as of attempts in a contrary direction.

Did the North ever pledge itself, or could it reasonably and with a good conscience pledge itself, to close the intellect and heart against those ideas and sentiments which come from the intellectual and moral progress of the race? Inheriting a Christian civilization, it could not do otherwise than favor Christian ideas, and join with the rest of the Christian world in attempting to grasp them in their whole scope, and to set them forth in the way of philosophical and moral discussion, before the whole world. While the men of reflection among us have entertained such views of their rights and duties as

individuals and as Christians, which no human government can justly curtail, they have just as scrupulously recognized their civil and political obligations to the people of the states where different views are held and a different practice prevails. The people of the North have generally held, with great tenacity, to the doctrine that they have no right to interfere with the institution of slavery in the slaveholding states, because it is recognized in the Constitution to which they owe allegiance. Indeed, they have kept this distinction so clear in their minds, and carried it so far, that they have thereby incurred the grave censure of the great body of the moral and religious men of England, France, and Germany. The chief accusation brought against the people of the Northern states, by their brethren in the British Islands, on the continent of Europe, and even in remote Asia, is, that they attach so much sacredness to the compromises of the Constitution. One of the most difficult and most important tasks which we have undertaken to perform, is that of justifying ourselves before the tribunal of the public moral sentiment of Europe, in refusing to violate the Constitution at the very moment that we are carrying on a war of unparalleled magnitude to maintain it in its integrity. They are not satisfied that our government should strike at slavery among the rebels merely as a war-measure, on account of its being used as a means of overthrowing the government. They call upon us, or rather upon the President of these United States, as our civil and military chief, to assail the Constitution, the very instrument from which he derives all his authority, and which he has solemnly sworn to observe and maintain, and to revolutionize the government on the subject of slavery by a *coup d'état*.

Will our Southern brethren pause to notice this; and then consider a little more carefully whether we have, by violating the spirit of the Constitution in respect to slavery, given them cause to make war upon us?

Another view often presented is, that the people of the Southern states, though they cannot allege that any political compact has been violated, are, nevertheless so annoyed by

the social influence of the North, that they have at length become weary of their political connection with us, and are therefore resuming their original sovereignty. We need not repeat what has so often been said of the tendency of this doctrine to dissolve all existing governments. If the principle be a sound one, then any state, however large, or however small, may be dismembered by any part of the same. This is about as good reasoning as it would be to say that either of two parties, having entered into the marriage contract, may, if he becomes weary of it, annul it and return to his original state. The family can be divided, and the estate distributed accordingly. But can the mother's affections be made a subject of barter? Can a husband and father undo the dependences he has created? Have children no rights growing out of their parentage? The obligations of a people to their legitimate government are as sacred as those springing from domestic ties. We are entitled, by solemn compact and by inheritance, to a country—to our own country, to our native land, its hills and valleys and streams. We cannot part with them. There is a common glory, won by the joint labors and sufferings of our ancestors, dearer to us than life. The fame of our Washington cannot be divided. Bunker Hill and Mount Vernon are parts of one and the same rare old picture, which cannot be cut into parts and disposed of separately. Our history, our hitherto successful national experiment, our traditions, our thrilling memories of the past, that undefinable, indescribable *tout ensemble* of things which fills the imagination, warms the heart, and stirs the lowest depths of the soul of the traveller abroad when he thinks of his native land, the home of his affections, and the object of his most ardent love, is too holy a thing to be rudely torn in pieces and destroyed because some of the children of the family have become angry with the mother that bore them. We have a well-established right to our whole inheritance. The whole country belongs to the whole American people. It is an undivided and indivisible patrimony. It is an organism; its parts must go together. It is a body with bones, and muscles, and veins, and arteries,

that can act only in concert. Only one soul can dwell in it and direct its movements. The coasts, the slopes, the rivers and valleys threading the length of the continent, cannot be artificially dissected, and yet perform their organic functions.

Another apologetic view put forth in behalf of our Southern brethren, is, that the two civilizations, Northern and Southern, are so radically different that there can be none but an unnatural and forced union between them, and that this circumstance itself justifies separation. The argument is not without plausibility. It may be said that Holland and Belgium, once united, was, within our recollection, divided on account of difference of religion, language, and popular feeling. The Belgian, with his Catholic sympathies and French tastes and language, could not live happily with his Protestant Dutch neighbor.

But the people of these United States have a common origin, a common language, and a common religion. Even politically, our good friends, now somewhat out of humor with us, would soon quarrel with England or France, and fall back with pride upon our American institutions and national power, and, like a lover after a quarrel, desire "to make up" with us.

Besides, if this principle is to be adopted without qualification, then Scotland and Ireland ought to be separated from England, Lower Canada from Upper Canada, the Rhenish provinces from the Kingdom of Prussia, and Holstein from Denmark. Here a balance is to be struck between two conflicting principles: the one, the homogeneousness and natural unity of the people; the other, the proper magnitude of a state, as compared with its geographical situation, and its relation to other powers. It is for the interest of no nation to be weak, or to attempt a division of territory which the laws of nature do not admit. Early experiments show that several small states could not exist side by side with each other, either safely or prosperously, in such a country as France or Spain. It is the present curse of Germany to be divided into many petty states without a national unity. While they may be individually saved from

foreign invasion so long as the two great powers, Austria and Prussia are agreed, — though the former are always at the mercy of the latter, — let those two states be divided, for whatever cause, and all these smaller ones become a prey to their more powerful neighbors. It would be no better with several independent governments, if they existed in our country. The Northern and Southern states belong to each other territorially, as much as the right and left hands belong to each other. Nature has marked out our country as the theatre of one great empire. Adhering to her plans and to our traditions and history, we shall be perfectly safe against the machinations or the assaults of the unscrupulous governments of England and France, which, like Herod and Pilate, would become friends for the sake of putting us in a vice between Canada and Mexico, and crushing us.

Now suppose the interests of slavery are of such a nature as to be incompatible with our national unity. Then the question arises: Which of the two conflicting things ought to yield to the other? Has the slaveholder a better title to slavery than the American people have to their own government and national existence? If we were to be put back, to-day, where we were before the war broke out, and it were evident to all that either the government were to be subverted, or slavery destroyed, would not the nation have just as good a right to abolish slavery as the slaveholder would to overthrow the government? If violence were to be done to the letter of the Constitution, would not the necessity of saving the state be greater than that of saving the institution of slavery? But the actual state of the case is very different from this. We are now practically dealing with a party who have renounced the Constitution and trampled on it, while we, on our part, have sacredly kept all our obligations, both to the Constitution and to them. While we remain where we were, they are no longer within the pale of the Constitution. They have chosen to be belligerents, revolutionists, rebels. What, now, are our obligations to them in respect to their slaves? Having given up their constitutional rights, and planted themselves upon belligerent rights, what do they expect of us?

Will they have the coolness to claim both classes of rights? There can be no doubt that we, as belligerents, have a right to weaken the power of the enemy in any manner consistent with civilized warfare. We have a right not only to capture cattle and men, but to draw to our use any *tertium quid* that may be found along the line between man and beast. The enemy's slaves are ours if we can get possession of them, whether they are taken by the sword, or drawn to us by a proclamation. There is nothing to be said about the constitutionality of the measure. The party most concerned has renounced the Constitution and torn it in pieces. There is, here, only one important question, and that is: Does the measure prove effective? It may be piously objected that, in this way, the children of the rebel slaveholders may be wronged, and deprived of their patrimony; that before they come to maturity, or signify their will to our government, the slaves may be beyond their reach. We are sorry for them, but do not see how we can help them. We have, in a manner that may, perhaps, seem to them unkind, ceased to take care of that species of property for them. Since they have appealed to the sword, they must take all the risks of property involved in their own measure. If slavery is weakened, or even destroyed by the legitimate and necessary results of this war, which they were so eager to initiate, they must hold, not us, but the authors of the war, responsible for those results. Whenever a father, by his improvidence or folly, becomes bankrupt, we suppose the children lose by the transaction. They can inherit only so much as he saves. What, then, is to be the future status of slavery? That is not our concern. If it destroys itself, we cannot help it. The Constitution provides no remedy for such a case. It has a great legitimate power; but it has no magical power.

If the cause of slavery has no political advantage over the government in the struggle for life or death on the ground of stipulated obligations, the question must be settled on grounds of moral necessity, backed up by force. The government has no option. It assumes that it has a right to exist, and that on the ground of its having long had an

existence which is unquestionably legitimate. The state is bound to maintain its own existence, to the last, against both rebellion and foreign invasion ; and what it must do, it will do.

Now, before the tribunal of the world, we maintain that we are called on by Providence to preserve and defend the moral order of society by supporting a legitimate, prosperous, enlightened, beneficent government,—a government not only lawful and just, like so many others, but, as we have seen, one which, in several important respects, has advantages over every other government. It would not be morally right to suffer such a mighty instrument, prepared, not by human ingenuity, but by Divine Providence, for promoting the general good, to be destroyed unlawfully by those whom we have the power to restrain. The ruler of such a nation is a minister of God for the punishment of evil doers; and he bears not the sword in vain. The keeping of this gift of God, the government to which we all—rebels no less than others—owe allegiance,—this precious legacy, received from the wisest and best of men, our venerated ancestors, to be held and used by us and our children forever, for our good and for the good of mankind, is committed to us, the rulers and people of the land ; and the most enlightened men of the age, and with them the millions abroad who are sighing and praying for liberty, will hold us responsible for the manner in which we execute that trust. We know with what solemnity our action is invested ; how many eyes are turned upon us to see in what way we dispose of the cause of universal freedom, now upon trial in our hands ; and we shall act according to our convictions of duty and our sense of responsibility in the matter, and commit the issue to God.

And now we turn to the other side of the picture, and inquire into the nature and value of the deposit committed to the safe keeping of those who are arrayed against us. How much would their own posterity lose, if slavery should not be handed down to them unimpaired ? How much less, fifty years hence, would there be of profitable industry, of

well-directed enterprise, of economy in preserving the soil from exhaustion, of true manhood, of that knowledge which is power, and of those social and moral qualities which exalt a people and give them an honored and untarnished name in history? How much would the nation at large lose, if, in the general preservation of our government, that feature of it should fade out and disappear? How much would the interests of humanity, the social and moral progress of the world suffer, if all the men on this continent should, by some uncontrollable necessity, become freemen? Would the evil be greater than that which would result from breaking this great nation into fragments, and exposing us all to incessant border warfare, to inroads from any powerful nation, and giving up all our southern waters to the piratical expeditions of slave-ships? We have weighed the relative value of the two interests, and have, as a people, come solemnly and deliberately to the conclusion that, if the one or the other must be given up, the surrender shall not, with our consent, be that of our national government, nor of its flag, — at least not till all our power of resistance is exhausted. Then we shall be able to say, with a good conscience and with clean hands, we have done what we could; and God will care for the rest.

One more inquiry remains to be made: How far is the Christian church concerned in this matter? and what are its duties in the present crisis?

We have already alluded to the religious origin of the New England colonies, and to its influence upon their political destinies. We are now to consider more particularly what the American church, both in its ministry and in its members, has, in later periods, accomplished for our country and for Christianity. Our object does not require us to speak of the different Christian denominations separately. Prominent among the causes of the power of the church in this country, is the character of its clergy. The people, more particularly in the New England states, have from the beginning manifested those traits of character which would be expected of persons who had been instructed by an intel-

ligent and pious ministry. Some denominations at the outset, and all in the end, have, by theological schools or otherwise, provided for the special education of their religious teachers. Nowhere, except at Wittenberg and Geneva, and in the schools formed from them on the continent of Europe, have theological studies flourished more than in America. The name of Franklin is not more eminent in experimental philosophy, than that of Edwards in theology. Men like Andrew Fuller and Robert Hall, themselves no mean judges in such matters, did not hesitate to place him at the head of theological writers in the English language. His influence upon the American clergy has been greater than that of any other theologian; and among the English Dissenters it has been scarcely less. Next to him, in celebrity and influence, must be named President Dwight, whose "Theology" was, until quite recently, on both sides of the Atlantic, the standard work on the subject. Modern biblical criticism and philology have indeed introduced important changes, and necessarily created a demand for a corresponding change in the form of theology. We need but allude to the names of Bellamy, of Emmons, of Mason, of former times, and of the theological seminaries of Andover and Princeton, and the many others modelled after them in later times, to explain the remarkable fact, that we have a larger body of men in the ministry who have received a thorough theological training, than can be found in England, Scotland, or France. Our theological literature has for many years past been far in advance of theirs. We say this in no boastful spirit. On the contrary, we observe with gratitude and pleasure the great progress which England is now making in biblical learning. We refer to it merely to explain the deep-toned religious sentiment of the numerous congregations in our country, which have been instructed by a ministry so formed and educated. We have the concurrent testimony of men in high official stations abroad, that wherever American clergymen or missionaries have been called to labor side by side with those of other countries, they have not, in respect to intelligence or energy, suffered in the comparison.

With all the deficiencies which exist in our churches and religious congregations, and which we do not wish to overlook or disguise, truth requires us to say, that there are few countries where the clergy exert a more wide-spread, legitimate, and salutary influence than in those parts of our country which are supplied with the class of pastors and teachers above described. Under the guidance of such men, has sprung up an active laity, whose labors and charities are widely known and felt. In relieving the destitute and instructing the ignorant in their own neighborhoods; in contributing to the establishment and maintenance of Sunday schools in all the land, to funds for the publication and distribution of religious tracts; in supporting home missions in the new settlements along all our western borders; in aiding young men preparing for the Christian ministry; in sustaining colleges and theological schools; in replenishing the treasuries of foreign missionary and Bible societies, they systematically perform an amount of service for Christ and his church which distinguishes them among their brethren of different Christian lands.

Nearly all our schools, from the lowest to the highest, are indebted to Christian influence for their existence and support. The academies and colleges are mostly creatures of the church. The public schools, in which five millions of persons, or one fifth of our free population, is taught, are to a great extent instructed and superintended by persons of Christian character.

The number of persons educated in our one hundred and twenty colleges is a little more than thirteen thousand, of whom more than three thousand go forth annually from these Christian seats of learning, to engage in professional studies or in the duties of active life.

A similar statement might be made of the great number of highly educated females in our country. In no country of Europe does so large a proportion of females receive an equal amount of thorough and solid education. Indeed, higher as well as lower education with us is democratic and eminently Christian.

The view which we have given of religion and education is by no means limited to the older states. One of the most remarkable features of our national growth and Christian civilization, is the extent to which religion and education have gone westward with the tide of emigration. Wherever the traveller directs his steps in the new settlements from the East, he finds the school, the church, Christian congregations, and Christian laborers, almost as in the older states. This is a marked feature in New England civilization. Certainly the cases are not numerous in which a new country is so rapidly settled, and at the same time, is so successful in resisting the tendency to degeneracy and barbarism. Taken all in all, our country must be admitted to present such a spectacle of moral enterprise to other nations, that the latter cannot, unless they are under wrong biases, be indifferent to our future prosperity.

Let us now look at the influence of our country upon the extension of Christianity and Christian civilization abroad. We invite the attention of the reader to what America has done for Christian missions; to the great number and high character of our missionaries; to the amount of literary labor they have performed; to the number of languages they have reduced to a written form, supplying them with dictionaries, grammars, and other books; to the contribution they have made to our present knowledge of countries, nations, and tribes but little known before; to the numerous instances in which they have opened the way to commercial and diplomatic relations with our country; to the cruel superstitions which, in many countries, they have been the means of abolishing or mitigating; and to the seeds of civilization which they have caused to take root in many countries, not to mention their more directly spiritual work. In view of such facts, known and acknowledged in all the world, we see not how it can be denied that America has been of some use to mankind; and that any great calamity that should befall her would be a calamity to all, both to the weaker and to the stronger races of men.

When we consider the natural vigor of the Anglo-Saxon people, and the comparative purity of the Protestant faith cherished among them, and connect with this the present attitude of the two powerful nations which represent them, we can hardly suppress the conviction that it is reserved for British and American Christians to take a leading part in the philanthropic work of raising the nations of Asia and Africa and the inhabitants of the Pacific islands from the degradation and barbarism long endured by them, and to give to their vast population the blessings of civilization and Christianity. Nor do we see any reason why America should not emulate England in this work. We certainly are not behind our English brethren in the scale of our missionary operations. There is no reason why our commerce should not always equal hers. We have some peculiar advantages, arising from the easy access to all the East from our Pacific coast; and perhaps from the circumstance that we have no military rule over any eastern people, and no design to conquer them, we may be none the less cordially received as teachers and benefactors, or less favored as a commercial people, seeking none but amicable relations with them.

If the foregoing view of the religious character of our country be correct, the Christian people of the country have an interest in the maintenance of our nationality to be measured only by their power and facilities for doing good. They cannot willingly see these diminished. They need just such a theatre of action as that which they now have. A narrower scope for their influence and activity would not be suited to their character and circumstances. The tide of Christian intelligence and benevolence rising in the Eastern states and setting westward, ought to meet no barriers this side of the Mexican line and the Pacific coast. The greatness of New England is not in her territory, nor in her political power. In these respects, she bows to the will of Providence, and rejoices in the growth of her larger and more powerful neighbors, belonging, as they do, to the same political family with herself. But she has a legitimate

moral power in her men, her institutions, and her means of education. The industry, economy, and energy of her sons fit them for some peculiar kinds of service which others cannot render so well. She asks for the honor of serving God by serving the people of the whole country. We wish to educate sons and daughters to go to the newer states, and to carry with them all that is good in our training, habits, and principles. But if the country should lose its unity, all such reciprocity between the different parts of it will be lost. We can neither receive, freely, as we now do, whatever is produced by any part of this vast continent, nor can we send out educated men to be pioneers in great enterprises, religious or secular, if at different points we must cross national boundaries. The Yankee schoolmaster, professor, preacher, lawyer, editor, agent, statesman, author, would be sent back to his own country. Each government would have a pride in employing only its own citizens. Public utility would be sacrificed to petty national jealousies. Now, wherever we go over the wide continent (bating the rebel states), we go as American citizens, and are received in that character. We are at home so long as we stand upon the soil of our native land. Is it well, either for ourselves or for mankind, that these social relations shall be severed, never again to be united ?

When we go abroad, we need the respect and the protection which the American flag never fails to give to a worthy citizen. We are a powerful nation, and are respected because we are such. We are a great commercial nation, and our vessels are welcomed to every shore. We are an enterprising people, carrying our active, inventive, progressive spirit wherever we go ; and kings and chiefs of the remotest tribes of men are eager to cultivate intercourse with us as a nation. All this will be changed so soon as we cease to be a united people. Some, of whom we had a right to expect better things, begin to despise us in advance. They seem anxious to lay hands upon us before the time. Even towards the seceding states they have thrown off the mask, and speak already as the strong are accustomed to

speak to the weak and dependent. May Heaven deliver us, North and South, from becoming like the petty Italian states, with Austria pushing them with the bayonet on the one side, and France on the other. We should be bartered and sold like Poland and Greece, or dragooned into obedience like Hungary and Venetia.

We do not forget the clerical character of the majority of our readers. The service now required in the field and on the arena of political discussion must, indeed, be performed chiefly by laymen. But there is something behind armies and political action, which is the necessary support of both. Our success in the present struggle for national existence will depend quite as much upon the conscience of the nation as upon its apparent interests or upon its policy. Present mercantile interests are in danger of outweighing the higher and permanent interests of posterity. Selfishness may overrule patriotism. Policy in the cabinet or in the field may fluctuate. It is the moral sense of the people and the unflinching determination growing out of it, that must keep treason in its hiding-places, and hold the men standing at the helm of government firm in their position. While the lovers of gain rather than of their country, and party politicians, are endeavoring to subject everything to their selfish and ambitious designs, and while others, desiring a better state of things, are discouraged by the obstacles thrown in their way, it becomes the enlightened moral teachers of the land to direct the attention of the people beyond what is temporary, beyond the present, to the distant and future; and thereby make them strong in heart for enduring the sufferings, bearing the burdens, and performing the work devolved upon them by an Invisible Hand. We need the spirit which animated the first settlers of the New England colonies and our revolutionary fathers, who endured all things for the sake of freedom, and for the benefit of coming generations. To create and sustain this spirit is, under God, the appropriate office of the Christian minister. It is his duty to ground the people in right principles, to inspire them with lofty ideas, and to attach them

by the strongest bonds to truths that are everlasting, to rights that are inviolable, to interests that are spiritual and imperishable. It is these that give to society its importance, and to history its dignity. Let the clergy of our country understand their true position and their legitimate influence and power on all great moral questions; and then let them be found at their posts, contending for the truth and standing up for the right with unfaltering fidelity and constancy.

ARTICLE IV.

ATHENS, OR AESTHETIC CULTURE AND THE ART OF EXPRESSION.¹

BY REV. W. S. TYLER, D.D., PROFESSOR, ETC., AMHERST COLLEGE.

AMONG the distinguishing characteristics of Athens, as they are sketched by a master-hand in the funeral oration of Pericles,² especial prominence is given to freedom of individual culture, together with the versatility of character and the variety of pursuits and attainments which are the natural result of spontaneous development. These, in the estimation of that consummate orator, statesman, and ruler, who has given his name to the golden age of Athenian glory, made Athens *worthy* of the heroes who fell on the field of battle, and upon whose patriotic and heroic virtues he was chosen to pronounce a eulogy. Unlike the Spartans, and most of the other nations of antiquity, the Athenians excelled alike in the arts of war and the arts of peace. The land and the sea were equally subject to their dominion.

¹ This Article was delivered as an oration before the Porter Rhetorical Society, in the Theological Seminary at Andover, at its anniversary in August, 1862. The introduction and the conclusion have been omitted. In other respects it is now printed in the form in which it was then delivered.

² Thucyd. II. 35-46.

Agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, all flourished at Athens, and in those colonies which Athenian enterprize established on the shores of the Mediterranean. The virgin goddess who gave name to the city and presided over its affairs, was goddess at once of war and of wisdom : while she extended her patronage over the useful arts, the fine arts, at the same time, rejoiced under her inspiration. "The same persons," says Pericles, in the oration just referred to, "pay attention at once to their own private concerns and those of the public; and the same class of men who are engaged in the labors of life, show no want of skill in the affairs of government. For we are the only people who deem him that takes no part in state affairs not only indolent, but utterly worthless." Nor were the mass of Athenian citizens more adepts in the science and practice of government, than they were connoisseurs in literature and the fine arts. The Greeks cultivated every species of literature, science, and art, and they excelled in every species to which they gave their attention. As we gaze on the monuments of their genius which have come down to us, we are at a loss to determine which is the most admirable, which the most perfect, the history or the philosophy, the oratory or the sculpture and architecture, the poetry or the mathematics. As proof of this, it is only necessary to mention the names of Euclid and Sophocles, of Thucydides and Plato, of Phidias and Demosthenes, representative men of this representative city and people. The muses were all born in Greece, all daughters of the Grecian god Zeus, and brought up at the feet of his son Apollo; and the sacred nine, as they are represented in the Hall of the Muses in the Vatican, grouped around their divine leader, with all their variety of form and face and costumes and instruments, and followed by long lines of poets and lawgivers and orators and philosophers, are an appropriate symbol of the whole circle of mental activities at Athens, of the fulness and freedom of development, as well as the beauty and inspiration which marked the whole literary culture of the Greeks.

And the order in which the several branches of Greek literature were developed is even more remarkable than the freedom and fulness. They came forth, one after another, in the natural and normal order of succession, like the branches of a goodly tree planted in a fertile soil and under a genial clime; we might almost say, like the revolutions of the spheres, in that harmonious order and arrangement which is the highest beauty, and which the Grecian philosophers so well expressed by the characteristic word *κόσμος*. In no other age or country does the history of literature correspond so entirely with the philosophy; nowhere is the theory so fully sustained by the facts.

Theoretically poetry, the language of the memory, the imagination, and the heart, takes the precedence, in literary culture, of prose, which is the language of the understanding, the reason, and of every-day life. Moreover, epic poetry, which is national, objective, and unconscious, is naturally followed by lyric poetry, which is self-conscious, subjective, and individual; and this, again, is as naturally succeeded by dramatic, which, partly epic and partly lyric, partly objective and partly subjective, is a union of the two. Prose, when it becomes the vehicle of literature, naturally admits of a threefold division, corresponding with that of poetry: history answering to epic poetry, philosophy to lyric, and oratory to dramatic — history objective, narrative, self-forgetful, national, perhaps universal; philosophy subjective, speculative, discursive, self-conscious, individual, perchance more or less personal; oratory, combining the essential features of history and philosophy with a third element of action, at once objective and subjective, general and particular, and what is most characteristic, not only *speaking* itself, in the first person, and speaking *of* persons and things in the third, but speaking *to* an audience in the second; and the speaker and the hearers acting and reacting the one upon the other. And here, again, in the natural and normal order of development, philosophy follows history as theory follows practice; and oratory — oratory as a branch of *literature* that will live and be perpetuated — succeeds history and

philosophy, as the more complex comes after the more simple; and in fact oratory, like that at Athens, cannot *exist* except where a free and a cultivated people furnish a fit audience.

Now the remarkable fact in regard to the history of Greek literature — a fact so well known that it only requires enunciation — the remarkable and obvious fact is, not only that the Greeks had all these various branches rooted and matured among them, but that their literary history proceeded almost without an anomaly, developing, in due order and season, “first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear”; just as it should, according to the theory of literature and the philosophy of the human mind.

But in a book on *representative cities* — a book we should like to see written by the author of “Representative Men” — Athens would stand as the special representative of aesthetic culture and the art of expression. With the law of order, the idea of beauty pervades and fashions the whole literature of the Greeks. In the earlier Greek poets, this idea seems to be intuitive. The beauty of their conceptions and the harmony of their verse are spontaneous. Homer’s epics are beautiful for the same reason that the light of the sun is beautiful; and, for the same reason, they transmit a perfect image of nature — of men and things as they were in the heroic age. Sappho and Anacreon sing of love as naturally, as sweetly, as harmoniously, as swallows twitter or doves coo.

The Greek drama is apt to strike the uninitiated as unnatural because it is so unlike the modern stage. But it seems unnatural only because it is the *ideal* of nature. It is the harmony of nature and the supernatural; in other words, it is nature in a supernatural age and state. A tragedy of Sophocles is a perfect flower, a manifest growth; only it is so symmetrical and so perfect, that we are half-persuaded it must have bloomed in paradise. “The first idea of the Greek dramatists was to exhibit their personages with heroic grandeur, a dignity more than human, and an ideal beauty. The fidelity of the representation was less their object than

its beauty. With us, it is exactly the reverse.”¹ The tragedies of the Greek masters are real, and yet eminently ideal. They are, in a sense, copies of nature; but they are, in a higher sense, pieces of that true and high art which is the perfection of nature. In reading them, we seem to see, not living men of our own day, walking before us in their ordinary gait, and conversing in plain, colloquial prose, but the heroes and demigods of a former generation, or, which is essentially the same, the animated statues of heroes and of gods, moving from their pedestals with a measured and stately step to the sound of music, and declaiming on superhuman themes in strains of lofty verse, and with a voice that may be heard by an assembled nation.

The prose literature of the Greeks is scarcely less artistic and ideal than their poetry. History, philosophy, and oratory, not less than architecture, sculpture, and painting, were fine arts, as conceived and executed by that tasteful and refined people. Their histories, like their epics, had an idea and a moral; had a definite subject and a limited period with “a beginning, a middle, and an end”;² had a kind of plot with its development, crisis, and conclusion; had their narrative diversified with dialogue, and enlivened by speeches which were not, perhaps, actually made by the speakers, but might have been and ought to have been, and which shed light on the men and the times in which they lived. Herodotus felt that he was writing a great prose epic, a sort of sequel to the Iliad and Odyssey, in which the Persians and the Greeks — Asiatics and Europeans — still battle for king or country, to maintain their own rights and liberties, or to avenge the wrongs of former generations; and in all which “the will of Jove is accomplished,”³ and an overruling, avenging providence asserts its unfailing “*Nemesis*.”⁴ And as if to consummate the analogy, his nine books were named after the nine muses, and were rehearsed, like the poems of Homer, at the Olympic games and the Panathenaic festivals.

¹ Schlegel's Dramatic Literature.

² Aristot. Poet. VII.

³ Hom. Il. I. 5: Διὸς δ' ἐτελέετο βουλή.

⁴ Herod. I. 34: ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις.

The dialogues of Plato exemplify, to perfection, that love of beautiful forms and artistic structure which is characteristic of the 'Greek mind. They answer to Aristotle's definition of *poetry*.¹ They are *imitations* — imitations of actual Socratic conversations, with all the details of time, place, and circumstance. They are pictures, bodying forth to the senses the essential idea and spirit of philosophy; for what is philosophy but a continual *inquiry* and search after truth. Even the style is characterized by Aristotle as intermediate between prose and poetry. No tragedy of Sophocles has a more dramatic structure, no comedy of Aristophanes a more pleasing dialogue, no epic of Homer or lyric of Anacreon more grace and affluence of language, no temple or statue in all Greece a more artistic form and finish, than the dialogues of Plato.

Attic oratory was formed scarcely less to please than to convince and persuade. Or rather it proceeds on the principle that the way to convince and persuade a people so ideal and refined as the Athenians, is not more to enlighten their understandings and move their passions than to gratify their taste. The bema, like the stage, furnished entertainment to the labor-shunning, pleasure-seeking, laughter-loving Athenians; and that *action* which Demosthenes declared to be the first, second, and third requisite in oratory, was expressed by the same word (*ὑπόκρισις*) which originally and properly denoted the *representation* of the actors in the theatre. Never before nor since has there been such an audience as that which listened, or refused to listen, to the Attic orators. The mass of Athenian citizens, in whose hands were concentrated all the powers of legislative, judicial, and executive government, educated to a man, of acute understanding, of cultivated taste, difficult to please, requiring to be instructed like a senate, and yet to be amused as in the theatre; canvassing measures like statesmen, and criticising words like rhetoricians; played upon by demagogues, like an instrument of thousand strings, and at the same time swaying the sceptre over sea and land; they

¹ Aristot. Poet. I.

assembled in the Pnyx, from day to day, scarcely more to transact the business of the state than to see their orators enter the lists against each other, like gladiators in the Roman amphitheatre, or knights in the tilts and tournaments of the Middle Ages. Never before nor since has there been such an oratory as that of Demosthenes — so artistic in conception, so faultless in execution, so fitted to tickle the ear, and delight the eye, and satisfy the taste that Bulwer, with apparent reason, declared it to be a mere play, suited to amuse the Athenians, but utterly incapable of persuading a modern audience;¹ yet, at the same time, so replete with the facts and arguments and measures required by the emergency, so business-like and statesman-like that Legaré, with better reason, pronounces his orations “the true and only models of popular eloquence — its *beau idéal* — for all times and all nations.”² Nothing more strikingly illustrates the high intellectual culture and refinement of this wonderful people, as compared with the Romans, the Spaniards, or even the citizens of our own republic, than the fact that politics was their amphitheatre, the struggles of such orators as Aeschines and Demosthenes for political ascendancy were their bull-fights; and they called by the elegant name of τὰ καλὰ³ those honors and offices of the state which we, with too much truth to our utilitarian ideas and our practical policy, denominate “the spoils.”

Religion at Athens was scarcely more a creed and a ceremony than a recreation and a fine art. With all its flagrant sins against the ἅγιον and the δίκαιον, the whole mythology of the Greeks, from the earliest times, was developed with the strictest observance of the καλόν and the πρέπον. In the golden age of Athenian civilization and refinement, the genius of their architects and sculptors was lavished on those temples and statues of the gods, so unlike the gloomy and sepulchral edifices and the images of deformity and monstrosity with which other heathen nations

¹ A Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients, etc.

² Writings of Hugh S. Legaré, Vol. I. p. 444.

³ Cf. Xen. Mem. III. 1. 1.

have honored or dishonored their divinities, — those beautiful temples whose ruins, crowning the Acropolis, have taught architects in this nineteenth century lessons in architecture, principles of curvilinear beauty, ideas of grace, dignity, and proportion of which they had no previous conception, and those calm and majestic yet speaking statues, whose remains, marred and defaced by time, and exhumed from the rubbish of ages, are to this day the perfect ideal of the human “form and face divine.” The wealth and power of the state conspired with the genius and taste of individuals to adorn the sacred festivals. The festivals of Dionysus were the graceful and joyful occasion for the exhibition of “the new tragedies,” and for the proclamation of the honors which were bestowed on those who had deserved well of their country. The theatre, sacred to the god Dionysus, combined in its *logeum* the stage, the rostrum, and the pulpit, while its programme presented a curious mixture of pleasure, politics, literature, and religion. There, on the steep southern declivity of the Acropolis, basking in the sunshine of an Athenian winter, the citizens of Athens and strangers from every part of Greece, while they forgot not the worship due to the youthful and beautiful god, whose festival they celebrated and in whose theatre they were assembled, listened, day after day, to the trilogies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

The Panathenaic festival was a still more magnificent display. The solemnities began with prayers, sacrifices, and offerings to Athena, the patron goddess of the city. For several days the whole population gave themselves up to the celebration of games, contests, and processions. Footmen, chariots, and horses ran in the races. Gymnasts and musicians contended for the prize. Rhapsodists recited the poems of Homer; philosophers disputed on the merits of their respective schools; historians rehearsed their immortal productions — κτήματα ἐς αἰεῖ (as they fondly hoped) μάλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν;¹ and orators expatiated on the ancestral glories of Athens. And on the

¹ Thucyd. I. 20.

last day, the great day of the feast, the magistrates and the whole population of Attica, on foot, on horseback, and in chariots, marched in sacred procession from the Cèrameicus along the sacred way, amid the monuments of the illustrious dead, first to the temple of Demeter at Eleusis, and then back through the streets of Athens, up the winding ascent at the west end of the Acropolis, through the Propylaea and beneath the towering statue of Athena Polias, to the Parthenon, where they laid the sacred πέπλος, embroidered with the triumphs of Athena over the giants, in the lap of the goddess whose festival they were celebrating. "Our laws," says Pericles, in the oration already cited, "have provided for the mind the most frequent intermission of care and labor, by the appointment of public recreations and sacrifices throughout the year, elegantly performed, with peculiar pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that banishes melancholy."¹ A people of rare taste and culture must they have been whose favorite holidays were the Dionysiac and Panathenaic festivals! The Athenians derived something more than their name from the bright-eyed and brilliant goddess whom they worshipped.

Ethics was one of the fine arts among the Greeks. Their best philosophers identified the good with the beautiful; and this conception was so radical, so innate in the minds of the masses, that it is inwrought in the very composition of their language. The word by which they expressed the highest excellence is a compound word (*καλοκάγαθία*), which denotes by its constituent parts the union of the beautiful and the good. And practically the beautiful was the predominating element in their estimation. The beauty of goodness, "the beauty of holiness," is a Christian idea. The Greek idea was rather the goodness of beauty. This suggests the radical defect in the character of the Greeks, conspicuous in too many of their leading men, and seen too often in the conduct of the masses and the history of public affairs. The conscience, individual and national, was not developed. Instead of it the taste was cultivated, perhaps

¹ Thucyd. II. 38.

to excess. Hence judicial murder may almost be said to have been a fine art at Athens. They ostracised their political leaders by the same process of universal suffrage by which they elected their generals; and they administered hemlock to their philosophers with as much courtesy and grace as a cup-bearer would present a cup of wine to a king. Who can read the conclusion of Plato's *Phaedo*, without feeling that the death of Socrates was the poetry of murder on one side, as it was the poetry of martyrdom on the other. When we see the politeness of the executioner, the tranquility of the victim, the grace with which the poison was given and taken, and the decorum of the whole transaction, we ourselves partly forget the wrong in the beauty and dignity of the scene.

Even the mathematical and physical sciences became fine arts in the hands of the tasteful Greeks. Euclid's *Elements* of Geometry, — so rigid is the demonstration, so perfect the unity of the *plot*, and so harmonious the development of the story, — is the very poetry of the mathematics. The *κόσμος* of Plato,¹ and of the larger part of the Greek philosophers, was a world of order and beauty; but it was as unreal as their world of ideas, and as much their own creation as the word which they appropriated to express it. Aristotle is an exception; but even his *Physics*, properly so called, are a series of metaphysical and, according to modern ideas, fanciful disquisitions on time, space, cause, and the like abstractions.

Conversation was a fine art at Athens. The elegant dialogues of Plato are only an imitation or expansion of the conversations which Socrates held every day of his life with the artisans in the shops and the people in the agora. When Paul visited Athens, "all the Athenians and the strangers which were there, spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing."¹ And so when "certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics encountered him," they gave him Mars Hill for a

¹ See the highly poetical and truly magnificent description of the earth seen as a whole, seen from above (ἐξ ὧς ἄνωθεν θεῶν), in the *Phaedo*, LVIII. LIX.

² Acts xvii. 21.

pulpit, and bade him preach to them for their amusement.

In short, taste and imagination overflow all the speculations, all the productions, all the actions of this wonderful people : clothe them with graceful forms and expressions, invest them with an ideal and almost unearthly beauty. Paul says : " The Greeks seek after wisdom." They sought after beauty, also, with idolatrous veneration. In his funeral oration, — which ought, perhaps, to have been prefixed as a text to this Article, so often do we advert to it, — Pericles brings these two characteristics together, and uses two very characteristic words to express them : *Φιλοκαλοῦμεν*, he says,¹ *φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφούμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας* ; that is, rendered as literally as possible into English, " We both love beauty (cultivate a love for the beautiful) with frugality, and we seek after wisdom without effeminacy." *Φιλοκαλία τε καὶ φιλοσοφία* — these words are both peculiar to the Greek language. The latter (philosophy) has been borrowed by the English and most of the modern European nations ; borrowed from the same source from which they derived the philosophical impulse. The other (*philocaly*, it would be if transferred into English) does not exist, nor any single word that is an equivalent, so far as we know, in any modern language. It stands alone, the representative word of that remarkable people, " whom, whatever their errors " (we use the words of Bulwer's Athens²), " the world can never see again ; with whom philosophy was a pastime — with whom the agora itself was an academy — whose coarsest exhibitions of buffoonery and caricature sparkle with a wit or expand into a poetry which attests the cultivation of the audience no less than the genius of the author, — a people, in a word, whom the Stagirite unconsciously individualized when he laid down a general proposition which nowhere else can be received as a truism, that the common people are the most exquisite judges of whatever is graceful, harmonious, or sublime."

If we inquire into the causes of this singular excellence,

¹ Thucyd. II. 40.

² Book IV. chap. v.

God laid the foundations for it when he laid the foundations of the earth ; when he based the whole country, not, like England and America, upon coal and iron, but upon Pentelic, Hymettian, and Parian marble ; when he not only built the mountains round about Athens of the finest materials for sculpture and architecture, but fashioned their towering fronts and gently-sloping summits into the perfect model of a Grecian temple, and lifted from the midst of the plain the Acropolis and Mars Hill — fit pedestals for temples and statues, fit abodes for gods and god-like men ; when he reared to heaven Helicon, Parnassus, and the snow-capped Olympus, where dwelt the muses and the gods, and poured down their sides the rivers in which the river-gods had their dwelling-place, and from which the muses derived their origin ; when he diversified the whole country with mountain and valley, with plain and promontory, with sea and land, with fountain and river and bay and strait and island and isthmus and peninsula, as no other country in the world, within the same compass, is diversified, and thus gave to each district almost every variety of soil, climate, and natural scenery ; when he drew the outline of the shores winding and waving, as if for the very purpose of realizing the ideal line of beauty, and spread around them the clear, liquid, laughing waters of the πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης, and poured over sea and land the pure, transparent air and bright sunshine which distinguish Greece in the dry season scarcely less than the rainless Egypt, and canopied the whole with that wonderfully deep and liquid sky, blue down to the very horizon, which is the never-ceasing admiration of foreigners who visit Athens.

God seems also to have made the Greek *race* originally of finer (we do not say *better*) clay than the other races, and moulded their persons more nearly after, not perhaps the divine archetype, but the *beau ideal* of the human form, and gave them an aesthetic nature singularly sensitive to all the beauties of the external world, attuned to all its harmonies, alive to all its life. For that philosophy of history is very defective which imputes the diversities of human character and life wholly to circumstances. Circumstances are only

the mould in which the nation is cast. Men, families, races, with their original and constitutional differences, are the materials which are run and fashioned in the mould. And the materials, not less than the mould, proceeded from the hand of God: *how, when*, we cannot tell; for the origin of races and languages, like the origin of countries and continents, is veiled in mystery which God alone can penetrate. But we may be sure that nature is only one pole, and that the negative pole too of human life. The positive pole is supernatural. And God is back of both. Earth *and* man — these are the elements of human history; and these both proceed from God. And it is just because *Greece* and the genius of the *Greeks* were so suited to each other, their nature was so adapted to their circumstances, or their circumstances were so adjusted to their nature — it was for this reason, that their whole development was so harmonious.

Hence their religion, the most refined system of idolatry that ever existed, was not the mere worship of nature, as some writers teach, nor, as others insist, the mere deification of man; but it was the worship of the beautiful and ideal in man *and* nature — the religion of nature in mysterious harmony with man and of man in wonderful sympathy with nature. Nature was full of nymphs, naiads, wind and river gods, and divinities of every sort. But even those gods that seemed to be impersonations of the elements, were more or less independent of the elements which they seemed to impersonate; and they all appeared in *human form*, not only when they manifested themselves to mortal eyes, but when they convened in the assembly of the immortals on Mount Olympus. And the idols (of which Athens was so full that, according to the proverb, it was easier to find a god in Athens than it was to find a man) were all modelled after some real or ideal type of humanity.

The Greek language, undoubtedly the most perfect medium through which human thoughts and feelings were ever expressed, — “the shrine of the genius of the Old World” (we quote from Coleridge’s familiar and magnificent

apostrophe to this wonderful language),¹ "as universal as our race, as individual as ourselves; of infinite flexibility, of indefatigable strength; with the complication and distinctness of nature herself; to which nothing was vulgar, from which nothing was excluded; speaking to the ear like Italian, speaking to the mind like English; with words like pictures, with words like the gossamer film of the summer," — this wonderful language was the *synthesis* of man and nature, as God made them in ancient Hellas; the genius of the Greek race clothing itself in the sunshine of Greece; Greek organs of speech speaking under a Grecian sky and through a Grecian atmosphere; the beautiful in man harmonizing and sympathizing with and expressing itself through the beautiful in nature, as probably man and nature never harmonized and sympathized anywhere else. And Greek literature is the music which that wonderful instrument of unknown sweetness and flexibility and depth and power, the Greek language, gave forth when played upon with its infinite number and variety of stops and keys by the masters of Grecian eloquence and song. Greek poetry is a reflection of scenes and scenery on the islands and shores of the Aegean. But Greek poets were the only mirrors — compassing those islands and shores like the Aegean itself, and more placid than that sea in its most tranquil moods, or its most quiet harbors — which could give back so perfect a reflection. Attic oratory is simple, unaffected, pure, clear, transparent as the air of Attica or the waters that wash her marble shores. But Turks and Bavarians, to say nothing of modern Greeks, breathe the same air and walk the same shores; and might do so forever without catching a breath of the same inspiration. The Acropolis is nature's own pedestal, and Pentelicus nature's own plan and outline for a Grecian temple; and Athens was alive with faces like those of Pericles, Plato, and Demosthenes, which were fit models for the statues of the gods. But other cities, too, had their citadels as grand, and some heroes as godlike as

¹ Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets, concluding chapter.

those of Athens; and yet no Parthenon crowned their brows, no Minerva Promachus invited ships far out at sea to their harbors. The Athenian Acropolis would not have been the envy of all Greece if the genius of Pericles and the architects and sculptors of his age had not adorned it with the Propylaea, the Parthenon and the Erechtheum, and those images of divinity which clustered in and around them. Mars Hill was made and set over against the Acropolis as if for the express purpose of being the judgment-seat of the Areopagus and the pulpit of Paul. But Paul only could have preached such a sermon there: combining the logic of the Jew and the learning of the Greek with the faith, hope, and love of the Christian; gracefully acknowledging the devoutness of the Athenians, quoting their poets as authority, and even recognizing elements of truth in their religion; but boldly censuring their idolatry, pointing to their gods of gold and silver and stone, graven by art and man's device, and declaring them to be no gods, and summoning the Areopagites themselves, with the whole crowd of curious spectators, to a coming judgment, infinitely transcending in solemnity that which they were wont to administer, before the Son of man whom God had raised from the dead, and appointed to judge the world in righteousness.

To the two causes already mentioned of the aesthetic superiority of the Greeks, we must add a third: the excellence of their system of education. Education at Athens was usually conceived as threefold: *γυμναστική*, *γράμματα*, and *μουσική* — gymnastics, letters, and music.¹ The first included the whole training of the body; the second, instruction in the common branches of literature and science; the third, the cultivation of the taste and the emotional nature: or, as the name imports, the whole department of the muses. Aristotle, and some other writers, add a fourth department, which they called *γραφική*, or drawing and painting.² Of these three or four departments, we scarcely recognize any but the second, the culture of the mind, as

¹ See Olympiodorus's Life of Plato, Plat. Op. Leipsic ed.

² Aristot. Polit. VIII. ii.

belonging to the system of education ; whereas the Greeks gave a special prominence to the very two which we leave out of our category, viz. physical, and emotional or aesthetic culture. The first, gymnastic or physical training, so important was it deemed, occupied more time than all the others ; and even after the other branches were suspended, this was continued through life. Believing a healthy and beautiful body to be the essential condition of a healthy and beautiful mind, they *lived* out of doors, breathed the open air and drank in the sunshine ; thus perfecting and perpetuating the sympathy with nature which God had given them. Their young men might almost be said to live in the *gymnasia*, where, under porticos or in open courts, in the sunshine or beneath the shadow of lofty plane-trees, as they chose or the weather required, they ran, leaped, boxed, wrestled, danced, pitched quoits, played ball, and engaged in every variety of graceful and invigorating exercises. Thus were developed those fine physical forms which still live and breathe in Grecian sculpture. Thus were trained the hand, the foot, the eye, the ear, and the voice ; the whole speaking person and action of the Athenian orators. These schools were the germs of the entire elegant culture of Athens. Learning and taste gathered around them ; genius and art adorned them ; and at length the three principal *Gymnasia*—the Academy, the Cynosarges, and the Lyceum—grew into the three great schools of philosophy which have ever since engrossed those honored names.

The third department, *μουσική*, beginning with the soothing of the passions by music, properly so called, and the formation of the manners by the rhythmical movements of the dance, proceeded to the cultivation of the taste in literature, poetry, and the fine arts, and embraced finally all the accomplishments of the scholar and the gentleman. Homer taught the noble Grecian youth lessons in taste and morals, with the myths of their religion and the legends of their earliest national history. The tragic poets, whom Milton styles “teachers best of moral prudence,” were even better teach-

ers of that purity and propriety of taste, that dignity and decorum in manners, and that harmony and proportion between the inward feelings and their outward expression, which may most fitly be denominated *music*. The philosophers lectured and conversed on the principles of aesthetics, while the orators and actors furnished the brightest examples of a faultless action; and even the comic writers, with all their license of ridicule and buffoonery, invested their productions with such graces of genius and taste, that the wisest and best of the philosophers wrote this epitaph for the wittiest and most sarcastic of the comedians: "The Graces, seeking an imperishable abode, found the soul of Aristophanes."¹ The theatre, the Pnyx, the Agora, the Areopagus, the Acropolis,—in a word, all Athens was a school of aesthetic culture, over which the muses presided, and in which, by the best masters, they taught all the arts; but more than all, and in them all, the art of *musical*—that is, harmonious and beautiful—expression. "All Greece was like an earthly Olympus,"—so says Frederic Jacobs, in his eloquent discourse on the "Moral Education of the Greeks," given to English readers by the most genial and elegant of American scholars, too soon, alas! snatched away, not only from Cambridge but from his country, by his recent sudden death,— "all Greece was like an earthly Olympus; and at every step the shapes of the immortals in human beauty, met the sight, or rose before the imagination of the traveller."² Jacobs's passionate admiration for the art and education of the Greeks, has led him into an indiscriminate apology for their vices, and a eulogy of their moral virtues which is not sustained by the authority of the ancients themselves, and which the best modern scholars, Professor Felton among them, refuse to sanction. The polished Greeks unquestionably sat for some of the darkest features of the dark picture of heathen depravity which the Apostle Paul has sketched in his Epistle to the Romans. And so prone is man to run to extremes and pervert even his virtues into

¹ Life of Plato by Olympiodorus, above cited.

² Classical Studies, p. 346.

vices, this corruption grew in part, no doubt, from the partial and excessive culture of the outward and aesthetic graces. It is no excessive admiration, still less indiscriminate imitation of Greek culture, that we advocate. On the contrary, we would repeat the proverb of the old Greek moralist: *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, and would fain hope we may "better reckon the rede than did the adviser."

One of the most discriminating, and at the same time one of the most beautiful articles that we have ever read on Greek literature, is another jewel in the same collection of gems from the German, rendered into English by another ripe and rare scholar, whose dust is among the sacred treasures of the seminary which he so loved and adorned by his life: "Nowhere," says Bishop Tegnér, in this article as translated by Prof. Edwards, — "nowhere have the materials, the stores of knowledge, been so closely united with their form, nowhere have they grown so much together, as with the Greeks. The *idea* was always one element only in culture. The other element, which was just as essential, was the expression, the visible representation of it in accordance with the general laws of the beautiful. The external form, for them, was never a matter of indifference. The Greeks were born to the love of beautiful forms. That which distinguished them was a natural sense for the apt and the fitting; an innate dislike of extravagance in any shape; an affection, as just as it was delicate, for true proportion — for that which is both the rule and the substance of real beauty. In aesthetics, we speak of the line of beauty. If it could be found, we might affirm that old Hellas lay within it. This separated the Greek from the barbarian. Hence the Greek taste has been regarded by all cultivated nations as the standard in various respects. Whatever falls short of it, or goes beyond it, is weak, extravagant, or confused."¹

There can scarcely be a greater contrast than that which exists between the ancient Greeks and the Americans of our own day. In character, as well as in geographical situation,

¹ Classical Studies, p. 37.

they are almost the antipodes of one another — a long sea and a broad ocean intervenes between them. As in time, so in culture, they stand at the two extremes in the history of the great European family of nations. The Greeks were preëminently an aesthetic and ideal people. We are proverbially practical and real. They were nicely observant of the outward form and expression. We are content with the substance. In wealth of ideas, in depth of thought, and boldness of conception, we doubtless surpass them. But we are greatly inferior to them in beauty and fitness of representation. They finished every thing which they undertook. Their historians toiled all their lives on a single volume. Their orators spent a decade of years in polishing one oration. Their philosophers occupied the last days of a long life in revising and perfecting the style of their immortal works. Their artists were content to be a long time in painting pieces that were destined to last a long time. We are too much in a hurry to finish anything. With some honorable exceptions, our literature, like our agriculture and our architecture, to a foreign eye bears evident marks of haste. Our style of writing and speaking, like our gait in walking, is rapid, vehement; perchance negligent and rude. We are a fast people. We talk about "Young America." Has there ever been any America that was not young? We are a nation of young men, running the race of life, to see who will despatch every part of it the quickest. In this sense, we *finish* everything. We "finish our education" while we are boys; finish our business or profession, or are finished by it, before we reach middle life; and finish life itself just as we ought to be entering on the wisest and most useful portion of it. A model man, perhaps, would be one who should unite the understanding and wisdom of an adult with the innocence, simplicity, and joyfulness of a little child. The pattern teacher, preacher, man of business, man of power in any profession, wears an old head on young shoulders. His heart never grows old. The Greeks never grew old in their feelings and sympathies. They were as full of mirth and sport and life and joy as if

they had been a nation of children. They combined the natural and simple grace of childhood with the dignity and decorum of manhood. We are just the opposite. There are no children in America. It might almost be said there are no men. We are a nation of boys, wearing often at a very early age the wrinkles and furrows of age, but transacting private and public affairs with too much of the hurry and restlessness, not to say recklessness of boys not yet out of their teens. Previous to the commencement of the war, we had not passed beyond the sophomore year in our education. The nation is notorious, all over the world, for sophomorical bragging and bluster. And as the prevailing style always reflects the spirit of the age and the manners of the nation, our authors, particularly our orators, show a prevailing tendency to a sophomorical style of writing and speaking. That serene repose which is so characteristic of Greek and Latin authors that it is called classical, is wanting in a large part of our popular literature, especially in our popular eloquence, while the public taste inclines to that pomp and passion and extravagance to which the Greeks were so averse. The war has done much to make the people more manly, thoughtful, serious, earnest. The last year has wrought changes sufficient to be the work of an ordinary century. And it is to be hoped that henceforth we shall enter on a new era — an era of literary as well as social and political regeneration.

As in the complex nature of man, so in all the productions of human intellect, there are two parts: soul and body, substance and form, idea and expression. When either of these two elements is neglected, there cannot be a normal, symmetrical, healthy development. The ancient Greeks were, doubtless, excessively devoted to the culture of form, manner, style; and this was, negatively, to say the least, one cause of their moral degeneracy. The moderns are too exclusively absorbed in the substantial and the material. And among the moderns, none are so negligent of everything pertaining to mere form and outward expression, as Americans. Compare the eloquence of the American Congress

with that of the British Parliament: not more earnest and impassioned, perhaps not more thoughtful and profound, but certainly, as a whole, more manly, more elevated, more cultivated and refined, even as the manners of Westminster are more dignified and decorous than those of Washington,—more classical even, as British statesmen have almost all received a university education, while too many American statesmen are self-educated; which, in the sense in which it is commonly used, is another name for no education, though in another, and better sense, every man who is educated at all, is self-educated. Compare the English quarterlies with our own. How much more elaborate, complete, finished, are the articles! The same comparison might be extended to the English encyclopaedias, to the English and French dailies, to English, French, and German works in literature and science. The British pulpit, in general, is inferior to ours in learning, in earnestness, in depth, and power. But there is a breadth of culture, a savor of accurate and thorough scholarship, a classic repose, an unaffected ease and tranquil grace of manner in the brightest lights of the British pulpit,—such, for instance, as Robertson and Trench and the Bishop of Oxford,—which is rarely, if ever, seen in America. The New England clergy as a body, in intellectual discipline, in theological training, in moral and spiritual culture, in all the substantial qualifications for their work, were never surpassed, probably never equalled, by the clergy of any other country or any other age. At the same time, there is not now—it may be doubted if there ever was—so large a number of clergymen so indifferent to all the graces of style and elocution. There is no part of the world where there is such a prodigious loss of power in the delivery of sermons as in New England. In this respect, we are behind our brethren in the Middle states, at the West, and even at the South. Indeed, where is there a pulpit or a learned profession, from which the Congregational clergymen of New England—the most learned and pious, and in many respects the most able, ministry in the world—might not learn a useful lesson in regard to delivery? Soon

after the great Athenian orator failed in his first attempt to speak before the assembled people, he was met by a distinguished actor, who pronounced after him some passages from the Greek poets, and thus explained to him the cause of his failure. Would that some better Satyrus might meet our preachers after their miserable failures to move or interest their people on the Sabbath, and teach them the same lesson. They would soon come to the conclusion of Demosthenes, that action — that is, correct *representation, answering exactly* to the truths and emotions to be *represented*, — is the first, second, and third qualification of an orator. And if, by years of retirement, study, and practice, they could work in themselves, in any considerable measure, the change which that orator wrought in himself, their people would be startled, at their next appearance before them, as by a new creation. Delivery is by no means all that belongs to correct representation; but proper delivery alone, without any other improvement, would effect a revolution in the American pulpit and, through the pulpit, in the people. If the very same sermons which were read (and mangled and murdered in the reading) in the pulpits of the country last Sabbath, could be delivered in the same pulpits next Sabbath by such speakers as we have all sometimes heard, the audience would not recognize them; and the very same hearers who then went away unmoved or disgusted, would go away next week charmed, instructed, perhaps converted.

This is no trifling matter. Here is a loss of moral power which ministers ought never to have allowed, and have no right to perpetuate. Here are several *thousand* talents laid up in a napkin. Herein they wrong at once themselves and their profession. Herein they rob God and man, and violate the proper law and order of the universe. Grace is the proper dress of truth; and it is a shame to leave her naked, or clothe her in rags or ill-fitted garments. Beauty is the native form and expression of goodness; and to mar that form is to commit high treason against the majesty of goodness herself. God arrays truth and goodness in forms of ex-

quisite beauty, both in his works and in his word, and his ministers should go and do likewise. "Consider the lilies of the field. Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these." This is the language of the Son of God to his ministers. Listen to the harmony of nature. Behold the beauty, variety, fitness of the scriptures. God hath joined truth and grace, goodness and beauty, as matter and form, as thought and expression, throughout his universe; and what God hath joined, let not man put asunder. Nay, God hath joined them together as body and soul; and to separate them is not only robbery and sacrilege, but murder. The connection between thought and style, ideas and their expression, is properly organic and vital, and anything which tends to sunder them, or to cherish one at the expense of the other, strikes at the health and life of both. Not only does thought necessarily act upon language: language reacts upon thought, speech upon reason, as the manners react upon the character and the body upon the soul. "Men believe," says Lord Bacon, "that their reason is lord over their words. But it happens, too, that words exert a reciprocal and reactionary power over our intellects. Words, as a Tartar's bow, shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment." And so expression reacts upon emotion, the delivery upon the heart and the character. He, therefore, who allows himself to write and speak in a cold or careless or slovenly or otherwise unseemly manner, is deranging, dividing, distracting his own nature, doing violence to his own physical, mental, and moral constitution, and thus greatly wronging himself as well as his hearers.

It is much easier, of course, to point out a defect of this kind than it is to apply the remedy. But it is not difficult to see at least the direction in which the remedy must be sought.

In the first place, our professional men, particularly our clergymen, should apply themselves more diligently, not only in the preparatory school and college, but in the study and practice of their profession, to the language and lit-

erature of the Greeks. There is the *supply* of the very article we *demand*. The Greeks had in its perfection the aesthetic culture in which we are deficient. They were masters of the art of expression, in which we are as yet but rude boys. They are the world's teachers in this art; and other nations excel in it just in proportion as they learn of them. The superiority which we have been constrained to acknowledge in the best English writers and speakers, is the result of their almost exclusively classical education in the English universities. The writers of the golden age of English literature, and especially the preachers of the golden age of the English pulpit, were nurtured almost entirely on the Bible and on Greek literature. Read Homer. "To be Homeric," as Coleridge remarks in the singularly graceful conclusion of his study of the Greek poets, "is to be natural, lively, rapid, energetic, harmonious." Study Plato. He is the divine writer as well as the divine philosopher, as affluent, flexible, and inimitably graceful in his style, as he is subtle, lofty, and profound in his speculations. Sit at the feet of the Attic orators. To be *Attic*, as we have before remarked, is to be simple, graceful, clear, transparent, as the air of Attica, pure and beautiful as the waters that wash her marble shores.¹ In a word, go to Athens. Adopt as your own the motto of all in ancient times who sought after the most finished culture: εἰς Ἀθήνας.

Were there time, we should be glad to dwell on several incidental advantages which would result from this familiar converse with the great lights of antiquity, especially of Athens, — advantages which, extending beyond aesthetic culture, penetrating deeper than style and manner, or anything merely external, might, peradventure, reach the moral and political philosophy of the age, and help to correct some of the most dangerous tendencies of modern civilization. The philosophy of Comte and Buckle, wholly mate-

¹ Of Demosthenes the pulpit orator might learn, not only to use "fit words in fit places," but also to stem the tide of popular degeneracy, to prefer a heroic failure to an ignoble success, and to breathe the breath of life into "the ribs of death" itself.

realistic and intellectual as it is, to the exclusion alike of moral and emotional culture, is at the antipodes of the best Athenian philosophy ; and it is just as unclassical and un-historical as it is unchristian. That stupendous monument of genius and industry, but no less stupendous monument of pride, vanity, and ambition, the History of Civilization, never could have been written by a profound classical scholar. It could have been written only by a man who had broken loose from all veneration for the past, all reverence for authority, human and divine. And we know of no better antidote to its false teachings and corrupting tendencies, than the study together of the Bible and the classics.

The study of the classics might conspire, with the study of the Bible, to correct, also, that extravagant estimate of the intellect above the heart, that worship of the intellect and neglect and contempt of the heart, which is the besetting sin of our age ; might contribute to restore the virtues of the heart to that place in the esteem of men which they hold in the divine estimation ; and so teach us to honor, instead of despising, individuals and races which may perhaps be inferior to ourselves in intellectual capacity, but are certainly superior to us in wealth of emotions and the virtues of the heart. The Aethiopians, though deriving their name from their dark complexion, were the favorites of the gods in the Homeric age. And in the sight of him who looketh not on the outward appearance, but on the heart, their modern representatives may still be looked upon with more favor than their haters and oppressors, and may yet have a grand history, when confederacies founded on the principle of their inferiority have become extinct, and when proud states which refuse to own them as brethren, or even to admit them within their territory, have been humbled beneath the mighty hand of him whom Greek poetry, as well as the Hebrew scriptures, recognize as emphatically the God of the poor and the stranger.

But to return to our subject. In the next place, appropriate and assiduous culture is required in the art of ex-

pression. The objects of mental education are usually said to be two, the discipline of the mind and the acquisition of knowledge. A third must be added, or these two will be of very little practical use to a public speaker, and that is the art of expression, or the power of communicating thought. It will not do to say: Make sure of the matter, and the manner will take care of itself. This is not true in good breeding, much less can it be true in good writing and speaking. Every faculty of the mind, like every organ of the body, must have its appropriate culture. The cultivation of the memory and the reasoning powers cannot take the place, or supersede the necessity, of cultivating the taste and the imagination. The exercise of the hands and the feet is no substitute for the training of the voice. Still less can the discipline of the mind supersede the training of the body, and of itself secure bodily health, beauty of person, or grace in action. Good writing, like everything else in our world, has a body as well as a soul; and the body as well as the soul must have its specific care and culture. Good *speaking* is doubly external, requiring not only a good style, but also a good elocution. Oratory is the most complex of all the branches of literature, the most difficult and at the same time the most useful of the arts, and therefore, perhaps, the highest attainment of human genius. It is the *whole* man speaking to the whole man; the whole spirit and soul and body of the orator speaking to the whole body, soul, and spirit of his hearers. Grecian eloquence was the culmination of Greek literature—the result of the whole physical, mental, and, to use their word, *musical* culture of the Greeks; and such eloquence will never be formed by the mere study of the sciences in college, or of theology in the seminary.

We shall not be suspected of an intention to depreciate literature or theology. Mental discipline, accurate scholarship, a thorough acquaintance with all the departments of human knowledge, as well as with that greatest of sciences, the science of God, must, of course, be the foundation of eminence in the clerical profession. But it is *only* the founda-

tion, and, so far as any practical use is concerned, might about as well not have been laid, unless the superstructure can be added. Alas! how many of us who preach the gospel give our hearers occasion to say: "This man began to build, and was not able to finish." If we could acquire a good delivery in no other way than by the sacrifice of half our knowledge (though we do not know any too much), those who are so unfortunate as to be obliged to hear us, would be great gainers by the exchange.

The practical difficulties in the way of reform, we are well aware, are very great. Our climate, our organs of speech and nasal pronunciation, our intellectual rather than emotional constitution, our undemonstrative natures and unsocial manners, our partial and one-sided education,—all these are against us. And though we have the grandest themes, the most inspiring objects and occasions for eloquence, yet there are circumstances not a few in our profession which tend to produce a hasty, formal, canting, and artificial style of writing and speaking. Still all these difficulties have been overcome; and what has been done can be done.

We must begin at the beginning. And that is physical education. Here, fortunately, the current of popular feeling and of educational effort is now setting in the right direction. The majority of clergymen have not the *bodily health*, the arms and *sides*, the lungs and organs of speech, to make good speakers. They want also the animal spirits, the physical courage, the strong and hearty *tone* which can come only from a hearty and healthy body. A good gymnasium in every college and theological seminary, with systematic and well-directed gymnastic and calisthenic exercises, continued *as a part of the course*, through the seven years curriculum, would do much to remedy this defect, and to give the next generation of ministers more ease and grace, as well as power of action and utterance. With this ministers and candidates for the ministry should connect as much as possible of that living *in the open air*,—not moping, but real *living*, walking, running, leaping, and laughing *in the open air*,—that communion with external nature, and

that observation of men and things, which, more than anything else, has given the most popular preacher in the United States his powerful frame and his commanding eloquence.

With physical culture must be connected the culture of the emotions. We must keep our hearts young, fresh, joyous, full of love and sympathy with all mankind. The heart is the fountain of eloquence. And if we would keep our emotions healthy in our own hearts, or impress them on others, we must not repress them, but express them in all natural ways and on all suitable occasions. If we would give forth music, like the Greeks, we must have their musical education. When our whole physical, intellectual, and emotional natures are thus brought into harmony with each other and with the world around us, then, perhaps, but certainly not till then, "have something to say, and say it," will be the only rhetorical rule which we need observe; then, like Milton, we can

"feed on thoughts that voluntary move
Harmonious numbers."

In regard to the direct study and practice of elocution, it must be confessed that it has not ordinarily been attended with such success as to be particularly encouraging. The professors of the art, too many of them, like Hamlet's players, so overdo and "strut and bellow," that you "would think Nature's journeymen made men, they imitate humanity so abominably." And the best that can be said of not a few of their pupils, is, that they are not worse than their teachers. On the other hand, from the days of the Athenian orator to the present time, there have been examples of the most brilliant success in the most unpromising subjects; and the failures are so manifestly the abuse and not the proper use of the art, that so far from being an argument for its neglect or rejection, they plead eloquently for a wiser study and a more persevering practice.

In order to be really successful, the practice should begin earlier and take a wider range. It should begin in the family, in the very nursery, with the formation of the person and the manners, with the expression, in the common rela-

tions of life, of all right feelings by all right words and actions. It should be continued in the common schools by the cultivation of good breeding, good reading, and good speaking, step by step, along with the branches of elementary education. Good reading is the foundation of good speaking; and good reading, like good spelling, must ordinarily be acquired in childhood. Good reading is as rare in the pulpit as good speaking; and good reading in the pulpit — good reading anywhere — is a higher accomplishment than all the ologies. Instead of being crammed with a smattering of all the sciences, let children, in their earlier years, be taught, by competent teachers, who can teach by example as well as by precept, to cultivate *music* in the wide sense of the Greeks, and to sacrifice to the Graces. And so throughout the preparatory school, the college, and the professional school, instruction in rhetoric and oratory should keep pace with instruction in literature and science. As fast as our young men discipline their minds and acquire useful knowledge, they should cultivate, by persevering practice, the power of expressing their ideas in appropriate forms, and thus impressing them on others; remembering that, in this world, every living thing has a body as well as a soul, and that even the truth of God loses half its vital power if it is not clothed in “the beauty of holiness.”

After such an education, in which aesthetic culture has held its normal place, it will not be difficult to maintain the habit of expressing fit thoughts in fit words, and by appropriate actions. Still it behooves the preacher to remember through life, that the *idea* is only one element in preparation for the pulpit; the power of the pulpit will depend quite as much upon the *representation*. “Representation in accordance with the laws of the beautiful” was the element of immortal life and power in the literature of the Greeks. Expression was the life-long study of Greek orators, authors, and artists. Plato spent the last days of his life in revising the style of his “*Republic*.” Is not the art of expression worthy of assiduous study by those whose sacred office it is to communicate to men the true wisdom?

ARTICLE V.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ANNIHILATION OF THE
WICKED.

BY REV. WILLIAM L. PARSONS, MATTAPOISETT, MASS.

THE Maker of the human soul, it may be granted, can, if he choose, terminate its existence. If annihilation be the appointed destiny of any of our race, the record of the fact will naturally be found in the Bible; and the question must be mainly decided on scripture grounds. The burden of proof, of course, rests upon those who affirm the doctrine.

Before considering the argument which annihilationists attempt to make from the Bible, we shall do well to take notice of the underlying fact, that their current reasoning is an assault upon the prevailing doctrine of future eternal punishment, which they assume to be inconsistent with the benevolence of God.

Mr. Hudson, their ablest writer, quotes a mournful strain from Mr. Barnes, in which he confesses that his mind is tortured with the fact "that the immortal soul should be allowed to jeopard its infinite welfare, and that trifles should be allowed to draw it away from God and virtue and heaven; that any should suffer forever—lingering on in hopeless despair, and rolling amidst infinite torments without the possibility of alleviation, and without end; that since God *can* save men, and will save a part, he has not purposed to save *all*; that, on the supposition that the atonement is ample, and that the blood of Christ can cleanse from all sin, it is not in fact applied to all; that, in a word, a God who claims to be worthy of the confidence of the universe, and to be a being of infinite benevolence, should make such a world as this, full of sinners and sufferers; and that, when an atonement had been made, he did not save all the race, and put an end to sin and woe forever."

The difficulty thus felt by Mr. Barnes, has burdened the minds of men of all schools in theology and philosophy; and they have sought, in different ways, so to vindicate the justice and benevolence of God, as to afford the relief which the human sensibility naturally craves from conclusions so painful as this picture presents.

One class of theologians resolves it into a question of divine sovereignty which, as yet, admits of no solution satisfactory to reason; and they demand that reason shall stand in awe and be silent before the sovereign majesty of God.

Another class justifies God on the ground of man's moral agency. They insist that God has made man in his own constitutional image, as his infinite benevolence dictated; that he has made the best possible provision for the salvation of moral agents; and, therefore, that if any reject life and persist in sin, and incur its penalty, there remains no good reason why the loyal subjects of God's government should be disquieted, as if God were unjust or cruel, or in any sense wanting in benevolence, in disposing of the finally incorrigible as the Bible declares he will.

Dr. Edward Beecher finds it impossible to admit that God, with an infinite sense and purpose of "honor and right," would allow immortal beings to begin an existence in such circumstances as encompass the opening of human life in the flesh, and as would inevitably overwhelm all men in sin, and expose them to its eternal and terrible consequences; and he resorts to his theory of pre-existence to make out his vindication of the divine government. He attempts to show that men began their existence in a previous world, where they became sinners under circumstances which clear God of all responsibility, near or remote, direct or indirect, for their sinfulness; and where they formed the characters which they develop here, and which justly expose them, remaining impenitent, to the hottest hell which the Bible anywhere brings to view.

Universalists attempt to escape the whole difficulty by substantially denying the fundamental fact that man's sinfulness is, or can be, such as to expose him to any future

or eternal punishment. They run riot through the Bible, and, with amazing exegetical ingenuity, make it teach, whether it will or not, that all men, alike and of necessity, are moving on in the one broad way which leads to life and glory. They deny the possibility of the sinner's continuing his rebellion, even should he choose to do it.

Annihilationists attempt to cut the knot by a still different theory. They simply deny that the facts are as Mr. Barnes represents them; and maintain that, when the Bible asserts that the doom of the wicked is eternal punishment, it means, not that they shall suffer without end, but that they shall be put entirely out of existence, so that suffering shall be forever terminated, and no ground be left for the charge against God of undue severity or cruelty.

Must we, then, consider the theory of annihilationists under the implied admission that the government of God needs any such vindication as they are kind enough to volunteer? We reply in the negative. We think God wishes no apology at our hands for making the condition of the incorrigible as miserable, through an endless state of existence, as the Bible teaches that he will.

What are the simple facts in the case?

1. We belong to a *moral* universe, of which God is the moral Governor.

2. His law is holy, just, and good. It adapts itself to all moral agents in his empire, and requires each man or angel to love the Supreme Being supremely, and his fellow man (whose interests are precisely equal to his own) as himself. It requires just that moral state, in other words, which, in the nature of mind and of things, is the immutable condition of the highest personal and general well-being of moral agents, and without which well-being is absolutely impossible, and which alone constitutes true virtue.

3. Every moral agent is endowed with the power of choice; and, so far as his constitution is concerned, is as free to choose right as wrong. God has supplied an infinite preponderance of motive to prefer the right to the wrong, the good to the evil, and laid it open to the inspection of

reason. Nor has God left man's nature in equipoise as between right and wrong, good and evil, but has wrought into it elements which make the sentiment of the right, the true, and the good intensely attractive; and the opposite sentiment of the wrong, the false, and the evil, correspondingly repulsive.

This freedom of choice will continue through eternity; and the relation of motive to volition, and the natural preferableness of the good to the evil will remain eternally unchanged. It follows, therefore, that the future and endless condition of the sinner will be *just what he chooses to have it in preference to surrendering his will to the will of God as expressed by his law*; and of this, neither the sinner, nor his friends, nor his apologists can reasonably complain. God simply gives to every moral agent his choice, at all times, between sin with its results, and holiness with its rewards. This is an essential and radical element of a moral government. And now, if any one deliberately chooses the former and persists in his choice, even after an experience of evil enabling him to decide intelligently, why should God turn his back upon his own government and become the servant of the sinner, and relieve him by blotting him out of existence?

Even in hell, if a sinner shall choose God, instead of himself, as his object of supreme affection; if he shall put his own individual interests on the true level with those of his equal fellow-creatures, instead of exalting his own at the sacrifice of theirs, his choice thenceforth will be satisfactory to God and to his own moral nature, and the sting of present sin will be extracted. And it is even more certain that the benevolence of God would find a way to pardon his past sin, than that any one will ever, in a future world, thus form the choice which God's law will there, as here, require.

4. Eternal misery is not to be regarded as the penalty inflicted for a few specific and hastily-performed acts of transgression, as is generally assumed by those who deny the doctrine of future punishment. Sin, in its generic and

fundamental form, is like the act of the Confederate States renouncing forever their allegiance to the Union. It is a rebellion against the law and government of God, not for a time, but as a finality. It is the comprehensive act of the soul eternally renouncing its allegiance to God, and, at the same time, allying itself, without reserve, to the "throne of iniquity." This essential quality of sin, in its generic form, appears also in the specific acts of sin. If a man steals your watch, or commits murder, he does it for eternity. His volition is not merely to commit the act, but to stand by it, perpetuate it, cover it with falsehood, and so conceal it that, if possible, the fire of the last day shall not disclose it. Moral acts have the attribute of eternity in them. The soul's fundamental act of rebellion involves its whole character, and will determine all its future developments toward God, as the one act of the secession of the Confederate States will determine all their acts toward the government against which they have rebelled. The war and all its bitter consequences are involved in the act of secession. Nothing but the regeneration of the soul, by which its allegiance to God shall be renewed, or its annihilation, can, by any possibility, prevent the evolution of an eternal succession of specific acts of sin from this one fountain of disloyalty.

It is not for the mere outward deeds done in this world, then, that sinners are to be forever punished. These are referred to, in the Bible, as indicating the degree of guilt involved in the one fundamental and eternal deed of revolting from the government of God, just as the deeds of the Southern Confederacy, in desolating the land with war, in crowding our hospitals with sick and wounded and dying men, in covering the battle field with the slain, and in filling the whole land with wailing and woe, might be referred to as illustrating the fearful wickedness of the one comprehensive act of secession.

The eternal penalty, then, which God pronounces against sin, only runs parallel with the sin which it punishes. The great sinful deed of revolt from God is done in the body, but

it does not spend and exhaust itself in the body. It reaches right on as long as the being of the sinner endures; and the penalty which it involves does no more. Surely, no apology is needed for a government which punishes sin no longer than it endures.

5. No fault can reasonably be found with God for the severity of the punishment he promises to inflict upon sinners; for, it is to correspond exactly with the grade of sin which is punished. God, who can make no mistakes, will adjust penalty to transgression with consummate perfection. He will so interlock the penalty and the transgression that there cannot be a variation of a hair's breadth from what is just and right.

6. It must be remembered that God, preparing the way by the greatest sacrifice it was possible for him to make, by a complete and "finished" atonement, and by the manifestation of his infinite love in forms richer than had been before known in the universe, and having therefore the highest power to attract the love of his creatures, has freely offered pardon for sin, and an eternal participation in all the glories of his kingdom and character, to every man who will heartily return to his allegiance to him. He makes the condition of salvation as easy as it can be in the nature of the case; for, without faith, salvation would be a natural impossibility. He employs the best methods to persuade men to turn and live which his infinite benevolence and wisdom could suggest. He sends the best agents the Godhead affords to the very hearts of men, to urge the great salvation upon them; and they do it with infinite love and compassion; nor do they cease their efforts till, by the sinner's own blasphemy, they must be utterly fruitless. Sitting as the spectator of the moral universe, and knowing from eternity just how each free moral agent will treat the offer of salvation, God predestinates to heaven, and adopts into his own family, every foreseen believer, shielding him from all fatal temptation, and completing, beyond peradventure, the work of his redemption.

7. This scheme of God for the salvation of the lost, the

incorrigible sinner contemptuously rejects, and stands to his rebellion.

With these elements entering into the problem of God's dealing with the wicked, why should we admit any necessity for the annihilationist's argument based on the assumption that God is either unjust or malevolent in following sin with endless misery?

But the objector may say: "men will not *choose* to live in a lake of fire and brimstone forever, and therefore one of your main premises is unsound, and your conclusion does not afford the relief desired."

To this objection two answers may be given: 1. While it would seem almost unaccountable that a moral being should choose such a doom as the Bible pictures for the lost; yet we know that, in its beginnings, and with an experience of what sin involves, and in full view of the cross of Christ to dissuade them therefrom, men do in this life make that astounding choice. It is not the suffering they choose, for its own sake, but the selfish and sinful gratification of their desires, which involves it. They freely give themselves up here, to be rolled and tossed restlessly about in the fiery lake of ambition and avarice, of envy and pride; to be tortured by the stings of passion, and eaten by the worms of lust. They set fire to their own moral natures, and feed the flames with all combustible materials, and gather fuel for future use, by making war upon God and the changeless laws of his moral government; by putting light for darkness, and darkness for light, and thus attempting to confound all moral distinctions; and their experience tends to confirm them in, rather than dissuade them from, their preferred course. Since such is the choice of the sinner here, and since nothing which issues either from God's throne of justice or of grace induces him to change it, it is impossible to say that he will not continue so to choose hereafter, rather than give up his selfishness and bow his heart to him whose atonement he now despises and rejects.

2. A second answer, and one to which especial attention is asked is this: The fearful descriptions which the Bible

presents of the condition of the lost are such as a *holy mind* would give, and not such as the sinner himself would draw. The picture which a sober, virtuous, and true man would put upon the canvas, of a drunken, profane, and polluted wretch, would scarcely be recognized by the vile man himself. He might boast, even, of his bad eminence, glory in his shame, and account his ruin a reward.

The suggestion here made, although in a certain way it modifies the impression in regard to the severity of God, made by the Bible descriptions of future and eternal punishment, does not in the least abate the solemn meaning of the scriptures; for the picture which the holy mind of God, by his prophets and apostles, draws of the condition of the lost, *is the true one*. The sinner will not be unconscious of suffering, any more than the drunkard, who can give the most graphic account of his miserable experiences, is unconscious of suffering; and the fact that the sinner will be in a state to choose his sins with the sufferings they involve, only makes his doom the more fearful to contemplate.

One of the assumptions of universalists and annihilationists is, that God, being infinite in goodness and power, will not allow evil to be eternal in the universe.

It is admitted that God will not allow any evil to exist eternally which he will not overrule to the higher good, on the whole, of his moral universe. The real question is this: *Is it an evil to allow moral beings who will, in spite of all right considerations, pervert their powers, and thus involve themselves in suffering, to exist forever?* The affirmative cannot be proved. We know that the existence of such beings, in itself and at least for a time, is on the whole a good; else how could a God of benevolence have given them such existence? It is equally clear that, if God can overrule the wrath of man or restrain it so that it shall be made to conserve the higher general ends of benevolence (and it is quite certain that he can, and altogether impossible to prove that he cannot), then the assumption of universalists, that God will destroy all sin, otherwise than as men may choose to give it up on the terms offered in the gospel; or of annihi-

lationalists, that he will put the wicked out of existence as a means of removing evil from the universe, is wholly destitute of logical force. Any incidental evil which, in his wondrous economy of moral influences, God can so overrule, neither benevolence nor power would seek to remove. If the United States government shall so put down the Southern rebellion that its history will forever tell against all future rebellions; if it shall so punish all incorrigible traitors that they shall have no power to inaugurate a new treason; if their sufferings shall promote loyalty and discourage secession in others, the triumph of the government will be complete — a triumph demanded alike by justice and benevolence. And when God shall have so put down the rebellion against his throne that its history will afford the strongest motives to future loyalty; and when all rebels and traitors who, refusing the mercy of the government kindly offered to all who will return to their allegiance, are condemned to suffer, in the state prison of the universe, the due reward of their deeds, as beacons to warn the race against further sin, then God will have cleared the universe of evil so far as his word teaches that he will do it. Every knee will have bowed to, and every tongue will have confessed, the rectitude, the benevolence, and the supremacy of his government.

To argue from the benevolence and power of God that he will remove from the universe all that men call evil, is to prove too much. The assumption that God would altogether *prevent* the existence of sin and suffering is quite as valid as the assumption that, having permitted them, he will some day change his policy, and exclude them from the universe. And would it not be as reasonable to infer from the existence of sin and suffering, the non-existence of a God of infinite love and power?

We pass now to consider the reasoning of annihilationists. We think Mr. Hudson, as well as his co-believers generally, has fallen into a fundamental error which vitiates his whole process of thought. The engine of his logic is off the

track at the start, and pulls the train off with it. When in the outset a writer assumes and commits himself to a radically false principle, notwithstanding his seeming integrity, it must and will shape all his reasoning. When the universalist or annihilationist commits himself to the sentiment, that the wicked are not to suffer in future conscious misery, he will almost unavoidably define all his essential terms, like sin and holiness, justice and mercy, faith and repentance; he will adopt and vindicate just such laws of interpretation; he will even invent just such a system of mental and moral philosophy; and he will form just such conceptions of God's character and government, as his adopted theory demands. Into that mould he will pour all the metal of his reasoning. Happy is he who does not start with the assumption of the truth of that which he is bound to prove.

Before endeavoring to point out the fundamental error of annihilationists, we desire to state clearly one principle which must guide us in our investigation of this subject, and which seems self-evidently true, namely: There is no original and changeless meaning inhering in *words* by which their sense can be determined independently of the context, and other circumstances which may throw light upon the ideas which those who used the words we seek to interpret, intended to convey by them. Words are but signs of ideas, and the reliable interpreter will go behind the signs, and will use all the light he can obtain, that he may find out just what is signified. For the interpreter, words may have no other meaning than that which their writer puts into them.

The radical fallacy of annihilationists, if we understand them, consists in the direct violation of this great rule, in the illogical assumption *that the original, settled, and inherent meaning of the word "death," is annihilation.* Their scripture argument is an attempt to force the Bible into harmony with this assumption. It is not an exhibition of the grand current of truth flowing like a river through the whole Bible, as we see it in the opposite arguments of Professor Barrows (Bib. Sac., July, 1858), Prof. Hovey (Impenitent Dead), Prof.

Cowles (Oberlin Evangelist, 1861), and Rev. Mr. Love (New Englander, April 1862), but rather an effort to prove from the reflowing of the waters in the eddies, that the river itself flows from the ocean backward to the mountains.

So far as we have been able to consult their works, annihilationists make this most false assumption in the outset, and carry it through, to the utter perversion of all their reasoning. Elder Cook (True Source of Immortality, Hartford, 1847) seems to himself to have proved annihilation when he has quoted, "All the days that Adam lived, were nine hundred and thirty years, and he *died*." "Abraham *buried* his wife in the cave of Macphelah." "David is both DEAD and BURIED." Mr. Blain (Death not Life) opens his work by collating the passages which threaten "death," "destruction," "perdition," "corruption;" which declare that sinners shall be "consumed," "devoured," "slain," "killed," "blotted out," "hewn down," "cut off," "ground to powder," "torn in pieces," "burned up," and the like. Mr. Hastings, (Old Paths, Providence, 1855) introduces his book with a liberal quantity of texts to show that men "shall not live forever," "that they shall die," "shall perish," "shall be consumed," "shall be devoured by fire," "shall be cut off," "destroyed," "burned up, root and branch," and "be as though they had not been." The same assumption is made by Ellis and Read in a work of some pretensions (Bible against Tradition). Elder Grant, in his discussion with Dr. Litch, at the Music Hall, Boston, 1859, is embarrassed by the fact that he should have to stand before an intelligent audience to prove that when a man is dead, he is *dead* and not alive. Mr. Dobney of England and Mr. Hudson of this country are the more learned and acute writers on the side of annihilation. They however make the same assumption. Mr. Dobney teaches that Adam went out of existence at his death, nine hundred and thirty years after he was formed of dust. To die was to cease to be. He was not allowed to eat of the tree of life, and his death was, therefore, an extermination of his being. (The Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment, p. 133.) The vicious assumption

glides into Mr. Hudson's work more unconsciously, but it is there. He asks (*The Doctrine of Future Life*, p. 171), "are 'life' and 'death,' and other like terms, to be taken in a metaphorical sense whenever they look beyond the veil that divides time from eternity, or *do they retain their common meaning?*" i. e. of existence or non-existence. Any other meaning than annihilation given to the word "death" is, with Mr. Hudson, metaphorical. He admits (*ibid.*, p. 172), "that these terms are sometimes used in a tropical sense," but adds, "language would be mere cloudland, a baseless fabric of visions, if its commonest words did not commonly hold their literal sense." In other words, *death* must commonly hold its literal signification of annihilation, or all reasoning about it would be "mere cloudland." All reasoning about it *will be* mere cloudland if we do not give to the word its *true sense*, undoubtedly; but what is its true sense, is the very question in debate. Mr. Hudson's book becomes sheer cloudland from his having assumed that there is some literal meaning inhering in the word "death," by which the controversy can be settled, when the whole question, in the last analysis, is, what is signified by the term itself.

Now, can we go behind the word "death" and find out what meaning there is in it? That word and others identical with it in meaning, are found in all languages, and they have been used in all ages. They have been employed to represent one great, everywhere prevailing fact in human experience, and therefore the same substantial meaning has always been given to them.

Let us inquire, then, what is the meaning of these words *now*? Suppose the annihilationist should quote all the obituary notices in Christendom in which the departed are said to have *died*; suppose he should quote all our authors as affirming unvaryingly of the departed that they had "died" and were "buried," that "dust had returned unto dust," that the dead were "cut off" and "were no more;" suppose he should quote passages from the public prints wherein men were said to have "perished" from a steamer sinking in mid-ocean, or by the frosts of a winter night, or to have

been "destroyed" by pestilence, or "killed," or even "annihilated" in battle; suppose he should produce from some daily journal an account of a great conflagration in which whole families were said to have been "burned up, root and branch" (parents and children), and "consumed like stubble," so that the ashes of their bodies were mingled with the ashes of their dwellings, and would be found "under the soles of the feet" of those who should walk over the ruins which the terrible flames had left behind them,—would he have proved that the dead of America were, in the judgment of the writers quoted, annihilated? Certainly not; and for the simple reason that the writers had put into the word "death," or any one of its equivalents, no such meaning. We know perfectly well that they used the language quoted, and at the same time believed that death did not terminate man's existence, but that it was continued right on in another state of being. To argue annihilation from any such supposed literal meaning inhering in the word "death," as used anywhere in the civilized world now, would not be respectable reasoning for a madhouse. With the present reigning belief of men, they could not by death mean annihilation. It would imply self-contradiction; and so to interpret the word would be to commit the gross absurdity of making those who used it witnesses against themselves.

Our next position is this: What is true now has been equally true in all ages of the world. The generations of mankind have believed in the continual existence of man after his death or departure from the flesh; and therefore, as now, the term "death," or any of its synonyms, has never had, and never could have had, the sense of annihilation in it.

The doctrine of a future state of existence did not originate with the "heathen Plato," as many annihilationists, less wise than Plato, are fond of affirming. Homer recognized it five hundred years before his day. The Egyptians believed it long before the Israelites were their bondmen. The earliest belief of the Hindus was that of the simple existence of the

soul after death (Bib. Sacra, April, 1859, Prof. Whitney on the Vedic doctrine of a Future Life). Turn where you will, to the most ancient or modern nations, to the most cultivated or to the most rude and savage tribes of the eastern and western hemispheres, and you find everywhere the belief in the continued existence of the man after he leaves the body. The doctrine of metempsychosis, which, in the natural order of thought, must have come after and presupposed the belief in continued existence, — for it relates to the history of the soul after its departure from the body, — held sway all over the eastern world long before Moses was cradled in the Nile. And to this day, that system has reigned over the Burman, Chinese, Tartar, Tibetan, and Indian nations, including at least 650,000,000 of mankind. From a time, then, to which the history of the world runneth not back, to the present day, in all the languages of men, the words corresponding to our word “death” could not have had in them the sense of annihilation. This was as true when Moses wrote the Pentateuch as when Gray wrote his “Elegy in a Country Churchyard.” But perhaps it will be said that God meant annihilation by the word “death,” whatever may have been its meaning in the languages of men. How this was, we shall see more fully when we come to the discussion of the texts bearing upon the subject. It is enough to say here that, if God would communicate thought to men, he must use words in the sense in which men understand them. Moses wrote the account of the creation and fall of our first parents for the instruction of the Hebrew people of his own age; and their understanding of the words used would determine the ideas they would receive from the record in Genesis. If God inspired Moses to use the language he did, he doubtless intended the Hebrews should receive the ideas the words used would convey to their minds. They recognized the continued existence of men after death, as certainly and distinctly as we do now. They had a more practical confidence in the existence of men out of the body than, if possible, in the existence of God himself. To keep them from following the supposed

guidance of the departed, instead of the will of God, Moses was obliged to make a law against necromancy, with the penalty of death attached. It was impossible, therefore, that God should have communicated the idea of annihilation to the Hebrew mind by the word "death" or any one of its synonyms; for, they had not the idea that death terminated man's existence.

It is not difficult to account for this universal conviction of the race that existence continues after death, and that the term "death," therefore, could never have had the sense of annihilation. There is an inner light, amounting to a consciousness, by which a man sees and knows the distinction between *himself* and his *body*, and so clearly that he cannot help making it. He sees and knows that his body is essentially an organism for his mind's use; that his arm, foot, tongue, all his voluntary members, are just as truly instruments which he uses, as the saw, axe, or pen which he grasps with his hand. The destruction of the organism does not destroy the agent for whom it is made. Death never reports itself as doing the work of annihilation upon the man. It rather suggests the idea of retribution to the wicked, and of deliverance to the righteous. From this inner light man sees his existence to be independent of his body, as clearly as he sees the existence of God, the duty of rectitude, or the fact of his accountability. Nature, from without, falls in with this inner conviction, and confirms it by her constantly recurring illustrations of the fact that apparent death is only a step from the lower to the higher forms of life.

Before passing to the more direct scripture argument, let us dispose of a matter upon which Mr. Hudson, as well as his less learned disciples, lays considerable stress, namely: "the silence of the scriptures respecting man's natural immortality."

The position of the Bible is never to offer proof of what is intuitively attested by the reason. All such truths are always taken for granted. Mr. Hudson, however, seizes upon the

fact that the Divine existence, which stands at the head of the list of intuitive truths, is frequently affirmed in the scriptures, and infers from this fact that, even if our natural immortality were a "postulate of reason," we ought to find it insisted upon as much as the Divine existence. The reply is very simple. We deny that the Bible ever asserts the Divine existence *for the purpose of proving it*. It always assumes that God's existence is known—that the idea is in every man's mind. Men have, however, utterly lost by sin the true conception of his character; and the very object of revelation is to reveal that character, that men may be saved. God does indeed affirm his existence; but it is to make his character known, to distinguish himself from the gods many and lords many whom the world worship. He declares his existence as the Creator of the universe; not to prove it, but to declare that "there is no God beside him"; to disprove the reigning and fatal polytheism of the people. The Bible urges the Divine existence with simple reference to the regeneration of the world—never to prove it.

Precisely so, the Bible deals also with the question of our immortality. It is an intuitive truth, universally believed; never asserted as a thing to be proved; always taken for granted. There was no occasion to affirm it. The conviction which the mind has of intuitive truths is always weakened when we attempt to draw it into a reliance upon any evidence which is short of that which is intuitive. The world has always believed in a continued future existence, independently of any affirmation of it in a written revelation, more firmly than it has believed any truth which is attested merely by such revelation. Men who reject revelation entirely, who will believe nothing on the mere authority of a book, implicitly hold to the doctrine of immortality. The mere assertion of the doctrine in the Bible, therefore, in order to prove it, would neither have deepened nor extended the conviction of its truthfulness. The thing the world needed was, not to have a future and endless existence proved to it, but to be shown how man could, in that future existence, secure to himself the purity and blessedness which

he was made to enjoy; not to have the mere fact of his existence "brought to light," as to which he had no doubt, but how to make that existence glorious and divine. And hence, on that subject, and to meet that real necessity, the oracles of God are full of light, from Genesis to Revelation. The sun is above the horizon in Moses; it rises higher in the psalmists and prophets; it culminates in the Messiah; and in him it stands and gives ample light to all who are willing to see the way, through the Spirit and the truth, into the kingdom of righteousness and peace.

We may as well, also, at this point, consider the subject of the resurrection, in its relations to the doctrine we are reviewing.

With most annihilationists, the death of the body practically extinguishes the whole man. There is no conscious existence between death and the resurrection. They can see no meaning to the resurrection if men are all the while in conscious existence. "Why raise a man from the dead if he is alive already?" is their triumphant challenge.

What are the several obvious positions of the Bible bearing on the resurrection?

1. There is to be a future resurrection of the race, of both the just and the unjust.

2. The bodies to be produced by the resurrection, will have a resemblance to our present bodies; yet they will not be of "flesh and blood, which cannot inherit the kingdom of God." They are to be changed from a material and corruptible nature, to an immaterial and immortal one.

3. The soul, at the death of the body, does at once enter and inhabit some sort of a vehicle for its use, "a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." The devoted Christian groans, "earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with this house which is from heaven." To leave the tabernacle of flesh is to enter that, and be "swallowed up of life" (2 Cor. v.). Moses and Elias appeared upon the mount of transfiguration in these heavenly vehicles.

4. The Bible everywhere recognizes the departed as still existing, as we shall soon show more fully.

In Christ's conversation with the Sadducees touching the resurrection of the dead, he quotes what God said to Moses at the burning bush: "I am the God of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob;" and adds: "God is not the God of the dead [the dead in the Sadducees and annihilationist's sense—of non-existent], but of the living"; proving that the patriarchs were then in existence, enjoying the benevolent reign of God. How this reasoning of Christ "touches" the resurrection of the dead, is obvious. The Sadducees did not believe there was any existence of men or angels out of the body; and, therefore, the proof that the patriarchs were then in conscious and joyous existence, would overthrow their radical position, and leave their materialism without support. If these patriarchs were in existence, without their material bodies, much more, the Sadducees would be compelled to admit, might they exist subsequently in their re-organized bodies. A later scripture would doubtless bear an interpretation like that given to the Saviour's quotation from Genesis: "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord: whether we live, therefore, or die, we are the Lord's. For to this end Christ both died and rose and revived, *that he might be Lord both of the dead and living*" (Rom. xiv. 7-9).

5. Consistently with all these facts of revelation, suppose,—when the judgment is to sit, and the affairs of Christ's earthly administration are to be reviewed, and men are to be judged according to the deeds done in the body; and when it may be essential that the race should appear in vestments corresponding to those they wore while their characters were forming,—that the righteous and the wicked should return, as it were, to their graves, and take on by a miracle of Omnipotence, their resurrection bodies—copies of those they dwelt in here—and appear at the judgment; and with them such as may then be living on the earth, whose bodies, by a like miracle, shall have been changed from corruptible to incorruptible,—would not all

be fulfilled which the scripture doctrine of the resurrection calls for? Describing the result as it would appear to the eye, we should say truly that the dead were raised; all that were in their graves had come forth to judgment; death and hell, hades and the grave, had given up all they contained; their prisons were emptied, and henceforth they themselves, as the keepers of the dead, might cease to be — might be destroyed as to their office of guardians of the dead previous to the resurrection.

It is not essential that the resurrection body should have the identical elements of the old one, even if identity of elements be possible as between an immortal and a mortal body. It would make no difference whether you have one particular square foot of oxygen in your body from the great ocean of that material or another; and so of all the elements which compose the human system. It would be the same, to appearance and to all practical purposes, in the one case as the other. It would be as truly the same, as your body of to-day is the same as your body of ten years ago.

Then, as to the vehicle occupied from death to the resurrection: since it was "eternal in the heavens," and divinely constructed, we need not suppose it thrown aside at the resurrection. It may combine with, and give immortality and eternity to, the resurrection body. Our present tabernacle seems like a nest of organizations, one within another; and Omnipotence surely will have no difficulty in securing the union of the heavenly and the resurrection body.

With this analysis of the resurrection, the doctrine falls in harmoniously with the common view of a future life, and has nothing in it which favors the sentiment of annihilation.

We are now ready for the scripture argument. Mr. Hudson's position, when reduced to its lowest terms, is, that the Bible teaches that we lose our existence by sin, and regain it by the gift of Christ. He does indeed protest (Christ's Life, p. 4) against being understood to mean by eternal life *mere* existence. But his argument seems confused by not properly distinguishing between what he calls

the literal and metaphorical meaning of the words. The Christian world has no controversy with him as to what he admits to be the metaphorical sense of eternal life and death, but only as to the literal one. He insists that the literal meaning of death as the penalty for sin, is, "extinction of being: one installment, physical death; the other, annihilation of soul"; and that the restoration of that which is lost by sin, namely, existence, is *the* great gift of Christ to believers. If Mr. Hudson proves that extinction of being is the penalty for sin, he proves, of course, that there can be no eternal suffering; for that would imply existence: but to prove that the radical gift of Christ is an immortality of existence, is *not* to prove an immortality of spiritual life, of holy blessedness; for we know that moral beings do and may exist in great misery and suffering. *The issue is on the question of existence.* If the doctrine of a future existence be established, then we can raise the inquiry: *In what moral condition will men exist?* The two questions are radically distinct; and Mr. Hudson can not be allowed to set all logic at defiance by confounding them.

The assumption runs through his works, that "life" is synonymous with existence; "death," with extinction of the whole being. Such is the "literal," any other the "metaphorical," meaning of the words. His books labor with the effort to harmonize the scriptures with that assumption.

Let us show:

I. That, contrary to the theory of most annihilationists, the soul is capable of existing independently of the body.

The record concerning the introduction of man into the world, is this: "And God said, Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness. So God created man in his own image" (Gen. i. 26, 27). In this creation no mention is made of the dust of the earth. In the next chapter (Ibid. 2-7) it is said: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." We have, then, a *creation* and a *formation* of man; the two distinct ideas being expressed by two different Hebrew words. That which was *created* bore the image and likeness of the invisible Creator — was the man,

as to his nature in the image of the Divine; that which was *formed* was the man as he appeared to the eye, but, as yet, a lifeless object. Subsequently to this formation, God breathed into the nostrils of the fashioned, visible, and yet inanimate man, and thereupon he became a living soul. That which was first *created*, spirit and life like its Creator, was doubtless united with that which was *formed* of the dust, lifeless and a man only in appearance; and this made the living man. As Jesus once breathed upon his disciples, and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," so, it is natural to suppose, that when God breathed upon the fashioned clay, the act was accompanied with a volition which might have been addressed to the waiting form thus: "Receive an immortal mind bearing my image as a spirit, and my likeness as a thinking, sensitive, voluntary, and responsible moral being,—powers enabling the creature to commune with and share the experiences of the Creator, and to exercise the lordship assigned to him on the earth."

That man has this double and separable nature, is evident from various scriptures: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28). These are the words of Christ, who made and knows man's nature; and, if the soul is not capable of an existence separate from the body, the statement has not even the attribute of common sense.

So the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, in its very structure and by the changeless laws of thought, proves that Christ taught the separable existence of the soul. It makes no sort of difference what lessons he designed to convey by the parable; there is the fact, put into the story itself, of a living, thinking, feeling, anxious man who had died and left his body. What an absurdity of speech would this be, if such an independent existence were impossible!

Paul declares that, when in his vision, he knew not whether he was in the body or out of the body. Could he have used such a form of words, if he had not believed he might be out of the body as well as in it, and even while

the body was living? He wrote (2 Cor. v.) of the body as the house in which we dwell, and which we may be called to leave at any time to occupy another tenement; of the body as the mere clothing of the man, which he will lay aside at death; and thus he takes for granted, as a most familiar fact, the possibility of the conscious and joyous existence of the man out of the body. He speaks as freely and naturally of being present in and absent from the body, as we of the present day can. Nor could there have been any good sense in the prayer of Stephen, as, looking up and beholding Jesus in glory, he said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit," if he had not understood perfectly well the distinction between the soul and the body, and believed that, being absent from the body, he should be immediately present with the Lord. How absurd, too, on any other supposition, was the promise of Christ to the thief. "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." A man must be distressedly pushed by his theory before he would commit the absurdity of trying to make "to-day" qualify the time when Christ was making the declaration. In this respect the promise qualifies itself. If a man make a promise to perform some certain thing, his duty is to tell *when* he will fulfil it. This Christ did.

We need not pursue this point further. Since the Bible was written, it has made the same impression which, by nature, men have all over the world; which is, that death does not terminate the soul's existence; and the task of forcing the scriptures to the support of the theory of annihilation, is as fruitless as it is laborious.

II. Let us show that the terms "life" and "death," as used in the Bible, do not mean mere existence and non-existence, as annihilationists assume.

From what has been shown, the application of the terms "life" and "death," and their synonyms to the body, can prove nothing whatever; for the body may die, and the soul continue its existence. The term "death" is applied both to the body and the soul, and there must be some analogy between

the death of the one and of the other. Where is it? The Bible, like all other books and like all men of common sense, describes things *as they appear*. Joshua said the sun, rather than the earth, "stood still," because it appeared so. David said the earth "could not be moved," while it was moving all the time, because it appeared so. The orator of to-day who wishes to represent the unchangeable character of one object, will declare that it is as immovable as the solid earth; although he knows, and his hearers also, that the globe is in perpetual motion. Lettered and unlettered men alike conform to this natural and unavoidable law of speech. Even the omniscient One, who cannot forget, says: "I, even I, will forget you"; because he would make it appear to them that he had done so.

Now, the Bible treats the subject of death in the popular language of appearance. Man, as he appears before us, an active, speaking, thinking being, dies and is buried. He is gone, and no longer appears among his fellow-men in the flesh. His "thoughts" or plans, as he appeared visibly executing them, have perished with him. The dead "know nothing" of what is taking place in the earthly sphere from which death has removed them. All intercourse, all recognition between the dead and the living in the realm of visibilities, has ceased. It is, in appearance, as if the dead were not and had not been. With this principle in view, the beautiful harmony of the Bible is at once apparent. It uses language on this subject precisely as we use it now; and it no more meant annihilation then than now. It was as natural for David to say: "I shall go to my child, but he shall not return to me"; for Moses to speak of the patriarchs as being gathered to their fathers; for Job to say: "There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest" — undisturbed by the "voice of the oppressor"; for Old Testament saints to "declare plainly" that they sought a heavenly country, and were but strangers and pilgrims here, as for us to say and do the same things.

Here, then, is found the analogy between the death of the body and the soul. The soul that is dead is, to God and in

appearance, as if out of existence ; it is out of the sphere of its true life. It has no practical and proper recognition of God ; no sensibility to his true character ; no communion with him as living men commune with each other ; and is as indifferent to the things which constitute the true life and glory of God, as a dead man is to the things which occupy the living. They do not know God. The dead soul, too, is in a miserable case, as is the dying and dead body. The soul may be still as active and sensitive in its sphere of wickedness and death, as the elements which composed the body continue to be after its dissolution.

The assumption of annihilationists, that death means extinction of being, is contradicted by the current representation of the scriptures ; which is, that sinners "*are dead*," and yet in existence.

The penalty of the violated law, was instant death. "*In the day thou eatest thou shalt surely die.*" Eve ate and *immediately* her eyes were opened, not to find herself as God, but to see and feel the ruin, the shame and guilt, her sin had incurred. We must remember that the history of the first sin was written by Moses, a man learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and who believed the doctrine of the continued existence of the soul after death as clearly as we do ; and that he was writing for the Hebrew people, who were keenly alive to the existence of the soul out of the body ; and that he could not, therefore, if he retained his common sense, have used the term "death" to signify something to which they had never applied the term. It is equally obvious that God, knowing how the word "death" was understood by Moses and his nation, could not have inspired him to use the word in the sense of annihilation, unless he wished to deceive the world.

Nor is there any ground for supposing that Adam himself understood death to mean annihilation. He was a very intelligent man, evidently ; able, extemporaneously, to give names to all the beasts and fowls, — a thing it would trouble any modern Agassiz to do, — and to strike out the family institution as by intuition, and proclaim it for all coming

generations (Gen. ii. 24). He had as yet all the light upon his mind which could reach him through the undisturbed image of God, in which he was created; and if he knew no more than a North American Indian, he would recognize the radical distinction between himself and his body, and be able to foresee his continued existence in the sphere where his Creator dwelt, though his body should crumble again to dust; and he would not, therefore, naturally have taken death as meaning annihilation.

The Bible is consistent from beginning to end in representing sinners as dead, not anticipatively, but really. They are so dead that they "must be born again" before they can have life. Until they receive Christ, he declares they have "no life" in them; they are "alienated from the life of God;" they must "pass from death unto life," and rise as from the dead to a new life. Christians are those who *were* dead but have been quickened or made alive by the Holy Ghost; those who *have* passed from death unto life; and *have* everlasting life through faith in Christ, who has raised them from death to life.

Now, with his theory, Mr. Hudson must say that sinners are *not* dead, and will not be, at least till they leave the world, or are finally annihilated after the judgment. Instead of admitting that sinners have "no life" as Christ declares, he must insist that they have life, as much as the righteous have, as much as they ever can have, for an eternal existence can only be possessed moment by moment. He must deny the necessity or possibility of man's passing from death unto life in this world, for they are not dead as yet, and they have life already, and therefore the idea of passing from death unto life, in his sense of the terms, is a palpable absurdity. He must deny that Christians have been born again to the life which the gospel promises; for, in the first place, they have never been dead, and if they had been dead, i. e. out of existence, nothing but the resurrection at the last day would restore them to life again.

Mr. Hudson attempts to escape these absurdities by claiming that, *by a figure of speech*, all these things are said

to occur in this life, when the real meaning is that they are to occur after this life! Sinners are going to be dead when they leave the body; then they are going to be "born again" by the resurrection, and finally be put out of existence after the judgment, to remain out forever. Christians were not really dead by sin and have not really passed from death unto life, but they will be dead in the grave after earth's experiences are all past, and from that be raised to existence again.

The absurdity of supposing such a figure of speech seems greater, if possible, than the absurdities which are thought to be removed by resorting to it. Would God have made such a wholesale use of prolepsis when he knew it would deceive the world for eighteen hundred years at least; when there was no sort of necessity for it; and on a subject of such vital and transcendent importance? If he had meant what Mr. Hudson's theory requires that he should mean, would not the truth have been sometimes put in direct and plain language? Would not some intimation have been given that it was concealed by a prolepsis? But Mr. Hudson cannot escape all the absurdities of his theory under the figure of prolepsis. He must resort to some other method of disposing of the fact, that the gospel everywhere represents eternal life as the product of moral forces, of truth, knowledge, faith, and not of a physical resurrection.

Mr. Hudson's theory will not allow him to admit that the penalty of sin came upon Adam "in the day" he transgressed; and hence he must deny that spiritual death is any part of the penalty of the law. But what are the facts? Under the natural government of God, the penalty of violated law begins to take effect as soon as the law is broken, and continues at least as long as the transgression, and often as long as life lasts. Is it not so under moral government? Is not spiritual death more than a state of sinfulness? Has it not the elements of punishment in it? The perjurer is a transgressor, doubtless; and has not his perjury the very sting of retribution in it? We hold, and Mr. Hudson cannot disprove it, that the penalty of the moral law is, in some measure, executed continually upon the transgressor. In the

progress of its execution, the body is swept down to the grave. Rest is gone from the sinner, who is like "the troubled sea, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." Nor is this idea of present infliction inconsistent with the fact, that the law will have a fuller and more fearful execution, beginning with that day when God shall make a revelation of the righteousness of his administration by exhibiting the wickedness of men, and publicly announce the doom thenceforward of the righteous and the wicked. That revelation, combining with the elements of retribution in the sinner's rebellious soul, will fearfully deepen his woe and anguish. If this be so, it follows that extinction of being is not the penalty of God's law.

Annihilationists seek support for their theory in the fact that man was not allowed to eat of "the tree of life," lest he should live for ever. The assumption is, that eating of the tree of life would have conferred an immortality of existence; and since Adam was forbidden to eat, he could have had no immortality. But such an interpretation is a mere fancy, having no support from reason or scripture. If we will allow the New Testament to throw its light back upon the symbolism of Genesis, we shall find that the fall of man consisted in the setting up of the human will to act upon the knowledge of good and evil, *guided by the light coming from the mere human understanding, instead of the light coming from the mind of God through his commands.* If Adam had followed God's direction, instead of "leaning to his own understanding," he would not have known good and evil in the ruinous sense. Refusing to do this, he brought woe and death upon himself, although he foolishly supposed he should become as God. Every sinner falls by the same process. The tree of life is for the healing of the nations, and all men are invited to come and eat of its fruit. It cannot be that God really wished to keep Adam from it. Adam was forbidden to put forth his hand to take the fruit of the tree of life *in the same mistaken and ruinous way in which he had put it forth to take the fruit of the former tree.* He must not be allowed to seek his recovery by an effort

put forth, even towards the tree of life, in reliance upon his self-wisdom, lest he should regard himself as having recovered his life, lost by sin, when he would only have made his sin and ruin more complete. The *self-righteous* act towards even the tree of life must be forbidden, therefore, not indeed to keep the soul from salvation, but to render its salvation, by the only true way, possible. The Pharisees, for example, acting *self-righteously* toward good and evil, laid hold of the tree of life, i. e. an offered salvation, and supposed they had recovered the eternal life lost by sin, and made themselves one with God; but they had only deceived themselves and confirmed their ruin. So it has always been with self-righteous men. There is no reaching the tree of life by the *self-route*. Self must die, "slain by the law"; the sinner must renounce his pride, his own wisdom, and become a little child, and receive his salvation as a "free gift" of a Redeemer raised up to bestow it, without money or price, on the believer. In this way salvation is a reality; in the forbidden way it is but a name.

The account of the fall and recovery of man, therefore, affords no countenance to the doctrine of annihilation.

Mr. Hudson has a chapter (13th, p. 446, The Highest Good) in which he labors to make it appear that life is the highest good. It is pervaded, however, with the fallacy of ambiguity. He uses the term "life" in the sense which his own theory requires, and also in that attached to it by those against whom he writes. The spiritual life which Christ gives is, no doubt, the highest good. But is life in the technical sense, which his theory demands, and for which he contends against the general sense of Christendom, the highest good? Suppose *life*, in his own proper sense, to be the "casket" whose enclosed powers must continue to act; suppose this "casket," the mere existing mind, has been emptied of all love, truth, justice, mercy, and all other forms of moral excellence, and filled with hatred, malice, revenge, ambition, jealousy, deceit, murder, and all their kindred iniquities; will life then be the greatest good? Will the

casket then contain heaven? Men may exist, and be full of hatred to God and man, hereafter, as well as here; in eternity, as well as in time. If in the expression, "life is the primary quality of all joy," Mr. Hudson uses the term "life" in his technical sense, it is not true. Existence is the *condition* of all joy, and of sorrow as well; but not the quality of all joy, in the sense of being *what we enjoy*. The rich enjoy their money; the student, his books; the traveller, what he sees; the Christian, his Saviour and his service. And so, on the other hand, men do not suffer because they exist, but because they are guilty, or cannot have the gratification they desire. It is only by the false assumption that existence must ultimately be attended with blessedness, that he can make it appear that the life for which he contends is the greatest good.

III. There is a class of passages which teach us definitely what life and death, as pertaining to the soul, are, and which are in palpable conflict with the theory of annihilation.

"And this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3). This is our Lord's own definition of the eternal life which is his gift; and it shows just how it is given. As the assured knowledge coming home to an orphan beggar that he had become heir to a large fortune, would give him such a life as it is in money to give, so the assured knowledge of our God, in his relations to us and ours to him, will, by the very law of our being, give us the moral and spiritual life which is in God, and which he waits to bestow on his creatures. Mr. Hudson seeks to evade this passage by construing it to mean, that the knowledge of God is that which leads to eternal life. But it does not lead to eternal life in his sense of eternal existence. It has no tendency whatever to produce existence, while it necessarily produces, in those who receive it from the Spirit, who alone can bestow it, the very life of God, from which sin has alienated us. His effort to avoid the passage is

fruitless, for there are too many texts in which the same doctrine is contained.

Take the remarkable passage of Peter (2 Pet. i. 2-4), in which he represents grace and peace as multiplied unto us through our *knowledge of God*; and all things that pertain unto life and godliness, as the product of the Divine power to us through the *knowledge of God*; and that our being made partakers of the Divine nature and life through the exceeding great and precious promises, is all by the knowledge of God—the promises becoming life-giving through the knowledge, by the Spirit, of the Promiser.

Now, if love, faith, obedience, communion with God, and benevolence toward man are among the elements of the eternal life which Christ bestows, it is naturally impossible that we should have this life in any other way than by the knowledge of God. No resurrection from the grave, no miracle of perpetuated existence, *can* bestow it. On the other hand, make known the excellence of God, and the willing mind will be filled with love toward him; make known his faithfulness, and to trust will be a thing of course; make known his humility, and the soul will flee its pride and seek the lowest place; make known his forgiving mercy, and the heavy burden of sin is gone; make known Jesus as brother, bridegroom, intercessor, deliverer, and the soul welcomes him to the throne as the all and in all of life.

Isaiah saw this truth when he said (liii. 11): "By his knowledge," i.e. knowledge of him, "shall my righteous servant justify many." Jeremiah understood it too, when he makes God say (iii. 15): "And I will give you pastors according to my heart, which shall feed you with *knowledge* and *understanding*." Paul reflects this view when, in his own experience, he counts all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus his Lord (Phil. iii. 8), where he testifies that the new man is renewed in knowledge (Col. iii. 10); and where he declares to the Corinthians (1 Cor. iv. 15), that he has begotten them through the gospel which he had made known unto them. The apostle John is

full of the doctrine also, that he that hath the knowledge of the Son hath life; and he that hath it not, hath not life.

On the other hand, Paul (Eph. iv. 18) affirms that we are "alienated from the life of God *through the ignorance*" of him in which sin has involved us; thus showing that the loss of the true knowledge of God brings the death, as the receiving of it, through the Spirit, restores the life, promised in the gospel. The whole heathen world was given over to corruption and reprobation, on the simple ground that they were "unwilling to retain God in their knowledge" (Rom. i. 28); and this, not in an arbitrary way, but because nothing could save them from such a result, save the knowledge of God retained as a living moral force within them. When Christ comes in flaming fire, it will be to take "vengeance on *those that know not God*" (2 Thess. i. 8), showing that their willing ignorance of him, rather than the forfeiture of their existence, was the thing from which they needed redemption, and which could be effected only by their coming to the knowledge of God through the gospel.

The philosophy of the whole scheme of salvation harmonizes with the interpretations here given. The policy of God, so to speak, from Genesis to Revelation, is to acquaint his creatures with him that they may be at peace (Job xxii. 21). He leads them into the wilderness that he may *instruct* them. He reveals himself, in his word and works, that men may know him and live. He laments over his people that they do not *know* him, not even as well as "the ox knoweth his owner, or the ass his master's crib," that they do not *consider* (Isa. i. 3).

The mission of the Holy Spirit is inexplicable on any other theory than that presented in this section. It is plainly his work to develop in us the eternal life promised in the gospel. He comes to show us the truth, to reveal to our inner consciousness the things of God, and thus to mould us into the moral image of Christ, from glory to glory, as we reach one degree of knowledge after another. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be," for here we only know in part; and the measure of our life is limited by the measure

of our spiritual knowledge; but when he shall appear, and we see him as he is, the fulness of our knowledge of him then will give us the completed life of love and blessedness, of holiness and happiness in heaven.

If an immortality of *existence*, instead of that *life* without which existence would be worthless, is the thing promised in the gospel, there is no adaptation whatever in the way of salvation revealed in the New Testament to secure it. Only a fiat of Omnipotence is needed to perpetuate existence. Grace could not do it; truth and knowledge would have no tendency, even, in that direction. But if an immortality of the soul's life — of purity and blessedness — is the thing promised to believers, the whole scheme of moral influences and agencies revealed in the scriptures is exactly adapted to secure that end.

On the other hand, if the penalty of the law is a state of misery and wretchedness, we can see the relation between transgression and its penalty; for sin, in its very nature, works misery, suffering, anguish, and moral and spiritual ruin, but has no apparent tendency to annihilate the soul. The analogy of truth in the New Testament, then, shows that death is not annihilation, but misery, "cursing," and spiritual ruin, just what sin naturally inflicts; and that life eternal, as the reward of righteousness, is peace, purity, blessing, the *summum bonum*, the τὸ καλόν, the soul's highest good, just what the gospel of Christ, thoroughly believed, is fitted, intended, and certain to secure. Jesus Christ, as the Word and Revealer of God, is the bread of a life of love and holiness, not of abstract existence. The convicted sinner is not distressed that he has forfeited his existence, but that he has lost purity, hope, that which his soul craves and was made to enjoy, and without which life is more barren than the mountains of Gilboa; in short, that he has lost God, the good. The source of joy to the renewed soul is not in the consciousness of recovered existence, but in reconciliation to God, in the "welcome home" of the penitent prodigal, in the knowledge of a Redeemer's pardoning mercy and love, in the recovery of God, the good, to the soul.

IV. There remains but one other class of passages which needs to be considered; and of this class it is only necessary to take a representative text:

“These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal” (Matt xxv. 46). The annihilationist must show, of course, that everlasting punishment means extinction of the entire being forever. Mr. Hudson makes no stand for a limited meaning to the word *everlasting* — αἰώνιον. He is satisfied with its literal signification. He accepts also the word *punishment* as the fair rendering of the word κόλασις. His position is this: *Privation of being is punishment*, and an eternal deprivation of being is eternal punishment.

Is the punishment of the wicked, then, annihilation, or is it suffering in conscious existence? This is the question at issue. Such a controversy is not to be settled by consulting the possible variations of signification which may be given to a few isolated words. Great principles and facts, as they appear in reason and revelation, must be consulted.

We meet the position taken by Mr. Hudson on this passage, then, with the whole force of the preceding argument, which seems to us absolutely conclusive. Have we not shown that existence is not the thing lost by sin, and regained by faith in Christ? If so, eternal punishment does not here mean extinction of being. Nor, independently of the foregoing reasoning, can Mr. Hudson's interpretation be made out. Look at the scene presented in the chapter which is closed in the words of this important passage (Matt. xxv). The Judge of the quick and dead has come in his glory, in the clouds of heaven, and all his holy angels with him. He has taken his seat upon the throne of his glory. All the nations and people of the earth are gathered before him. He separates them one from another as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats, placing the sheep upon his right hand, and the goats upon his left. The day of judgment has come; the judgment is set. It is not the trial day, but that of sentence. Character has been tried and proved, good or bad; and men are standing on

either hand of the judge to hear their sentence, the doom to be visited upon them for the deeds done in the body. The King proceeds with the solemn work. He says to those on his right hand: "Come, *ye blessed* of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Turning to those on his left hand, he says: "Depart from me, *ye cursed*, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." The scene closes with the declaration that the sentences thus publicly announced will be executed: "These [the wicked] shall go away into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal."

Now the reward bestowed upon the righteous, is not the restoration of a forfeited existence, but the blessing of inheriting God's kingdom, prepared for their enjoyment from the foundation of the world. To go into this kingdom, and to receive of its provisions of purity, glory, and life, is the thing to which the righteous are welcomed. On the other hand, no intimation is given in the sentence of the wicked that they are to be put out of existence. They are to depart from God, instead of being welcomed into his presence in his kingdom. They are *cursed* by being thus driven away from God; not into non-existence, but to the habitation of the devil and his angels. The righteous are taken to God's blessed and glorious home; the wicked, to the miserable abode of satan and his followers. There is nothing, so far, that hints in the least at annihilation. Now it is an essential part of a sentence pronounced upon a criminal in punishment of his crimes,—for example, in the state prison,—that the court should state *how long it shall continue*. This is just what we seem to have in the passage under consideration. Mr. Hudson's construction is unnatural. The word "eternal" is of no use in the passage, if the punishment be annihilation; for that is eternal, of course. "Kolasis," or punishment, contains the whole idea, without the adjective. The word "eternal" is as needlessly and inaptly employed, as it would be if a judge were to sentence a convicted murderer to an eternal execution upon the gallows.

Mr. Hudson's construction of the passage is not confirmed, but rather overthrown by other passages. According to Rev. xx. 10, this same lake of fire prepared for the devil and his angels, does not have the effect to annihilate them, but to "torment them day and night forever." If it does not destroy the existence of those for whom it is prepared, why should it be supposed to annihilate the wicked from this world who are to be cast into it, and not, rather, torment them, also, "day and night forever?"

Take the passage which affirms that the blasphemer of the Holy Spirit (Mark iii. 29) "shall never have forgiveness, neither in this world nor in that to come." The obvious assumption is that the blasphemer will exist in that world, and that forgiveness will be denied to him. Why speak of withholding pardon from a being who is not in existence, and to whom there is no world to come? Does the wrath of God "abide upon" what does not exist? The ideas have no fitness to each other.

Then the representations of the Bible as to what is subsequent to the judgment, are in conflict with Mr. Hudson's construction of this passage. The righteous are *within* the kingdom, shining as the sun and enjoying the accumulated treasures of blessing in the New Jerusalem. The wicked are alive, in the full possession of their existence — "*without*," "weeping and wailing and gnashing their teeth." "They see " Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the prophets in the kingdom of God," and themselves "thrust out" (Luke xiii. 28). They have their part, not in heaven, but in hell. The gates of heaven are forever shut against them: a precaution wholly unnecessary if they were annihilated.

There the Bible leaves the wicked, in the burning lake of a sin-experience, with the smoke of their torment ascending up for ever and ever; and so long as the smoke rises, the fuel will last. And since existence is a fuel which sin has no tendency to exhaust, how can we suppose annihilation to be the "eternal punishment" of the wicked? We conclude, therefore, that the second death is but the fuller and more fearful execution of the penalty of the violated law,

which, from the beginning, sin has inflicted by its progressive curse upon all disobedient minds.

The lost are to be given over to the ravages of the "worm that never dies." Do not annihilationists admit that this worm is remorse of conscience? According to their rendering, the worm will never die, but only the soul on which it preys. But the continuance of this worm implies the continued existence of the conscience; and if that power of our being is not to go out of existence, what other power of it will?

The common sense of mankind, and the scriptures, which teach that the punishment of sinners will be of different degrees according to their different characters, bear strongly against the doctrine of annihilation. This has been a perplexing difficulty for the advocates of that doctrine to dispose of; and some of their writers have actually denied that the Bible teaches different degrees of punishment. What their construction could be of Luke xii. 46-48, concerning the few and many stripes, and of Matt. xxv. 14-29, concerning the certain man and the servants to whom he committed the talents, it is difficult to see. Mr. Hudson does not relieve the difficulty by saying that "all such differences may be met in the processes of the 'second death' itself, whether such processes be natural, or inflictive and supernatural" (*Christ our Life*, p. 4); for, according to his theory, extinction of being is the penalty, and not "the processes of the second death." And his argument is that death means annihilation; so that he can have no ground for supposing a difference in the processes of death, making it painful to men according to their character. What evidence is there that the painfulness of death corresponds to men's wickedness?

The passages which affirm the resurrection of the wicked, do not fit well to the annihilation theory. If the sinner is to be immediately put out of existence after the judgment, why raise him from the dead only to re-destroy him? Some of their writers have also met this objection by denying that the wicked will be raised; forgetting that Christ

said that "all who were in their graves should come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation"; and not remembering that Paul's hope toward God was, "that there should be a resurrection both of the just and the unjust" (Acts xxiv. 15).

In conclusion, it may be said that the practical effect of this theory upon unconverted and sin-loving minds must be fearfully injurious. They can and will say: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die; and death, at the worst, will only be an eternal, unconscious sleep, undisturbed even by a painful dream. We have nothing to fear from protracted, endless suffering. There is no 'wrath to come,' and 'to abide upon us' forever." Alas! how readily will men, supremely devoted to their selfish ends, satisfied with their sinful gratifications, and only fearing the terrible retribution which sin has seemed to threaten, seize upon this theory to relieve their forebodings. It is in vain for Mr. Hudson to protest against such a practical result of his teachings. The wicked will insist upon the conclusions his premises afford.

The logical tendencies of this doctrine are in strange conflict with the system of truth revealed in the New Testament. It has allied itself already, in the minds of some of its advocates, with the most positive materialism. One of them, to escape a difficulty, says: "Yes, there is such a thing as *soul-dust*, to which the dead soul moulders back." The argument of another is, that the whole man, soul and all, is *dust*, and unto dust he—all there is of man—must return. From such materialism, to a most mischievous infidelity, there is but a step—a step, too, difficult for a materialist *not* to take; for the very laws of thought are such that it is difficult to adopt one radical error without accepting, at least unconsciously, its correlative ones.

ARTICLE VI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

AMONG all the current publications of the German theological press, weighty as many of them are, few, if any, will meet with a warmer welcome from the transatlantic scholar than the new Manual of the latest Theological Literature of Germany, now in the course of publication at Göttingen. The first of the four instalments has appeared, and forms a solid royal octavo of three hundred and twenty pages (*Bibliotheca Theologica. Verzeichniss der auf dem Gebiet der evangelischen Theologie, nebst den für dieselbe wichtigen, während der Jahre 1830—1862 in Deutschland erschienenen Schriften. Von Ernst Amandus Zuchold. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1 thaler 10 neugroschen*). It was a happy thought to restrict the new work to the most recent period of German theological literature. As regards the elder periods, little improvement could be made upon the works of Walch and Winer and others; while the expense of the new manual would have been at least doubled. As it is, without burdening itself with bibliographical materials already thoroughly indexed and in everybody's possession, it commences at a point far enough back to correct and fill out the defects of existing works, and so supplements the literary apparatus of the scholar by a thorough and exhaustive catalogue of theological literature reaching down to the present year. That there exists an urgent demand for such a work, no one can for a moment doubt, who has any correct conception of the enormous productiveness of the German theological press. No one, except perhaps professional bibliographers, can keep abreast with the stream of current publications; much less master the unfathomable accumulations of the past twenty years. For the rising generation of theologians, and especially for all foreign students of German theology, the work will be of the greatest value.

The same publishers have also just brought out the second volume of an important work on the Origin of Sin (*Vom Ursprunge der Sünde nach paulinischen Lehrgehalte in besonderer Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen modernen Theorien. 8vo. 2 vols. 2 thaler 12 neugroschen*). The author is Dr. H. Fr. Th. L. Ernesti, Abt. Consistorialrath, and General Superintendent at Wolfenbüttel. The first volume was published in 1855, and it discussed "The Theory of the Origin of Sin from Sense" (pp. xvi and 280). The present one (pp. xii and 349) contains the discussion of the "Theory of the Origin of Sin from antetemporal Self-determination." Whoever has read the profound discussion of Müller on this subject, will be eager to compare our author's results with those of the distinguished Halenser. The new volume will command the greater interest and produce

the greater sensation, as it is the first thorough-going and extensive critique of the theory to which Müller's investigations lead. It will also be read with interest in America, where the theory, so far as its essential feature is concerned, has found so able and eloquent an advocate in Dr. Shedd. It would seem from the last number of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, that the theory was likely to be further ventilated (see July No. p. 517); if so, the new publication will be eagerly sought by parties on both sides of the question. The present volume completes the work.

A valuable contribution toward the systematic development and statement of what the Germans call the "Johannean Theology," is the new work from the pen of Dr. Bernhard Weiss (*Der Johanneische Lehrbegriff in seinen Grundzügen untersucht.* Berlin: 1862. pp. 298). The author makes no claim to set forth the system in complete form; indeed, he expressly disclaims (preface, p. x) the intention of so doing. He proposes to himself merely the investigation of the main features of the system "in different directions." The book of Revelation is not taken into account; not because of any doubt of its genuineness, but rather because "it belongs to a wholly different life-epoch and a wholly different stadium in the doctrinal development of the apostle." He thinks its doctrinal contents should be taken into account in an investigation like his, only after they have been first independently developed and systematized. A comparison of the result with the theological system of the fourth gospel and of the epistles of John, might be of scientific value. His work is divided into three parts: I. The Fundamental conceptions of the Johannean Theology (Eternal Life, Knowledge of God, Faith, Life in Christ, Light, etc.); II. Its New Testament Foundations (Divine Manifestation in Judaism, Law, Heathenism, the two Classes of men, etc.); III. The Johannean Christianity (Self-Testimony of Christ, Sonship, Oneness with the Father, Perfect Knowledge of the Father, Original Being with the Father, etc.). The first section embraces pages 1—100; the second, 101—191; the third, 192—296.

The venerable youth, Professor von Hofmann, of Erlangen, has just laid before the public the first instalment of a new work: a work whose dimensions would appall most men, with a whole lifetime before them. The hale old man, having won a name already in almost every department of theological study, brings, with a youthful fire of enthusiasm, the ripe maturity of judgment, the skilled faculties, the methodical habits of age, to the task to which he proposes to devote the evening of his life. This task is none other than the elaboration and systematic establishment of the true doctrine of the Holy scriptures by means of an independent investigation of each book of the New Testament in the order of their composition. The part before us is entitled: "*Die Heilige Schrift Neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht.*" (Theil I. Nördlingen: Beck. 1862. 8vo. pp. 372. 1 thaler 26 ngr.) The needfulness of such a work is

strongly set forth in the author's Introduction (pp. 1-54). He thinks the church should have a clear and better-settled judgment as to what is meant by *Holy* scripture; how much is to be deemed holy, and how her judgment is to be established and justified both to herself and to the world. He regards the old Protestant (mechanical) theory of inspiration and the ground on which the early Protestants determined or accepted the canonicity of alleged biblical books (Testimony of the Primitive Church) as alike untenable. He does not question the complete inspiration of the Bible, nor the canonicity of any constituent part of it; he only wishes to see both elaborated and established upon what he regards a genuine scientific and Protestant basis. There is much force in what he says of the uncertain and unsatisfactory state of the question among the most recent theologians of Germany (compare Tholuck's article on "Inspiration," Herzog's *Cyclopædia*). He subjects Philippi's opinion (if opinion it can be called) to a most searching criticism; then exhibits the utter untenableness of the Schleiermacherian conception, especially as carried out to its legitimate consequences by Dr. Richard Rothe (*Studien und Kritiken*, I., II., 1860); and finally presents his objections to Beck's view, according to which the canonicity of a doubtful book is to be settled on dogmatic grounds; that is, by exhibiting the conformableness of its contents with the doctrinal systems and conceptions of the other scriptures. Having thus shown the necessity of a new and final settlement of the great question, he proceeds to discriminate the work of dogmatic from that of historical theology. He attributes much of the confusion which has arisen in this department to the general failure to make or duly carry out this discrimination. It is the business of dogmatic theology, to deduce from the conception and aim of revelation the necessity of a *Holy* scripture, to set forth the character of the same, and the peculiar operation of the Holy Spirit by which it is to be produced. All questions, however, which, on the other hand, pertain to the actual condition of the scriptures, or of the memorials of sacred history in the Old or New Testament, their origin, extent, contents, internal processes of development, etc., pertain to historical theology, and must be settled in this department, independent of all dogmatic prepossessions. In the lack of any existing work, which aims at the establishment of the new canon in the purely historical method, unhampered by all and every theological prejudice, Professor von Hofmann proposes to enter the field; and taking up every book of the New Testament in chronological order, investigate its canonical claims, their validity or invalidity, and, on the evidence of history and the results of historical investigation alone, settle the whole controversy. If then, in addition thereto, the testimony of the church shall be found (in the way of historical investigation) to agree with the result won as above described, we shall have a confirmation which will place the question forever beyond the reach of rational doubt. He "hopes," from the results of former studies, that his investigation will lead to the confirmation and establishment of every portion of the New Testament as *holy* scripture.—The present

volume contains his elaboration of the argument as regards the Epistles to the Thessalonians. The second volume will embrace the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians, and is promised about Easter next year.

Rationalism of the old stamp is by no means dead yet. One of the most extensive and attractive rationalistic publications ever issued in Germany, has just appeared at Leipsic, in the form of Theological Letters addressed to the educated classes (*Theologische Briefe an die Gebildeten der deutschen Nation. Von Richard von der Alm.* 3 vols. Royal octavo. 10 thaler 20 neugroschen). It professes to be a complete and final slaughter of the more than thrice-slain Christian revelation. It is heralded as "one of the weightiest and most remarkable publications of the century," etc. Peace to its ashes.

Hase's *Hutterus Redivivus* has reached its tenth edition, but appears without essential alteration.

A new work on the Wrath of God, by Dr. Ferdinand Weber, is attracting some attention in dogmatic circles. (*Vom Zorne Gottes. Ein biblisch-theologisch Versuch. Mit Prolegomenen über den bisherigen Entwicklungsgang der Grundbegriffe der Versöhnungslehre von Professor Frz. Delitzsch.* Erlangen: Deichert. Large 8vo. pp. xlvii and 368. 1½ Thaler.) Its contents are as follows: Introduction. I. *Of the Essence of the Wrath of God.* 1. The Reality of the Wrath of God; 2. The Wrath-Fire of God; 3. The Wrath-Will of God; 4. The Antitheses and their Solution; 5. The Result. II. *The History of Divine Wrath.* First Stadium: The Revelation of Divine Wrath in its Beginnings, or the Wrath of God and the Adamic Sin. Second Stadium: The Revelation of God's Wrath in the Time of His Patience, or the Wrath of God and the Day of the Lord. Third Stadium: God's Wrath and the Work of Christ, or Christ the Turning-point in the Revelation of Divine Wrath. The author is a theological Tutor in the Mission Seminary at Neuendettelsau. He writes in a very clear and forcible style, and shows great mastery of his theme in all its varied relations. It is, all in all, a most suggestive work, possessing solid value not only for the systematic theologian, but also for such as aim to grasp the scope and significance of the history of the kingdom of Christ in its historical development. Exceedingly valuable are also the prolegomena of Dr. Delitzsch of Erlangen, in which the whole development of the fundamental ideas of the doctrine of the atonement, from Irenaeus down to Dr. von Hofmann, is reproduced, furnishing perhaps the completest condensed history of the doctrine extant.

Although the third volume of Dr. Gass's *History of Protestant Dogmatics* has been issued some six months, it deserves to be mentioned here. It contains three hundred and eighty pages, of which about one hundred are devoted to the theology of England. The author made an especial visit to

England for the collection of materials, and has given us a better account of the development of theological science in England than we remember to have met in the English language. It is said the best work on the English universities is a German one; shall it be so as respects the history of English theology? It is certainly time we had something better to show in this department. Dr. Gass has just removed to Griefswald, whither he was called last year. He is laboring upon the fourth and last volume. He proposes to include Scotch and American theology in it, provided he can obtain suitable literary materials. — The latest announcements of German books in press which we have received, are not of sufficient importance to merit notice here.

W. F. W.

AMONG the American works recently published, is Dana's admirable "Manual of Geology." A compendious description of the work is given in its title-page: Manual of Geology: treating of the Principles of the Science, with special reference to American Geological History; for the use of Colleges, Academies, and Schools of Science. By James D. Dana, M. A., LL. D., Silliman Professor of Geology and Natural History in Yale College; Author of "A System of Mineralogy," of Reports of Wilkes's Exploring Expedition on Geology, on Zoöphytes, and on Crustacea, etc. Illustrated by a Chart of the World and over one thousand Figures, mostly from American sources. Philadelphia: Published by Theodore Bliss and Company. London: Trübner and Company. 1863. pp. 798. Small 8vo. — As in his System of Mineralogy and Reports upon Crustacea, etc. in Zoölogy, so in the Manual of Geology Professor Dana has given an *exhaustive* treatise — so far as this term is applicable to works pertaining to a rapidly progressive science. The subject is treated under four heads: I. Physiographic Geology, or general survey of the earth's surface-features; II. Lithological Geology, or the description of the constitution and arrangement of the rock-masses of the globe; III. Historical Geology, or a complete history of the North American continent (chiefly), both as to its geography and inhabitants, from the earliest geological period to the "age of man"; IV. Dynamical Geology, or an account of the forces that have produced geological changes. The first and third of these divisions are treated in a more satisfactory way than is common in geological manuals. The very latest discoveries are described, and the author is very careful to quote the authorities for every statement made. In some respects he has improved the nomenclature of geologists. All students of geology may study this work with profit.

The theological bearings of the science are unfolded with great skill. The author strongly advocates the very recent origin of man, and his specific unity. The supporters of Darwinism will find but little comfort in this volume. Professor Dana fully believes in the creation of successive races of animals and plants at different periods, saying that geology "leads

to no other solution of the great problem of creation, whether of kinds of matter or species of life than this: *DEUS FECIT.*" The various progressive changes through the whole history of the earth had reference to the future creation of man; and these adaptations of nature to his wants are styled the "spiritual element" in the science. Philosophers will do well to heed such views from a master mind, and not to be troubled with the flimsy speculations of sceptical neophytes.

This book forms an era in the progress of science, and we are the more pleased with it, as an indication of returning vigor to the author after his recent illness.

The lovers of historical investigation will be delighted with *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*; with an Introduction on the Study of Ecclesiastical History. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D. D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. From the Second London edition, revised. — New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1862. [Published by arrangement with the author.] pp. 551. 8vo. — This volume is the fruit of original research, and of various, extensive learning. It is written in the author's rich, versatile, and attractive style. The affluent thoughts and the graceful diction of the History are well represented by the typographical appearance of the volume, which is an honor to the Riverside press.

The Origin and History of the English Language, and of the Early Literature it embodies. By George P. Marsh, author of *Lectures on the English Language*, etc. New York: Charles Scribner, Grand Street. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Co. 1862. pp. 574. 8vo. — When Mr. Marsh writes on the early history of the English language, he is always suggestive. Those who do not accept his conclusions, are instructed by the facts which he communicates. We have been much interested in the illustrations of the structure of our mother-tongue which are contained in the volume now before us.

Lyra Coelestis: Hymns on Heaven. Selected by A. C. Thompson, D. D., author of "The Better Land," "Morning Hours at Patmos," "Gathered Lillies," etc. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 59 Washington Street. New York: Sheldon and Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1863. — Sacred poetry has been more prolific on the subject of Heaven than on any other. Perhaps no two editors could agree on a selection of the worthiest among the thousands of hymns on this poetical theme. It is sufficient to say that Dr. Thompson has collected many of the choicest of these celestial songs, and has produced a volume which, in times like these, is well fitted to console the expectant citizens of a better country.

Lectures on Moral Science. Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By Mark Hopkins, D. D., LL. D., President of Williams College,

author of *Lectures on the "Evidences of Christianity,"* etc. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. New York: Sheldon and Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1862. pp. 304. 12mo. — These Lectures exhibit much practical wisdom, and contain many sparkling thoughts. We are glad to perceive that the author rejects the utilitarian theory of virtue; but we are sorry to add that he sanctions the very principles which involve that theory. Adopting these principles, a strict logician must accept the system of utilitarianism. But although these Lectures are inconsistent with themselves, their general impression is good. They do not pretend to exhibit a complete theory of ethics, but they will be useful as a supplement to other treatises. Their office will be to stimulate the scholar in his private investigations, rather than to form a text-book for class recitations.

Aesthetics; or Science of Beauty. By John Bascom, Professor in Williams College. Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 117 Washington Street. 1862. pp. 256. 12mo. — Professor Bascom is a scholar of much enterprise. He has selected an important as well as interesting theme, and has treated it with ability.

Tracts for Priests and People. By various writers. Boston: Walker, Wise, and Company, 245 Washington Street. 1862. pp. 372. 12mo. — This is one of the volumes called forth by the celebrated *Essays and Reviews*. The authors of the volume do not pretend to be in exact unison with each other, but are all in favor of a liberal construction of church creeds. Their utterances are too vague and indiscriminate. The two essays by Mr. Maurice are characterized by his usual indefiniteness and "fatal facility" of speech.

THE Article in the present number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* on the German Reformed Church, is the fourth of a series of essays stating the distinctive opinions and usages of the various evangelical denominations and schools in the United States. — The critical notices of several works, — among which are the *Life and Writings of Rufus Choate*, and the *Commentaries of Dr. J. J. Owen*, — are necessarily deferred until the next number, which will also contain an Article on the Inspiration of the Pentateuch, with special reference to the recent attack of Bishop Colenso.

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ARTICLE I.

THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND CHRISTIANITY.¹

BY REV. B. SEARS, PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

A FEW years ago French materialism was revived in Germany, and lifted its head in a somewhat threatening manner, under the form of a demonstration from "the exact sciences" that Christianity was a fable. The result was good. Men of real science were induced to turn their attention to the subject, and the consequence was that a demonstration, to which no reply has been attempted, was given by them, that the pretended connection between materialism and "the exact sciences," was a fable.

More recently, the Deism of England has been revived in a similar manner, in the land of its birth, by men who profess to utter their doubts or disbelief, in the name of science and learning. They are already in a fair way to be disposed of in the same manner as their German neighbors, predecessors, and teachers were. The essayists, represent-

¹ Essai Historique sur la Société Civile dans le Monde Romain et sur sa Transformation par le Christianisme par C. Schmidt. pp. 508. Strasbourg: 1853.

ing almost every shade of unbelief and every form of sophistry, from the most shallow to the most subtile, have aroused the English mind, which had too long slumbered over the achievements of the great Christian apologists of former generations, and given it a healthier and more vigorous tone. Indeed, this sudden outbreak of scepticism in England is attributable, not so much to the advancement of science as to the stagnation of sacred learning in the national church. That men, with such facilities for profound learning such universities, such foundations and fellowships; that professors, enjoying such sinecures, and prelates having such incomes, should suffer the national church to come to the very verge of bankruptcy in biblical learning, has long been a matter of regret in this country, and is now apparently one of surprise and grief to the better part of the whole English nation. Some signs of this are given in the numerous replies to the "Essays and Reviews" that have already been published. Still better signs of a return of English scholars to their former well-earned renown, are furnished in substantial works of an independent and positive character, such as those produced by Ellicott and Westcott.

It is with unfeigned pleasure that we have perused the work named at the head of this Article — a work of profound, original research, furnishing, in a historical way, important positive proof of the actual results of the introduction of Christianity into the ancient Roman world. Replies to the objections urged against Christianity, although necessary often for local and temporary effect, are, on account of their want of unity, their wearisome details, and purely negative character, the least satisfactory of the various modes of defending Christianity. Systematic treatises on the evidences of Christianity have the disadvantage of being obliged to attempt more than can be accomplished; namely, the task of presenting all the evidences under one view, while they are in their nature cumulative, and therefore inexhaustible. Even if it were possible for any one mind to take them all in, and give them their proper place

in a complete system, the execution of the task would prove as endless as a universal biography, with its innumerable supplements. The unfinished work of Lilienthal on the evidences, which was broken off at the sixteenth volume, had a most natural, and perhaps philosophical, history; and if a continuator of that learned and excellent work were to resume the task, he would be obliged either to leave it unfinished, or to omit much that another mind would look upon as pertaining to the subject. Without unduly disparaging such works, which certainly have their value, we may safely affirm that treatises on the subject which have the greatest permanent value, are those which, like Butler's *Analogy*, Paley's *Horae Paulinae*, Ullmann's *Sinlessness of Christ*, Westcott's *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, and this work of Schmidt, take up some one topic and treat it exhaustively. One man can no more present Christianity in all its apologetic aspects, than one bard can present nature in all its poetic aspects. The several articles of Ulrici on Christian Art in Herzog's *Encyclopaedia*, suggest that an admirable argument might be drawn in favor of Christianity from that single point of view. Another could be drawn from a history of the schemes of education, with or without the Christian element, as they have been tested by experiments, in different ages and in various countries. It will probably not be long before we shall have a new investigation of the subject; not merely whether society can be safe without Christianity, but whether governments can reach to any high degree of perfection without it. There is furthermore the historical inquiry, whether continued and uninterrupted social progress of the human species will be possible without the polar-star of a perfect humanity united with divinity, as in the Christ of the Bible. It would probably not be difficult to show that no biography of Christ could be written with psychological verisimilitude, or with a historical reasonableness for all its parts except on the theory of his miraculous character and history. Indeed, the grand defect of all sceptical theories of religion is, that they do

not leave room even for a tolerable historical explanation of the origin and progress of Christianity. It is precisely here that the attempt of Strauss is acknowledged by those once sympathizing with him, to be a signal failure. The more single points of view there can be taken by different Christian scholars, and conclusive deductions made from the facts in each case, showing that, in the distinct matters contemplated, the facts harmonize better with the theory of a veritable Christianity, than with a mythical or rationalistic one, the broader and the firmer will be the ground on which the public mind can stand in respect to its religious convictions. To contribute something to our theological literature in this direction, we propose to select certain topics of Schmidt's Historical Prize Essay, and bring them forward without reference to the precise order in which they are discussed by the author.

We begin with the moral nature of paganism. Its radical defect is, that it did not recognize the worth and dignity of a human being, as such; that it knew nothing of man as having been created in the image of his Maker. All the institutions of pagan society are vitiated in consequence of this fundamental error. The individual, as such, was of no special importance — had no special value. Only as a part of the state did he come into consideration. The social fabric, as a whole, was everything; its parts, dissevered from the whole, were nothing. As the state constitutes the whole, so it possesses everything. It can claim everything. The individual has no natural rights. His duty is obedience to the laws of the state, whatever be the sacrifice they require. The state absorbs and swallows up everything else. It knows the individual only as a citizen. It ignores, despises, and crushes him, if he be not a citizen. Morality itself is essentially political. The cardinal virtues are political, such as are necessary to the citizen. He who possesses them and adds to them decorum, the ornament of life, is a model man, a perfect citizen. Thus man is truly “a political animal.” This idea pervades Greek and Roman life, and is

the source of its virtues in its best and palmiest days. The indissoluble union of the whole personality of the individual with the state as a citizen, and the acceptance of this position, come life, come death, constitutes his greatness.

But of what is the state composed? Does it embrace all men? May any man obtain the privileges of citizenship? By no means. They belong only to the native inhabitants, and are limited to certain classes of these. The wisest men of antiquity affirm that such blessings belong only to the Greek, to the Roman, to the citizen of the country. All others are foreigners, barbarians, beneath the rank of men, and on a level with the slave. They are born, not to command, but to obey; and it is perfectly just to subdue them, and sell them as slaves.

Nor do the blessings of citizenship belong to every Greek, or every Roman. Such a state of happiness and freedom, was not a natural right. Wherever the state is regarded as anterior to the individual, and the recognition of the latter is only secondary and derived from the state, there can be no natural and true liberty. In Greece and Rome the value of a man was determined, not by his inherent nature and his common origin with all other men, but by external and accidental circumstances. He is respected, not on account of the dignity of his nature, but according to his accidental position in the state. The end for which the state existed was the good of those who constituted it. This good was the reward of civil and political virtues. But, according to the ideas of the ancients, such virtues could be exercised by none but persons of leisure. A citizen must be unoccupied; must be free from the care of providing by labor for his livelihood; free to serve the state. This requires that he be a man of fortune. Wealth makes the citizen. He only is the true man. He only enjoys the favors of the state. Such persons guide and defend the state, and, taken collectively they are the state. No others are, in reality, citizens, and, in every sense, free.

Labor being an impediment to public service, is of course

degrading and servile. It does not allow time for intellectual culture, nor for attending to affairs of state. While political and military service belong to the independent citizen, labor is the lot of the slave. In ancient times, agriculture was respected; but it at length fell into the discredit which attached to all labor having for its object the procuring the necessaries of life. Hence it is easy to infer the condition of those, who, without being slaves, were not wealthy enough to live without labor. It is true they enjoyed some of the rights of citizens; but they were debarred from others. The laws of Solon excluded men of any profession, calling, or trade, from the public service. In Rome, only Patricians could attain to the highest offices of the state. The philosophers themselves did not rise in their speculations above the practices of their respective governments. Socrates thought it perfectly proper to look with contempt upon those whose occupations did not allow them to live for their friends or for the republic. Plato maintained that politicians and warriors were honorable castes, who ought to live at the expense of artisans and agriculturists, for whom he hardly provided any place in his republic. To merchants he assigned a still lower rank. Aristotle says they are occupations in which a gentleman cannot be engaged without degradation, such as require physical strength, for which nature has provided a special class of men. To this class belong those whom we reduce to subjection, in order that they may perform manual labor for us, under the name of slaves or of paid laborers. Rulers and warriors constitute the state. Husbandmen and artisans are indeed necessary; but they have nothing to do with public affairs, do not deserve to be called citizens, cannot be relied on for noble actions, as they are mercenary, and therefore incapable of virtue. Between them and slaves there is but a nominal distinction.

The Roman looked down upon labor with equal contempt. Cicero thought nothing was more senseless than to respect collectively those whom we despise individually.

It is to the slaves and freedmen that the citizen ought to abandon the mercenary occupations of trade and industry, because he is not free who depends on a salary, or must be paid for his labor. The citizen ought to disdain receiving a salary, as a sordid, illiberal gain, as the price of servitude, putting him who receives it in a state of dependence upon him who gives it. The freeman ought not to do anything for pay, not even to perform the intellectual work of a teacher. The more liberal arts, such as the science and practice of medicine, philosophy, architecture, commerce on a large scale, are honorable, and not unworthy of a citizen.

In all antiquity, poverty was regarded as one of those evils which were to be avoided with the greatest care. So dishonorable was it, that none but men of low minds were deemed capable of enduring it. The poor were judged incapable of wisdom or virtue. Neither their word nor their oath was trusted. It was considered unreasonable for them to marry; and if women married without dowry, their children were hardly recognized as legitimate. Poets and philosophers, indeed, speak of the contempt of riches; but this is limited to a world of the imagination, or at least to a few exceptional cases. In accordance with these general views, the poor were abandoned to the miseries of their lot. Accustomed to regard himself a man by virtue of his position in the state, of his liberty, and of his fortune, the rich citizen had no sympathy with the poor, from whom he was so widely separated. Lactantius justly says that the philosophers, not knowing the respect due to man as a human being, gave no moral precepts on the subject of relieving the poor. Even Cicero says, that though man is naturally prone to do good to others, even to strangers, he is not bound to yield to this sentiment to his own detriment. In other words, we are bound to show a favor to strangers only when it costs us nothing. Why, says Plautus, give to the poor? Such liberality not only deprives the giver of his possessions, but prolongs the miserable existence of the receiver. If you cannot enrich the poor, would it not be

better to leave them to end their useless life and their misery together. It is with such a view that Plato thought it unnecessary to attend to the wants of the poor if they were smitten with disease. If a poor man's constitution was not strong enough to resist disease, the physician might innocently abandon him; for of what use is his life, if he cannot labor? Thus, among the poor, the sick were left to perish, being abandoned without remorse by those whom they had served.

To this contempt of the poor was added a selfish love of life and fear of death. So strong was the selfish passion that the rich man would, in time of an epidemic, abandon his own household, or send away his nearest relative.

The largesses so often mentioned in Roman history, had nothing to do with charity or benevolence to a human sufferer. They were a very questionable means of compassing one's ambitious objects.

We will not enter upon the prolix subject of slavery in the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. When we say it was the corner stone of those republics, we state only a necessary corollary of the principles already presented; a principle and a practice whose immense mischievous results need not be portrayed anew in such a time as this. As a fundamental violation of the law of God, it could not but prove a most blighting curse. It was a turbid stream flowing from that prolific fountain of evil, the inhumanity that characterized ancient civilization.

According to what has already been said, one must, in order to be a citizen, be able to serve the state, either in administering the government, or in defending the country. This requires qualities to be found only in persons who are their own masters, who have wealth and leisure and bodily vigor. Others form no part of the state, and, according to ancient ideas, have no absolute rights as citizens. Thus there are two classes, those who are free, or independent and strong, and those who are not. The first are citizens; the second, including women, children, slaves, the infirm, the

poor, and laborers, forming a vast majority, are not citizens. It is not the least peculiarity of ancient civilization that women belonged to this despised class. In barbarous states they are consigned to this rank because of physical weakness; in civilized states, because of their inaptitude to political or public life. The stronger and more ambitious sex gives to the weaker and more quiet one a lower rank, assigning to it those toils which it thinks beneath itself. Woman does not exist on her own account; she is a mere means of perpetuating the race, and is the instrument and servant of her lord. Aristotle, while maintaining that the Asiatic nations erred in regarding and treating her as a slave, asserts that if she have a will, it is a will without rights, and if she have virtues they are kindred to those of slaves. In others, she was treated through all her life-time as a minor; she was always under a guardian, and could inherit property only when there were no male heirs. In Rome, it was customary to speak of the majesty of man and of the imbecility and levity of woman. This inferiority of rank, which tended to develop female vices rather than female virtues, was confounded with an inferiority of nature, and woman was said to be more inclined to evil than man, who was sustained by his intellectual superiority. Marriage did not improve the condition of women, but rather made their humiliation more complete. It was not a union of hearts; it was not even a moral relation. It was a political institution to provide citizens for the state. Plato maintained that in entering into this relation persons ought to regard their own inclinations less than the public good. Though Aristotle disapproved of the community of wives, practised in part at Sparta and advocated by Plato, he did not rise above the common idea, that marriage derived its importance, not from moral, but merely from political, considerations. Nowhere did the force of law act with more rigor upon the married woman than in Rome. Nearly all the obligations and burdens of married life were on one side; while on the other were unbounded licence and power. If in early times

there were examples of a contrary character, they were exceptions to the general rule. We pass over the topics of adultery and concubinage, not because they are regarded as only incidentally connected with our subject, for in few things do paganism and Christianity appear more strikingly in contrast, but because the discussion itself is repulsive.

This libertinage was rather increased than checked by the facility with which divorces were obtained. Towards the end of the Roman republic, and during the whole period of the empire, when the purity of ancient manners declined, and when marriage, which never had a moral character, ceased to be a political institution, except in name, and ambition and pleasure became its only objects, divorces, furnishing the readiest relief to the disappointments and disgusts incident to such connections, were multiplied in an almost incredible manner. They give a peculiar coloring to the social history of this period. They were sought sometimes by the husband, and sometimes by the wife, and generally on the most trivial grounds by both. Plutarch speaks of a Roman who was asked by his friends why he repudiated his wife, who was beautiful, rich, and wise. Showing them his shoe, he replied, "you see that it is beautiful and new, and no one knows where it pinches me." Macaenas, the celebrated patron of letters, was so notorious for his gallantries that Seneca speaks of his thousand marriages, and his daily divorces (*qui uxorem millies duxit. — Quotidiana repudia*). Tertullian said, it would seem that women entered into wedlock only that they might be released from it by divorce. Under the empire, marriage lost the last remains of its dignity and importance. Women, emancipating themselves from ancient servitude, at the same time emancipated themselves from all the laws of morality. No wonder that the Roman state was upon the eve of falling into ruins.

The same undervaluing of the individual and overvaluing of the state, already described, gave to the father an absolute power over the child. This power was given in order that the children might be raised for the service of the state.

Greece and Rome were alike in making political considerations overrule those of natural affection. In Rome the father was a civil magistrate, or rather despot, in his own family. He could cruelly rid himself of those children who did not promise usefulness to the republic. It was the object of the government to secure a vigorous and healthy population. It did not desire that there should be persons of feeble constitutions to perpetuate their race. Why, then, should a weak and sickly child be spared, especially if he were poor, since his life would be of no service to the state? Such children were sometimes destroyed without mercy: more frequently they were "exposed." The philosophers, instead of condemning this violation of the laws of nature, justified it. Both Plato and Aristotle offered political reasons for checking the growth of this kind of population. The practice of "exposing" children, to be devoured by wild beasts, or to be taken up and sold into slavery or put into places of infamy, if they were females, continued till the time of the Christian emperors.

Though we do not propose to enter upon the subject of ancient slavery, there are certain immoral uses made of slaves which it will be proper to notice. They were not only employed in all kinds of ordinary service, but also in those which ministered to the amusement of their masters, at the expense of virtue and humanity. They were trained to be actors, players upon instruments, and dancers to entertain the rich at banquets, stimulating them to voluptuousness by indecent songs and pantomimes. Before the introduction of Christianity, the Greek theatre had lost its ancient dignity. From the time of Augustus, obscenity was the chief characteristic of the Roman stage. The subjects most frequently represented were husbands deceived by their wives, libertines with their intrigues, and prostitutes in their dens. Of course the morals of these men and women devoted to the stage were ruined. Constant familiarity with scenes of vice and shame could not but leave a stain upon the soul. Virtue was derided, and everything holy was trampled on.

From actors and actresses the poison passed to the eager crowds of spectators, and a general corruption was the necessary consequence. But this was not enough. These immoral representations, these voluptuous pantomimes, nude women swimming in basins of water in the amphitheatres, surrounded by thousands of spectators of both sexes and of every age, did not satisfy the passions of the Roman people. They desired more exciting scenes, scenes of blood. The rich sent their own slaves, and the state its captives, into the murderous gladiatorial contest to amuse the demoralized populace.

The passion for these bloody contests was ardent and universal. For no purpose were there greater assemblies of the people. Tired of idleness, and yet averse to labor, the Roman citizen passed his days at the circus, witnessing the fights of bears and lions, and filling up the intervals of time by resorting to the combats of gladiators (*interim jugulantur homines, ne nihil agatur*). In times of anxiety and trouble, he repaired to the amphitheatre to banish his thoughts ; in moods of sadness, he sought diversion by looking upon the spectacle of human slaughter. With the multitude were seen knights, nobles, and senators ; men of distinguished rank presided. Not only tyrants, like Nero, Commodus, Gallienus, were of this number, but good princes, like Vespasian and Titus, found pleasure in the combats of the circus. And what is still more strange, females of every rank resorted to these scenes of cruelty with an avidity equal to that of the most hardened soldier. Among the vast crowds of spectators, there was no sign of pity for the combatants. The least indication of tenderness, by any person, would have been sufficient cause for his removal. The multitude applauded enthusiastically when one of the combatants fell gloriously ; and uttered cries of vengeance, if one allowed his zeal to flag. They thought themselves insulted if men did not willingly rush to a barbarous death for their amusement (*injuriâ putat, quod non libenter pereunt*).

This passion of the Romans for gladiatorial contests

continued as long as the empire stood. When they were pressed by barbarian invaders on every side, the people would run to the circus to see men shed each other's blood, when they themselves were too cowardly to lose a drop of their own to save their country. Consuls and quaestors were bound by the law of Tiberius to provide gladiatorial shows when they entered upon their office. To vary the scene, Domitian once compelled women to enter the lists. Men provided in their wills for honoring their own names with the populace by entertainments of this kind after their decease. This madness was carried to such an extent that a certain rich Roman desired that, after his death, the beautiful slaves which he kept in his own house should fight in these combats; another had the same desire in respect to the delicate boys who had been his *deliciae*. What a contrast to the last acts of departing Christians, who freed their slaves, and left legacies for the relief of the poor and the suffering! What must have been the state of society where men of wealth, to keep their own name in honor with the populace after their decease, would make the instruments of their own guilty pleasures the victims of murderous contests! Or what must one think of those impure orgies so common at Rome, in which the blood of slaves was mingled with the wine of their masters, crowned with flowers: in which the guests were entertained alternately with the grimaces of actors, the carnage of gladiators, and the kisses of courtezans?

If, now, from this general picture of the false principles, unjust acts, and immoral practices of the ancient pagan world, we turn to the Roman world immediately after its conversion to Christianity, or rather to the great body of Christians living in the empire between the apostolic age and the age of Constantine, we shall see the evidences of a revolution the most fundamental and extraordinary of any known in human history. Instead of the all-prevailing doctrine of a natural inequality in the various classes of men, we find, shining with celestial brightness everywhere

in this otherwise dark world, the doctrine of the original and essential equality of all men. The writers of the church, the interpreters of the Christian thought of the age, unanimously proclaim this equality, not only on the authority of their religion, but also on that of the laws of nature. The extent of the change thus wrought in the whole structure of human society, and in the condition of the entire mass of the population, is great almost beyond conception. In the midst of oppression and persecution, the fathers of the church taught the common origin and destiny of all men, and their natural equality. Coming from the hand of the same Creator, they are formed in the same divine image, descended from the same progenitors, are made of the same corporeal substance, come into the world with the same weakness and nakedness, are subject alike to death as the common lot, are equally immortal in their immaterial nature, are equally capable of receiving the Holy Spirit of God, and are all, without exception, subjects of the divine compassion. The distinctions that exist in the world are not founded in nature, but are accidental, and spring from causes purely external. It is not birth that ennobles, but high qualities of the soul. "You affirm," says Chrysostom, "that your father was a consul, and your mother a saint. What is that to me? Show me your own manner of life; it is by that alone that I judge of your claim to nobility." To these early Christian teachers, a human being was of great account (*μέγα ἄνθρωπος*), so that an Ambrose could say: *Magnum opus Dei es, homo*. All men were considered as deserving the same regard. A common origin made them all members of one and the same family; the world constituted one great republic (*unam omnium rempublicam agnoscimus mundum*). In this great family of mankind, love was the common bond of union. As this virtue had its most perfect manifestation in Christ, Christians were to imitate him in cherishing and exercising it. Like him, they were to pity their suffering fellow-men, and bear their burdens.

Familiar as these doctrines are to us, they were novelties,

and even paradoxes, when they were first announced to the pagan world. The philosophers foresaw that such views, if adopted, would change all things; but they could not conceive how they could be carried out in such a world as this. The new religion seemed to them opposed to nature.

According to Augustine, Christians formed a spiritual republic in the midst of pagan society,—the city of God upon the earth. It was not established by means of any violent change in the external order of things. Its members were required to respect the established forms of government. Its aim was to transform society by penetrating the hearts of individuals and introducing a new spirit there. Says one of the early writers: "Christians do not distinguish themselves from other nations by their language, their costume, or their usages. They do not live in towns by themselves, but remain in the midst of the Greeks or of the barbarians where they were born. But while they are not distinguished externally from the pagans, their life is altogether a different one." They obeyed the laws, paid tribute with a zeal which might well serve as a model for those who were more interested to maintain the ancient forms of society. They honored magistrates, because they considered them appointed by God for the maintenance of civil order. They prayed to their divine Master that he would grant to the emperors a tranquil reign, courageous armies, faithful counsellors, and an upright people, disposed to peace. These petitions were put up in the midst of persecutions. Even the most cruel torture could not prevent them from commending the emperors to the divine protection. During this whole period, so full of revolts, often from the most trivial causes, the Christians, though oppressed and persecuted in the most inhuman manner, as public enemies, and as rebels against the imperial authority, were never found guilty of exciting a single insurrection. It was only when the magistrates required them to violate the laws of God that they refused to obey. Thus they refused to render divine honors to the emperors, either by offering incense to their images, or swearing by

their genius. At first, Christians would not hold public offices, on account of the pagan rites connected with them, for which Gibbon censures them. But, at a later period, the emperors preferred to be surrounded by Christians on account of their superior fidelity, and chose to favor them in matters of conscience, rather than to forego their services. What a tribute is this to the excellence of their character, that monarchs should pass by pagans, men of their own religion, and select their servants from among the followers of the new faith!

The primitive Christians, guided both by scripture and reason regarded labor as honorable rather than degrading. It is the natural means of procuring a livelihood, and ought to be common to all men. This is sufficiently indicated by the fact that nature has made no provision for man without labor on his part; and is confirmed by the example of Christ, who was a carpenter's son, and of the apostles, who labored with their own hands. Idleness was therefore regarded as culpable. It was maintained that a voluntary slave was much nearer to Christ, in that respect, than his master. Of course, if there ought, according to Christian perfection, to be no masters, there ought, in strictness, to be no slaves. The first lessons of the church were, that all Christians should make it a matter of religion to be the servants of others, and live for the benefit of all, with little concern about their external condition. The remote consequences involved were, that slavery would thus disappear of itself. The writings of the fathers are full of precepts and discussions on these subjects, to which we can make but this general allusion. The examples of the early Christians were in conformity with such instructions. The employment of slaves, in any way unfavorable to their morals or their honor, was entirely prohibited by the church. Both master and slave were required to abandon the circus, the theatre, and all places of unholy amusement.

It was as characteristic of Christianity to elevate the poor, as it was of paganism to depress and crush them. The

pagan philosopher taught only men of leisure and wealth, who were few in number; the Christian teacher addressed himself to the greatest number, to the poor and the ignorant, to women and children, as well as the rich, and thus built up society, beginning at the foundation. Said Origen in reply to a pagan representation of the selfish, exclusive principle: "We are separated from the irrational brutes, but not from men of low condition, for they are as much our brethren as those of distinguished rank." The church fathers repeatedly say that in order to show that the poor bear as distinctly the image of God as the rich, and that, in the view of the supreme Judge, the beggar is not inferior to the king. Christ himself chose the lot of humble poverty, and thus ennobled it for his immediate disciples and for his followers in all time to come. "Poverty," says Clement of Alexandria, "is not necessarily a curse, nor riches a blessing; it depends, in both cases, on the use that is made of them." Without aiming to overthrow the laws and institutions of society in respect to private property, or to alter the external relations of men, the Christian teachers urged, with great fervor and eloquence, the exercise of that voluntary beneficence which should make men like a society of angels. They opposed, not the holding of property, but selfishness in the use of it. The church, in exalting the poor, taught neither that riches are a bar to salvation, nor that the poor have a right to the property of the rich; but that it is the duty of all to live for all, and to do what is practicable towards equalizing the essential blessings of life.

Christian benevolence and active charity to the unfortunate are represented as a primary duty and a distinctive mark of a disciple of Christ. The early Christian writers and preachers employ all their resources to impress upon the faithful the duty of charity at all times and in all circumstances. At every period — in the dawning existence of the church, in the times of its persecution, and in the days of its final triumph; when the empire was powerful, when it was sinking, and when it had fallen, — charity, sincere and all-

pervading, was the Christian's life and watchword; and if some of the religious teachers, as Chrysostom and Augustine, were apparently more the apostles of charity than others, it was only because they had more frequent occasion to call for the exercise of this Christian grace than others had.

With the pagans we find only the semblance of true charity. The poor among them were generally repulsed with a coolness that was regarded as indicative of greatness; and if aid was granted, it was with a secret repugnance, and almost always from some selfish motive. With the Christians, it was quite otherwise. They extended a helping hand to the sufferer with joy, finding true delight in comforting and consoling the distressed. If the pagan gave anything in charity, it was that which he could part with without injury. The Christian gave not only of his abundance, but of his deep poverty. The pagan aided those who had a rank to maintain, but neglected others, especially if they were not needed by the state. The Christian, on the contrary, aided all the helpless without distinction, who stretched forth their hand for relief. The pagan gave most frequently from mere ostentation or ambition; he made largesses, which did no good, for the sake of gaining the favor of the populace. The Christian acted from an inward impulse, and judged of the act, not from its outward form, or from the estimation in which others held it, but from the measure of love there was in his heart towards God, and towards man as his creature.

Among the unfortunate persons cared for by the church should be mentioned captives and persons unjustly oppressed. Never was personal safety less guarded than under the capricious government of the emperors and the brutal power of the victorious barbarians; and never was Christian benevolence exercised with more perseverance, or with more happy results, than in this period of tyranny and disorder. During the persecutions, Christians thrown into prison or sent to the galleys, were visited by their brethren, who brought them aid and comfort. Collections were made for

them ; and the poor would go without food for a day, that they might have something to give to their brethren. If the latter were condemned to labor on public works, or to contend in the circus, their freedom was purchased from the funds of the church. When the tyrant Licinius inflicted the same penalties upon those who visited the prisoners, even this did not deter tender females from braving those perils that they might care for the sick among the prisoners.

The wars of the empire, the civil troubles growing out of the struggles of competitors for the crown, and, above all, the invasions of the barbarians, gave ample scope for Christian charity. Besides the prisoners taken in battle, the population of whole districts, after having their homes laid waste, were sometimes carried into captivity. Young Christians were thus exposed, not only to death or slavery, but to the danger of relapsing into idolatry. Sons were torn not only from their country, but from their parents. Females were exposed to brutal treatment by rude barbarians. Men sometimes sacrificed their own liberty to restore to his family a husband or a son. The church of Rome sent money to Cappadocia to redeem captives doomed to slavery. When the Numidian hordes invaded northern Africa, and carried away many captives, the church of Carthage made a large collection to redeem them. When the Goths devastated Italy, carrying away prisoners, the latter were redeemed by their brethren, Ambrose giving up the sacred utensils of the church of Milan for the purpose. Augustine gave a similar example, which was followed, in turn, by the bishop of Carthage at a later time, who, for want of room elsewhere, lodged the returned captives in two churches, and attended personally to their wants. Nor were these acts of charity limited to Christian captives. Touched with compassion for all sufferers, and prizing the liberty of all, the Christians could make the same sacrifices to restore pagan prisoners of war to their country. Bishop Acacius of Amida, near the year 420, sold the sacred vessels of the church and purchased the liberty of nearly seven thousand Persians captured by the Roman army.

The ancient pagans, as we have seen, attached to the present life, and having no hopes for a future world, naturally feared death and dreaded sickness. They even avoided the sick. To the poor, already degraded, sickness added a new opprobrium, because they were now doubly incapacitated to serve the state. In Christian society all this was changed. Bodily disease was regarded rather as a trial of faith than as a misfortune, and as a call upon others to redouble their acts of love and tenderness. There was one class of sufferers for whom Christians felt a very lively sympathy. It was that of leprous persons, so numerous in the East, driven from the abodes of men, abandoned by their own kindred, and forced to retire to the mountains or to caverns, not daring to show themselves lest they should be stoned as objects of dread and aversion, instead of being pitied as objects of love. Basil made most eloquent pleas in their behalf, saying that to neglect them was nothing less than to grieve Christ, whose members they were, and that they ought to be loved and pitied all the more for their being abandoned by others. Great epidemics, which made the terrified pagans flee from the scene of danger, were the occasions of the most brilliant display of Christian charity. "The Lord," says Cyprian, "wishes to try men, and see if those in health will care for the sick; if members of the same family truly love each other; if masters have any pity for their slaves; if physicians will prove faithful; if the prospect of death will not soften the hearts of obdurate and violent men, and check the cupidity of the avaricious." It requires courage, no doubt, to overcome the fear of contagion and its repulsiveness; but Christian charity must allow no repulse. Let no one excuse himself, says a writer of the second century, under the pretext that he does not know how to take care of the sick, or that he cannot bear the sight. Let him who uses such language consider that he also may become a victim of disease, and may need the aid of his brethren. The same idea is developed, in touching words, two centuries later, by Gregory of Nazianzum, and Gregory of Nyssa.

The duties thus urgently enjoined, were as diligently performed, both by individuals and by churches. Everywhere, in the first ages of the church, the faithful, and more particularly Christian women, went to visit the sick, for their relief and for their religious consolation. The Fabiolas, the Placillas, Ephrems, and a long list of others of like character, are well known for their Christian labors in this direction. Especially were the deacons and deaconesses charged with the care of the sick, for whose relief the funds of the church were placed at their disposal. When the plague raged at Carthage, about the year 250, the Christians, led on by Cyprian their bishop, addressed themselves earnestly to the work of mercy, some of them taking charge of the sick, others providing the means for their relief. The same self-denying love was manifested on a similar occasion at Alexandria. Presbyters, deacons, and the rich and powerful among the laity, visited the sick and dying, and buried the dead. As fast as they themselves were cut down, their places were filled by other brethren, notwithstanding the great peril to which they exposed themselves.

The attention of the church to the poor visited by sickness and calamity, early led to the founding of charitable institutions which were wholly unknown to pagan antiquity. The first of these institutions, the fruit and the glory of Christianity, appears to have been established in the early part of the fourth century. Near the close of the century they became numerous, both in the East and in the West. Everywhere were seen houses of refuge, hospitals for the sick, and hostelries for poor travellers. Some of these were founded by individuals; others, by churches. The largest hostelry was that founded by Basil the Great, in Caesarea, where he was bishop. It rose, says Gregory of Nazianzum, like a villa, near the gates of the city, embracing apartments for weary travellers, halls for invalids, provided with physicians and nurses, work-shops for those who wished to labor, and a special asylum for leprous persons. Chrysostom followed Basil's example, and, like him, founded hospitals in

different parts of his diocese. In the time of Theodosius, most of the churches in large towns had such establishments.

The restitution of woman to her true place in society, proclaimed by Christ and the apostles, was practically effected by the church. In the midst of a pagan world where she was degraded by the laws and abased by the customs of society, Christianity extended to her a friendly hand, and the Fathers of the Church contended with great energy to deliver her from her degradation. Christ had come to redeem humanity without regard to sex. Both sexes were made in the image of God, were formed from the dust, were subject to like temptations, and were called to the same holy life. The differences of sex, which were construed to her disadvantage by the pagans, are in the views of Christianity, differences which admit of equal degrees of excellence. If the gentler sex is more a creature of feeling than the stronger, it is superior in Christian sympathy and tenderness, and not inferior in patience and endurance. "Who," says Gregory of Nyssa, "can compare with the Christian woman in times of trial; who is found to equal her in piety, constancy, and devotion"? Such views of the nature and proper sphere of woman, had an indescribable influence upon her character and condition. Those womanly sentiments which were repressed or perverted by paganism, shot forth into a beautiful life and activity under the genial influences of Christianity. Christian women showed from the beginning, a benign charity, a sweetness and modesty unknown to the pagan world. In the times of persecution, they were models of courage and charity, consoling the prisoners, nursing the sick, the vexed, the distressed, confessors, and martyrs. "More courageous than lions," says Chrysostom, "they endured the most cruel tortures, thereby proving, better than anything else, the superiority of the Christian woman over the pagan. In love for their Saviour, in purity, in compassion for the suffering, they excel us men." Among many splendid examples, may be mentioned Melania the younger, who, having vast possessions in all

parts of the empire, gave them liberally to relieve the suffering poor, and consecrated herself to the service of the unfortunate, travelling from province to province, seeking the objects of her compassion; Paulla, of the family of the Scipios and of Paulus Emilius, and Fabiola, of the family of the Fabii, who imitated the example of Melania, and added new lustre to their ancestral name; the princess Placilla, who visited hospitals, and with her own hands ministered to the wants of the sick; and the empresses Pulcheria and Eudoxia were no less distinguished for their Christian virtues than for their rank.

It was a great change when matrimony was raised from being a mere institution of the state, an expedient for civil purposes, to be an institution for the kingdom of God, a moral union, to improve, perfect, and sanctify life. Christ had pronounced it a divine institution; and an inspired apostle had declared it a type of the union of Christ and his church. This great idea was actually carried out in the primitive ages of Christianity.

The Christian fathers, with the scriptures as their guide, avoided the two extremes of the enslavement of the wife on the one hand, and the entire emancipation of her from all domestic restraints, as in the time of the empire, on the other. The submission of the wife to the husband, was not the submission of a slave to a master, but a union formed by love where the one was, voluntarily and for the good of both, merged, as it were, in the other. These fathers knew nothing of the doctrines of modern socialism. While the hearts of husband and wife were united, their spheres of action were kept distinct. God himself had drawn a dividing line between them which neither party could pass with impunity. To the husband, it was maintained, belong affairs abroad, in the forum, the senate, the camp; to the wife, domestic duties, the ministry of the interior in this little state, the family. "Woman," says Chrysostom, "is not to bear arms, not to vote in assemblies, nor to administer government; but to devote herself to domestic life, superin-

tending household matters, maintaining order in the house, directing servants, and educating her children. She is not the servant of her lord, but his companion and aid, his indispensable complement, by whose gentle influence he becomes what he was designed to be." The early Christians conceded no more liberty to the one sex than to the other; both were equally under the laws of Christ in all things. The husband was to be devoted to the wife, as Christ was to the church. The lenity of pagans towards the licentiousness of men was severely censured by Christian writers. Says Jerome, on this subject: "The laws of the Caesars are very different from the laws of Christ, and the requirements of paganism, from the requirements of Paul. The pagans gave loose reins to the profligacy of men, condemning them only for violence, or adultery with free persons, but allowing indulgence with slaves or prostitutes, as if sin depended, not on the will of the transgressor, but on the position of the person with whom it is committed. With us, on the contrary, what is not allowed in women is not allowed in men."

The Christian spirit, which elevated and sanctified marriage, transformed the family into a Christian family; it modified the relations of parents and children, without weakening the authority of the one or the respect and submission of the other. Christians, from the very beginning, reprobated the barbarous custom of "exposing" children, as well as the frequent abortions by which mothers attempted to conceal their criminal loves. Human life was considered sacred; and even the unborn, as well as the feeble and infirm, were cared for, and protected against inhumanity. The church espoused the cause of children and blessed them because Christ had declared "of such is the kingdom of heaven." Against the practice of "exposing infants," so deeply rooted in ancient society, Lactantius inveighs with a vigorous eloquence. His words are: "Let no one imagine that fathers have the right to destroy their new-born infants. Such an act is the greatest impiety; for God causes human souls to be born for life and not for death. But there are men who

think they are without sin, though they take from beings scarcely formed, a life which they did not give. Think not that they will spare the blood of strangers who spare not their own blood. Such men are entirely perverted in their minds. What shall I say of those whom a false feeling leads to expose their children? Can they be considered innocent who give as a prey to dogs their own bowels, who destroy them more cruelly than if they strangled them? Even when it happens that a child so exposed is taken up to be nourished by another, it is the father who is guilty of delivering up his own blood to slavery or to prostitution. It is true those homicidal fathers plead poverty, and their inability to rear a family, just as if the good things of this world were in the power of those who possess them, as if God did not continually plunge the rich into poverty, and raise the poor to abundance. If poverty really prevents anyone from the power of maintaining children, let him not be a father. That would be much better than, by impious hands, to destroy the work of God."

According to Ambrose, parents are responsible for the souls of the children committed to their care, and designed to be fellow-citizens with them in the kingdom of God. The ancient inflexible severity of the Roman father is to disappear, and give place to an authority softened by love. The father ought to consider the son equal to himself in natural dignity, and as designed to perpetuate upon the earth a race of the children of God. No doubt, the father is to teach his child obedience, but not the obedience of a slave; it is by making them know and love the law of God that he is to teach them to be subject to his own authority. This religious education is the subject of frequent exhortation with the fathers, and most of all with Chrysostom. This great man, the eloquent expounder of the Christian spirit in regard to the wants and necessities of men, saw in the want of a Christian education the cause of the decline of the empire. Men are occupied, said he, with the acquisition of honors and wealth, that they may give to their

children reputation and a fortune, but do not care for their souls. They are thus guilty of a great sin; for they devote their children to destruction, and contribute to the overthrow of society. He sees their salvation only in their religious education; and presses upon parents the duty of employing the tender age of childhood, when the will is flexible for making good impressions, and for forming them, by the fear of God and in the love of Christ, to faith, humility, and charity. He insists that parents should themselves teach their children the great principles of the Christian life, and not turn them over to be instructed by slaves. Especially is this duty inculcated upon mothers, who are more constantly at home than fathers, and who by their bland and soft natures are better adapted to instruct infancy and childhood than fathers are. The pagan moralists scarcely knew this power of the mother over the hearts of her children; they make no mention of the education of daughters by their own mothers, of which the Christian teachers speak so often and so eloquently. Chrysostom and Jerome insist on mothers bringing up their daughters in such a way as to make them models of Christian virtue, and to prepare them to take their place, in due time, in society, moulding it by their influence, and presiding over their own households in such a way as to train them for the kingdom of God. While pagan mothers rarely exerted any permanent influence over their sons, being confined in their gynaecea, or devoted to a life of vicious pleasure, Christian mothers distinguished themselves by forming the characters of their sons, as was the case of Monica, the mother of Augustine, Nona, the mother of Gregory of Nazianzum, and Arethusa, the mother of Chrysostom.

We have spoken thus far of the direct influence of Christianity upon those who embraced it. We should fail to do justice to the subject, if we did not notice that indirect and fainter influence exerted by Christian ideas upon the opinions and sentiments of those who were hardly conscious of it. At first, Christians, comparatively few in number, lived

scattered among those who were not Christians. They gradually multiplied till they became the predominant party, and their opponents, at first numerous, gradually decreased till they dwindled quite away. Now is there any observable change in the sentiments of the latter that can be accounted for only on the ground that they had some knowledge of the principles of the former? Our author thinks there is, and presents reasons for this opinion that seem to be not without weight. Of course, in some instances the modification of pagan ideas is very slight, and may have been occasioned by Christian ideas set afloat in society, and reaching the individuals referred to in a very circuitous way. The evidence is to be sought in the similarity of ideas not otherwise to be accounted for, rather than in direct proof of personal connection with Christians. The books of Christians, particularly the apologies addressed to the emperors, the discourses of Christian teachers as reported by pagans who listened to them, the conversation of Christians with pagans, and the marked peculiarities of Christians both in doctrine and in practice, might be known more or less accurately by those who professed to stand entirely aloof from the new religion.

The first philosopher who gives evidence of having his doctrines tinged by Christian ideas, is Seneca. His system of morality, drawn out at length, as it is by the author of the *Essay*, furnishes the means of forming a correct judgment on the disputed point whether his opinions were purely pagan or whether they had been affected by Christianity. We have room for specifying only one or two of his philosophical opinions that seem to betray a Christian origin. A human being, he teaches, is "a sacred thing," which no one ought to dispise, or has the right to abuse. Men, having a common origin, and being naturally equal, have a spiritual relationship, and are fellow-citizens of "the great state," not the Roman state, but that universal society, where all men are equal, and are governed by those natural principles which are above writ-

ten laws. "Nature has made us social beings; we are born for the general good." Men are designed to love and aid each other. Nature disposes us to such love by our common relationship. Love is not to be a barren sentiment, but an active principle. By such beneficence, we imitate the Deity who constantly pours his bounties upon us, upon the evil and the good. We ought to imitate him by bestowing benefits without regard to being benefitted in turn. The important thing in an act of beneficence is not what is done, but the intention with which it is done.

His views of forgiveness are no less remarkable. He said, that revenge is inhuman: that it is better to suffer injury than to inflict it; that we should be the more ready to forgive others if we consider how often we need to be forgiven by others. Such sentiments, and many others which might be mentioned—sentiments found nowhere in the pagan world before the introduction of Christianity—would be an enigma on any other supposition than that of their emanating in some way from the latter. If as early as the time of Nero Christianity could begin to influence the thoughts of reflective pagans, we should expect much more to find evidences of such influence under the later emperors.

Pliny's great humanity, his provisions for the poor, his sympathy for the slave, his efforts—the earliest known among pagans—to improve education by rendering it less public and more domestic, seem to indicate that some breath of Christian sentiment had passed over his mind.

Plutarch entertained the most elevated sentiments in respect to the unity and perfection of God, his providential care for men, the duty of loving him, and of loving and forgiving our fellow-men. His idea of marriage and of the family are even more nearly Christian than those of Seneca or Pliny. On the relations of husband and wife, their duties to each other, and the duty of educating their children with care, morally as well as physically and intellectually, his language sounds very much like that of some modern Christian writer.

Still more does Epictetus, the contemporary of Plutarch, show that the atmosphere which surrounded him was one upon which Christianity had shed its influences. Some have even gone so far as to maintain that he was a Christian; but it is enough to say, with Pascal, that "he is one of the philosophers of the world who best understood the duties of man." If it is true, as no doubt it is, that his writings are edifying to Christians, and yet that he was not a Christian himself, it is not easy to draw any other conclusion than that Christianity had cast a broad intellectual light over his mind. From the days of Plato we see no progress on moral subjects among the pagan writers, but rather degeneracy, till after the age of Christ and the apostles. We can discover no adequate cause for this rise in the tone of pagan philosophy aside from Christianity; and this explanation is the more satisfactory from the fact that the improvement lies exactly in the direction of Christian ideas and sentiments.

The emperor Marcus Aurelius, was not less religious than Epictetus, and seems to be more influenced by love. If the latter who was a slave, taught the theory of inward liberty, maintaining the natural equality of men as the children of God, the former, who ruled over a vast empire, insisted upon a practical benevolence in imitation of Divine Providence, which bordered very closely upon Christian charity. He taught that God, supreme in wisdom and goodness, directs all things well; that good and evil, which come at his bidding, are alike ordered for our benefit; that we ought to be entirely submissive to his will, and trustfully to walk in his ways, and so to elevate ourselves to him; that the human soul has a peculiar value, not affected by rank; that, in this respect, all men are equal, and form a vast society, of which a nation is but a part; that while Rome belonged to him as emperor, the world belonged to him as man; that each one has a mission to fulfil in a system in which God is chief; that in the most obscure position one can be "a divine man;" that we should always

remember that all men are our kindred ; that we are members of a great body which would be incomplete without us ; that we ought to love our neighbor and do him good irrespective of his deserts ; nay, that we ought to love our enemies and forgive them. These assuredly are noble sentiments, free from the refined selfishness of the more ancient philosophers, and from the proud self-sufficiency of the later stoics. They express a fraternal interest in man, and a tender compassion for the weak and erring, unknown, both in theory and in practice, till after the coming of Christ.

Putting together all these sentiments of the later philosophers, we observe a marked progress in respect to the social relations of men, humanity taking the place of nationality ; personal dignity, the place of political rank ; forgiveness the place of revenge ; compassion to the miserable, the place of indifference or inhumanity ; and a moral purity, if not sacredness, in domestic life taking the place of the low economic views which corrupted ancient life, and weakened the body politic. Finding such principles in the ethical writers of the age, we seem to have passed the dividing line between ancient and modern society. Strictly speaking, modern history begins where Christian influence begins ; and it is evidently a mistake to suppose that this began with the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity.

The spirit of legislation, during this period, was no less changed than that of philosophy. The whole atmosphere of public and private life was more or less affected by the presence of Christian ideas. Even when men opposed Christianity, they were unconsciously influenced by some of its doctrines. When we consider the extent to which the emperors and jurists of the first Christian centuries introduced humanity into the laws of the state, we are compelled to attribute the change to the cause above assigned. In this twilight of Christianity in which many lived without ever seeing its central luminary, we find several eminent jurists. They often induced tyrannical emperors to

mitigate the severity of the old Roman laws. "The injustice of the laws complained of, said Trajan, does not belong to our age (*nec nostri seculi est*)."¹ Florentinus maintained that men, *on account of their relationship to each other*, ought to abstain from doing injuries. The laws of nature, of affection and humanity now began to hold a place above the old civil law. Ulpian, a celebrated reformer of the laws under Alexander Severus, often said that the interpreter of the laws ought to lean to piety and humanity (*pietatis—humanitatis intuitu*). Antoninus also uniformly preferred the more humane interpretation (*humanior interpretatio*) of the law. While the ancient laws spoke only of *rights*, the idea of *duty* now entered into the laws. The judges were directed, in cases relating to domestic life, to regard the laws of natural affection as well as those of the civil code. This increasing humanity in the laws of the empire is easily explained by referring it to the benign spirit of Christianity, which was beginning to be felt even in pagan society.

It would require too much space to mention all the particular laws, or even classes of laws, which might be adduced to illustrate the foregoing general statements. The condition of woman was improved. The jurists admitted that her legal rights were inferior to those of men. Papinius says, in *multis juris nostri articulis deterior est conditio feminarum quam masculorum*. During the first three centuries her condition was gradually improved.

The same idea of the dignity of a human being which tended to equalize the rights of the two sexes, redounded to the advantage of children, who could no longer be crushed with impunity. Even the children of the poor began to be provided for. Nerva was the first pagan who made public provision for them. Trajan followed his example, and supported five thousand in Rome, and many others in different parts of Italy and Africa. In nothing, perhaps, is the indirect influence of Christianity upon paganism more evident than in these and other kindred institutions of charity. The emperor Julian resorted to them expressly for the purpose

of giving to paganism the advantages belonging to Christianity. Could there be a more unequivocal testimony to the excellence of that new spirit which was beginning to permeate and regenerate society?

ARTICLE II.

THE DENIAL OF THE SUPERNATURAL.

BY J. M. MANNING, CHAPLAIN OF 43D REGT. MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS.

THE subject of divine interpositions, recent denials of which we propose to consider in the present Article, is not a matter to be debated with all classes of unbelievers. There may be other questions lying back of this, which render any such debate useless. The adversary should not be allowed to meet us where, if we gain the battle, he can say it amounts to nothing; but should be compelled to defend himself in his real and fundamental position. Why should we discuss the problem of miracles, or of the supernatural generally, with a disciple of Spinoza? His pantheism is a foregone conclusion against every one of our arguments; and until he admits a personal Creator, distinct from the creation, we are merely chopping logic for each other's amusement or mockery. This remark holds in regard to the *positivist* also. As neither Spinoza, Hegel, or Emerson is the antagonist, in precisely the same way, we cannot argue with Comte or Mr. Buckle for divine interpositions. If there be no first truths, transcending time and space and revealed to the spirit, but all knowledge must be reached by the induction of the senses, then, as a matter of course, there is nothing of the nature of a miracle. It is idle to attempt to show that something above the cosmos may come into it, until the existence of that something is admitted; this is the common ground on which the objector must meet us, if he

has anything to say against the Christian doctrine of the supernatural. If Hume's celebrated Essay be atheistic, then it should be met as atheism; but if he believed in a loving and overruling God (though he carefully concealed any such belief), then that essay is one of the best possible safeguards against imposture. His argument no sooner becomes pertinent than it ceases to be an objection. When Mr. Lewes ridicules praying for rain, as like praying "for the sun to rise at midnight," we have nothing to say, for he is speaking in praise of the positive philosophy; but the same remark on the lips of Baden Powell or Theodore Parker might deserve a respectful answer. These latter men, if we understand them, were not disciples of Comte; neither were they atheists or pantheists. Though rejecting the idea of the supernatural, claiming that nature is guided by cosmic forces only, they believed in a personal God, infinitely wise and good, who arranged the universe in the beginning, and in accordance with whose original purpose it still proceeds.

Taking these two names as representative of a class of objectors to all divine interpositions in nature, the debate to which they challenge us may be both honest and legitimate. What is, and what in all ages of the church has been, the position of this class of unbelievers?

They have refused to see anything supernatural in human history or experience. They argue that Nature, with her necessary laws and inherent life, is adequate to the production of all events; that it is unphilosophical and superstitious to refer any of those events, even the most extraordinary, to a source higher than nature.

This class of sceptics are not unaptly characterized, in the Epistle to the Romans, as "worshipping and serving the creature more than the Creator." Though not deifying the cosmos, yet they take it out of the hands of any controlling power; though conceding a certain supremacy to the Author of nature, it is difficult to see in what that supremacy now consists. They will hear of no interruption to the uniform

order of the world. That order, they contend, is a chain of necessary sequences, admitting no interference. They admonish us that our faith in divine interventions is a belief resting on ignorance; that all such faith will vanish away in the clear light of advancing science. To them there is no such thing as a providence — whether general, particular, or special — daily interposing in human affairs. Prayer is a speaking into the winds. The miracle, as defined by orthodox divines, is a dishonor to the inherent beauty and perfection of the universe. “It is derogatory to the idea of infinite power and wisdom,” says Professor Powell, “to suppose an order of things so imperfectly established that it must be occasionally interrupted and violated;” or, as Theodore Parker, with less affectation of reverence, remarks: “men have their precarious make-shifts; the Infinite has no tricks and subterfuges, — not a whim in God, and so not a miracle in nature.” “Why is it,” such men as these ask, “that certain events are referred by the pious to an immediate divine agency?” And then they proceed, somewhat in the following strain, and with great assurance, to dispose of the phenomenon. “The pious Christian, in his ignorance of the cosmical forces, fails to discover the true cause of the event; and therefore, since his mind refuses to rest without some explanation, he springs to the notion of a supernatural author. Reason not having the data for a philosophical answer, recourse is had to the all-feigning power of imagination.” In the same patronizing strain the writers of the sacred books are excused for representing as divine interpositions many events now explicable on natural principles. Such interferences as they describe can never be anything but a calamity, in this faultless universe; and even granting that for any reason they should be desirable, they are still impossible; it is not in the power of Omnipotence to bring them to pass; or, if we prefer, so far as the working of miracles is concerned, God is *not* omnipotent. “The light of the inductive sciences did not blaze, in its full splendors, in the times of the apostles. What seemed to

them to transcend all created causes, for the reason that the system of nature was so veiled to them, should not arouse superstition in the middle of this nineteenth century; for no small portion of it may be explained on scientific grounds, and anything beyond this cannot claim to be historic." That we may not seem to misrepresent these apostles of naturalism, we quote the words of the late Oxford essayist. Professor Powell, in his tract on the Christian evidences, says: "the inevitable progress of research must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel all that seems most marvellous, and what is at present least understood will become as familiarly known to the science of the future, as those points which a few centuries ago were involved in equal obscurity, but are now thoroughly understood." So, then, we are bidden to look for a day when the supernatural element will be entirely eliminated from Christianity; when it shall be universally perceived that general history, individual experience, and all events in the religious, as well as in the secular, world move on with a fatal harmony, like that which the starry hosts are forever weaving through the sky. The doctrine of divine interpositions is a girdled trunk, under which faith may no longer sit, having none to molest or make afraid, but from which she must hasten, to the broad-spreading tree of naturalistic research, if she would not be buried in the ruin soon to fall.

Let it not be inferred that we underrate the strength of these assailants, or the importance of meeting them and turning back their weapons from the holy citadel of truth. Christianity, as an unfolding kingdom, has nothing to fear from errorists; but while the Lord's chariot is steadily advancing, unhindered by any opposition, multitudes of souls, caught in the glittering toils of error, may be overthrown and crushed beneath his chariot wheels. There are various reasons why this denial of the supernatural should, if possible, be shown to be baseless and false:

1. This impatience of everything of the nature of miracle is wide-spread at the present time. The popular mind is more

deeply infected with it than many of us may be disposed to admit. We shall discover, upon careful inquiry, that nearly all doubts about the special inspiration of the scriptures, the Trinity, the twofold personality of Christ, prophetic utterances, the new-birth and its related doctrines, are traceable to a single source: Every such doctrine transcends the human understanding, and involves something supernatural. Only persuade the unbeliever of the reasonableness of divine interpositions, in nature and history, and he can entertain many truths at which he now stumbles and persistently rebels. As there is no propriety in arguing the subject of miracles with an atheist, so there is no propriety in discussing the doctrine of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, with one who denies that any divine force ever comes into nature. Though we lop off the boughs of his unbelief never so often, yet they instantly begin to grow again, if the root thereof, which is his denial of the supernatural, be not uncovered and destroyed.

2. This incredulity respecting anything not amenable to science is gaining ground in certain localities. It can already fortify itself with names renowned in the scientific world; names which give it an air of respectability, although they are appropriated with an indiscriminating eagerness,—some of them being on the extreme right, and others on the extreme left, and but few having any real connection with this naturalistic “Christianity.” A great name is a power with the unthinking many, however misapplied, even though it may be equally fatal to their own theories and the belief which they deny. Not perceiving this, they regard their Christian teachers with a certain self-complacent scorn, fancying those teachers far behind the best intellects of the age, puffed up with a fragmentary and superficial knowledge, pointing to the fact that phenomena once deemed miraculous are now explained on natural principles, and from this drawing the inference—plausible to many an unreflecting mind—that future discoveries will gradually bring everything now referred to divine agency within the compass of natural law.

3. But this growing hesitancy of men, or distinct refusal to believe what transcends the domain of science, is oftentimes honest. However erroneous, and however slight the investigations on which it rests, to disdain it, or treat it with indifference, is a sure way of confirming its strength. By such a course, we shall be understood to confess that our belief in the supernatural is a blind faith; that we are unable to give a sound reason thereof; that we dare not trust it in the arena of debate. It behooves us to meet and satisfy these misgiving minds, to show the reasonableness and need of divine interpositions in the world, if we would smite down that scepticism which is the secret of nearly all existing hostility to evangelical religion. Persuade men that events of the nature of a miracle are not impossible; that they are reasonable, and, in certain great exigencies indispensable, and they are prepared to approach the subject of a revelation from God, and to entertain all and each of its mysterious doctrines.

It is in the hope of contributing something toward such a result, that we now proceed to point out some of the errors and misapprehensions to which the disbelief of divine interpositions is traceable.

In the first place, many persons have refused to believe in any such interpositions, owing to a misunderstanding of the doctrine involved. The question which arrays them against us is one of terms and definitions, rather than of essential doctrine. The word "miracle," which has proved more obnoxious than any other to the doubting, tells us nothing of the nature or origin of the event it designates. An event properly thus designated may have none of the element of supernaturalness in it,—may arise out of a created source; while other events, less striking in themselves, and even passing unnoticed perhaps, may spring immediately from a divine volition. This term "miracle," belonging partly to the technics of theology, is used to describe an *effect* produced in the mind of the beholder.

Certain occurrences are thus named, in the scriptural narrative, because they excited the wonder of the bystanders; the people witnessing them greatly *marvelled*, and were astonished above measure. Now the inspired penmen call such events by various names, in their artless records — signs, mighty deeds, wondrous works; but we, viewing them all from a single point of view, are wont to embrace them under the one term “miracles.” This may not be the best word. Looking only at the etymology of it, the objector may make it mean something very different from what we mean by it. Since we have chosen it, he must allow us to define it. We do not ask him to believe any notion which it may seem to him to convey, but only the doctrine which we mean it to express. What, then, do we understand by a miracle? Do we mean, as the sceptic affirms, that the laws of nature have been set aside and dishonored? Certainly not. Do we mean that God could not create a perfect world in the beginning, but is obliged to be continually interposing to remedy its original defects? We intend nothing of this sort by the word. Do we mean that there is irregularity and confusion in the government of the world; that God is fickle-minded, at cross-purposes with himself, undoing to-day what he did yesterday? On the contrary, we believe that Jehovah changes not; that he is not man, nor the son of man, that he should repent. We have an unfaltering faith in the orderly march of history; in the steady administration of the affairs of the universe; in those eternal counsels, so wise and perfect as never to need any change or modification in the carrying out. When we apply the term “miracles” to certain historic events, we mean that they were manifestations of God’s power, so direct and immediate as to convince the witnesses of his agency in them. This is the whole statement; and certainly it involves no monstrous interference with the order of nature; it only asserts the divine sovereignty and supremacy, the Creator’s right and ability to do what he will with his own. Mediatly and indirectly God is continually

manifesting himself to all mankind. His invisible things, even his eternal power and Godhead, may be known from the creation of the world; from the heavens, which "declare his glory;" from the human frame, "fearfully and wonderfully made;" from the earth, which is "full of the riches of his goodness;" from the "great and wide sea, wherein he hath made things small and great." But these revelations in nature do not constitute a miracle. They lack the essential quality—the element of supernaturalness; neither are they convincing signs of God's presence, given for a special and extraordinary purpose. There is always some originating force, satisfactory to science, between the divine fiat and the eye of the beholder; always some secondary cause, veiling the face of the great First Cause. A miracle, according to the technical use of the word, is wrought only when God steps out from behind these intervening agents; when he drops the instruments of his ordinary providence; when he stands, as it were, in front of the powers of nature, and works independently of them, so as to compel a recognition of his authorship in what occurs. The event, as the name signifies, is of a startling character; it arrests, and powerfully holds, the attention of the witnesses; it refuses to be accounted for on any naturalistic grounds, and obliges all men, even the most reluctant, to exclaim: "Lo! God is here; let the earth keep silence before him."

The value of the biblical miracles, as establishing the divine authority of the scriptures, has been doubted and denied. An elaborate effort is making, to show that Christ and his apostles relied altogether on the *character* of their teachings for credit with mankind. The very apparent fact, that they used miraculous in connection with moral evidence, is first declared unnecessary and impossible, and then explained away. But this reasoning cannot change the laws of mental action. Healthy and unsophisticated minds do require something besides moral excellence in a teacher, in order to accept him as sent from God; and wondrous works cannot of themselves avail with persons knowing the

feats of magic, and believing in the power of malignant spirits; it must therefore be these two species of evidence supporting each other, rising until they meet and make a glorious archway of testimony, under which alone the divinely commissioned prophet may walk, receiving the homage and consent of men. This special value of the Christian miracles would not be doubted, were it not for the intrinsic character of the events. It is the quality of supernaturalness in them which gives offence; and therefore they need not be discussed separately, but on the same ground with all other divine interpositions. From the point of view of the present remarks, a miracle is the same thing as a special providence; whoever does not recoil from one, will easily be persuaded to believe in the other. The essential fact in regard to these, and all other like occurrences, is the entrance into nature of a divine force. This is the head and front of all their offending; and though firmly convinced of their necessity and historical reality, and prepared to bring forth our arguments, yet we wish it understood all along, that by such events, — whether called miracles, acts of providence, or divine interpositions, — we mean no dishonor to nature, no denial of the uniform order of the world; we only affirm, in opposition to the naturalistic theory, that those effects flow immediately and directly from the volitions of the Almighty.

Those persons who appeal to science, as showing that a divine cause never comes into the creation, may be reminded that the best results of modern science are against them. Any respectable museum of zoölogy, like the one at Harvard University, convicts them of inconsistency. It is they, and not we, who have abandoned the inductive method. Mr. Darwin, whom they quote as their chief apostle, is notoriously imaginative as to his data, and hypothetical in his reasonings. No mediaeval scholastic, or disciple of the *a priori* school of philosophy, has ever shown more ingenuity in guessing at convenient premises. His theory, as it has

been briefly stated,¹ is, "that not only all plants and animals, but that man also, with his mind and conscience, with his gift of government and sense of immortality, are all derived, by natural selection, from a common parentage." This conclusion sets at nought, and is irreconcilably at war with, some of the latest and surest discoveries of science. Professor Agassiz has shown that it rests on a purely fictitious basis; that its pretended facts are empty imaginations; that it is a wild hypothesis dependent altogether on perverse and special pleading; that it forsakes and dishonors the scientific method, in whose name it is baptized. The upturned strata of the continents, from the present back to the remotest geologic ages, bear testimony against this vaunted theory. Not "natural selection," but creative acts coming into the domain of nature, explain the succession of races on this terraqueous sphere. Science, speaking through her most eminent votaries, proclaims the reality of divine interventions *since* that original fiat which called the universe into being. Naturalists make four grand divisions of the animal kingdom; and these they subdivide according to certain structural peculiarities, into branches, classes, orders, families, genera, and species. Now these subdivisions, in either of the four departments, did not all begin to exist at the same time; but the least perfectly developed first, and then others less rudimental, in distinct succession,—the genealogical tree being marked with a joint, at the commencement of each new stage of the progress, showing where a supernatural and creative force had intervened. Farthest away in the past, we may suppose, the humble star-fish and sea-anemone sprang into being; then, after vast cycles of ages, the nautilus rose out of the waters and spread his tiny sail; again, unnumbered centuries having rolled by, the many-hued insects began to display their beauties in the sunlight; and finally, the dry land having slowly risen and girded the waves, reptiles, birds, the beasts of the field, and MAN appeared. Our faith in these succes-

sive creations is not beholden to an uncriticising piety. They are neither the dreams of the religious nor metaphysical entities. Science has spelled out the record, where her own clear eye discovered it, graven, in imperishable letters, on the earth's foundations; science, in opposition to the clamors of a few — children whom she has nourished and brought up, but who have rebelled against her — declares that no new order of life has ever arisen, save by the incoming of the creative word; that no cause in nature is adequate to so grand an effect; but that it is the high and awful prerogative of him who speaks, and it is done; who commands, and it standeth fast forever. Here and there a scholar, confused by such speculations as Mr. Darwin's, until the wish has unconsciously become father to the thought, may have attempted to overthrow the conclusions of science; to make it appear that there has been no intervention of the creative fiat in time, and that the succession of living creatures is caused by the gradual unfolding of the lower into the higher forms of life. But this attempt cannot make headway against the mighty pressure of truth. Science, with the torch of the inductive philosophy in her hand, has searched down the ages, and returned and spoken. She reports that the gulf between one species of life and another is too broad to be spanned by any force in nature; that the boundary between any two adjacent orders is insurmountable to all but God; that throughout all the millions of past ages it has stood uneffaced and unaffected by any cosmical agency; that the different families of plants and animals have stood immutably apart; that without a new and purely creative act, there has been, and can be, no shadow of a change. None can dispute the statement, save in defiance of the conclusions of palaeontology, that a supernatural power has entered nature many times since Jehovah first said "let there be light," inserting forces not there before, and necessitating new and peculiar results. The testimony is unimpeachable: what have been called "the vestiges of creation," turn out indeed to be the "foot-prints

of the Creator;" and the everlasting rocks, as well as the heavens over us, show forth his glorious handiwork.

This argument, we are aware, does not remove the objection to supernatural events, considered not as creative, but as providential. The unbeliever may admit the divine interpositions attested by geology, and still claim that they do not occur in the subsequent management of the new races. "Science proves that God created the *first* bird, the first lion, the first man, by a direct act; but there is no evidence that he interfered with that work, or with the race springing therefrom afterwards. Having produced it, he placed it under eternal and changeless laws, and there left it to fulfil its own destiny."

Proceeding to this new form of the objection, we meet it by denying the assumption on which it stands. Granting that the laws of nature are changeless and eternal, where do we learn that God has placed all his creations in their custody? Has he told us, anywhere, that such must be the fate of everything he calls into being? May he not constitute some of his creatures free and self-directive, and withhold them from the bonds of necessity, to be immediately subject unto himself? If he does place all his works under the guardianship of natural law, to remain in their keeping forever, then we may as well admit, with the sceptic, that no way is open for a miracle to come in subsequently. But we deny this assumption. God has given us no intimation or hint of any such procedure on his part; and certainly there is no necessity binding him to this course of action. If we would not fall back into pantheism, but hold fast the truth that God is distinct from nature, then we must grant that his power of creating involves power to locate each creature as he pleases. It is purely gratuitous, since he is at liberty to do as he will, to say that he has subjected all his works to immutable laws. He does not thus abdicate his sovereignty, and give his glory to another, so far as reason has discovered. We can accept such a doctrine only

by going beyond known facts, and believing unproved conjectures. God has placed many of his works under the dominion of fixed laws—the day and night, the cold and heat, the functions of the animal frame, the motions of the heavenly bodies; but by what authority do we extend that dominion over all his works? If a father sends his son into the army, and if the enlistment be for life, that son is ever after subject to military rule; the father cannot interpose, in any case, to relieve him of the prescribed discipline. But suppose that he keeps his son under his personal supervision: then he may interfere, and *ought* to, as the good of that son shall require. So with the divine interpositions. If we might assume that God subjects everything he makes to natural law, perhaps there might be no opportunity for providential miracles. But the assumption is purely gratuitous,—unsupported by any well-ascertained fact. The sovereign Creator may refuse, in the case of some of his children, to place them under such control. He may prefer to keep them in a state of freedom, answerable only to his own fatherly injunctions. And while they are thus independent of nature,—at liberty to turn either to the right hand or the left hand, as their own desires may prompt, we must grant the extreme probability of occasions for God to interpose. Miraculous events are likely to occur, and reason leads us to expect them, so long as any creature of our great and wise Sovereign is free.

More positively, then, we remark, that any denial of providential miracles overlooks the distinctions of natural and moral government—merging the moral in the natural. Not only may the omnipotent One create free agents, but he actually has. That voice of divine satisfaction, which went forth over the sinless pair in Eden, and the Psalmist's exulting shout: "Thou hast crowned him with glory and honor, and set him *over* the work of thy hand," do but syllable and reëcho the consciousness of all immortals. Jehovah's government of the universe embraces two grand departments, the natural and the moral. Many of his works, above

and around us, are in the control of secondary causes; but there is one creature "made in the image of God." Man, as his own thoughts testify, is endowed with liberty; his will, like the Creator's, is free to move *with* or *against* the law of holiness placed over it. Man is superior to the control of nature. He may be called supernatural, so far as his moral agency is concerned. He can spurn all creative influence, whether by the inner or outer world; and therefore, in order to be sure of governing him, God must reserve the power to interpose. Nature may persuade man, but she cannot overawe and subdue his will. No iron destiny rules the action of his moral faculties. Though the movements of his body and mind are to a certain extent under the dominion of fixed laws, yet in his volitions he is necessarily and forever free. So far as he shares the life of nature, he is the subject of a natural government; but as a moral agent, nothing but a moral government can have any fitness, or even reality, to him. It was said that we are conscious of this freedom. We *know* that our wills can be in allegiance only to that which is supernatural. It is graven upon our hearts that we are free, and that no being but God can sit in authority over our souls. As we believe that man is not a machine, that his Maker has honored him above every other creature, withholding him from the grasp of fate, and endowing him with the power to choose his own course of action, we must cling to the doctrine of divine interpositions as the sheet anchor of human safety.

Since man is not subject to fixed laws, but is free to act as he will, he may act unwisely. He may leave the path of righteousness, and enter the pathway of unholiness and sin. He may go astray into wretchedness and despair; and what shall restore him from the fatal wandering? Natural forces cannot; for, as we have just seen, his moral capacity is superior to nature; it does not own her sway. Evidently something from above — a power not only different in kind from nature's but infinite in degree, and which his will shall not disdain to obey — must be interposed. Nothing but

the intervening hand of God can reverse the downward flight of a soul. Our wills, which spurn all natural dominion, must feel the awful majesty of divinity, or there is no certainty that they will be bowed into submission. The Almighty gives himself a terrible being to govern, as often as he makes a man! Nature cannot govern that creature; God must control him, or he may roam a wild marauder through the universe. Nor can any force of necessity restrain him. That free-will knows not the meaning of fate. Only motives, still leaving it the master of its own action, can reach it. Instead of being driven, it must be convinced and overawed. It must be turned back from the wrong, and influenced to follow after righteousness, by "the terrors of the Lord," — by such wondrous interpositions as it shall not dare resist. Take from God the miracle-working power, and the sceptre of his moral government is broken. He may trust nature to the management of natural forces; but, in order to be sure of controlling men, he must be able to touch them with his own finger, to utter the voice of his majesty close in their hearing, and make all his splendors flash immediately upon them. And if the existence of a *single* man calls for a ruler, able and ever ready to interpose, how much more impressively the argument reveals its greatness, in view of the countless hosts of free spirits peopling both time and eternity! If it be true that evil spirits may interfere with the movements of creation, what agency shall overrule their power? All angels, whether fallen or unfallen, have the same liberty as man to bring chaos and night into the moral realm; and considering their capacities and uncounted armies, and adding thereto the ever-springing and never-dying children of the human race, what must be the result if there be not some arm of holiness and wisdom which may reach and sway them at will? The evil which might ensue in such a universe, were it left without an interposing God, is but faintly imaged in the Miltonic description, where "hills amid the air encountered hills, hurled to and fro with jaculation dire."

Naturalism affirms that the miracle-working power could only introduce confusion and irregularity into the world. But nothing could be further from the truth, or more opposite, so long as the human will remains free. Divine interpositions alone, are adequate to keep irregularity and ruin out of the moral universe. The fountain of disorder is in the soul of man,—in a creature finite and temptable, and clothed with the transcendent power of self-direction. Aside from the fact of angelic orders of intelligence, and ceasing from any broad survey, every one may detect, in his own personality, an energy which threatens the moral harmony of the world. Over against the fearful truth of human liberty stand the miracles, winged messengers of goodness, ready to fly for our rescue whenever we abuse our freedom. We see not how it is possible for God to overmaster and guide this faculty of free-will, unless he, in certain great emergencies, lifts the curtain which veils his presence, and shows us his hand grasping his thunderbolts. His power to interpose and control us, independently of created causes, is the foundation of his throne. Without it all the beauty and lustre now encircling him would vanish away. The fact that he may deal with us immediately, no finite force intervening, so far from exciting our terror, saves us from alarm. It is no signal of anarchy, but an assurance that the moral world, no less than the natural, shall be governed; that there is a hand ready to be interposed, when any disturbance rises out of the free-agency of man, and able to restrain the agent at the same time that the freedom remains unimpaired; that the heathen may rage, the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, while the harmony of the universe is still secure.

The denial of supernatural events in nature and history often arises from a failure to see that it behoves God to subject his natural to his moral government. Reason teaches that matter should be the servant of mind, that all unintelligent forces should minister in the education of the soul.

Man is the flower of creation. 'The glory of the world lies in contributing to his excellency. His needs are sovereign. All things below him on the scale of life, should be subordinated to his fullest and fairest development. It is the verdict of philosophy that he should "have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth on the earth." Now the devotee of science is apt to forget this subserviency of nature to moral and spiritual ends. He becomes so absorbed in his favorite studies, as to lose sight of the royalty and supremacy of the soul. He is charmed with the beautiful order which pervades both earth and sky. Whenever he is able to penetrate by the aid of either telescope or microscope, he finds all things moving in obedience to uniform laws; and he comes to be so in love with this exquisite harmony, as to recoil from the idea of the smallest interruption thereof. Forgetting the paramount moral government, he can see no occasion for the intervention of the supernatural; and he deems it unworthy of the God of order — as though he would wantonly bring a sudden crash and discord into the anthem of nature — to intimate that he may thus interpose.

From this point of view, and with this exclusive devotion to cosmical agencies, it is not at all strange that one should look with distrust on the Christian doctrine of the supernatural. But such is not the position which we are to take, if we would comprehend all the facts in our survey. Glorious as the fabric of nature is, there is something unspeakably more noble, — something to which all the laws of nature should be subordinate. That most precious of created things is the immortal soul. Looking steadily on that, and balancing its fearful possibilities, nature, with all her vast harmonies, appears only as a means and an instrument. If that free soul wanders, and threatens disturbance to the moral realm, the material universe ought to be sacrificed, if needful, to bring it back. God is concerned for its recovery. He decreed the saving interposition in eternity, when he

foresaw the wandering. There is no acting from sudden impulse, or by stress of unexpected emergencies. All takes place in fulfilment of the ancient purpose. But what is there that God shall not give in exchange for a soul? Who shall say that he is not infinitely wise, if, to hold up his noblest work from ruin, he thrusts his hand through all the course of nature, and wields the entire creation as the instrument of his fatherly love? Is any one so unreflecting as to believe that God would create a material universe, and launch it forth into space, and make it such that he cannot use it to educate and restrain his own children? Is nature a tyrant, to pluck those children out of his hand; or a willing servant, to whom he speaks as he has purposed on their behalf, and instantly his word is performed? An immediate act of the Almighty may become necessary to man's salvation. His soul has such power, is so terrible in its liberty, that nothing in nature can be sure of controlling it. And since it is worth so much, — God's costliest jewel, and his own offspring, — the whole realm of nature is as nothing in the comparison. Rather than that soul should perish, or one tittle of the law over it fail, the elements should be confounded, and the heavens be folded up as a decayed vesture, and laid aside. God shows his wisdom — a divine and holy economy of means — in seizing all nature with his omnipotent grasp, and wielding it, as the exigency may demand, for the rescue of his immortal child. He subordinates the less to the greater; he uses what is temporary and limited in value to secure that, the value of which passeth knowledge.

Passing on from this branch of the discussion, we remark in the next place, that those who reject the doctrine of the supernatural, lose the only ground on which the history of Christ can be explained. Of all miracles he is the greatest; and any attempt to make him less than the Son of God manifest in the flesh, is a wild defiance of both fact and philosophy. It had become necessary that the Creator should

interpose, in order to save the human race. What was the condition of the world, at the time of Christ's appearing? Every scheme originating with man, and instituted for the elevation of society, had miserably failed. Degeneracy was written all over the history of the nations. Morality, literature, art, philosophy, masculine energy, waned everywhere with the lapse of time. Nothing, within the sphere of finite causes, could reverse or check the headlong tendency. It had been demonstrated,

"Unless above himself he can erect
Himself, how mean a thing is man."

Nothing remained but that God should interpose, or leave the human race to perish in its corruptions. And rather than behold the ruin, he chose to work the miracle. According to the quaint but striking phrase of John Foster, "the great bell of the universe" was rung, calling the nations together, to hear the divine and saving sermon. The supernaturalness of the undertaking consisted in the incarnation of the Redeemer. Only accept Christ's declaration, "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father," and every other miracle mentioned in scripture ceases to perplex us. They all find their solution in this one great mystery, and seem to be necessitated by it. When a monarch appears, we expect to see him attended by a train of servants and nobles. So the incarnation once admitted, and we are prepared to recognize all the marvels preceding or following it. They are no intruders, but the meet heralds and servitors of Immanuel. The supernatural births of Isaac, Samson, and the child moving so obscurely through the vision of Isaiah, were needed as a preparation, in order that welcome might be given to the virgin-born reconciler of earth and heaven. The miracles of the Old Testament, nearly all of which open the way to some aspect of the many-sided mystery of the incarnation, were a schoolmaster to lead the world believingly up to Christ. And those signs and wonders which the apostles wrought, instead of requiring any sep-

arate vindication, were only the trailing splendors and filaments of the glory passed into the heavens. Now who is prepared to deny the declaration of Christ, that "he proceeded and came forth from the Father?" Though he bears witness of himself, yet will any one doubt that his testimony is true? Are we not called upon by reason and the voice of the ages to believe his words, though every man, and every human speculation, should thereby be proved false? He was neither an enthusiast nor an impostor; and it is the judgment of all the enlightened and the good, to-day, "better that every other name should perish, than that his great name should be obscured." His profound wisdom, his all-loving beneficence and unselfishness, his perfect insight and truthfulness, are not so much a record as the deep and inwrought conviction of mankind. And aside from his own testimony, which ought to be forever conclusive, who will say that his miraculous mission was uncalled for? Who denies that his life, teachings, and death are the hope of the world? There is no reformer worthy of the name, no teacher of good morals, no man laboring in any way for the spiritual benefit of the race, but draws his inspiration from Jesus of Nazareth. Take that wondrous name out of history, and we all should feel that our sheet-anchor was gone. But in this same Jesus, coming forth from God, and returning whence he came, the problem of the supernatural is forever solved. He steps across nature with a single stride, in leaving his throne and becoming the babe of Bethlehem. There is nothing incredible, however much that may be inexplicable, in miracles and other supernatural events in nature and history; but they appear only as the bright halo of divinity around him in whom all the fulness of the God-head dwelt, while he proceeds on his wondrous mission,—healing the sick, raising the dead, foiling and defeating the prince of darkness, bursting the chains of the grave, and ascending up, where he was before, above all principalities and powers in heavenly places.

The argument for divine interpositions would be incomplete without some notice of the ennobling influence of the doctrine on the believing mind. The soul which regards itself as excluded from immediate contact with God, hedged about by secondary causes, and woven into the mechanism of nature, can hardly escape a feeling of degradation. Any consciousness of its high origin must raise the suspicion that it is an outcast and disinherited child. It misses the warming and beautifying presence of its own Father, and is rolled helplessly along under an inexorable destiny. Not until it escapes from this fatalistic movement, and enters into a divine companionship, does the sense of humiliation depart; then only may it raise the questions, "whence am I, and what, and whither bound," and not fall prostrate, crushed by its own self-communings. We have seen what events those are for which the doctrine of the supernatural pleads, — divine interventions, sometimes secret and at other times manifest, but always the direct and immediate forth-puttings of Jehovah's power. We have seen that the principle involved in all such interpositions must be admitted, since the findings of science attest a long succession of creative acts. We have seen that God is not compelled to place all his creatures in the power of natural laws, granting those laws to be uniform and eternal. We have seen — since *man* is exempted from the chain of necessity, and honored with the faculty of self-control — that occasion for God to interfere may arise; that he is not sure of governing this free agent, unless he reserves to himself the miracle-working power; that the exercise of such a power, instead of bringing in disorder, is needed to keep irregularity and confusion out of the world. We have also seen that a miracle, whether open or concealed, is no insult to nature when wrought in behalf of the soul and high moral ends, since God's moral government is his grandest care, in ministering to which the glory of all nature culminates. And we have seen that in no way, save on the ground of divine interventions, can we

frame a satisfactory answer to the question: "What think ye of Christ?"

From this high argument, mounting up through so many cumulative stages, we look forth as from the summit of a lofty watch-tower; and what must be the revulsion, and painful amazement in our minds, if unable to descry anywhere the movements and traces of the intervening hand of God! Though he is a sovereign, and may stretch forth his arms or keep them folded up at pleasure; yet where are his justice, his goodness, and his mercy, if he sits motionless and uncaring while woe and wickedness are stalking through the world? Believing, as we do, in his all-pitying kindness, we expect him to appear in the likeness of sinful flesh; to startle his erring and miserable children by his manifested presence; to call them around him, overawe them with his wondrous works, convince them that he is their Maker and Saviour, and instruct them into the upward way of blessedness and life. There are great spiritual exigences in the history of every reflective man, when he feels that nothing in nature can save him; when, distrusting his own strength, and all other created aid, his sinking soul cries out for a supernatural and divine helper. Such works as the essay of Professor Powell are a cruel impertinence to the soul thus overwhelmed. Instead of being regarded as inquiries after truth, they should be termed "further contributions toward universal hopelessness and despair." Such essays may have a brief notoriety, like that of an arraigned culprit. We are curious to know their contents, and talk about them immoderately, just as we waste many words on the criminal brought to trial; but as the case is soon closed, and the name of the culprit perishes, so the much-discussed tracts disappear beneath the onward sweep of the cause which helps and saves. We need have no fears, in view of the efforts of scepticism, — those "swarms of gnats" gathering ever and anon about the flashing sword of truth: mankind will never accept the humiliating conclusions of naturalism; our souls know that they are unsphered and wrecked forever,

if there be not around them the arm of a sustaining and ennobling God. This faith of the supernatural, which exalts and glorifies humanity, is interwoven with our most sacred instincts. We feel that it would not be like God, the father of compassions, to leave his world all these thousands of years, and make no direct effort to rescue it from its woes. We believe that he has interposed, simply because we believe in his goodness. We needed to hear his voice, and therefore he has spoken. No created arm could stay the degeneracy of the race, and therefore he made bare his own holy arm. The incarnation was indispensable to our rescue from sin; hence he wrought that miracle of miracles. We were perishing for lack of knowledge, and he, seeing our miserable estate, sent his revelation, miracle-winged, flying across the realms of nature. His soul is stirred within him, and his repentings are kindled together. Resolved to save his most precious work from the consequences of its own folly, he lays hold of nature, and wields her forces, or sets them aside, or walks over them all, for man's salvation. This is the God whom we worship, in whom we dare to trust, and by communing with whom we are transfigured into his own bright image. We do not recognize his face, nor the awfulness of his authority, if the miracle-working power be absent. That must remain. It is the terrible majesty which nature obeys, and which cheers and blesses the adoring soul. The transcendent jewel, the chief ornament and glory of God's crown, may nothing ever obscure its brightness, or dim our clear vision thereof, lest the hope of perfection die out of our hearts, and a night, such as never brooded upon primeval chaos, spread over us its all-ending gloom!

ARTICLE III.

BUCKLE'S HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION.¹

BY REV. HEMAN LINCOLN, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

THE recent death of Mr. Buckle took the world by surprise. In the prime of life, possessed of an ample fortune, and free from the cares and hardships which cut short the days of many literary men, he might have been expected to reach the green old age enjoyed so often by English scholars and statesmen. When Lord Macaulay, after a long and brilliant career in literature and statesmanship, announced his purpose "to write the history of England from the accession of king James the Second down to a time which is within the memory of men still living," his most hopeful readers doubted if the work, postponed to so late a period of life, would ever be completed. But when Mr. Buckle, in his thirty-fifth year, published the first volume of his great work, and announced that several others were in a state of forwardness, men of letters anticipated that, like Hume and Gibbon, he would give to the world a *κτημὰ ἐς αἰεί*, a work, by its originality and learning, sure of immortality. The grave has closed over both historians, and the work of each is unfinished; but Lord Macaulay has left a classic torso, beautiful in incompleteness; Mr. Buckle has left only a gigantic fragment, suggestive, like the fossil rib of a mastodon, of vast stature and prodigious strength.

The story of his life, told in this country for the first time since his decease, gives the clue to the singular defects of his character and his History. He was an insatiable reader from his childhood, like John Milton; and like Milton, too, was blessed with an indulgent father, proud of his abilities, and willing to release him from care and toil, and leave him to

¹ History of Civilization in England. By Henry Thomas Buckle, Vols. I. II. New York: D. Appleton and Co.

woo the muses at his own sweet will. But, unlike Milton, he escaped the severe discipline of English schools and universities, and was left, at the early age of fourteen, to consult his own tastes in study, without the guidance or control of wise teachers. Such a method of study yielded its natural fruits. The undisciplined boy grew up to manhood, with an overweening confidence in self, and a hearty contempt for men and institutions beyond the range of his personal sympathies. The intense dogmatism of his history is a natural sequel to his distorted education. Two or three years on the lower forms of Rugby or Eton, with a constrained submission to older boys, and to monitors and teachers, or the experience of men and life gained by a competition with equals at Cambridge or Oxford, might have supplemented original mental defects, and made him a wiser man and a more discriminating historian. Mr. Coleridge always confessed a great obligation to one of his masters who had given him a sound flogging in boyhood, for impudence in broaching sceptical opinions; and one has an instinctive feeling, in reading our author's crude theories, that a similar discipline in his boyhood might have exerted a wholesome influence.

Mr. Buckle entered on his literary career with high hopes. He aspired to the fame of a discoverer. He wished to be honored in the new science of history as a Copernicus, who first comprehended the relations of man to nature, solved the mysteries enveloping human progress, and disclosed the subtle causes which control social revolutions.¹ He had little respect for the laborers who had preceded him in this

¹ "I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the different branches of natural science. In regard to nature, events apparently the most irregular and capricious have been explained, and have been shown to be in accordance with certain fixed and universal laws. This has been done because men of ability, and, above all, men of patient, untiring thought, have studied natural events with the view of discovering their regularity; and if human events were subjected to a similar treatment, we have every right to expect similar results." — Vol. I. p. 5.

field of inquiry. They were, in his opinion, only blind leaders of the blind. The theories of religion and race and government, by which they interpreted the movements of history, were of no more value than the cycles and epicycles by which Ptolemy explained the movements of the solar system. He assumed to make known simple and intelligible laws, which regulate all human progress, and to demonstrate that "the movements of nations are perfectly regular, and, like all other movements, are solely determined by their antecedents" (vol. ii. 205). Astronomy had grown into a science, he said, by setting aside the dreams of the astrologer; and chemistry, by discarding the arts of the magician. History could be raised to the same dignity by eliminating from it the antiquated ideas of a supernatural providence, and the freedom of the human will, and the influences of race and government and religion. "There can be no science of history so long as one holds that the actions of men are determined, not by fixed law, but by free-will, or by supernatural influences or providence" (i. 6).

In place of such theories, called with characteristic energy "the draff and offal of a bygone age," he aimed to prove that the character and destiny of nations are determined by the food they eat, the soil they cultivate, the climate which enfolds them, and the natural phenomena with which they are conversant. The knowledge of these phenomena he considered the only lever by which man can be lifted from barbarism to civilization, and the degree to which this knowledge is diffused as the ultimate test of social progress. To demonstrate this theory, by showing that the leading nations of the world have attained their greatness in accordance with its methods, is the object proposed in Mr. Buckle's *History*. The first volume summons France and England to the bar as witnesses; the second volume professes to present conclusive testimony from Scotland and Spain.

Mr. Buckle brought to his work many extraordinary qualifications, even his enemies being judges. He was inspired by a lofty enthusiasm, which transmuted the

drudgery of toil into pleasure, and made him indifferent to the praise or censure of the world. He had a vast and multifarious learning, which, though sometimes superficial, and often paraded with an offensive pedantry, was generally remarkable for accuracy no less than breadth. Diligent students marvelled at the range of his researches, and the tenacity of his memory. Men of small mental stature are cumbered by great learning, like David with Saul's armor, and lose the power of original thought. Mr. Buckle was always the master, never the slave, of his learning. He was an original thinker, as well as a ripe scholar. His pages are full of profound and bold and suggestive thoughts, which quicken the sluggish reader, and startle or delight the reflective mind. His style is unsurpassed by any historian; never dull or careless, never cumbrous or obscure, it is singularly elastic, changing readily with its subject; now simple in narrative; now vigorous and sinewy in statement; and anon rising, in argument, into a majestic eloquence. It is always employed, too, simply as the vehicle of thought, and expresses with exactness the author's precise shade of meaning.

These are good qualities, entitling their possessor to a high rank in the world of letters. We concede them to Mr. Buckle in an uncommon degree. But they do not make a historian. His mental deficiencies or eccentricities were equally marked, some of them due to natural temperament, others to an unfortunate education, and they disqualify him for a candid and trustworthy writer of history.

He was a materialist in philosophy. Differing in a few particulars from Comte and the Positive School, he agreed with him in ascribing to material causes the growth of nations, and the forms of social institutions. This philosophy may be adequate to the discovery of the laws of natural science, but the great problems of history will elude its analysis. A mole, burrowing in a cornfield, is quite as capable of interpreting the movements of the heavens, as a materialistic philosopher of interpreting the movements of

mankind, who is blind to the fact of a personal God, as a force immanent in nature; of an intelligent Providence, shaping the destiny of nations by the eternal laws of justice; and of the human will, as a power superior to natural forces.

The materialism of our author sinks to a lower level, by many degrees, than Mr. Darwin's. The latter resolves man into a developed monad, guided in its progress towards intelligence by the unerring law of natural selection. But after the monad has culminated in man, it is freed from the mastery of physical forces, and becomes a sovereign, by virtue of reason and will. The origin may be ignoble; the stages of progress, through which the ascent is made, may be humiliating; but man himself approaches to divinity in his power to comprehend the laws of the universe, and to control its forces for his own use. But the philosophy of Mr. Buckle makes man the servant instead of the lord of nature, and the slave instead of the master of circumstances. He is held in bondage by physical laws, and denied even the power of the nascent lion in Milton's pagan cosmology, "pawing to get free." The "Prometheus Bound" of Aeschylus could find no place in the human family, by the psychology of this system. It is obvious that one holding such low views of human nature is unprepared to write human history.

Nor did Mr. Buckle correct the errors of his philosophy by a large practical experience. He had little knowledge of men. He was a student in the cloister, not an observer in the living world. He solved difficult problems by theory, not by experience; by looking into his books, rather than looking into real life. Nor was this habit an arbitrary or accidental one. It was adopted deliberately, as essential to the highest success in historical study. In the finest passage in his second volume, which, under the guise of an exposition of the aims and methods of the historian, may be regarded as an elaborate eulogy of himself, he says:

"Some of the most pleasurable incentives to action he must disregard. Not for him are those rewards which, in other pursuits, the same energy

would have earned ; not for him the sweets of popular applause ; not for him the luxury of power ; not for him a share in the councils of his country ; not for him a conspicuous and honored place before the public eye. Albeit conscious of what he could do, he may not compete in the great contest ; he cannot hope to win the prize ; he cannot even enjoy the excitement of the struggle. To him the arena is closed." — II. 256.

This theory we believe to be radically false, and fidelity to it has caused some of the fatal blemishes in his *History*. The great masters in this department have been also leaders in the state, or magnates in the social world. Thucydides, Livy, Machiavelli, Guizot, Thiers, Niebuhr, and Macaulay had a long experience in public life, and could say of the great events which they narrated, some of them, like Aeneas, "quorum magna pars fui;" others, with more modesty, "haud ignotus loquor." Tacitus and Hume and Gibbon were not retired scholars, but men of the world, whose intimate knowledge of all classes of society enabled them to penetrate to the subtle springs of human action. But Mr. Buckle learned little of men by mingling with his race, and this practical ignorance is obvious in his *History*. He writes like a philosopher, to defend a theory ; not like a historian tracing the steps of human progress, in the successive triumphs of mind over matter, and the development of the intellect and the conscience by the discipline of life. His sketches of the achievements of the study are masterly, for here he is at home ; and his analyses of scientific and philosophic progress cannot be surpassed. But the men, drawn upon his canvas, whether statesmen or scholars, — and he has little to say of the humbler classes, — are not men of flesh and blood, such as we meet in daily life, but intellectual machines, without conscience or heart.

Another hindrance to our author's success was his intense dogmatism. It blinded him utterly to his own defects, and unfitted him to form a candid judgment of the opinions of others. It is a curious fact that he furnished illustrations of the mental and moral vices he most sharply condemned. His volumes have many fine tributes to the value of induction in the discovery of truth ; and he deals unsparing censure

to men of the first eminence in philosophy and science, because they neglected the Baconian method. But he is a victim to an intellectual pravity, closely akin to the moral pravity described by Paul: What he does, he allows not; for what he would, that he does not, and what he would not, that does he. He extols the inductive method of reasoning, but follows the deductive. He frames his theory, and marshals facts to sustain it, instead of patiently collecting his facts, and educing the theory. Every reader instinctively feels that he is in the presence of an ingenious advocate, not an inductive philosopher. Facts at variance with his theory are overlooked, or, if too prominent to be ignored, are explained away by hypotheses at variance with his principles. When the difficulties are most perplexing, his assertions grow more vehement, as the worsted party in argument often covers his defeat by angry words.

His dogmatism often assumes the worst forms of intolerance. He denounces religious persecution as the blackest sin in the catalogue of crimes: "compared to it all other crimes are of small account"; but he is quite unconscious that he combined in his own character the elements which make up a Duke of Alva or a Torquemada. The supreme confidence in the truth of his own opinions, and his incapacity to make allowance for the opinions of others, would have made him a model inquisitor, whose hand would have never failed from the weakness of his heart. No modesty betrayed him into a doubt of his own infallibility. If self-unconsciousness, as Mr. Ruskin maintains, is a test of true greatness, we fear that neither Mr. Buckle nor Mr. Ruskin can claim a place among the magnates. We know of no author in our generation, whose abuse of others is so unstinted. He says of past historians: "They are unable to understand social phenomena"; of statesmen: "I have had occasion to read many thousand letters written by diplomatists and politicians, and I have hardly ever found an instance of one who understood the spirit and tendency of the age in which he lived." He characterized the Bridgewater Treatises, and

the Burnet Prize Essays, as "school-boy productions," and imputed to Knox and the Scotch Reformers the lowest and meanest motives. It would go hard with the reputation of our author, if his readers should mete to him the same measure he gives to others.

As no formal review of Mr. Buckle's works has appeared in our pages, it has seemed proper to give this sketch of his mental character, and his qualifications as a historian, before proceeding to a notice of the second volume of his History, which has more recently appeared. Our objections to this volume will be included under three heads: *The fundamental principles are unsound; The facts adduced are not trustworthy; The reasoning is fallacious.*

1. The fundamental principles are unsound. Mr. Buckle nowhere defines civilization, though this would seem essential to any attempt to unfold its history, and the exact laws which control its development. He seems to lose himself and to beguile his readers with eloquent phrases about progress; but if one attempts to analyze his ideas of progress, they resolve themselves into intellectual progress simply, and civilization is made identical with knowledge. He says: "The growth of European civilization is *solely* due to the progress of knowledge, and the progress of knowledge depends on the number of truths which the human intellect discovers, and on the extent to which they are diffused." This seems, at first sight, a strong assertion, but when adjusted to the theory of civilization held by our author, is reduced to the bald truism, that progress in knowledge is solely due to progress in knowledge.

But if we substitute, in place of Mr. Buckle's, the true idea of civilization, defining it, the well-being of a community, indicated, not by intelligence alone, but by morality and religion and refinement; by industrial activity and social freedom and philanthropic institutions, the strong assertion becomes a transparent untruth, for the course of history proves that progress in knowledge has no power of itself to secure morality or refinement or freedom or benevolence.

The best epochs in Grecian and Roman civilization had passed before those nations made their largest attainments in knowledge, and as learning increased, power and happiness declined. The most brilliant eras of scientific discovery in Europe have been marked by extreme corruption in the state and profligacy in society. The confession of the Roman poet, "I know the right, but follow the wrong," is an embodiment of the world's experience, that knowledge alone cannot create nobility of individual character, or confer happiness upon a nation. The leaders of literature in past ages have failed to be patterns of social virtue, and many of them have found, like Solomon, that increase of knowledge is increase of sorrow.

The unsoundness of this principle in Mr. Buckle's theory is obvious, if we give the widest scope to the term "knowledge," including in it all truth, physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral. It is more palpable if we limit it chiefly to the phenomena of nature, as is his ordinary method. His dogmatism is too extreme to speak a kind word for all departments of knowledge. Scientific discovery is the object of his worship, and scientific knowledge he extols as the chief factor in human progress. The most useful inventions never inspire him to eloquent periods: for poetry, in the highest flights of Shakspeare and Milton, he cherishes an ill-disguised contempt; and he ridicules the opinion that moral teachings exert an appreciable influence on civilization. These prejudices of Mr. Buckle, assumed to be truths by his perverse self-confidence, are hardly worthy of notice, except as they lie at the foundation of his theory. Any critic, of small ability, might demonstrate that such inventions as gunpowder, the mariner's compass, the printing-press, the steam-engine, and the telegraph, have been mightier agents in the world's progress, than remarkable discoveries, like the law of gravity, or the circulation of the blood, or the succession of geological strata. Nor would it be a harder task to prove that the poetry of Homer and Shakspeare has given a more powerful stimulus to intellectual

activity than the scientific truths of Aristotle and Newton ; and that Paul and John in their religious teachings have contributed more potent elements to human progress than Leibnitz and La Place by their investigations of natural phenomena. Guizot is a wiser observer than Mr. Buckle, when he discovers the Christian religion to be the chief factor in modern civilization, and that scientific progress has always followed in its wake, not heralded its coming. A Scotch critic, at the close of some strong arguments against our author's principle, shrewdly suggests a practical test of its soundness : " he should contrast Paul, rearing amidst the ruins of Greek and Roman culture a new moral world ; and La Place, amid the wreck of French institutions, discovering the laws that regulate phenomena ; and show in the one case, the *zero* of stationary ethics, and, in the other, the *plus* of intellectual progress."

Another fundamental principle of Mr. Buckle is equally erroneous, that scepticism is essential to progress. He says :

"To scepticism we owe the spirit of inquiry, which, during the last two centuries, has gradually eneroached on every subject."—I p. 242.

"Scepticism in physics must always be the beginning of science, and in religion must always be the beginning of toleration."—I. p. 250.

"In physics it is the necessary precursor of science ; in politics, of liberty ; in theology, of toleration."—I. p. 258.

This dogma is the more worthy of examination, because it has become a part of the cant of our day, by which sceptics claim to be leaders of the world's progress. It has a semblance of truth, but only as the statement of an exceptional law, not as the normal condition of the human mind or of society. The assertion is confuted by stubborn facts. The eras of great intellectual activity in the world's history have been ages characterized by strong belief, while eras of general scepticism have been followed almost uniformly by intellectual torpor. The great discoverers, whose labors have contributed largely to human progress, have been, with few exceptions, men of earnest beliefs, and the champions of scepticism have gathered their laurels chiefly on the field

of general literature. Scepticism is indeed intimately related to great discoveries, but those, who, like Mr. Buckle, make it a pioneer to them, are guilty of the serious blunder of confounding cause and effect. Scepticism is not the antecedent of intellectual activity, but its consequent. It does not lead to discovery, but follows it. When large accessions have been made to human knowledge, it is natural that the accumulation of new facts should undermine old principles, and create doubts of old beliefs, and lead to a reconstruction of systems in science and theology. It was not a disbelief of the Ptolemaic system which led to a discovery of the true motion of the solar system, but the discoveries of Copernicus created the disbelief. Doubts of the Mosaic cosmogony did not induce to geological discovery, but the discoveries of geologists compelled a new interpretation of Genesis.

If facts confute this theory, a careful analysis of mental phenomena shows more clearly its absurdity. Negation is powerless to create a motive force; affirmation alone can beget it. Faith in an established order in the universe is the only stimulus to investigation. Faith in the uniformity of law, which may be learned by study, is the true guide to discovery. "The works of the Lord are great, *sought out* of all them that have pleasure therein." The stronger one's faith in a personal God, the Creator and Preserver and Governor of the world, the stronger, in a direct ratio, must be the incentive to search out the plan by which he works and the laws which he administers. And conversely, the stronger one's scepticism in a divine order in nature, or in the universality of law, the weaker, in an inverse ratio, must be the impulse to investigate phenomena. It was Newton's belief that the law of attraction extended through all space, which led him to examine and re-examine the elements of the law of gravitation. It was Leverrier's belief in the law that certain inexplicable perturbations in the solar system must be due to an unknown planet, which led him to the discovery of the planet Neptune. It is a similar

belief in the established order in creation, which leads geologists to infer from the succession of strata, filled with peculiar fossils, that the world has existed for ages. Nor is it unfair to add, as an *argumentum ad hominem*, that belief has been the motive power to Mr. Buckle's scholarship and historical labors. Without the faith that "the movements of nations are perfectly regular," following an unvarying law, he would have had no impulse to acquire his prodigious learning, and the two volumes of his History would have been unwritten.

It is almost needless to attempt a refutation of another principle of our author's theory: that the progress of nations depends on physical laws, and is regulated by food and soil and climate and the effects of nature. The most superficial reader must see that his induction of facts is incomplete and his generalizations hasty. If one honestly takes his data, and applies them on a larger scale, they are found to be worthless. A fertile soil and warm climate must, of necessity, develop a rapid and brilliant civilization, says our author, and points in confirmation to Egypt and India. But Brazil and Central Africa have possessed these elements for centuries, without any notable advance in civilization. The first application of the law is not satisfactory. Again, says Mr. Buckle, a warm climate, where a vegetable diet is sufficient for the inhabitants, and is cheap and produced in abundance, creates great social inequalities, and leads to despotism; while a colder climate, where animal food, at dearer rates, is essential to life, induces social equality, and leads to republicanism. The theory is a very intelligible one, but, as soon as we pass from his illustrations, it works badly. Russia has the coldest climate of any European nation, and animal food is an important part of the national diet; but it has at the same time the greatest social inequalities and the most absolute despotism in Europe. There are many islands in the Pacific, on the other hand, where hard labor and animal food are almost unknown; but they support a large population, having

few social distinctions, and nothing worthy of the name of a government. And to confute the theory beyond all doubt, the same sky and soil and climate give birth to opposite civilizations, proving that the cause of difference lies not in nature, but in man. The Indian races lived for centuries on the fertile soil of North America without apparent progress, while the Anglo-Saxon race, under the same external influences, have developed a material wealth and a mental activity unequalled in history. The luxuriant valley of the Mississippi ought, on this theory, to reproduce the castes and despotism of India, but it is distinguished, above other sections of our country, for its ultra-democracy.

The attempt of Mr. Buckle to trace the rise of superstition to a familiarity with awful phenomena of nature, as earthquakes and volcanoes, is no more successful. He can find a few countries where the law holds good, apparently. But a larger and more careful inquiry fails to sustain it. In Iceland these phenomena are witnessed on the most gigantic scale, but the people are remarkably free from superstition; while in Scotland, where they are almost unknown, and in Spain, where they are infrequent, the people are, in Mr. Buckle's opinion, the most superstitious in Europe.

Principles which fail so frequently and signally when one attempts to apply them are of little value. But the human mind, without a labored refutation, rejects instinctively this bald materialism. Man is not the slave of nature, but its lord, and his power to overcome and control the adverse influences of nature is a crucial test of his social progress. Moral character and the distinctions of race, which our author affects to despise, are mightier agents in civilization than all physical influences. He attributes the indolence of the Spaniards, and their superstition, in part to the uncertainty of agricultural returns, growing out of the aridity of the soil and the irregularity of rain. But the Moors, with the same natural disadvantages, were neither indolent nor superstitious. Their ingenious industry converted Southern Spain into a luxuriant garden, where the annual crops were

abundant and uniform. They did what the Spaniards never attempted, but God designed man everywhere to do. They exerted a sovereignty over nature, and controlled its tendency to drought by a thorough system of irrigation. The Indian tribes gathered only a scanty subsistence from the barren soil of New England, and slowly wasted towards extinction; but the Anglo-Saxon race, by superior energy of character, have triumphed over all natural obstacles, and founded on the same barren soil a mighty empire.

Mr. Buckle's philosophy of history is palpably false. It must discard the three unsound principles which underlie it—the controlling influence of physical causes, the quickening influence of scepticism, and the superiority of intellectual to moral truth—before it can solve the intricate problems of the world's civilization.

2. The facts adduced by Mr. Buckle are not trustworthy.

This has been shown, in part, in the previous remarks on soil and climate. He errs not so much in false statements as in suppressing important facts. He attaches an undue value to those which favor his theories, and conceals or explains away those which are adverse. We may attribute this, perhaps, to a constitutional defect; a want of power to see things in their true relations and proportions. It is apparent in the very arrangement of the contents of his volumes. A most inordinate space is given to an analysis of scientific works, like those of Adam Smith and Black and Hunter. The analysis is admirable, but strangely out of place in a history. The defect becomes more serious when he marshals facts in support of a theory. By failing to adjust them in their true relations, his statements sometimes have the effect of falsehoods. He detects the error in others, for he says: "in all large fields of inquiry there are a sufficient number of empirical coincidences to make a plausible case in favor of whatever view a man chooses to advocate"; but he never suspects the tendency in himself, though it would be difficult to find an author in our generation who has sinned so flagrantly.

He shifts the aspects and relations of his facts with the adroitness of a skilful magician. If he wishes to prove that, in the great march of affairs, general laws rule with uniform results, the facts come ready to his hand. He says: "individual peculiarities count for nothing"; "prevalent opinions are the inevitable results of circumstances"; "suicide is merely the product of the general conditions of society, and a given number of persons must put an end to their own life." The testimony of consciousness invalidates such assertions, but this gives him no trouble. He denies the validity of consciousness, and the value of metaphysical studies. By such general laws crime seems to be wholly eliminated, and it is not easy to discover any moral difference between death by small-pox and death by suicide; between saving a man from drowning, or pushing him from a precipice; for "the individual only carries into effect the necessary consequence of preceding circumstances."

All this is startling, and one looks suspiciously at the facts on which the conclusions rest. These facts become flexible to his hand as the implements of the conjuror. When he wishes to magnify the influence of scepticism—"presto, agrimento!"—the magical wand waves, the handkerchief turns to a dove! In the interests of scepticism, Descartes is called the profoundest of French thinkers. A metaphysician, before ridiculed, is now worthy "to be honored above the most successful discoverers of physical laws." The reason assigned is equally remarkable: because "we ought to prefer freedom to knowledge, and liberty to science." The excellence discerned in Descartes is no less singular: "His chief merit is, that his method rests solely on the consciousness that each man has of the operations of his own mind;" "it is this which has given to his philosophy the peculiar sublimity which distinguishes it from all other systems."

There is a tradition of an English advocate, who commenced his plea by a strong argument against his client; and, on being informed of his blunder by a colleague, turned

gracefully to the court, and apologized for having presented the case of his opponent in the strongest light possible, that he might show how easily it was refuted. Such an experiment would be hazardous at the bar, and it creates distrust of Mr. Buckle's fairness to find him, in one chapter, denying the validity of consciousness, and in the next, ascribing to it a value above physical laws; on one page asserting that "individual peculiarities count for nothing," and on another, that individual statesmen and philosophers change the character of an age.

This distrust of his impartiality is increased by a careful scrutiny of the facts cited in support of any favorite theory. One or two illustrations will show our meaning. He has a personal antipathy to the clergy as an order in society.¹ This antipathy disposes him to be a severe judge. He arraigns, therefore, the Scottish clergy as an ignorant, superstitious, and vindictive body, a burden and a curse to the state. To substantiate his charge, he fills several pages with quotations from Scotch preachers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The general effect is appalling. But when one sifts the testimony, it appears that the most startling passages are quotations from the poetical books of the Bible, which he cannot or will not recognize. Many of the others are ironical, many are metaphorical; and he is too blind to detect the irony and metaphor, or too prejudiced to admit it. A theologian might easily collate numerous extracts from Dr. Hare, Judge Edmonds, and Mr. Davis, and hold them up to public ridicule as specimens of the arrogance and absurdity of scientific research in our age. But he would gain little credit with honorable men by such unfairness, and Mr. Buckle is entitled to no higher confidence in his bitter tirade against the Scotch preachers.

¹ One of Mr. Buckle's personal friends, in an obituary notice, ascribes this antipathy to his presence in boyhood in a religious circle, where Edward Irving attempted to raise a dead man. If the statement is reliable, it shows very curiously how impressions and impulses assumed in Mr. Buckle's mind the place of convictions and beliefs.

Had he been careful to collect facts adverse to his antipathies, he would have found that the Scotch clergy, denounced as opposed to the diffusion of knowledge, have been, from the first, the earnest advocates of national schools, and devised the first system of national education in Europe. He would have found also, that, instead of being ignorant, many of them have been among the first scholars of their age, and have made important contributions to different departments of knowledge. He would have been compelled, also, to modify his harsh sentence, that they have been vindictive persecutors, and confess that they have never put any one to death for heresy.

With a similar spirit of unfairness, he ascribes the decline of Spain in national greatness solely to the bigotry of the Catholic clergy and the superstition of the people. If he had treated these as prominent causes, or even as controlling causes, no exception would have been taken to his statement. But when a thoughtful student of history, who has traced the influence of American discovery and American gold upon Spanish character, and marked the drain of the most energetic and enterprising citizens by migration, and noted the debasing effect of colonial life, finds none of these causes alluded to, or apparently thought of, he is compelled to doubt either the penetration or the fairness of our author. Nor has he a word to say of the suppression of the Spanish Commons, which may have been the fatal blow to Spanish liberty, as Macaulay believes the establishment of standing armies prostrated European freedom.

No other proof is needed of our assertion that Mr. Buckle's citation of facts is not trustworthy, but is designedly limited and partial in defence of a theory, not broad and generous in search of the truth.

3. A third objection to the *History* is found in its fallacious reasoning.

The logic is weak, and the conclusions from his premises may be reversed by any skillful critic, and made to refute the theories of the author. Instances of this kind are

numerous. He wishes to prove that general causes control national progress and decay ; that individual influence is of little moment, and governments have little power to accelerate or retard the progress of civilization. Spain is cited in proof of this assertion, and its history for several centuries is reviewed, by way of demonstration. He gives a brilliant sketch of its gradual decline from a position as the first power in Europe to an abject weakness bordering on national extinction. It was borne down inevitably into the deep abyss, he says, by the superstition and loyalty of the people. But this sketch, by which he designs to furnish a conclusive proof of the impotence of the government for permanent good or evil, seems to us to prove precisely the reverse, that the national prosperity has always reflected the character of the rulers. Under able sovereigns, as Ferdinand and Isabella, and Charles V., the nation rose rapidly in wealth and power to the first place in Europe. Under a weaker monarch, Philip II., it began to decline, and a succession of impotent rulers reduced it to a fourth-rate power. After touching the lowest point of decline, its condition slowly improved by the administration of wise statesmen under weak monarchs, until the accession of a wise monarch, Charles III., aided by sagacious counsellors, renewed the prosperity of its palmy days. After him came a line of idiotic sovereigns, and a succession of ignorant statesmen, and the kingdom relapsed into general poverty and ruin. We give Mr. Buckle's own outline of facts, without exaggeration or perversion, and we hold that a sound logic must draw from these premises a conclusion precisely the opposite of his : viz. that the character of the rulers regulated the civilization of Spain, and general causes were of small account. The superstition and loyalty of the people have been, as he acknowledges, fixed quantities from the reign of Ferdinand to the present queen ; the ability and wisdom of the rulers have been the variable quantities, and these have turned the scale. Nor will any candid historian deny that individual minds and strong governments often give charac-

ter to a nation or an age. The genius of Cromwell made England a leading power of Europe; the imbecility of Charles the Second reduced it to a fief of France. Peter the Great, by the force of personal character, lifted Russia from barbarism. Pelopidas and Epaminondas made Thebes, under their administration, the mistress of Greece. Philip and Alexander raised Macedon to a sovereignty over Asia. The kingdom of Italy owes its existence to the genius of Count Cavour far more than to the general course of events; and it is yet uncertain whether it will long outlive the great statesman. With such facts before him, one may hesitate to accept Mr. Buckle's dogmatic assertion, that "general causes uniformly rule, and individual peculiarities are of no account."

Nor is he more fortunate in his argument from Scottish history. Detesting the religious zeal of the Scotch, which he calls superstition, he aims to prove that it has been a fatal barrier to the advance of civilization. But the logic limps badly. Let us examine the train of reasoning. It is a little complicated. The paralyzing power of superstition caused Spain to recede steadily from its high rank, till it became a cypher in Europe. The influence of general causes is uniform, and the same superstition in Scotland ought to cause a similar retrograde movement. But, instead of declining, Scotland has been steadily rising in intelligence and wealth and influence.

A cautious reasoner would confess that there must be some flaw either in the major or the minor premise. But the ingenuity of Mr. Buckle was rarely at fault, and he evaded the dilemma by saying, that a want of loyalty to sovereigns gave the Scotch nation an independence which neutralized their superstition; and their prosperity was due to political freedom, and in spite of religious despotism. Two important objections lie against this plea; the political loyalty of the Scotch Highlanders has never been surpassed, even in Spain; and the despotism of the religious leaders was the direct cause, as Mr. Buckle confesses, of the civil

freedom, and the remote cause, therefore, of the social prosperity.

But, conceding full force to this ingenious plea, it does not help his main argument, that general causes are uniform, and will inevitably produce the same results. Spain, by this argument, in virtue of soil and climate and food, ought to be among the first nations of the world, but the superstition of its people has given birth to a strong government, and prevented social progress. Scotland, on the other hand, by virtue of soil and climate and food, ought to take rank among barbarous nations. The superstition of its people, superadded to these natural disadvantages, ought to sink it far below Spain, and create a despotic government to bar all possible progress. So runs the logic. The facts run otherwise. Scotland, as the direct result of its superstition, has had a mild government and a free people and, in spite of natural disadvantages, has attained a brilliant civilization, worthy to compare with the most favored nations of Europe. If the uniform action of general laws produces such discordant results, it is quite certain that under Mr. Buckle's guidance history cannot yet take its place among the exact sciences.

He makes one more attempt to save his theory, and enters another plea: that the spread of scepticism in Scotland saved it from the fate of Spain. He discovers in the eighteenth century a magnificent growth of the scepticism, which, by his philosophy, is "the necessary precursor, in physics, of science; in politics, of freedom; and in religion, of toleration." This plea is his last hope, and he relies on it, as Napoleon on the charge of the Old Guard at Waterloo, to turn a defeat into a victory. But never was discomfiture more complete. The sceptical philosophy is to his theory what the jutting rock was to the "one-horse-shay" in Dr. Holmes's comic poem, and leaves it a pile of worthless dust. The scepticism was not the precursor of political freedom, for, by Mr. Buckle's own testimony, the freedom preceded the scepticism, and was the offspring of the religion or

superstition of Scotland. Nor was scepticism the parent of scientific progress, for he laments that the scientific inquiry of Scotland followed the deductive method, instead of the inductive taught by scepticism, and that this error was derived from the dominant theological method. The science, therefore, as well as the freedom of Scotland, sprang from religion. Nor did the scepticism give birth to religious toleration. One may learn from Dr. Carlyle's Autobiography how deeply this scepticism penetrated into the heart of the Scottish Church. Many of its leaders had no faith in evangelical piety, and the General Assembly, in an annual meeting at Edinburgh found its afternoon sessions deserted, as the members, clerical and lay, flocked to the theatre to hear Mrs. Siddons in tragedy. But this wide-spread scepticism failed — and it is a lasting regret to Mr. Buckle — to exert an appreciable influence on the Scotch theology, and the people continue to be, in his opinion, the most superstitious and intolerant nation of Europe.

We think our readers will admit that the reasoning of our author is very fallacious, and that from his own premises, so carefully elaborated in this volume, a rigorous logic must refute his theory. Taking the data which he has furnished from the history of Scotland and Spain, the conclusion is inevitable, that, in the development of these countries, special influences have been more powerful than general causes; that in the former country superstition has been the chief motive power, and in the latter government and rulers.

It is sad, in view of the recent death of Mr. Buckle, to read some passages in this volume, which seem to contain a premonition of his approaching end: "Of all that I had hoped to do, I now find but too surely how small a part I shall accomplish. Little did I know how the horizon enlarges as well as recedes, and how vainly we grasp at the fleeting forms which melt away and elude us in the distance. In those early aspirations there was much that was fanciful, perhaps there was much also that was foolish. Perhaps,

too, they contained a moral defect, and savored of an arrogance which belongs to a strength that refuses to recognize its own weakness. To me they seem now more like the visions of a disordered fancy, than the sober realities of things that were and are not." — II. pp. 257, 258.

The History of Civilization in England will remain a fragment. The sword, fallen from our author's hands, no other can lift. Few living men have the ability to complete it on the scale which he projected; no one, probably, has the hardihood to attempt it. If the giants have failed to reach heaven by heaping Pelion upon Ossa, mortals may dismiss all hope of success. We cannot regret the failure of Mr. Buckle to establish his philosophy of history. It would have been a calamity to the race, and have turned the dial of the world backward. We must regret that he failed to discover a wise Providence, directing the world's progress by a harmonious union of general and special causes, and ordaining man to be, not the victim of physical laws, but their master and interpreter. Then in God's light would he have seen light; the problems of history would have disclosed a new order and beauty in their solution, and his commanding abilities would have instructed instead of bewildering mankind.

[NOTE. — Since this Article was prepared (designed for the January number), a posthumous volume has appeared, with two of Mr. Buckle's Essays, and a brief biographical sketch of the author. The sketch is very imperfect and unsatisfactory; full of detail where information was needless, and reticent in the very particulars about which one desires to be informed. The essays are characteristic of their author. Rich in learning, fertile in suggestion, and comprehensive in discussion, they are full of his peculiar crotchets, on which he insists with great vehemence. These crotchets often provoke the reader by their want of practical wisdom, which a little acquaintance with men and daily life would have supplied. The biography and essays only confirm the opinion expressed in the Article, that Mr. Buckle was too much of a recluse to comprehend human life, or unfold human history.]

ARTICLE IV.

WHENCE CAME THE QUOTATION IN HEBREWS I. 6.

Καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ?

BY REV. EDWARD C. MITCHELL, ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS.

THE writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews demonstrates Christ's superiority to angels by citing certain declarations of Jehovah respecting him. Among others is the following command (Heb. i. 6): *Καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ*, "And let all the angels of God worship him."

Much discussion has arisen among commentators respecting the origin of this quotation. It so happens that our Hebrew scriptures do not contain any passage, the literal translation of which would precisely correspond with it. The nearest approximation to it is thought to be found in the seventh verse of the ninety-seventh Psalm; the last clause of which reads thus: *וְשִׁתְּחַוֶּה לְפָנָיו כָּל־אֱלֹהִים* *worship him all ye Gods*, and which the LXX translate: *προσκυνήσατε αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ*, *worship him all his angels*.

In the Septuagint version of Deuteronomy xxxii. 43, however, another passage occurs precisely similar to the one in Hebrews, but without the corresponding words in our Hebrew text. Now, upon the presumption, generally admitted, that we must look for the origin of this quotation in some part of the Old Testament scriptures which have come down to us, the question has arisen: To which of the above sources shall it be ascribed?

To English readers, until within a year or two, the weight of authority has been altogether in favor of Psalm xcvi. 7.

Professor Stuart, in his note on Heb. i. 6, says: "There is scarcely any room for doubt that the writer means to quote here from Psalm xcvi. 7," an opinion which he defends by a comparison of the two alleged sources in his *Excursus* on the passage.

Dr. Bloomfield, following Stuart, tells us that "the best expositors are now agreed that they [the words of the clause in question] are taken from Ps. xvi. 7 according to the LXX." And Mr. Barnes (notes on Heb. i. 6), after stating three objections to Deut. xxxii. 43 as its source, remarks: "It is morally certain, that this was *not* the passage which the writer intended to quote. The probability is that the writer here referred to Psalm xcvii. 7, etc."

In Germany, however, scholars have ventured to maintain a different opinion, though by no means with entire unanimity. Among them none are more highly esteemed than Bleek (*Commentar*, Berlin · 1828–1840) and Ebrard (successor of Olshausen at Erlangen), the latter having been lately introduced to American readers through the excellent translation of his commentary by Professor Kendrick. Both of these eminent commentators give the preference to Deut. xxxii. 43 as the probable origin of our quotation, and the hints which they have given encourage us to attempt a brief re-examination of the subject.

It is agreed by all the parties to this discussion to whom we have referred, that the Epistle to the Hebrews was originally written in Greek. It is also clearly obvious from internal evidence that the author, unlike many of the New Testament writers (especially Paul), made his quotations from the Old Testament with the text of the Septuagint¹ open before him, carefully copying his authority *verbatim*, evidently intending that his proof-texts should be studied and compared with the original.² It will moreover appear, upon an examination of the style, that the treatise

¹ See quotations everywhere, but especially Heb. i. 7 compared with Psalm civ. 4; Heb. x. 5–10 with Psalm xl. 7–9; x. 38 with Hab. ii. 3; xi. 21 with Gen. xlvii. 31, and xii. 26 with Hag. ii. 6, in which the Septuagint differs from the Hebrew.

² It is the opinion of Ebrard, as a conclusion to the very thorough and able discussion in his appendix to the Epistle to the Hebrews, that Luke wrote it in the name and by the direction of Paul, having received from him the material and plan of the work. Hence the peculiarity of style and accuracy of citation mentioned above. Paul usually cites freely, and for the most part follows the Vatican codex of the Septuagint (see Bleek, p. 361).

was intended for readers who were familiar with Greek,¹ and who, especially, were in the habit of using the Greek² version of the scriptures, as was indeed the prevailing custom in the times of our Saviour.

The point of view, therefore, most favorable for us, in looking at this question, will be by the side of one of those "Hebrews" who, Septuagint in hand, may be supposed to have commenced a careful reading of the argument which is here addressed to him.

He has read and assented to the opening proposition, that the Son of God is the heir of all things, the creator of worlds, the brightness of the divine glory, the true expression of the divine nature, and the upholder of all things (vs. 1-3). He has noted with interest the proofs of his superiority to angels, drawn from Ps. ii. 7 and 2 Sam. vii. 14, and now he comes to a third proof of the same point, drawn from the following words, said to have been uttered on an occasion when the divine being was introducing his only begotten into the world: *καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ*. He opens his Greek scriptures to find the passage. He does find it at Deut. xxxii. 43, and *only* there. To satisfy himself of its validity as a proof-text, his next step would naturally be to inquire whether the words were there designed to be applied to the Messiah. He examines its position, and finds it to form one of the concluding sentences in that sublime song of Moses in which, like the dying swan, he breathes out his life in strains of eloquent and triumphant melody. The song, like those of Isaiah, Amos, Hosea, and Micah, is a combination of history and prophecy. It is a prophetic-dramatic picture of Israel, from its beginning in the loins of Jacob to the culmination of its being and mission in the person of the Mes-

¹ See the play upon Greek words in i. 1: *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*; v. 8, *ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν*; v. 14. *καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ*; ix. 10, *βρώμασι καὶ πόμασι*; xi. 27, *ἀόρατον ὡς ὁρῶν*; xiii. 14, *μένουσιν, μέλλουσιν*, etc. etc.

² Compare ii. 8 with Psalm viii. 7, Sept. and Heb.; also iv. 5 with Psalm xcv. 11 and Sept. xciv. 11, and x. 5 with Psalm xl. 6, etc., where the argument turns upon Greek words, the parallels of which are not found in the Hebrew.

siah. The Hebrew Christian, as his eye ran through its stanzas, and his lips instinctively chanted its music, would be carried again through the scenes of the bondage and deliverance, beholding the pillar of fire and of cloud, tasting the grapes of Eschol, and revelling in the milk and honey of the promised land (7-14). Yet over all these memories a cloud sweeps down, as, in soft and brief and mournful strains, the bard opens a glimpse of the unbelief and idolatry and iniquity which were intermingled with the reception of all these mercies (15-18). Then, in bolder, sterner lines, is pictured forth the terrible retribution which subsequent years and their continued obduracy was to bring upon them (19-35). In this vision is depicted, in true though dim and shadowy outlines, the trial of their faith and God's patience in the years of prosperity from Joshua to David (19-21), and the bitter experience of adversity from David to Zedekiah (22-28), followed, as a climax, by the cruel bondage among heathen nations—Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, Syria, Egypt, and Rome, which extended to the birth of Jesus (29-35). Then the future brightens, and we behold Jehovah's face again appearing. The people begin to be convinced of their helplessness and to acknowledge God as their only rock and refuge. His compassion is awakened. He comes to their relief. He comes, as of old, a Divine deliverer. It is Jehovah the Saviour, the long-looked-for, long-promised, almighty Saviour, who now appears, and, at the sight, the prophetic bard bursts forth in joyous exultation :

Rejoice ye heavens, at once, in him,
And let all the angels of God worship him;
Rejoice, O ye nations, with his people,
And let all the sons of God be strong in him;
For he will avenge the blood of his sons,
And will recompense his enemies with vengeance,
And will requite them that hate him,
And will make atonement for his land,—
The land of his people.

Here, certainly, is evidence enough of Messianic refer-

ence to satisfy the mind of any common reader; and here, so far as we can see, our Hebrew Christian would rest the matter. A text has been cited to him from his own scriptures to prove a certain point. He has sought and discovered one place, and only one, which contains the precise words of the citation. He finds that here they have the bearing which is claimed for them. They prove the point.

If our supposition has thus far been fairly stated, we have obtained presumptive evidence that those to whom the epistle was addressed would generally understand the author to refer to Deut. xxxii. 43 in this quotation. If the Septuagint had been our authorized version of the Old Testament, it seems hardly likely that the question of its source would ever have been raised; especially since, as we have seen, it was our author's ordinary practice to quote literally from this version, even when it differs from the Hebrew. But, as we remarked above, it has been proposed and almost decided, in this country, to prefer Ps. xcvi. 7 as the probable source of the quotation. The reasons for this preference, as stated by Stuart and Barnes, are two: the condition of our Hebrew versions of those passages, and their comparative Messianic character.

I. It is objected to Deut. xxxii. 43, that our Hebrew scriptures contain no words corresponding to the clause in question. The objection presumes, first, that the writer of the Hebrews would have been divinely prevented from quoting any passage as a proof-text which was not actually written by Moses or the prophets; and, secondly, that our Hebrew scriptures contain the true version of this passage, to which the Septuagint copy has affixed a spurious addition.

The first of these presumptions seems fairly to admit of question. The purpose of the writer was to convince Jewish Christians, *from acknowledged Jewish authorities*, that their dispensation was inferior to, and superceded by, the Messianic; just as Paul proved to the Athenians the su-

premacv of Jehovah by citing one of their own poets. So long as the citation was from their authorized version, was suited to its purpose, and contained no error, it does not appear that we should insist upon anything further.

But even supposing we should demand that inspiration should have guided the writer into a selection of the precise words actually penned by Moses, or David, or some other inspired man, we are by no means certain that he has not done so in this instance. It is by no means certain that the Hebrew, in this and some other instances, contains the complete and correct version. So far as antiquity of manuscripts is concerned, the Septuagint here has the advantage of it, as our earliest Hebrew manuscripts date from the twelfth century, while we have copies of the Alexandrine Septuagint which were undoubtedly made in the fourth and fifth. The LXX must have had in their possession Hebrew manuscripts of the Pentateuch at least two thousand years older than any within our present knowledge, the Septuagint itself being the oldest version of the scriptures in any language. Our blessed Lord, on more than one occasion, quoted the Septuagint in places where it differs from our original.¹ Thenius, in his commentary on the Book of Kings (Leipsic, 1849), forming a part of the "Kurzgefasstes Exeg. Handb. zum Alten Test.," regards the Septuagint version as a correct representative of the original text, in very many cases where the present Hebrew is, as he supposes, corrupt.

Though the LXX used great latitude in their version, it

¹ Compare Luke xviii. 19 with Isaiah lxi. 1; lviii. 6; Matt. xix. 5, and Mark x. 8 compare with Gen. i. 27, ii. 24, on which latter passage Olshausen remarks (com. in loc.): "This declaration, *καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν*, is so much the more remarkable, as it is given by our Lord himself (though at the same time in the words of the Old Testament) and *is to be found only in the translation of the Seventy* (the original Hebrew text runs thus: *וְהָיוּ לְבָשָׂר אֶחָד*). We have here, therefore, a new instance of this translation being made use of even where it differs from the original. The view which these translators, owing to their correct perception [or more accurate copy ?] of the Old Testament passage, introduced, is acknowledged by the Saviour as right, and confirmed by his divine authority."

will be found that in this song of Moses they have followed the original quite closely; and if our text be an interpolation, it is the only one, and a very wholesale and remarkable one, even for them. *Bleek*, in his commentary on the Hebrews, vol. ii. p. 137, remarks on Deut. xxxii. 43, "the Hebrew text has nothing indeed, in that place, answering to this [citation]; but that the words belong to the *original* Alexandrine version, and were not introduced by a later interpolater, from that Psalm [xvii. 7], or from our Epistle (as Seb. Schmidt, Chr. F. Schmid, Pierce, and others maintain), cannot be doubted; for these words do not stand there isolated and alone, but as part of a large addition, in which nearly all manuscripts of the Seventy agree; presenting, at least, no considerable variations. The whole character [beschaffenheit] of this passage of the Seventy renders it also probable that it is not an arbitrary addition by the translators themselves, but found by them in their *Hebrew codex*,"

Mill (as quoted by Bengel)¹ supposes that the omission of this clause by transcribers was occasioned by the recurrence of the same word הִרְנִינִי, *rejoice*, at the beginning of the line.

So much for the passage in Deuteronomy. And now how will Psalm xvii. 7 bear the test of a similar criticism?

We answer: if the clause in Deuteronomy is wanting in our Hebrew text, in the ninety-seventh Psalm, it is wanting both in Greek and Hebrew. The clause, as quoted in the Epistle, is: καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ. The καὶ here is an essential part of the quotation. Indeed, it forms a prominent source of evidence that it is a quota-

¹ "Καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ (et adorent eum omnes angeli Dei); LXX, Deut. xxxii. ante versum 43. hæc habent: εὐφράνθητε οὐρανοὶ ἅμα αὐτῷ, καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ, quæ in textu Hebraico et in paraphrasi Chaldaica desiderantur. Millius hiatum, recurrente verbo הִרְנִינִי pridem admissum statuit. Inde sequitur apud Mosen, εὐφράνθητε ἔθνη μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ, הִרְנִינִי גוֹיִם עַמּוֹ (ubi ב post מ ἁλλείπει), quod Paulus Rom. xv. 10, item ad Messiae tempora refert."—Bengeli Gnom. Nov. Test., ed. 3. Tübing. 1855. pp. 861.

tion. Unnecessary as it is to the connection in the Epistle, it shows that the author has taken the clause which it commences out of some other connection, and introduced it verbatim. But this *καὶ* is not found in the Septuagint of Psalm xcvii. 7. It is neither required by the context, nor *is it admissible as a translation*, since there is no corresponding *ו* in the Hebrew. Moreover, the structure of the sentence is different, the exhortation in the Psalm being in the second person instead of the third : *προσκυνήσατε αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ*. Finally, even this imperfect resemblance to our clause is *obtained by a false translation* of the original.

הַשְׁתַּחוּיִי-לוֹ כָּל-אֱלֹהִים signifies “do homage to him all ye Gods;” and though some interpreters—partly in deference to the Septuagint here—have assigned to *אֱלֹהִים* the signification *angels*, Gesenius has shown this opinion to be untenable (see his *Thesaur. Ling. Heb.* p. 95). Hengstenberg remarks, in loc.: “the exhortation according to the Psalmist, here also, as in Isa. xlii. 17, is addressed to the heathen: *All who worship images shall be ashamed, and boast themselves of nullities; worship him, all ye Gods*. The false gods are called upon to worship him, through the medium of their servants. The gods are also, in other passages, frequently viewed as momentarily gifted with life and feeling, only for the purpose of exhibiting the Lord as triumphing over them; compare Exod. xii. 12. Num. xxxiii. 4. The LXX could not understand this representation, and substituted *angels* instead of *gods*, to whom what was said could apply only by an inference, as *a majore ad minus*. As decisive against the *direct* reference to the angels, may be mentioned the whole connection and tendency of the Psalm, which is to enspirit the people of God in prospect of the approaching victory of the false gods, and also the *usus loquendi*, as the Elohim never signifies angels” (Hengsten. Com. on Psalm xcvii. 7).

Thus upon every critical point the passage in Psalms fails to satisfy us. It may safely be said that whatever be the source of the quotation in Hebrews, Psalm xcvii. 7 is not

that source. It could neither have been copied from the Septuagint, nor independently translated from the Hebrew of that Psalm.

II. Finally, the ninety-seventh Psalm is preferred to Deuteronomy xxxii. on account of its Messianic character.

We have already noticed (p. 303–304) the obvious allusion of the song of Moses to the times of the Messiah's advent.¹ It may be sufficient to add that Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans (xv. 10) quotes from the very verse in which this passage is found (Deut. xxxii. 43), as an evidence that Christ was coming to redeem Gentiles and Jews together. Considering that the Epistle to the Hebrews is generally agreed to have been written after that to the Romans, and if not written or dictated by Paul, was at least the work of one of his companions or disciples, and prepared under his supervision, this quotation would seem to be conclusive. The author of the Hebrews must have regarded it as *Messianic*.

Now so far from there being superior claims to be urged in favor of Psalm xcvi, the only substantial basis for such a claim seems to have been derived from the presumption, hitherto hastily admitted among commentators, that the author of the Hebrews *made this quotation from it*. "On account of the application given to these Psalms in our Epistle," says Tholuck in some remarks on Ps. xcvi. 7 and cii. 26, as compared with Heb. i. 6, 10,² "the majority of commentators, it is true, down to A. Cramer (1756), have regarded the Messiah as their subject (cf. the controversy of Colov with Grotius); yet Michaelis, in his exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews," concedes, on vs. 10: "I should say that it was inconceivable how expositors have been able to persuade themselves of this, had I not made a similar vain

¹ "Moses, in Cantico presertim, de Christo scripsit."—Bengel Gnom. N. T., Heb. i. 6.

² "Citations of the Old Testament in the New," translated for Bib. Sacra, Vol. XI. p. 610.

attempt in the thirty-first note to Pierce." At least with reference to vs. 6, this expedient was resorted to by Storr, that the author had, as in Rom. x. 6-8, used the words of the Old Testament as a substratum for his own thoughts, in "order to express himself elegantly." Still these expressions are used as *proofs*! De Wette speaks of a typical application of them, but, says Tholuck: "If a typical exposition is to be thought of, the author must have recognized the primary reference of the Psalms to Jehovah; but is this probable, since he still uses them in his proof?" We are, then, brought back to the conjecture that, among the Jews, the Messiah was regarded as the subject of these two Psalms, and that the author could depend on the assent of his readers. But this has, from the outset, no probability, as it would hardly fall in with the dogmatic notions then prevalent concerning the Messiah. "Only from the idea of the incarnation of the λόγος," says Bleek, "could such a construction of the Psalm proceed." "It seems, then," concludes Tholuck, "that we must regard the Messianic application of those Psalms as the *peculiar possession of our author* (i. e. of the Hebrews), and this can best be explained from the rhetorical, homiletic character of the Epistle." Tholuck also remarks that Limborg seems to have resorted to this explanation, since on vs. 6 he lays stress on the fact that the author had to do, not with unbelieving Jews, but Jews become believers.

As we have already seen, each of these interpreters might have been saved their perplexity, at least in reference to the ninety-seventh Psalm,¹ by looking again at the premises on which their reasoning was based. There is no good evidence that inspired authority either designed or interpreted the Psalm to refer to the Messiah. It is, in fact, as Heng-

¹ The two passages should not have been classed together. Ebrard has shown (Com. on Heb. i. 10) that Psalm cii. contains such a reference to Messianic redemption as is appropriate to the purpose of our author; and no such critical difficulties oppose the quotation of Heb. i. 10 from it, as pertain to the clause we are considering.

stenberg calls it, a piece of mosaic-work, leaning upon quotations from the more ancient sacred scriptures, and comprising a description of Jehovah's appearance in judgment against idolaters. Though Hengstenberg, influenced apparently by the same misapprehension about Heb. i. 6, endeavors to connect it, in some way, with Messianic hopes, he is obliged to confess that "judgment alone is brought prominently forward in this Psalm;" and he has conclusively shown, in our quotation from him above (p. 308), that it was *idols* and not *angels* (and we may add, *Jehovah* and not *Jesus*) to whom vs 7 refers.

From what has been said, we think it will appear: *First*, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whether correctly or not, did copy this proof-text from the Septuagint of Deut. xxxii. 43.

Second, that there is no decisive evidence against his having done this consistently, and with the sanction of divine authority.

ARTICLE V.

THE OLD SCHOOL IN NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

BY REV. EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, D.D., PROFESSOR IN THEOLOGICAL INST.,
EAST WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT.

WHEN age had ripened his judgment with rich experience, the Rev. Dr. Humphrey expressed the opinion that evangelical writers differ more in their use of terms than in their views of truth. Many other good men, of every denomination, are finding that the principles that unite them are broader and stronger than those which separate them. Hence they are beginning to seek out and intensify their agreements, and let their divergencies disappear in the background. The late Dr. William Nevins gave fine expression

to this beautiful catholic sentiment. "I don't belong, exactly, to either of the schools. I am something of an eclectic. There are many things about the Old school that I like, and I am of opinion that it is none the worse for being old. There are some things about the New school that I don't greatly object to. I suspect, after all, that both the schools have the same Master, though in each some things are learned, as is apt to be the case, which the Master does not teach. I think the scholars of both schools ought to love one another. Oh, I wish they would. I desire it for charity's sake. I desire it for truth's sake ; for the way to think alike, is first to feel alike."

It is, however, necessary to know *what* men think, in order to know how far they are united, and in what they differ. Hence the practical value of clear and exact theological statements. When discreetly made, they often subserve the ends of truth and charity much better than argument or exhortation. Men are much more likely to be drawn towards agreement, when they correctly and fully understand each other, than when they do not. And they are never more sure to miss truth, and descend to personalities and mutual repulsion, than when misunderstood and misrepresented.

To present the Old school in New England theology as distinguished from the New school, from Hopkinsianism, and the Old school Presbyterians, is a difficult task. And it is the more difficult because it requires us to define, in a degree, the systems from which it differs. We are more confident of an honest purpose in the undertaking, than of entire success.

By New England theology we mean the system of doctrines which, from the founding of the colonies, has been held by the Congregational churches of New England. By the Old school is understood those who have accepted this system, for substance, as expressed in the Westminster Confession, adopted first, at Cambridge, in 1648, and after-

wards re-adopted, in 1680, at Boston, and, in 1708, at Saybrook. Edwards and Bellamy were the defenders of this type of doctrine, and leaders in this school, in the last century. Drs. Woods, Humphrey, and Tyler may be taken as fair exponents of it in the present. The doctrines are sometimes called "Old Calvinism," to distinguish them from Hopkinsianism, which was termed "New Calvinism." It came to be designated as the Old school because of its adherence to the old Puritan theology, as set forth in our confessions and maintained by the elder Edwards, and to distinguish it from certain "improvements," called "new theology," of which Dr. Taylor was, at his death, the accredited and the ablest representative.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL DOCTRINES.

The Old school takes, as the basis of its anthropology, the three following facts :

1st. Man was created, in God's image, a rational and a perfectly holy being.

2d. He fell from this normal state by transgressing the law of his Maker.

3d. His posterity are born in that state of moral evil into which he fell, Jesus of Nazareth being the only exception.

These facts preface and explain the anthropological *doctrines* of which they are the historical basis.

1. *Original Righteousness.*

God created man holy, morally as well as physically, a perfect being. The first holiness in him was that of his *being*, and concreated. It was an upright disposal or disposition of his moral nature, as really pleasing to God as the righteous volitions that followed from it. This was original righteousness in the strict sense. It was first in the order of time, and it was the origin of all that preceded the fall. As created *being* preceded creature-action, faculties, their exercise; so created holiness of being, in the first man, was the logical antecedent of his holy activities. Thus

the old doctrine of original righteousness connects itself with the ancient record, that God "created man in his own image."

II. *The Federal Headship.*

As a doctrine, this rests on the fact that Adam's offspring are born in the state of sinfulness and misery into which he fell. The peculiar *fact* proclaims and proves the peculiar doctrine, — a covenant connection, ethical as well as natural, of the first man with his descendants. The union is not the identity of persons, which some have imputed to the school, but an organic continuity in one human race and nature. Adam is no more the same person with Cain, than Cain is with Abel. Yet he is connected with them, and with all his posterity, *representatively* and by covenant, as no other father has been or can be with his children. Identity and federal representation are incompatible ideas. But though federal headship does not allow a personal, it does require a moral or legal, identity, as the members of a corporation are, in law, *one* with their agent. They are responsible for his transactions. Their fortunes are involved in his well or ill management. For all corporate purposes, to a certain extent, they are one legal person. So Adam, as the federal or corporate head of the race, for which he acts, as well as for himself, is sometimes spoken of by men of this school, as a "public person," — as the root, of which his descendants are the branches.

The Old school Presbyterians, some of them at least, have of late given up the "root theory," and thus diverged from Turretin and the Assembly's Confession, as well as from the old New England theology. The New school recedes in the opposite direction, and drops altogether the covenant and the federal headship. Dr. Emmons resolves the whole into an absolute decree, according to which, if the first man, who was created holy, should sin, all his descendants were, by direct divine efficiency, to be created sinners.

III. *The Imputation of Adam's Sin.*

This doctrine falls back on the moral or covenant unity of the race, and is the complement of federal headship. But the term, as employed by the school, needs explanation. The words "impute" and "imputation" have good usage in two quite distinct significations. One ascribes to a person the actions or qualities which are properly his own; as the guilt of murder is imputed to the criminal, because he is the guilty actor. The other use is, in reckoning to one's advantage or disadvantage, on the ground of some compact or connection, natural or moral, or both, certain actions of another, or their consequences, which are not properly his. This latter is the accredited use of the word to express the imputation of sin. The sinful agency of Adam, in his first transgression, as *a personal act*, was placed solely to his account. None of his descendants took part in it, for none were in existence. But certain disastrous consequences of his act passed over to them, as really as they came upon him. It affected them, in certain respects, as it did him. On account of it, he became a sinful being, and subject to temporal and eternal death, and so do they. The first evil disposition, which led to the evil choice, was not only confirmed in him as an individual, but also as a quality of human nature, and it re-appears, successively, in each one of them. In short, it gave him a posterity, fallen like himself. Thus his sin is imputed to them. They, as well as he, suffer the consequences of it, but without the transfer of his actual guilt. And the effects or consequences of it came upon them in that want of original righteousness and corruption of nature which "is commonly called original sin." It is not a sin to be born sinful; but the sin with which men are born is, nevertheless, sinful. We are, strictly, guilty only for our own sin; but the sinfulness with which we are born is as *really* ours as if it originated in our act.

The term "guilt," *reatus*, is also employed, in this connection, in a secondary sense. Primarily it denotes ill-desert for

one's own acts. It also signifies a liability to penal evil on account of another's acts; as when the members of a corporation suffer from the ill management of its agent. There may be no participation with the offender in the fault, — certainly no personal identity. But there is always a corporate oneness where there is this common liability, this corporate guilt. Adam's guilt for his offense was personal and literal. That of his descendants, on account of it, was federal and corporate, as, by a common liability, they are partakers of the evil consequences. Thus it is that by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; thus, and thus only, that they "sinned in him, and fell with him, in his first transgression."

The objection, that representation implies the consent of the represented, is ruled out by the nature of the case. Such consent was simply *impossible*. No man can choose his own father, or whether he shall have any father, and no one sees in this any injustice. It was not, either, *necessary*. God needed not to ask leave of his creatures to bring them into being, nor to get their consent to any of the links by which they are connected, or laws by which they are governed.

Not a few who seem to have dissented from the school on this doctrine, have only somewhat emphatically agreed with it in discarding some of the errors and absurdities which have been unfortunately associated with it; partly through its uncareful friends; but oftener by the misconstructions of its enemies. Of this class was Dr. Dwight. He repudiated the idea of personal identity, — of action before being, and the literal transfer of Adam's sin to his descendants. This, however, is little else than the standing repudiation of the school.

Dr. Hopkins did not employ the word "impute" in reference to Adam's sin, though he did in respect to the righteousness of Christ. But no man maintained more strenuously than he the doctrine denoted by it. He earnestly defended the federal headship, — the trial of the race in the first parents on the ground of the covenant, and the transmission of a

morally depraved nature. Dr. Emmons, with his sharp logic, cut the knot, and resolved imputation into absolute decree. He rejected all ideas of a covenant, of federal headship, of representation, and of hereditary or transmitted depravity. God created the first man holy. Because he sinned he creates all the rest sinners.

The Princeton school holds to *immediate* imputation, and makes less of the natural connection of Adam and his posterity than did Edwards and the old theology. The New England theory combines more the physical and the ethical—one as the medium of the other. The moral constitution, logically the antecedent, is yet inseparable from the natural, and works itself out upon that, as its basis. The law violated by Adam as the covenant father, goes on to its penal consequences in the generations that proceed from him as the natural father. Thus original and imputed sin are, as Edwards says, not two sins, one real and the other unreal, but one *verum peccatum*.

The New school sets aside the whole doctrine of imputation, both of sin and righteousness, as “a fiction,” “a phantasm.” It admits, indeed, a connection of the sins of his descendants with the first sin of Adam, and it calls theirs a consequence of his. But it is scarcely more than a *sequence*; certain, indeed, and necessary, in the sense that God could not prevent it. It was not a penal consequence from a legal relation, nor was it a moral consequence from a federal relation, nor according to any hereditary or moral law. In this aspect, the Old school is broadly distinguished from the New.

THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

As a general term, the word “sin” is employed by the school to denote the *status*, and consequent activities, into which man fell. In its essence it is the contradiction of God, and the opposite of holiness. It includes the violation of known law. But it consists primarily in what lies deeper and more central,—in a wrong bias or bent of the *will*,

which becomes action in the violation of law. It has a negative and a positive side. Negatively, it is a want of the righteousness in which the race commenced its existence. Positively, it is the moral deterioration or corruption of nature into which it fell. By the generally accepted definition, it is "a want of conformity unto, or a transgression of, the law of God." This presents its relations to the precepts of the law, and also to its prohibitions. It defines it as both debt and trespass, original and actual. It includes everything in the moral being not perfectly coincident with the moral law, whether by excess, deviation, or defect. The apostle gives the same double element in the two words *ἀμαρτία*, aberration or violation of law, and *ἀνόμια*, non-conformity to law.

Some of the old writers, not very carefully, speak of sin as a *nature*. The New England theology neither accepts the idea, nor employs the language. The phrase "sin a nature," is capable of a Manichean construction, and is liable to mislead. But as used by Prof. Shedd and some others, it means only that sin *pertains* to fallen nature, as a super-induced quality, or *proprium*. This is the old New England doctrine. The substance of the soul is not sin, nor are any of its faculties. None of these constituted man's holiness before, neither do they constitute his sin since, the fall. But, as original righteousness belonged to his rational nature,—the affections and will,—and consisted in a disposal of these in harmony with God's nature, so sin, by which man lost that original disposition, belongs equally to his nature. The nature was not holiness in the one case, but it was *holy*. Nor is it sin in the other, yet it is sinful. We say, therefore, that sin belongs to human nature, just as we say that it is a quality of a human being.

There is a sense in which the school regards all sin as voluntary. The effects of the fall reached to the centre of man's being, to the will-principle, the *voluntas*. All sin, even original, is in this sense voluntary. It belongs to the voluntary principle. The states of the will are, therefore, as really

voluntary and moral as its acts; but they cannot, in strict propriety, be called acts.

The depravity of nature, the first sinfulness of the child, consists in this voluntary deflection of the will from God. It is not choice, for this implies antecedent knowledge of law, and a comparison of right and wrong; but it leads to choice, and is the generic moral *force* concentered and determined in choice to a specific object. Hence we call a disposition to sin a sinful disposition. It is the primal force, the central dynamic oppugnancy to God which works itself out in all the actualities of evil.

This abnormal condition is hereditary. It is transmitted from father to son and thus from the first of the race to the last. We are born in the image of *fallen* Adam. There is no charterless middle ground for us between sin and holiness; no innocent depravity, or sinless disposition to sin. There are no first months of mere animal existence in human history, within which the child is no subject of moral government. The commencement of a rational soul and the beginning of subjection to moral government are held to be simultaneous. Both these, in the Old theology, are natal. Man is a rational and a moral being by birth. And at birth begins his need of forgiving love, of renewing and purifying grace. In this view of native rationality and depravity, the Old and the New Calvinists were in essential agreement, the latter making original sin *actual* as well as voluntary.

Some of the points by which the Old school is distinguished from the New, on the doctrine of sin, are as follows:

1st. The Old predicates sinfulness of human nature. This the New denies. The nature is only the non-moral *occasion* of sin, and is not sinful.

2d. The Old affirms sin to be a wrong status, or bias of the will, as well as a violation of known law. The New confines sin strictly to acts. "Guilt pertains solely to the action of an agent who acts. There can be no other sin than actual."

3d. The Old theology adheres to the doctrine of hereditary moral depravity. The New sets it aside as obsolete. Men are not born with moral depravity, but as free from any real sinfulness as Adam was at his creation. With an innocent constitutional desire for happiness, prompting an act of the heart or will, they make themselves depraved as soon as they are capable of violating known law.

4th. It is a doctrine of the Old school that the disposition or subjective motive, in the descendants of Adam, which dictates their first sinful act, is discordant with the divine law, and therefore sinful. The New pronounces this motive an impulse of self-love, not discordant with the law. All moral acts, holy as well as sinful, are prompted by the desire of one's happiness as their ultimate end.

5th. The Old includes new-born infants as human beings, and subjects of moral government; the New allows them no more subjection to moral government than doves and lambs. They are not morally depraved, and are not capable of either sin or holiness.

6th. It is the general belief of the Old school that those who die in infancy, before actual transgression, are renewed and saved by the blood of Christ; that a great multitude of infant voices swell the choral anthems of heaven in praise to the Lamb. By the New, it is possible that those who die in infancy may have a future life; but if they should, it will be "in angel purity," having escaped both "the *character* and the doom of a sinful world"; but we cannot know what becomes of them. They may be annihilated. And it is only a "presumptuous curiosity" that asks what is their state.

7th. The Old includes temporal death as a part of the penalty for sin. The New postpones this penalty wholly to the future state, and limits it to eternal death.

MORAL AGENCY.

A moral agent is one who has the powers which qualify him for moral acts, either good or evil. These powers, by

the analyses of the schools, are commonly classed as affections, understanding, and will. The moral life-force is in the first; the perceptive or *regulative* in the second; and the *determinative* in the third. Together, they constitute a free moral agent—one who wills as he pleases, and acts as he chooses. This is the old doctrine of freedom, external and internal. It is what Edwards means when he says that no being, not even the Supreme, can have more liberty than this. And this freedom is as complete in man since the fall as before. The change of moral status did not alter or weaken this essential law of his being. We do not mean that man since the fall is free from the influence of motives, or the law of choosing according to the greatest apparent good, or from the divine influence, or the certainty of events pre-established by the operation of moral causes. Nor was he free from these before the fall. Neither are the unfallen angels thus free. These, however, are not restraints upon liberty, but its conditions and wholesome regulations.

The certainty of events, called sometimes metaphysical necessity, is charged with infringement of freedom, and with fatalism. But we believe it is not fairly open to this objection. Men choose to do, in their utmost freedom, what, from the operation of moral causes, in perfect harmony with their liberty, it was certain they would choose to do. The crucifixion of Jesus was the act of perfectly free moral agents. Yet it rested on as sure a ground of antecedent certainty as did the eclipse of the sun that attended it. The freedom of the actors took up into itself, as the woof of its evil web, causes and influences adapted to bring on just such a trial of their character, in the fullest exercise of their liberty. They had all the liberty possible to any being,—liberty to do as they pleased,—all possible “power for a different volition instead,” except a different disposition. They were not *forced* to the issue by any foregone certainty, but delighted in it from their own intense desire. They welcomed the providential course of events—the very decree

that conspired with their plans to deliver him into their power, and thus they gloried in their shame.

Such is the harmony of metaphysical necessity and moral freedom — of God's purpose of good and man's intent of evil — in this central fact of Christian history. Thus remote, too, is the doctrine from fatalism. All the operations of mind are necessarily free, though not the less certain, or foreknown to God and connected with a pre-established order of the moral universe. The regularity of the divine administration never infringes the flexibility of man's free will. In working good, as in inflicting evil, the Creator keeps this inviolate.

This freedom the school carefully distinguishes from what the Arminians call the self-determining power of the will. The will, as distinguished from the mind, has no power. It is a power, a faculty, and cannot have as its property what it *is* in its essence. Edwards defines it as that by which the soul chooses or refuses anything. President Day and others view it in essentially the same light. It is not an agent, but an implement; not a determiner, but a something that is determined. By the self-determining power of the will is generally understood the power of determining its own volitions, and whether to act or not act, independently of all causes, motives, and influences. But this seems to involve, first, an infinite series of volitions; and, secondly, a volition before the first; and, thirdly, it resolves the will into an agent distinct from the mind, and independent of it. From this, the Old theology dissents. The will cannot separate itself from the antecedent disposition or desire which moves it to a choice. It cannot will this inclining status or moving power into being, and it cannot will it out of being. Nor can it stand still in a dead indifferentism between two antipathetic impulses, not choosing or refusing either. In short, the will is not an autocrat, as this self-determining power would make it, but a subject of the mind and a servant among its fellow-faculties. The mind, the only agent, possesses all the autocracy of which our mental science takes any cognizance. It determines its volitions

freely and sovereignly. It wills and nills, loves and hates, as is most pleasing, and suffers no insurrectionary claimants among its subordinates.

The Old school distinguishes, also, this freedom from the power of contrary choice. It does not allow any such power. Choice is the preference of one of two or more objects. A contrary choice, as distinguished from simple choice, is the preference of an object and the opposite of the one which is preferred. Or, in another form, choice is willing as one does, *or* otherwise. Contrary choice is willing as he does *and* otherwise,—choosing as he does and as he does not. This, in strictness of speech, is the only intelligible distinction between choice and contrary choice. If a man chooses simply as he does, though with a disposition to choose differently, it is only choice. If he had chosen otherwise than he did, it would have been nothing but choice—a later choice contrary to an earlier one. But if he should choose as he does, and at the same time otherwise, that is, as he does and as he does not, he would exercise the power of contrary choice in the only sense in which it is distinguishable from simple choice. The power of *choice* includes everything but this idea of an opposite or double choice. For, to choose one thing at one time, and its contrary at another, is to exercise the power of choice. It is the ability for any *single* mental act which the agent pleases to put forth. But this power of a contrary choice is the ability to put forth *two* acts at the same time; of choosing as one does, and as he does not. This we regard as an impossibility. It is pure idealism.

If the power of contrary choice be taken in the sense of choosing according to the *least* instead of the greatest apparent good,—from a weaker against the force of a stronger motive, it is equally disallowed by the Old school. Men often choose against the greatest real good, but never against the greatest apparent good, or what, on the whole, is most agreeable. It is held as a law of the mind that choice follows the ruling disposition, or love. The mind always

wills as it pleases, and never the contrary, or as it does not please.

Thus we hold that simple choice exhausts the potencies of the will. It is fully adequate to all the exigencies of moral freedom. The power of contrary choice is speculative and impracticable. Mind is no more constructed to work in opposite directions at the same time, than a locomotive. It can suddenly reverse its operations, — change its choices as it will; but it has no power to move forwards and backwards at the same time, or to obey the weakest motive-force against the strongest. This view may explain the answer we give to Fletcher's question to Toplady. "Is the will at liberty to choose otherwise than it does, or is it not?" The man who affirms the first member of this question, says Dr. Whedon, is bound to be an Arminian; the affirmant of the latter member, must, we suppose, logically be a Calvinist." Putting the question in a little more exact form — Is the moral *agent* at liberty to choose otherwise than he does? — the old New England theology affirms "the first member of this question." A man is at perfect liberty to choose otherwise than he does, if he wishes to. And when he has chosen, he can "put forth another act in its stead," though not another and the same at the same time. And this is something more than the power to will as we will. It is the power to will as we wish to will — to choose what we like rather than what we dislike. It is the very essence of volitional freedom. Even Whitby defines liberty as the power of doing what we will.

ABILITY AND INABILITY.

The powers of moral agency constitute what, in the Old school, is termed Natural Ability. This ability defines man's relation to God, as an accountable creature, and is the subjective ground and the measure of his responsibility.

Moral ability is, in addition to these natural faculties, a disposition which, as a motive-force, puts them in action, and determines the moral quality of the action. Natural

and moral ability together, furnish all the conditions of moral agency, and constitute power in the sense of efficiency, energy, or plenary ability. Power, in the proper sense, is therefore more than mere faculty. It is the force that energizes the faculty in action. There can be no moral action without both, and hence no *adequate* power for such action. Natural ability, as thus distinguished from moral, is often denoted in the school as "natural capacity," "capability," "powers," and "faculties." In the creed of the East Windsor Seminary it is called "natural strength," and in that of the Associate Founders at Andover, "corporeal strength."

Natural inability is the incapacity for moral actions arising from the absence or derangement of the faculties of moral agency, as in idiots and maniacs, and is incompatible with obligation.

Moral inability lies in the depravity of moral beings, and is in proportion to the fixedness and intensity of this depravity. It is moral, because it is in the disposition, and it is voluntary, because it takes hold of the will. It is a real inability because the agent has no self-corrective or regenerating efficiency. The natural powers are *sufficient*, as faculties, to this end, but not efficient. And yet the obligation is unimpaired by the inability because it is only moral, and consists in a fixed will—in opposition to good. The claim of the divine law is primarily for this elementary, central obedience. It demands first this very *dispositional* ability, whose absence indicates the sinner's deep-rooted opposition to God.

This distinction between natural and moral ability and inability, has been held by some as of great practical value. Dr. Tyler so regarded it, and made free use of it. Dr. Woods was accustomed to use and explain it more cautiously. Yet they agreed with each other and the school, and also with the earlier Hopkinsians, that fallen man has *powers* adequate to his duty, but that he is "morally incapable of recovering the image of his Creator which was lost in Adam."

In this distinction the New England theology differs, in form at least, from the old school Presbyterians, and from the old Dutch and Scotch divines. These generally do not allow the distinction, though it is found essentially in Calvin, Augustine, and all the old theology. The Princeton school admitted it thirty years ago as substantially correct. It regards it now with disfavor, as ascribing too much to man, and leading to Pelagianism.

The New school diverges from the Old towards the other extreme. It emphasizes natural ability in order to secure responsibility, and so loosens moral inability, if it does not let it slide altogether. It adopts as an axiom, that power, in the sense of plenary ability, is necessary to obligation. It holds that, over and above the powers and opportunity of right action, unregenerate men have a power at any moment to commence using their powers in right action — a natural ability to remove their moral inability; that they can successfully resist all God's recovering influences, can sin in defiance of all possible hindrances, and repent despite all obstacles.

Dr. Stephen West, and some other Hopkinsians, adopted similar sentiments, but viewed from the point of divine efficiency, rather than human ability. Dr. Emmons, who carried the exercise scheme to the fullest extent, says that men are as able to embrace the gospel as to drink, to do right as wrong. But it was because doing right and wrong are simply the creations of God; hence man, as *man*, can no more do one than the other. As such, he has no ability, no will or character or nature or being, except what consists in these divinely created exercises, and he *is* nothing else. Thus the scheme entirely ignores the psychology of the Old school, and attenuates its anthropology to a mere continuity of created exercises, each one of which is purely good or entirely evil.

The relation of the old theology on this subject to the Arminian or Methodist view is scarcely less peculiar. In respect to man's primitive holiness, the federal headship of

Adam, the fall, and original sin as a positive and hereditary corruption of nature, the two schemes are essentially Augustinian. Edwards and Wesley occupied common ground in their simultaneous and noble defense of these catholic doctrines against Dr. John Taylor. On the inability of man to good works, the Articles of the Methodist Episcopal Church are as explicit and full as the Westminster Confession. But the two theologies differ.

1st. On the *nature* of inability. The inability to good held by the old, is in the fixedness of man's indisposition to good, which yet implies a perfect obligation to it, and responsibility for evil. The Arminian doctrine admits the indisposition, but implies that it is incompatible with obligation, and that it destroys responsibility. This difference is occasioned by the axiom in Methodist theology that power to the contrary underlies all responsible action.

2d. There is an equal diversity on the question of natural ability. The New England theology regards natural ability — the powers of moral agency — as constituting a perfect obligation to right action, and blameworthiness for wrong. But Arminianism entirely discards natural ability in fallen man as a ground of responsibility. The fixedness of his natural repugnance to good cancels his obligation to it, and the strength of his disposition to evil destroys the guilt of his evil.

3d. There is a further difference in respect to what Arminianism calls a gracious ability. This ability consists in some redemptive provision or appliance, and *constitutes* man a responsible agent. He was organically free before, but not responsible. The New England theology allows no need of any such ability for such a purpose. Man needs not grace to become what he already is by nature — as free to choose good as evil if he pleases, and hence blameworthy for the evil which pleases him, and bound to the good which does not please him. A child, by the old view, needs only growth to make him guilty of actual sin. But by this he needs growth and grace too.

Just how much, and what, is meant by this gracious ability is not perfectly clear to us. Does it include only an objective provision of salvation? It seems not. For this does not remove the inability of will, the disinclination to salvation. It gives, it is true, another object of choice, an external motive, but no power of a choice to the contrary, and hence no responsibility.

It may be, then, that this gracious ability is *subjective*, and identical with what is called the power of contrary choice—a disposition to good, conjoined by grace with a disposition to evil, placing the will *in equilibrio*, between two opposite forces. This counter disposition removes the inability, and, on the theory, creates the obligation to good by imparting an *inclination* to it. Without this disposition, this gracious ability, or power to the contrary, man is, properly, neither sinful nor holy; nor is he capable of becoming either one or the other. He chooses evil spontaneously, and has no disposition to the contrary, hence no power to the contrary, and hence no blameworthiness for not choosing the contrary.

By the Calvinian philosophy, redemption presupposes a really sinful subject needing to be redeemed. By the Arminian, a proper sin in the subject presupposes the antecedent provision of redemption. The one *starts* with the idea of sin, in a reference to the divine law and to man's powers of moral agency, and proceeds from it to the grace that provides salvation. The other, denying responsibility to the power of choice, and also sin to all volitions of the fallen in a non-redemptive dispensation, starts with grace as a factor, and responsible sin as the product. According to the one we are saved by grace. According to the other, we first become really sinners by grace, and then may be saved by it.

REGENERATION.

There are a few points in relation to this doctrine, which are generally accepted as settled by this school:

1st. Regeneration (*παλιγγενεσία*) is the act of God. He is the sole agent in it. The immediate effect of this act is a new and holy principle of action in man, leading to repentance, or conversion, as the first holy act of the regenerate.

2d. It is *instantaneous*, that is, there is no point of time at which the subject is neither regenerate nor unregenerate, in which the new life is neither commenced nor uncommenced. Sanctification is the continuance and completion of what is begun in regeneration. This is progressive, and by the use of means.

3d. The subject of regeneration is passive, but only in respect to the act by which he is regenerated, on the principle that a child cannot co-operate in his own generation—cannot act before he exists. Beyond this, the school affirms no passivity. There is no creation of new faculties, nor change in the substance of the old. There is no suspension of rational, responsible activity, no infringement of freedom, no sudden shock; but the silent in-breathing of a new and governing moral life. “The grace of regeneration,” says the Synod of Dort, “does not act upon men like stocks and trees, nor take away the properties of the soul, nor violently compel it while unwilling, but it spiritually quickens, heals, corrects, and sweetly, and at the same time powerfully, inclines it. “The will is drawn,” as Charnock felicitously expresses it, “as if it would not come, and then it comes as if it were not drawn.”

4th. The divine agency in regeneration is *invincible*. Some have been accustomed to speak of it as irresistible. It is not, however, implied, that the sinner opposes no resistance, for it is plain that he does. This resistance makes the conflict. But in regeneration, God, the stronger will, prevails; man, the weaker, submits, and the contest ends. The divine free-will so magnetically touches the human free-will, renewing and effectually persuading it, that it *loves* to yield. But this only shows the sovereign invincibility and conquering power of God’s will over man’s, where they come into the fullest opposition.

"Irresistible grace" does not accurately express the idea, for grace is resistible and is resisted, and by some, to its final rejection. Unless carefully defined, the phrase may be perplexing. Nor does invincibility express all the truth. It conveys only the idea that God's will cannot be conquered by man's, but not the further and peculiar truth of his sovereign power to subjugate to his will the free-will of his subject-creatures.

5th. The principle of holiness introduced in regeneration looks directly to infinite excellence — as the ultimate end of all holy action. It does not exclude a regard to happiness, but excludes it as the *ultimate* end. It does not, either, require one to be willing to be *lost*, in order to be saved. It seeks holiness, the *moral* good, as the ultimate and chief end, and happiness, the merely natural good, as subordinate.

6th. Infants are capable of regeneration, and need it for a positive sinfulness, though not for actual sin. Upon all these leading features of the subject, the Hopkinsians and the Old school are, we believe, in essential harmony.

Upon the following positions, the Old school is broadly distinguished from the New :

1st. That regeneration, in the theological sense, is the *act of man*, "a simple act," "the sinner's act," "the ultimate act," an "intelligent, free, voluntary, mental act." In the popular use of the term, it is "a complete act." This definition grows out of the philosophy of the school respecting the autocracy of the will. Man makes himself morally depraved when he is old enough, by an act of the will, and he reverses his state by a counter act. It is allowed, indeed, that God *produces* this act of the will, but not that God's act is the regenerating one, or that anything is, except the act of the regenerated. The Old school emphasizes the distinction between regeneration and conversion, which the New confounds. The one is purely God's act, the other, as purely man's. God does not repent for man. Nor does he create the turning act in man, but the new life-*motive* which prompts it. By a law of secondary causation, man is the dependent

author of his own act in conversion, for he wills it from the holy principle, antecedently implanted in regeneration. But God is the independent, absolute author of his own act in regeneration. Thus the two definitions are not only different, but antagonistic. They mutually exclude, each what the other makes the sole agent. Yet it should be said, that the new philosophy recognizes fully the divine power in connection with regeneration, direct as well as indirect. But it is not the regenerating power.

2d. The ultimate end of this human act which constitutes regeneration, is *self-love*, or the desire of happiness. This is its "primary reason and cause." Right, and its synonymes, virtue and holiness, have no value either to God or man, except as *means* to happiness. Wrong, or vice, is evil only as a means of misery, and would be as good as virtue if it produced as much happiness. Virtue and vice are good and evil ministerially, or *relatively*. Nothing is good but happiness, and the means of it, and nothing evil but unhappiness and the means of it. Hence, nothing is absolutely good but happiness, nor absolutely evil but misery. Benevolence and selfishness respect simply the mode, or means, by which the desire of happiness, as the ultimate end of all moral action, is gratified. A benevolent act is worth to other beings just the value of its fitness to produce their highest happiness; and this act and this happiness of other beings are worth to the agent just the value of their use in promoting his highest happiness.

3d. Regeneration is *mediated*, as well as prompted, by self-love. The suspension of the selfish principle is supposed to take place *before* regeneration. The acts which precede this suspension, are sinful, and not means of regeneration. Those which follow it, and precede the regenerative act, are dictated by self-love, and are morally pure, and a means of regeneration. This feature grows out of the central idea of regeneration as man's act, and as prompted by self-love, and harmonizes with it. By the old doctrine, the selfish principle continues to operate and to rule till it is

displaced by the benevolent principle, and the first holy act is prompted by this holy principle, and not by a constitutional desire of happiness. There is no logical or chronological interval which admits of any such sinless self-love and irresponsible agency.

4th. That the act of regeneration is impossible to infants; "as impossible as that of calculating an eclipse." This view harmonizes with the non-moral being of infants. Thus, according to this definition and doctrine of regeneration, man is its author and happiness its final end. It begins, continues, and ends in self-love. By the Old doctrine, it begins and centres in God. The common view includes the human family, each in the first moment of his being, as capable of this change, and as needing it. And it is the general belief that those who die before actual sin do become the subjects of it. This, we admit, was not Calvin's view. But it is a point to which his principles of interpretation and theology led the way.

ATONEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION.

The Old theology finds the primary *cause* of the redemptive work in love. God was not moved to be merciful by the atonement, but the atonement is his marvellous device in behalf of the miserable and guilty. This is the view of the Augustinian and Calvinistic school, though exactly the opposite is often ascribed to it. Augustine says: "We must not think of the reconciliation of man as if God required blood in order to forgive, but that his love was the very cause of his sending his Son into the world." Calvin says, love "holds the first place as the supreme and original cause" of atonement and justification. While the love of God is thus clearly the ground of redemption, the *necessity* for providing it by the atonement is found in his justice. Both the ground and the necessity are in the ethical nature of God.

The atonement is taken, primarily, as a *provision*. It consists, essentially, in the life and death of Christ,—a

perfect conformity to the law, and the endurance of its penalty. "There is the very same need," says Edwards, "of Christ's obeying the law in our stead in order to the reward, as of his suffering the penalty of the law in our stead in order to our escaping the penalty." Justification is not, therefore, simply an act of sovereignty, but the result of a judicial process, which combines the exercise of love and justice, and satisfies perfectly the demands of both. The Holy One, from a dictate of love and justice, came and stood in the law-place of man, a servant and a sufferer. These two elements of the atonement, substitutionary obedience and suffering, constitute vicariousness—its distinguishing peculiarity—and furnish the ground of the two correspondent parts of justification, acquittal and acceptance. In each the virtue of his two natures was blended; and in each the Son of God was equally voluntary. The obligation to obey the law was not such as rests on all mere men, but assumed and gratuitous. Nevertheless, his obedience was a real substitution, and his death a real penalty; not the very *same* due to the guilty, but a substitute. A thing cannot be the same with that for which it is a substitute. But it should be an equivalent, and answer the same end, or a better one. Christ could not suffer the remorse and eternal pain due to the guilty. But he did suffer what, as a substitute, satisfied the justice of God, or a just God, as well, and honored equally the divine law. The Old theology, therefore, speaks freely of Christ, in the style of the sacred writers, as "suffering the penalty of the law," as "paying our debts." But it never implies that he was a sinner, suffering demerits, but always that he was spotless and divine, even while "being made a curse for us." "Our guilt and punishment," says Calvin, "being *as it were* transferred to him." Edwards says: "he suffered *as though guilty*." Hopkins calls Christ's sufferings "a complete equivalent for the penalty." Dr. Woods says, Christ suffered the penalty "virtually," that which had "a like value in God's moral government." It was "as though the curse of the law had been endured literally."

Incidental to the atonement, in the active obedience of Christ, are a perfect example and provision for divine sympathy. Possessing a veritable human soul in union with the divine soul, he laid his whole moral being open to the assaults of temptation, from circumference to centre, but without one leaning towards assent. Had there been, at any point in his history, a yielding instead of a resistance, a single taint or stain of evil, hereditary or actual, he would not have been either a perfect model, or have made atonement. He who needs salvation cannot be a saviour.

As a *provision*, the atonement is commensurate with the moral necessities of the race. The recovery provided by the Second Adam is generally believed, by the school, to be co-extensive with the ruin caused by the first. In this respect it makes a distinction between the atonement and redemption,—its sufficiency and its efficiency. It is sufficient for all. It is, or may be, offered to all; but it will not be made effectual in all. Calvin, in his commentary on the passage: “God so loved the world” (John iii. 26), is explicit as to the extent of the atonement. “*Tametsi enim in mundo nihil reperietur Dei favore dignum, se tamen toti mundo propitium ostendit quum sine exceptione omnes ad fidem Christi vocat, quae nihil aliud est quam ingressus in vitam.*” Also on the text: “This is my blood which is shed for many for the remission of sins (Matt. xxvi. 28), he says: “*Caeterum sub multorum nomine, non partem mundi tantum designat, sed totum humanum genus.*” The language of President Edwards is to the same effect, that “Christ, in some sense, may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, and the whole world, by his death.” The limitation relates, not to the atonement (as a provision), but to its application. And this is what Edwards means by “something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should be actually saved thereby.”

If this is all the Old school Presbyterians intend by limited atonement,—that one general design was to pro-

vide salvation for all, rendering it objectively possible to all; and another, more specific, to secure the actual salvation of his people; the difference between them and the Old school of New England theologians is only nominal. With some of them, doubtless, this is all the difference. With others, the atonement is commensurate only with its application. It was provided for the elect, and had no relation, as a provision, to any others. In this view, the difference between the two systems is radical and important.

The atonement is made available, in justification, by *faith*. This faith is called justifying or saving, because it is an act by which the sinner receives Christ, and relies on him alone for pardon and eternal life. It is so far a condition of salvation, that no one can be saved without it. It is a positive Christian virtue, but has no quality that can claim pardon and life as a right or recompense. It receives these altogether on the ground of Christ's obedience and death.

This is what our catechism calls "the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." It is not by an infusion of righteousness, but by a remission of the penalty. It is not a transfer of his personal acts to believers as theirs, but a reckoning of them to their account; so that they have acquittal from the charge of guilt, and acceptance with God as innocent. "Christ's perfect obedience," says Edwards, "shall be reckoned to our account; so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves." According to Calvin, justification denotes "the legal state of one acquitted of crime by the favor of the judge, as though his innocence had been proved." There is a *covenant* union between Christ and the believer, and a oneness from sympathy; but no oneness of substance or personality.

When it is said that justification is by "faith *alone*," without the deeds of the law, the idea is simply that obedience to the law is not the *ground* of justification. It is by faith alone, because this is the *receptive* principle of the

soul. It is that by which the atonement passes from a mere historical fact, into the human consciousness, as a principle of life and peace. It receives Christ, not only as a sacrifice, but as the great High Priest; not a passive redemption, but a living Redeemer. Such a faith is never alone, but always holds Christ, and is accompanied by love and good works. It is "as impossible to separate good works from faith, as heat and light from fire." "It cannot be idle." "It must bring forth good works." So teach our old Protestant symbols. Luther says: "We must certainly hold that where there is no faith there can be no good works; and on the other hand, there is no faith where there are no good works." "The whole life of a Christian man consisteth, inwardly, in faith towards God; and, outwardly, in charity and good works towards our neighbor." Calvin writes: "True faith and repentance, though they may be distinguished, cannot be separated." Edwards: "True love is an ingredient in true and living faith, and is what is most distinguishing in it." So manifest is the misrepresentation that the old theology, excludes charity from a justifying faith.

In the Arminian system, the atonement holds the place of a "compensation," a recompense for losses sustained by sin. Man is not obliged to obey the law, or to repent of sin, until its provisions meet him. "If he had not come, they would not have known responsible sin," but would have been only "imputative," "irresponsible sinners."

Here Calvinism and Arminianism part. But not so widely as some imagine. It is indeed "a disgrace to Christian theology, and a dishonor to the human intellect," to teach, "that it is divinely just to create one being bad, or a race bad, and then damn them for being bad." But who has endorsed this dark caricature of the divine government? Certainly not "the Old school," which is charged with it. It ignores and abjures it as cordially as do our Methodist brethren. Its distinguishing doctrine of creation is, that God created all things "good," and man "very good;" that

he never created any being or race, bad, morally or physically; that he condemns men only for the evil which they were free in producing, and are free in perpetuating. God simply does not *annul* the constitutional law of continuity in the race, that each should bring forth "after his kind." When it had fallen, *he did not annihilate it*. But this is very far from *creating it bad*. Nor was the alternative, as a matter of justice, the extinction of the race, or provision for its recovery. For what could justice demand the atoning provisions as "a compensation" to man? For not being *annihilated*? God was under no obligation to destroy his last and best work because it had perverted itself. This might have been just, but it was not implied in the threatened penalty. Nor could the atonement be due to the race, or to any part of it, as a compensation for their *sin*. Service is the correlate of compensation. Sin is the moral opposite of this, and its correlate is penalty, and not pay. The Old theology admits sinful man's need of gracious ability — an atonement, and a disposition to accept it. This he needs as soon as he is born. But it denies that he is, for any reason or in any sense, entitled to it. It insists that man could not be saved without both the objective provision and the subjective renewal; but it also insists that neither of these possesses the slightest ingredient of "compensation," or the least power to constitute free-agency or obligation to repentance and a holy life.

Perhaps this chief difference between the Calvinistic and Arminian theories is occasioned by a different view of justice. The latter confounds it with benevolence. The former makes a broad distinction between them. Arminianism places a gracious ability to the account of justice, as a debt. Calvinism puts it entirely to the account of benevolence, as a donation, and on a principle of mediatorial interposition, that answers all the ends of justice as well as they could have been answered by the exact penalty, and those of love far better.

Dr. Hopkins was in essential agreement upon this subject

with the old theology. But his speculative habit led him to start some trains of thought, which others have carried out into distinct dogmas. In his sharp definition, he restricts the atonement to a provision for *pardon*, and confines it to the death of Christ, as the penalty of the law. In logical consistency, he was obliged to limit justification to *forgiveness*. But he allows that pardon is "only one part of justification," and that it leaves men "without any title to eternal life" or capacity to enjoy positive happiness. "It was, therefore, necessary that Christ should obey the precepts of the law for man, and in his stead."

Another of his speculative notions is, that those who have once sinned, though pardoned, remain as criminal as ever, and can never cease to deserve eternal destruction. This was little else, we think, than the astute metaphysician's emphatic way of saying that forgiveness is undeserved, and that it can never be true of one who has sinned, that he has not sinned and deserved punishment. In this it is not discrepant with the Old theology.

Still another peculiarity is, that the *full* penalty of sin, if it could be endured by the sinner, would alter his moral character, so that he would stand right in law, and on the principle of equation, have no need of a pardon. These speculations of Dr. Hopkins were held in check by his deep piety, and the strong evangelical character of his general teachings. But they led the way to more important deviations from the Old theology by the New.

Among these are the following :

1st. The atonement satisfied the *general* justice of God, but not his particular or distributive justice.

2d. It satisfied the honor of God as lawgiver and ruler, but did not answer the penal demands of the *law itself* upon the offender.

3d. The active obedience of Christ was not performed as a substitution, nor imputed to believers as satisfying the claims of the law upon them for a perfect obedience.

4th. Nothing can be imputed but one's own personal

attribute or act. All imputation, both of sin and righteousness, in any other sense, is impossible.

5th. Christ did not either obey the law for believers, or suffer its penalty. The penalty for transgression, in respect to the forgiven, is not, in any sense, executed. Neither the law nor the lawgiver can be satisfied with any substitute or equivalent for obedience in the subject.

6th. The atonement is not an equivalent for the objects of the law which is violated, though it is sufficient to maintain the right of the lawgiver. It does not accomplish these objects, and nothing can do it. The kingdom and blessedness of God suffer a loss by sin, for which there can be no adequate redress or remedy. The final objects of his government, including his own highest blessedness, he is obliged, hopelessly and forever, to abandon.

By the Old theology, the work of Christ, as the second Adam, is an adequate redress for the evils introduced by the first. The objects of the lawgiver will be more fully accomplished through the law and gospel, than any mere process of law would secure. The government of God as a Redeemer, is not a lapse from his original and ultimate end as a lawgiver to a restricted good, by a loss to the kingdom and his infinite blessedness; not a defeat, but a majestic advance, a more full, though mysterious, unfoldment of his eternal, unbroken plan, in a far greater general good than any mere law administration would have secured.

DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The terms Creator, Lord, and Redeemer imply not only government, but *sovereignty*. God, as the author of the realm of matter and of mind, is its sovereign. Infinite rectitude is the distinguishing property of his being. The ground of all moral distinctions is in the completeness of his moral nature, which is the standard of goodness and of all right government. There can be no foundation or source of these outside of God, either above or below him. His will is the exponent of these distinctions, and a perfect rule

of right and duty to his creatures. The chief end of creation is the manifested excellence and glory of the Creator, and the highest good of the intelligent universe. This end was prompted by the infinite benevolence of the sovereign, planned by his wisdom, and achieved by his power. These are taken as the elements of divine sovereignty, benevolence, wisdom, and power. And as these are infinite, they exclude the possibility of mistake or failure. They also bar out everything arbitrary, in the sense of reasonless or tyrannical, and constitute the most desirable moral ruler.

The school makes a distinction between God's knowledge and foreknowledge. The one relates to principles and the possibility of things, without necessary reference to succession or actuality. The other relates to facts or events, and takes in the element of time. It is *before* the event, but *after* the divine purpose which makes it certain. There is also a difference between foreknowledge and *decree*. The decree comes, in the order of nature, after the knowledge which is its preparation, or the material on which it acts, and precedes the foreknowledge which is its logical consequence.

This relation of God's knowledge and foreknowledge to his purpose is important to a just conception of his sovereignty. God could not foreknow an event which was dependent on his positive or permissive will until he had *purposed* to accomplish or permit it. He knew the possibility of a created universe, in the order of nature, before he decreed its existence, or before he foreknew that existence as certain.

Divine fore-ordination respects, primarily, God's acts, but is inclusive of his permission and disposal to his ends of the acts of his creatures. This is the import of the Catechism, where it says God "hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass." Fore-ordination in respect to God's works of creation, providence, and redemption, fixes them *causatively*, and makes him the immediate author. In respect to

man's *holy* acts, as repentance and faith, it involves a mediate causation, as these follow freely from the holy disposition implanted by God's act of regeneration. But, the fore-ordination of man's *evil* acts, as Adam's first sin, or the betrayal of Judas, conveys no proper idea of divine causation or authorship. The ordination here was non-preventive and negative, though the purpose not to prevent was positive. Man was the author of his own evil deed. His agency not only excluded, but even perverted, the divine agency. God fore-ordained man to be holy, and created him such; but he turned from that ordination, and made himself sinful. He created the garden, and placed Adam in it to keep it. He set aside a certain tree, under a prohibition, to develop and strengthen his virtue by trial. He endowed him with noble powers of knowledge, and aspirations after improvement. These are all God's causative fore-ordinations. They stand close to man's sin; they are the very conditions without which the sin could not have occurred. God, further, fore-ordained what disposal he would make of the sin. But in causative agency, these fore-ordinations of God are entirely distinct from the sin of man, and ethically opposite. Sin, in every instance, is in its nature counter to all the decrees of God, except his purpose not to prevent it, and to dispose of it in furtherance of the ultimate ends of his wise and perfect administration.

There is a sense in which God's acts and man's are *contingent*. They are acts of choice; and all man's agency is a dependent agency. The framers of our Confession employ the term in this sense, when they speak of the "liberty, or contingency of secondary causes," as not being taken away, but rather established, by God's "ordaining whatsoever comes to pass." But it is a principle of the Old school, that no event under the government of God, free or unfree, is contingent as being uncertain or unordained. All conceivable events are divisible into three classes: the *impossible*, the *possible*, and the *certain*. The first cannot be regarded as contingent, for they will not occur. The third class is

excluded from contingency, for they either *have* taken place, or certainly will. The other class, the possible events, is made up of those which may and *will* take place, and of those which might, but will *not*. The former are not contingent, because they certainly *will* happen. The latter are not, for it is equally certain they will not happen. Thus contingency, in the sense of uncertainty, according to the Old doctrine, is excluded. All things are certain, either to be, or not to be. There is nothing between. They cannot be both certain and uncertain, for this is a contradiction.

Further, God's foreknowledge extends to everything that is to occur. But foreknowledge implies antecedent certainty as its ground. God cannot foreknow an event as *doubtful*, for this would necessitate ignorance and doubt in him. And when it should be decided, he would pass from doubt to certainty, and to an increase of knowledge. But God cannot be in doubt respecting anything,—no more in respect to free acts than physical operations. This is one point of difference between the Old theology and Arminianism. The latter affirms contingency respecting the acts of free agents, and the former denies it.

Another point of difference relates to the *ground* of moral certainty. Arminianism places this in foreknowledge. God's foreknowledge precedes his predeterminations, as all "cause must precede its effect." "God, as foreknowing, must be viewed as preceding God as predetermining."

The Old order is just the reverse: God, as predetermining, precedes God as foreknowing, and for the same reason, i. e. that the cause precedes the effect. God did not first foreknow that he should create man, and then, as the effect of this foreknowledge, determine that he would do it. He decided to do it, and then foreknew it as certain to be done. So of all things that depend on his positive or permissive will. This seems a fixed law of the human, perhaps we may say also of the divine, mind. Every skilful architect first decides what he wishes to do, and then does it. God is the only

perfect architect. In the order of nature, he was first acquainted with all possibilities and materials, with all means and ends. Then he predetermined what it was best to do, and, in due time, did it.

The standing objection to this view of divine sovereignty is, that it destroys free-agency. To this the system has its answers:

1st. Fore-ordination, in respect to man's *holy* acts, is causation only in that mediate sense which perfectly harmonizes with his freedom. And in respect to his *evil* acts, it is not causation, but simple permission and disposal.

2d. Fore-ordination is accomplished *by means* of the free-agency of man. The first sin of the first man, which God had predetermined to permit, was as absolutely free as were any of his antecedent acts of holiness, in which God was equally predetermined to preserve him for a time. He had all the power for a different choice that he had while he did choose differently, except a disposition.

3d. The freedom of moral agents is one of the things most especially *fixed* by God's predetermination. Surely that which secures moral freedom cannot destroy it.

5th. The certainty which foreknowledge implies is open to this objection as really as is fore-ordination. It limits moral agents to "some one way, and no other, in which all free volitions will be put forth," that is, it makes them *certain*. Fore-ordination does no more. "Foreknowledge does not cause the free act to be unfree," nor "prove" it to be so. Neither does fore-ordination. So far as there is causation at all, it only makes man's free acts more free, by bringing them under the "perfect law of liberty." There is a kind of necessity, a moral *must be*, in what God foreknows will take place, as also in his fore-ordination; but no infringement of freedom in either. For, if it is not perfectly certain to be, his foreknowledge would not be "sure of verification," and he might be "deceived."

THEODICY.

A moral system may be defined as the government of a moral being over moral beings. Among the theodicic principles of the Old theology, the following, we believe, are generally accepted :

1st. All possible systems were open to the divine mind, and optional to him,—those in which holiness and happiness are universal; those in which sin and misery are universal; and those in which they mingle. Of these, God chose the last.

2d. This choice was prompted by infinite love, which would be satisfied with no other system than the best. It was planned by infinite wisdom, and executed by absolute, creative, and governmental power.

3d. Sin, which comes by man's free act, and against God's prohibitory law, yet exists by his voluntary non-prevention.

4th. This permission of moral evil, combining the joint action of love and wisdom, was chosen rather than the prevention of it, as resulting in a higher good to the universe, and hence in greater glory to the Supreme Ruler.

5th. Sin is no less sinful on account of its being made the occasion of a greater good. It is evil, and only evil, in its entire nature and all its tendencies. It is not chosen as, in itself, "better than holiness in its place," for it is nowhere better, but always bad *per se*. Hence God's treatment of it by prohibition and penalty is a stigma according to its nature, and a means of securing the good of its permission. Pardon by a vicarious atonement, making the stigma still more emphatic, is another means to the same end. The overruling of sin, against its nature, as an occasion of good, no more alters that nature than its permission sanctions it. It is not, properly, a means of good, although God's permission and overruling of it are good.

Some of the Hopkinsians, putting the occasion for the means, have spoken of it as a "necessary means of the

greatest good." Dr. Stephen West presents it in this light. So do Drs. Emmons and Hopkins. The language of the last of these acute divines, is very strong: "No evil has taken place in the universe," he says, "nor ever will, which is not the occasion of an overbalancing good, so that, on the whole, there is more good than if there had been no evil; and in this sense all evil is turned into good, that is, it is on the whole, all things considered, not evil but good." Drs. Burton and Strong adopted a similar phraseology. But it was only a hyper-Calvinistic way of stating the simple truth, that sin is the occasion of, or is over-ruled for, more good than would have followed its prevention. Edwards and Bellamy did not employ the language. Nor did Dr. Woods or Dr. Tyler, though they held fast to the Old doctrine, that God's permission was good, and that sin was made the occasion of a greater good than would have followed its absence. We believe the phraseology is not now approved by any who may be classed as Hopkinsians, although the doctrine is held by the New Calvinists and the Old.

6th. God is possessed of adequate power to have prevented sin, if he had chosen to do so. The idea of permission implies the power of prevention. It would be preposterous to speak of God's permitting what he was not able to prevent. And we hold it to be equally peculiar to speak of God's permitting sin in a moral system, if he had no other way of preventing it, than by *preventing the moral system*; as the watch-maker can prevent friction in the wear of a watch only by not making the watch. We concede, also, that if sin were, in its nature and tendency, "a necessary means of good," there would be an equal impropriety in saying that God permitted it. It would, in that case, hold its place in the system by appointment, and not by mere sufferance and subjugation.

7th. The ultimate end of God, as a moral governor, is the manifestation of his infinite excellence and glory in the production of the highest good of the moral universe. By

the mingling of good and evil in the system chosen by God, this end is more perfectly secured than it would otherwise be. It brings out the gospel, as well as law, side of the divine nature,—a more complete development, so to speak, of God and man. Had there been no sin, there could have been no Saviour. If there had been no misery, there would have been no mercy; no experience of evil, no capability of that ineffable participation with the God-man in good, which flows from his incarnate love, and in which the redeemed are eternally confirmed. To bring good out of good, is only the law that “like produces like.” But to make *evil* produce good—so to treat all the sin in the world, through the incarnation of God, by mingled law and gospel, love and justice, that the result shall be a vastly greater sum total of good than if sin had not entered it—is an achievement possible only to infinite administrative skill. It is equally honorable to the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and brings them all into exercise and the fullest exhibition.

Thus the conflict between good and evil is not a drawn battle, in which the combatants gain only partial victories and sustain about equal losses. Christ is more than a match for Satan. The seed of the woman will bruise the serpent’s head. God is perfect master of the field, and of all the forces, and is directing the evil and the good, more and more, to the highest weal of the universe.

With these leading theodic principles of the Old school, in New England theology, the Presbyterian, Hopkinsian, and Methodist teaching is in substantial agreement. The theodicy of the New school departs from them, somewhat essentially, in the following particulars:

1st. The chief and ultimate end of God in the government of the universe, is *happiness*, and the means to it is holiness.

2d. This chief end of moral government, by the best means, is not secured in the present system.

3d. The system which would have produced the most

perfect results, — a system without moral evil, — was not optional with God. It is conceivable, and cannot be assumed as an “impossibility.” Yet it was impossible to God.

4th. Every system possible to God was conditioned on the necessity of sin. The evils that are in the world “arise from the *nature* of a moral universe itself.” A moral system “necessarily, in the nature of things, involves moral evil.” “In respect to divine prevention, it is incidental to a moral system,” which is “not only better than no system, but the best possible to God.”

5th. Hence, in deciding on a plan of government, the alternative was, a system with sin, or *no moral universe*. In reducing an unavoidable evil to the least possible limits, God shows that “he prefers, not the existence of sin to its non-existence, but simply its existence to the non-existence of a moral kingdom”; he shows “a purpose to permit its existence rather than to have no moral kingdom.” No reason can be given why God does not prevent all sin under a moral government, “except that he cannot without destroying moral agency.”

6th. The impossibility to God of securing the best end of moral government by the best means, is *absolute*. God “introduced redemption into a universe from which sin could not by any providence be excluded.” It is as impossible as to have a watch without friction in the wheels, or a clock without expansibility in the rod. The impossibility is as absolute as “to make a part equal to the whole”; as “that two and two should be five” or “the diameter of a circle be equal to its circumference.”

7th. God cannot prevent any more sin than he *does* prevent, nor secure any more holiness than he does secure. “Whatever a benevolent God does in any given instance, must be, not only better than to do nothing, but the best thing which he can do in that instance,” — “all the good possible to him.”

The root of these differences between the Old theology

and the New, lies in the essentially different view of the nature of a moral system. By the philosophy of the New, sin is essential to free-agency,—to the nature of a moral system. By the Old, it is only the *possibility* of sin that is thus necessary. Hence the alternative is not with the Old, as with the New—sin, or no moral universe; but the *capability* of sin, or no moral universe. The possibility, however, neither necessitates, nor makes certain, its actual existence. Beings who can sin if they will, are equally able to refuse to sin; and they may so refuse, and remain holy, in defiance of all possible influences to prevent.

The theory of a divine inability to prevent sin, was at first presented in the New school as “a possible alternative,” an “hypothesis,” which might solve the problem of evil more satisfactorily than the Old one did. But it soon fell into the dogmatics of the school, and was categorically affirmed; the old being denied as incapable of proof,—as false, dishonorable to God, and tending to infidelity. It was held as the only rational ground for the exercise of humiliation and repentance in man, and for defending the sincerity and benevolence of God. “Either he can prevent sin in the case, or he cannot. If he cannot, then he may be sincere in the prohibition of it in his law. But if he can, and does not, he cannot be sincere in its prohibition in any case in which sin takes place. Disobedience in the subject is decisive of insincerity in the lawgiver.”

This is explicit, and, with unmistakable clearness, defines the difference between the schools. It shows that the hypothetical divergence has become a radical antagonism. On the Old doctrine, by this theory, God is neither benevolent, nor sincere in prohibiting any sins which he does not prevent; that is, in prohibiting any sin which exists. And he is malevolent for punishing it. According to the New, God does the best he can in every instance, and therefore is sincere and benevolent. But he cannot do as well as he would. His governmental power falls short of his benevolence, by the sum-total of the sin and suffering which are

in the world, but which it was an absolute impossibility for him to prevent, if he created moral beings, and which he cannot even attempt to diminish without danger of increasing it.

The New theology claims to be an improvement upon the Old, and the Old to find its substantive doctrines in the Old and New Testaments, which cannot be improved. It counts no human creeds or compendiums perfect, and uses them only as helps. Welcoming all forms of expression that convey essential gospel truth, and finding the fundamental Christian doctrine in all the evangelical denominations, it holds fast to the catholic counsel of the elders at Saybrook: "to account nothing ancient that will not stand by this rule — the Old and New Testaments, — and nothing new that will."

ARTICLE VI.

THE CHURCH AND CHURCHES.

BY REV. DANIEL P. NOYES, NEW YORK CITY.

THERE are few sentences which furnish a more fruitful theme of meditation than that which fell from the lips of Paul on Mars Hill: "in Him we live, and move, and have our being"; "We are His offspring." But more wonderful are those words of our Lord: "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us."

What, to the ancients, was an uncertain theory, to us is a reality: "Now are we the sons of God." Despite the broken ties, there is yet a family of God on earth, made up of those within whom he dwells, and who have begun to be

holy, in the obedience of love. Here shall the race attain, at last, its fore-ordained but forfeited unity; the prayer of Christ and the doubts of the ancients shall be answered; in Christ shall all be made one. In the *love of God* shall souls rise to their true life, and enter into oneness with the Father and with each other.

The history of language furnishes no instance of the *apotheosis* of a word more remarkable than that which the word "love" has experienced in Jesus Christ. In Immanuel, we may reverently say, God makes bare his heart before man, and shows to him the motion of his own holiness. And this, for want of a nobler or more kindred element in human speech, receives the name of *love* — a word long familiar and dear, but now exalted and transfigured with a divine brightness. There is nought else that we can conceive as within finite reach, so excellent as this holy, voluntary impulse and delight; and, in its absolute perfection, it is what we necessarily think of as constituting God's own essential glory. If asked to describe what we mean by this love, we may say: It is an energy within us, in which our souls freely go forth in blissful adoration and desire toward the holiness and blessedness of Jehovah, or the likeness of the same in his offspring; in which we give ourselves up, with a peculiar, deep, sure joy, to God, or, with accordant delight, to that which is God-like in man. The love is, fundamentally and supremely, a delight in this good, a yearning after it and a free consecration to it. It involves an endless aspiration (for others as for ourselves) and a ceaseless prayer, a perpetual adoration of the All-holy, and a perpetual benediction and beneficence upon his intelligent creatures. There is no end to the power of this love; for it can never be satiated, though ever satisfied, but is ever striving, while yet ever at peace. So, it binds forever; uniting man with God and men with one another in a union which is ever attaining, yet has never fulfilled its end. It is the eternal tie.

It is also the perfect law. The *law of love* — set forth in

scripture, and illustrated in the life and in the death of Immanuel; it is the one all-comprehending law of the kingdom of heaven; being the law of God's own soul, and of all who bear his image, and summing up within itself all forms of moral excellence: justice, no less than mercy; fortitude, magnanimity, and brotherly kindness; the innocency, the sanctity, the dignity, the beauty of holiness. It is the law enfolding all moral laws; the form and expression of the very life of the soul; so that he who is without this love is empty of holiness — dead in sin; while he who should love God perfectly would lack no virtue.

It is in love, therefore, as has been said, that man returns to his true life, in oneness with God and with his kind. "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God in him." "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us." "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God," and is a member of his family, the church. The church consists of those whom God has thus reunited to himself in love.

The condition of admission to the church, therefore, is this love: when the love begins, the membership begins. For faith without love is dead. But since it is the blood of Christ that hath redeemed us from our sins; and since it is in believing in Christ that the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, — as many as are, with open face, beholding, being changed into the same image; and since it is in union with Christ that men become at one with God and each other, therefore is this church the church of Christ; all who are members of God's family form one body, of which Christ is the head; and the love which admits to this family is not to be distinguished (for those who hear the gospel) from the "believing" which unites to Christ.

The church is "visible" on earth. In all ages, men have seen, have heard, and have felt it. Its life, its counsels, its holy song and its word of power have ever witnessed of sin, of righteousness, of judgment, and of redemption.

But though seen, it has not been wholly seen. Men

have never known it perfectly, as God knows it. They have never been able to trace the boundaries of this kingdom with accuracy, and to say "here, but not beyond." It has been a presence and a power, but of more or less shadowy outline, changing in form and in place — seen, known, but not wholly known.

There has been, however, and there still is, a certain definite and determinable number of men — determinable through their regular admission by baptism,¹ and their formal organization — in which the church is visibly present on earth. This body, though in appearance, and even in reality, containing some who are not members of God's real household and not containing others who are, has been, for convenience, called *the visible church*; and for many purposes — always bearing in mind the imperfect sense in which the term is true — the distinction thus made is important, indeed we may say indispensable. Many topics related to the church organic compel us to speak of it. It must have a name.

As the church universal is composed of all those who are united to God in love, so the visible church, in a certain general sense, may be said to be composed of all who visibly love God, and embraces every human soul who gives good evidence of genuine piety. The organic church is obliged to determine for itself what evidences can safely be taken as valid.

Properly, piety is evidenced by its fruits — in those views of divine and of human character, those sentiments, purposes, and habits, which are involved in the indwelling of God in the soul. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

There are, for example, certain views of God which cannot be wanting where love of God is present. There are estimates of human character and condition that are in

¹ Baptism admits to the visible church, but not necessarily to a particular local organization, as in the case narrated in the eighth of Acts. The visible church and the organic church are not, therefore, absolutely conterminous. Yet they are so nearly so, that for ordinary purposes the terms are interchangeable.

harmony with these views, and a love of man that agrees with this love of the Father, and is essentially one with it. There are certain feelings and certain purposes involved in the views and estimates just referred to, as well as certain acts and habits, and a mode and tone of life, with which these all accord. Now, although it is not within the scope of human faculties to penetrate with certainty all secrets of the soul, and know, beyond possibility of error, its character and state, it is possible to attain a probable knowledge of these matters, and men are, every day, affording reasonable grounds for opinions concerning them. Who has not rejoiced in beholding manifestations of faith and love, which were as convincing as they were delightful?

Some kind of inquiry, therefore, into personal views, experiences, and character is a necessary preliminary to a recognition as a member of the church universal, through a formal admission, in full, into the organized visible church,—into what may be called the church *organic*. Any denomination of Christians (that is, any body of believers organized in church relations, under a distinctive name) which has nothing in its mode of admitting or of treating members equivalent to such an examination, is irregular; and any local society, calling itself a church, which should essentially omit this needful inquiry, would, at the very least, be a defective organization.

The form, indeed, in which this investigation should be conducted, though a matter of great importance, is yet of but secondary consequence, and necessarily varies somewhat with circumstances. In certain conceivable cases, the bare fact that a person has requested the seal of baptism, would afford reasonable ground for believing him a Christian; though even in these cases, such inquiry as should bring to view the apprehensions of truth and the tone of feeling under which the request was made would add to the clearness and satisfactoriness of this conclusion. When, again, persons have grown up from infancy in the bosom of a Christian community, such a tender and watchful

inspection *may* have been exercised over their spiritual state and growth as to diminish the importance of further scrutiny, if not to render it unnecessary. But, on the other hand, in cases of an opposite character, a formal and searching examination would be imperatively demanded. In what way soever the facts may be discovered, it is indispensable that *reasonable grounds* exist for a charitable belief that the persons seeking admission are true Christians.

The genuineness of the organic church cannot otherwise be maintained. For, obviously, unless it be composed of Christians, that is, of those who are members of that only true church which is Christ's spiritual family, then this family is not present in it, and the *church* is not visible in it; but, instead, it might even come to be an organic "visible" manifestation of the kingdom of darkness itself. In order to be able to justify its claim to be a part of the visible family of God, it must be substantially made up of his children; and however burdened and stained with imperfection, must yet be so joined to God and so filled with God, as to reflect his likeness in *holiness*. Any society claiming to be a visible, organic church, must be made up of church-material, must be holy, or its claim is, *prima facie*, unsound.

Moreover, were we to organize churches of persons affording no reasonable grounds for a hope and belief in their genuine discipleship, we should do a wrong to Christ, who does not ask us to call by his name them that are not his; and a wrong and injury to the souls of these persons themselves, who are thus made to wear unworthily a name and seeming which do not belong to them, and who may be cheated into the belief that they are the Lord's, while yet in voluntary and obstinate bondage unto sin; and an injury and a wrong to the church, building its walls of unseemly and treacherous material,—the stones of this palace are of adamant; and, finally, an injury to the world, dying for lack of the truth, and needing true, not false, examples. The sayings of our Lord, the tenor of the New Testament

instructions, the example of the apostles and of their immediate successors, all ratify this view; while the history of later times is full of loudest testimonies to the lamentable consequences of a corruption of the church material, and the folly of building the walls of Zion of crumbling stones and untempered mortar.

We must think of the church, therefore, and of particular churches, as rightly composed of persons in whom dwells a true love of God and a godly love of man, in which their souls begin to partake of the Divine likeness in a genuine holiness.

But a society may be composed of such persons, and yet be an association for temporal, secular ends, and no church. In order that it may be a church, it must not only be made up of the church material, but must have the *church end*.

What, then, is the end for which God's family on earth exists? In general terms, we may answer: The church exists, that it may perfect itself as the body of Christ on earth and, in union with him as its head, continue his work; or, more particularly, that its members may, in public and in private, pay homage unto God; that they may learn God, through a united study and practice of his truth and his will; may cherish and enlarge their love of God, in associated worship, labor, and self-sacrifice; may be happy in this blissful communion; and may give to others what they thus receive and gain—becoming God's instrument for the deliverance of the world from its iniquities.

But a society of good men may exist for the promotion of this end, and yet not be a church, but only, for example, an association of Christian teachers or missionaries. The church is not a mere voluntary society, born of the will of man, and for a temporary or fragmentary end; it is a divine society, ordained of God, for immortal wants. It is the body of Christ, and exists only as it is instinct with his Spirit and perpetuating his memory and work, in the ways which he has appointed. Accordingly, it is as truly the

necessity as it is the joy of the church, to observe the *sacraments*, baptism and the Lord's supper; and no society, however useful, can make a valid claim to be considered a church unless it honors these essential rites. In other words, we must not only have the church-material and the church-end, but also the church-mode; which connects a holy witnessing, teaching, worship, and labor with the appointed, solemn recognitions of the divine covenant and sacrifice. Any form of organization which secures this end, by a use of this material, in accordance with this mode, must be considered as essentially fulfilling the idea of a church; but, obviously, only that form which is the one most perfect expression and instrument of the Spirit of Christ—being, in fine, the stated and necessary method in which the law of love acts itself out, for its own end, in a society, constituting a polity—this form is the only one which can claim pre-eminence over all others, as the divinely sanctioned polity of the church. Even this is only the best, and not the sole, form under which churches may exist.

Wherefore we may say, that an organized body of men may properly call themselves a church, and are to be recognized as an orderly branch of the general organic church, when, and only when, the condition, bond, and law of their organization is that love which is holiness; when the end of their organization is the promotion of their own and of universal holiness; and when the mode in which this end is sought includes a holy life, doctrine, and worship, and the communion with Christ in the sacraments—the standard of holiness being the Bible, as interpreted by the Holy Ghost to docile and prayerful believers. Or, in other words:

An organized body of men is a Christian church, when the terms of admission are such as, in effect, to secure penitence for sin and faith in Christ on the part of the members; when the object of the organization is the glory of God, in a pure worship and a true penitence, love, and service among its own members and among all men; when

this object is pursued by holding up a Christian example and testimony, by the preaching of God's word, by public adorations, and the communion in the sacraments; and when the form of the organization provides, in reasonable measure, for the attainment of the object, in the modes specified. Where these things are, there is a visible organic church.

The object of the church, as already explained, is three-fold: to render homage to God, to perfect its members in a Christ-like character, and to Christianize mankind.

To the family of God belongs that sweetest duty and privilege of adoring his absolute and eternal majesty, of pouring forth, in presence of the universe, expressions of the unutterable reverence and love, in which holy souls strive in vain to utter forth God. In prayers and songs and all service, in every act that can be made to express a sense of divine pureness and love and might and wisdom, in all readiness of obedience and gladsome trust and patient endurance, in all toil and suffering in which the heart of man can speak when language fails, in whatsoever contains the essence of worship, it is the proper work of the church to pay homage unto her king. Long as creatures continue to adore that absolute perfection of spiritual being which for creatures must ever remain unattainable; long as a yearning and reaching forth toward the knowledge, the love and the life of God shall live in created souls, until aspiration ceases, until finite no longer falls short of the Infinite, must worship continue — the employment, alike, of the church on earth and the church triumphant in heaven. That "charity which never faileth," is itself a perpetual incense going up sublimely from all realms of sanctified being, forever and forever, unto God.

The church enjoys a second privilege, in the duty of aiding all her members to become Christ-like.

Immanuel is God-with-us. Being the archetype according to which, in the beginning, man was made, he furnishes

the end toward which man is eternally to advance — the fulfilment of all human possibility, the SUMMIT, far off, glorious, never reached though forever apprehended, wherein God and man incomprehensibly unite and become one person.

True Christians are those who have caught sight of this archetype and have loved it; and to them it has been given, in this knowledge and love of Christ, to begin to be such as he is, and to do his work. They have seen Christ, and they know the Father. United in the church, they individually furnish assistance to one another in the divine life; and, together, constitute an instrumentality whereby God promotes the attainment of a Christly life and character.

God lives for each one of us; and the wealth of his being is waiting to be ours. But God is so great that all that he is cannot be imparted. Some are capable of one good, others of a different good; and we can often receive through our brethren what could not so soon have been directly conveyed. Hence, our real fraternity, and the divine appointment of a society — the church. The church is a true channel of grace to its members, bringing them gifts through one another that could have come so soon by no other route. There is a real life in the church, through the vital indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls that compose it; and it helps them to a nobler fruitfulness and beauty, through the greater and more varied fulness of the Spirit of God, which, through his grace, they are jointly and severally enabled to intercommunicate.

These blessings the church conveys in many obvious ways. It perpetually makes known and applies the gospel and the power of it. It exhibits Christ, and so holds him up to view, that none but those who wilfully refuse to see can fail to discern him. In providing times, places and modes of worship, it promotes those liftings of heart in which the soul draws nigh unto God (the church is the mother of aspiration); and in the preaching of the gospel,

and a holy and timely witnessing unto its demands, it furnishes admonition concerning sin, righteousness, and the judgment to come; stirs up sleeping sensibilities, alarms, encourages, instructs, counsels, comforts, edifies. It records baptismal vows, and applies the seal. It spreads the table of the Lord; and enables believers to commune "in remembrance of" him, feeding their souls, as they take the bread and the wine, upon that which makes these material elements sacred, and receiving the blessing of their Saviour's prayer,¹ while thus before the world renewing their *sacramentum* — the oath of their consecration, the solemn sign of their union.

The church organic furnishes, moreover, a needed leadership, system, and discipline; without which it would not be possible for believers to do so much either for one another or for the world.

What is hardly less important, it supplies an atmosphere of opinion, a social support and defence, to most souls indispensable for their health and for their protection from assaults. The world's air is debilitating and miasmatic. Unless God had provided some mountain, therefore, gifted, by its nearness to heaven, with clearer light and more wholesome winds, souls must sink enfeebled. The world is full of enemies of truth and goodness, and every heart carries the world within it. Unless there were some power provided, to ward off attacks and to help half-emancipated wills to bind and slay their rebellious, base impulses, many hearts would be overcome. The church is appointed, that it may be a sheltering home of souls, wherein they rest and are medicined and armed for the ever-fresh conflict — a home of consolation and of reinforcement. It is, properly, a society wherein a man is sure of finding true friends, who, for Christ's sake, will love him and will help him, whatever his soul's hurt or want may be; of which he is able to say: Here I am sure of justice; and more, I am sure of kindness; and more still, I am sure of finding a love like Christ's own

¹ John xvii.

love, self-sacrificing for my sake, whensoever such I need. Here, also, are furnished examples showing what the divine life is, and avenues are opened for the exercise of love, in good works, to all them that hunger and thirst after righteousness. But these interior offices and operations of the church need to be developed more in detail.

Our life begins in the family. The family is a divine institution; and is appointed, not merely for the continuance, but also for the sanctification, of the race. The love between the one husband and one wife, faithful unto death, with the wider affection which enfolds children and others near of kin, checks the tendency, so strong in the heart, to a total centering upon self, and awaits only the action of the Universal Spirit, to become a love broad as creation and rising supreme toward its divine Author. The family, being thus the birth-place of a love resembling the heavenly love, and the home of the heart's early discipline, is also — and doubtless for this reason — the instrument divinely ordained for the introduction of the soul into the ways of the life of God and into his kingdom; which, accordingly, has its natural and best growth in and through families.

But as the family is the fold where individual souls receive their first nurture, so the church is, properly, a nursery of families, wherein they are planted, as it were, that they may be engrafted with a new, divine life, so as to grow strong and beautiful in holy love. The church is the guardian of the idea of this love; and endows therewith all who welcome her care. Under her hand it is, that the family is sanctified and becomes an integral Christian power. If we ask, *How?* the answer is: Through the influence of its atmosphere, its sunlight of divine wisdom, its presence of the Holy Ghost; and, specifically, through a solemn observance of the sacrament of baptism, and fidelity to its vow. Household worship and instruction may, indeed, fall short of this standard; but if so, the church fulfils its office, when faithful to its trust, in vividly remind-

ing its members of their neglect, and compelling them to sit in judgment on their fault.

But baptized children are children of the church itself; which has a distinct responsibility of its own concerning them, and finds its most natural, reliable, and valuable growth in maturing them into full membership. The church that is truly wise in its ways, aims to secure to the child of its baptism an effective Christian nurture, and through the season of early youth to guard him so skilfully, and encompass him with influences so sweet and potent, that, on reaching years of reflection, he shall voluntarily ratify his baptism, and, owning himself the Lord's, remember ever after with gratitude the love that has been so faithful to him, and look upon the church as a true family of God (a fragment of his universal household), which has been keeping a place for him, and waiting and watching for his coming, gently drawing and leading him along, until at last it has joyfully, with open arms, received him, to go no more out. Few churches realize this picture. But, ah! we are barbarians yet, and have not learned the civilities of our new home.

But furthermore, not for its children alone, but for all its members, the church is, properly, a spiritual *home*. All who enter a church which fulfils its ideal, find a home-life there, that nurtures and disciplines them in spiritual strength; if any fall, they are tenderly helped to rise; and partition walls are so broken down that the poor and rich are not shut out from each other's respect and sympathy — the envy and contempt which are the subversion of society being themselves slain, and the love of God shed abroad throughout all ranks and classes, making them *one*.

No church can be found, perhaps, that has steadily, for a long course of years, accomplished all this; but many have for brief periods realized such an ideal; and it is the standard towards which all strive, and which will at last be reached. A communion that is small in numbers furnishes such a home to its members so long as the tone of its piety

is really warm; but in a large church, many of whose members seldom meet except in the sanctuary, for worship, and among whom strong repellances frequently exist, *special arrangements* need to be devised for promoting such a Christian intercourse as shall bring the rich and poor, the refined and rude, the born conservative and the born radical, to a mutual understanding. The prayer of the Saviour is not fulfilled until his disciples have become *one*. His last command is not obeyed until they love one another. This unity in love cannot be made real and be kept up without intercourse; and, in most churches, an effective Christian intercourse—such as shall make the church a true household of the Lord, a home and refuge of souls tempted and distressed—cannot be maintained, except upon some carefully matured system.

But still again, the church is not only a home, it is also a *practical school* for its members; and a part of its office is, to build them up in the knowledge of God's will, in knowledge and spiritual understanding.

True wisdom is that comprehension of God's will in reference to the affairs of life, in which we see things as he sees them. It is essential, not only to progress in holiness, but to an advance in anything truly good. Without it, men know nothing as they ought to know; and though ever learning, never come to knowledge. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of it; and he only who doeth the truth cometh to its light. For it is not an acquisition of mere intellect, like natural science; but a gift of God, and the fruit of an active experience in godliness. He who would know the life divine, must always be living it. Wanderers from Christ's ways stumble among dark mountains.

Whoso enters the church, therefore, which is the true family of God on earth, has a right to trust that he is entering a school, where arrangements have been carefully perfected that will help him to grow in the practical knowledge of God's will. The new disciple, in the dawning of his Christian apprehensions, may justly anticipate,

that in joining Christ's household, he goes where he will come into such living contact with duty, that he will be helped to apprehend it and will be led to apply Christian principles to the shaping of his whole life; so that it shall come to pass, that his daily acts shall be carving, in God's imperishable memory and in the immortal substance of his own soul, an image of divine beauty.

So far, then, as it is possible for the church to thrust questions of moment upon its members, in such a way as to compel a decision of them under strong Christian influences and on Christian principles, it is manifestly its duty to do so. If it can so shape its structure and its usages as to bring home forcibly to the hearts of believers the solemn *thou shalt* of Christ's law, in the varied fulness of its meaning, if it can make this ever vivid, imperative, pressing; if it can necessitate a decision, an adoption; if it can habituate its members to such decisions and to such adoption, multiplying the forms in which the great question comes, so that it shall cover all issues, public and private, it will, in all this, be but fulfilling the appropriate, peculiar office of a church of Christ. For, as the world works in the hearts of all men, to produce its own image there, so the church, God's kingdom within the world, works in the hearts of all its members, restoring the lost likeness of the glory of God; stimulating dormant spiritual powers and employing them as fast as they are developed, so that by exercise they ripen into character.

Now it is very clear that no fitful efforts or temporary expedients suffice for such results, and indeed nothing short of a permanent habit that is equivalent to organization. The very structure of the church, indeed, has to be moulded with a reference to this end, and in such a manner, that so long as the church shall continue to exist, it cannot fail of continuing this essential part of its work.

For it is impossible that a Christian should grow in wisdom, except by the use of such wisdom as he already owns. He needs, and his whole nature cries out for, the

privilege of responsibility in counselling and laboring in behalf of the interests of Christ's kingdom. An opportunity to do this, to the full measure of his ability, is his want and his right, and every church is bound so to adjust its structure and usages as to afford all possible facilities and motives to its members for such associate counsel and effort. It has no more right to take from them opportunities and incitements for doing the word of God than for learning it; and is as much bound to secure the one as to furnish the other. And this obligation of the church to its members agrees with its duty to itself; for the development of individual spirituality and power in an associate church-action, is but a developement of the church's own power; and the service which she owes to her Head is not rendered, if it include not this.

The correctness of these observations is, if possible, even more obvious when we come to consider the *third* great duty and end of the church, to wit, *the Christianization of mankind*.

The earthly kingdom of God is ordained to the conquest of the world. Every church has a part in this work of divine love, and is impelled thereto by its own love, which is its life; nor can it cease from this holy yearning and labor, while any souls remain in bondage, without entering the shadow of death. The church lives, only as it is animated by the love of God. The energy of its love is the measure of its vitality. It was by virtue of having this love, and consecrating itself wholly thereto, that it became a church at the first; and only by continuing as it begun, can it retain its character as a municipality of Heaven. Nor is the exercise of a Christly love more the duty of any one church member than of every other. For only as partaking of it are any of them members of his body at all. The glorious work of the Lord is no more the property of a particular class than is the privilege of loving him; and every one who loves is not only permitted, but is bound,

to labor for him; being the faith that shows not itself by works is counted dead, since it is dead.

Every individual member of Christ's body, in that he is a member, is held to Christ's work; and the measure of his opportunity and ability is the sole measure of his duty. The antipodes are embraced in his field, if he can reach them, and the dwellers on the uttermost islands are his neighbors, if it is possible for him to touch them with the blessing of a Christian deed or word.

Nor has any creature a right to interpose an obstacle to such exercise of Christian love on the part of any disciple toward any human being; least of all may the church do it. On the contrary, it is the most solemn duty of the church to furnish every possible help to this love's working; and this, both for the sake of its own children and of them that are without. It was, indeed, organized for this very purpose, to wit: that God's people might, through combination and method, be able to do more for each other and the world than was possible if they should act separately. A church, therefore, which should refuse or omit to open the door of Christian usefulness to its members, to throw upon them the responsibility essential to a steady and effective activity, and to favor in all ways, the best development of their energies, in private efforts and in public united labors, would not merely be unfaithful, but would stultify itself, contradicting the acknowledged end of its existence.

Every member of every church has property in that church's work, which no man may take from him; it is his birthright, a part of his inheritance as a saint. He owns the privilege of doing as much of it as divine providence renders possible. If he receives from the Spirit a word of wisdom, it is his duty to contribute that; if a gift of exhortation and "prophecy," it is his privilege to exercise it; if of help, or of government, knowledge of tongues, a gift of teaching, of comforting, or of reclaiming, it is his privilege to exercise that; if he is clothed with a spirit of prayer or a knowledge of mysteries, or if he is able only to

walk humbly, in meekness and in fear, or if, shut out from all activity, he can only silently endure, while his body wastes and life's fountains break, — whatever, under the ordering of Infinite Wisdom, he is able to do, that it is his privilege and duty to do; and he may justly claim of every man and of every human organization, that no hinderance be thrust in his way; and that the whole kingdom of God be united in rendering him every possible help.

From all this it follows: 1. That every church is bound to instruct its members in the duty of thus putting *into life* their love to all men; and of combining for mutual help in fulfilling this love's high behest.

2. That every church is bound, as a church, to incite and assist its members in all such labors.

3. In order that they may be incited, it is bound to impose upon them, in the most impressive and authoritative manner, *the responsibility* of doing the Lord's work.

4. That they may be assisted, it is bound so to arrange its own structure and usages, that this responsibility shall always bear directly upon all, and opportunity for meeting it be always open to all.

5. In order that responsibility and opportunity may be thus universal, the structure and usage of the church must make its work the duty, not of a select few, but of the entire membership.

6. But as each church is an organized society, and must be, its structure provides for leadership, and the due ordering and portioning out of labor; in which, of course, every member cannot have the same office, or be doing at every time the same work or kind of work. Indeed, while the general structure of the church proclaims its own fundamental law, declaring, "all we are brethren," many of its details furnish a commentary thereto, saying with equal emphasis, "in honor preferring one another," "he that is greatest among us is as the younger, and he that is chief as he that doth serve." But all distinctions are made solely with a view to Christian efficiency; the question of church

polity being, properly, not a question of authority, rank, and dominion, but of instruments, adjustments, and modes of usefulness. But it is desirable to examine, still more minutely, certain particulars of church organization.

As already stated, the ends of the local church are, the worship of God, the building up of its members in Christ's likeness, and the Christianization of the world, particularly of the community in which the church itself stands.

The first of these objects ordinarily demands that the members regularly assemble in one place; and therefore limits their number to as many as can do this without too great inconvenience.

It is desirable, however, that churches be large. Large churches and congregations demand and create church leaders and teachers of superior abilities; are more dignified, impressive, and powerful, than the same numbers broken into feeble fragments; and favor a varied development of Christian activity and growth. A people gathered into noble churches is better off than one whose worshipping congregations are individually despicable from their smallness.

The other two objects demand (A) *in general*: 1. That all the members of the church *take an interest* in its work, and, accordingly, that they *share* in the work and in its responsibility. This is necessary, as has been already shown, to the church's greatest efficiency for good, alike upon those without and those within; to the greatest amount of Christian work and of Christian growth. The claim in behalf of the members is, not to power as such, but to power as the necessary means of their growth in the divine life and their most telling service in Christ's work. Whatsoever is essential to these two ends is their's by divine right.

It is not enough that questions of practical moment be rightly decided by somebody, whom the church shall blindly and unconcernedly follow; but, so far as possible, they must be decided by the church. The household of God is not

constituted for the purpose of educating a few, merely, into the wisdom of the "mind of Christ," but of putting all its members, individually and collectively, in possession of it. The church itself, therefore, the whole church — if possible, every member — should be brought face to face with the issues that involve foundation principles of truth and duty, be made to see and to feel their glory and imperative authority, and, under that impression, to decide. Thus should the decision be the act of the church — done in the light.

Wherefore, so much of authority necessarily belongs to the members of a church as suffices to awaken a living interest and sense of responsibility. But there can be no feeling of responsibility where there is not a consciousness of power. The power, therefore, must largely, must substantially, rest with the membership of the church.

And this, furthermore, because its strength cannot otherwise be fully called out. If it be understood that responsibility for the work of the church is confined to one man, set over it and salaried for that specific purpose, or to a limited number, named, chosen, and consecrated thereto, then obviously it is also understood that the church's own immediate responsibility is met when it has thus provided itself with laborers. The work that is not theirs, they will not think of attempting; nor can the inertia of indolence and preoccupation be overcome, while they feel no responsibility; nor will they feel it until it exists. When the church itself is the responsible power, then will it act with a sense of direct accountability and as under its great Taskmaster's eye; not before. Furthermore still: No men are *able* to put forth all their power, though ever so desirous of doing it, upon work in which they do not feel a property, and which is not theirs; and any society or combination of men must have conferences and discussions in order to reach, and to diffuse among its members, the best views and the highest enthusiasm, and secure a fusion of warm hearts in one glowing purpose. But it is futile, and so it is impossible, to confer and discuss on questions of practical interest,

unless something can be decided and done. In a word, there must be power in the church, or it is powerless. This power properly extends, not to matters of secondary consequence merely, but,

(2) The *supreme* local authority is in the church as a whole, acting through its leaders and according to its law.

The choice of the highest officers—even those of apostolic dignity—the admission, exclusion, and readmission of members, in fine, the *supreme acts* were thus performed while the apostles were living, and can only be safely and wisely performed in the same manner now. The questions of truth and duty involved in *fundamental decisions* are the very matters which believers most need to study, under an immediate sense of solemn, personal responsibility; for only by such prayerful and earnest inquiry after God's way can they be quickened in spiritual wisdom, and grow to the stature of men in Christ Jesus. The gospel is a system of great truths and of great precepts; and it is one of its ends to train men to a familiarity with those thoughts that take hold on eternity, withdrawing them from an exclusive interest in small things, and stirring their souls with things infinite. A mighty, purifying, and enlarging influence is poured through the hearts of a people who are thus led to familiarize themselves with the fundamental principles of the heavenly kingdom; nor is it always found, by any means, that they who excel in knowledge and acumen are the best learners in this nobler lore. Out of the mouths of those who in such things are but babes, has God often perfected praise. Wholly to withhold from church members a motive and responsibility for the study of the highest and deepest questions, is to balk one of the main ends for which the church exists, to debase the church itself, to cripple its power, and imperil its life. For if this life be removed from the members of the body and centered in some local ruling organs, the body is no longer celestial, vital everywhere, but has taken on mortality, and, if wounded in one of those vital parts, may die. In its essential idea, the church is the union

of God with man, the presence of Christ in those who have become branches of the Vine. But the omnipresence of God does not divide him into parts, or allow one place to have more of him than another. So, the pure idea of the church demands that God and his action be in all its members; and this is the idea which we are to try to realize. Every soul in the church is to be both instructed and exercised in the fundamental principles, the great truths and precepts which make up the heavenly wisdom, so that the whole body of believers shall be alive with the thoughts of God, and the life of the church shall have its centre everywhere, and thus be indestructible save by annihilation of all its members.

The churches early lost the spirit of the gospels and the epistles, departed from the apostolic maxims and the precepts of Christ, tolerated horrible *shams*, stripped themselves of their immortality, fell into dreary decays, desolations, and death; and some into a life worse than death, which may be called a second death, since they died, not into extinction, but into vile and base action. Had the ancient purity and fraternity been maintained by the churches, what graves of perished glory had now been empty, what deserts were now gardens of the Lord.

The body of Christ, in its proper form, is vital everywhere; not a monarchy, or an oligarchy, nor yet a democracy, or any form of dominion known among earthly powers, but, in contradistinction from all, a *fraternity*, having its unity in that oneness of spirit which comes of its union with Christ, the indwelling of God. It knows no coercion, except such as resides in truth, in love, and in the Holy Ghost. The church is a fraternity, because all its members are such solely by virtue of their oneness in the Spirit, who graciously imparts himself to all, and whose eternal power is in all. The church is a fraternity; and the question, Who is greatest? is without pertinency here; since he who humbled himself, even to death, and that the most ignominious, taking the form of a servant, and not hesitating to stoop

down and wash the feet of his followers, he is the Lord and Master of all. So that they are nearest the Master who are the lowliest of the brethren, and their servants ; and the least is the greatest — a paradox which signifies that here such terms as great and small have no place. The church is a fraternity, therefore, whose members, submitting themselves one to another in the fear of God and in honor preferring one another, esteem very highly in love, for their *works*' sake, them that are over them in the Lord, receiving them with gladness, holding them in honor, and thankfully striving to obey their holy admonitions and counsels. For it is not to be forgotten that,

3. Each church has its *leaders*, who are, not its governors, having dominion, but helpers of its joy, in counseling, planning, preparing matters for consideration, promoting a general understanding, agreement, and interest, and securing a proper dignity, deliberation, system, and vigor of execution.

Churches have always had leaders. They ought never to have had rulers. In the world,¹ men "exercise dominion" and "authority ;" but, said our Lord : "it shall not be so among you." "One is your Master, even Christ ; all ye are brethren." The apostle disclaimed domination ; and all who have since assumed it in the name of Christ and his church, have so far put themselves out of the line of the apostolic succession.

"Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty ;" but where the Spirit of the Lord is not, true liberty is impossible. It is one of the lamentable consequences of the admission to the church of persons not in union with the Spirit but still in voluntary alienation from God, that there speedily springs up, within her bounds, either some counterfeit of liberty, or an authority, the very idea of which is fundamentally at variance with the character of the church as a kingdom *not* of this world. So, likewise, the imposition of such rule checks that divine communion and

inspired, spontaneous activity, in which is the secret of perpetual growth and purity.

4. Each church properly has one chief leader, upon whom responsibility centers, who is specially educated for his work, and gives himself wholly to it, the "servant of all." This is demanded by the nature of the church's work, and accords with fundamental principles, which decree that every organization, to be complete, must have a head, and that every distinct work, to be properly cared for, must be put into the hands, not of many, but of one, who shall be mainly accountable.

5. If it be possible, church acts should be done with a unanimous consent of the members.

If differences exist, Christian charity and expediency both demand, in cases where delay is possible, that time be taken for prayer and counsel; and Christians counsel best with one another when they unitedly take counsel of God. The Father gives the Holy Spirit to them that ask him; Christ is with his disciples to the end of the world, and they that seek him find him. The numerous quarrels among believers are but an exemplification of that vanity of mind and darkness of understanding still prevailing even among good men, who, notwithstanding they have turned unto God, are yet in part "alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." The remedy for this is to be found in counselling together in prayer. Tricks of organization may hide, they cannot heal.

Such, very briefly, are the outlines of the general arrangements needful to secure the internal and external usefulness of particular churches. We come next to consider, more in detail, (B) What is necessary to a church's *internal efficiency*.

It is bound to prove itself a true home of souls, a household of instruction, nurture, and consolation, to all its members. Hence it must provide, (1) For *public worship*. (The discussion of this topic we are obliged to omit.) (2) For *general instruction*. Accordingly, there must be at

least one man in the church who has access to all the important sources of knowledge on divine things; who has, furthermore, the leisure to prosecute his work of study and instruction thoroughly; and who, from long familiarity, becomes acquainted with the peculiar wants of his people. In short, the church must have a teacher, thoroughly furnished unto every good work, educated for this sacred ministry unto spiritual wants, freed from worldly cares, and permanently settled and consecrated to this one only employment, a shepherd of souls, knowing how to lead them into the pastures of divine knowledge, and to the living waters.

But one man cannot give all the instruction that is wanted; and all who are able to teach, do themselves need, for their own good, the privilege of imparting what they have to give. The church should see, therefore, that in Sunday schools and in Bible classes, and in family circles under the care of Christian parents, this work is faithfully prosecuted; and it ought to be at all times informed respecting the fidelity or the lack of fidelity with which these blessed privileges are improved.

But the church that is to prove itself a true home of souls, must not only provide for worship and instruction, but also, (3) For *familiar intercourse* among its members.

The best Christian intimacy is secured in social "neighborhood prayer-meetings," in classes for the study of the scriptures, and in associated labors among the young, the sick, the poor, the ignorant, and the erring. Let every church bring as many of its members as possible into such Christian contact. Nothing else will so quicken their mutual love, or furnish such favorable opportunities for an interchange of experience, sympathy, and counsel.

But there will always be some, and generally many, who cannot thus be brought together. For the benefit of such, and indeed of all, *social assemblies* for conversation and the promotion of acquaintance and friendship, are desirable. It is wonderful how the crust is broken from off dried hearts by a few expressions of cordial sympathy or friendly regard;

and how persons who, through seclusion and care, had long been growing selfish may have their latent Christian feeling suddenly kindled into a bright blaze of affection by a single evening's intercourse; and how those who, through diversity of temperament and education, had been unable to understand each other, have the mist taken from their eyes by one hour's frank talk. Those who cannot be united in the intimacies of social worship and of personal Christian labor, must therefore, if possible, be at least brought face to face thus in friendly conversation. But there are some who withhold themselves, or are withheld, even from this. And such must be *visited at their homes*, not by the church's "servant of all" alone, but by others also; and that this may not fail to be done, definite arrangements need to be made to secure it. Again, it is not easy to see why the plan of dividing the membership of a large church into suitable portions, which should severally be committed to the fraternal watch and care of fit persons from among their own number, is not well conceived.

Finally, it should be the study of the church and its leaders to secure the greatest possible variety of labor, and to impose distinct responsibilities upon as many as it can. Thus shall a variety of capabilities be developed and cultivated, while numerous opportunities shall be afforded for that intercourse which is strength and comfort. The mere effort to do all this, in the conscious purpose of making the church a spiritual home, will go far toward accomplishing the end.

We must next consider, somewhat in detail, (C) What is needful to a church's *external efficiency*.

The first thing necessary is, that the church, *recognizing* its duty toward those without, should proceed to organize itself after the general manner just described. By this organization the church becomes a regular and complete society for Christian aggression. The next thing to be done is, to ascertain and define its field. Every church occupies a parish. Every bishop has a diocese. To every church is committed, of God, a certain community, which

it is to Christianize ; its members not omitting, of course, to join their brethren of other churches in sending the gospel to them that are outside the bounds of any particular congregations.

Having fixed upon the limits of its own field, the church next determines the work to be done therein ; settles what is now possible, and, through its leaders, divides this work into varieties and quantities, to suit the capabilities and the leisure of its different members.

It provides for Christian instruction, not from the pulpit alone, but in Sunday schools, Bible classes, and children's meetings. It furnishes opportunities for worship and for awakening, cherishing, and correcting religious feelings and aims, not in the sanctuary alone, but also in neighborhood prayer meetings and lectures. It strives to reach some of those who stand aloof, by an organized and systematic visitation of them in their own homes, a distribution of tracts and Bibles, and of such charities as may be needed by those who are poor, and, better than all, by *readings of the Bible* to the illiterate and to any who are willing to hear. These labors are readily followed up in the neighborhood meetings, already mentioned, which afford opportunities for the most varied religious instruction and impression.

These several departments of Christian labor, with such others as the condition of the community may demand, need superintendents, whose duty it shall be to see that each is vigorously conducted, and to keep the whole church informed of all success and failure, so that all its members may have a share in the whole work and in the Christian interest which it creates.

Nor is it enough that the facts should somehow be communicated to the members individually. The church does not know them until they have been stated in her presence, and the members are not likely to appreciate them until they have been publicly reported and made a subject of fraternal conference and of prayer. No amount of pains in spreading the information privately would in-

sure the results that can be gained by its communication to the church, in due form, in one of its solemn assemblies.

"Tell it unto the church," therefore, is a fundamental article in church polity; and applies not only to cases of discipline, but to all matters of church interest, and especially to its own success or failure in its own work. The omission to observe this has been the occasion of much want of success. Any other society might as well neglect to make report, to itself and to those whom it wishes to interest, of what it has done; and organizations for the prosecution of Christian missions and for the exercise of political rule, could as well afford to be ignorant of their own doings as the church can.

Wherefore it is of essential importance to the church's efficiency and well-being, that it regularly assemble for hearing reports concerning all its labor, from that of the bishop to that of the youngest and the most preoccupied member, and for prayer and counsel thereupon. Thus only is it brought into contact with its whole field, and kept acquainted with the progress of its whole work for Christianizing the population entrusted to its care. So may it become a "living creature, going whithersoever the Spirit goes," and, "vital in every part, cannot but by annihilating, die." Thus doth it prove itself the "body of Christ," being instinct with his Spirit, showing forth his beauty, continuing his work, participating in his joy—a fulness of him who filleth all in all.

Suppose, now, the power of the church of God and the dominion over all churches and Christians to be put into the hands of a guild of experts, who, from generation to generation hold this control, under the claim of a divine commission, and exercise absolute authority, as in place of God, and as being the sole appointed channels of his grace. How alien from the Christian idea of the church would such an organization be, and for *Christian* uses how feeble. The life is all concentrated in the head,

which drags the mass of the body after it, an obedient, but a passive, and hardly vital, load.

Or suppose *all* responsibility within the local church to be centered in one leader or rector, who shall do all that is done, alone by himself, or else by his own authoritative direction. How unworthily would this, again, realize the idea of a household of Christ, a band of apostles, a brotherhood of disciples.

Still again, gather all the power and responsibility into the hands of a few, elected, if you please, or their nomination consented unto, by the church. With the sense of responsibility, and the necessity of Christian oversight and effort, you have largely centered also the Christian interest, and your organization still but feebly realizes the idea of a Christian church. Relax this centralization; allow to the members the privilege of taking a part in prayer meetings, in Sunday schools and Bible classes and religious visitation; in other words, concede to them duty, prerogative, responsibility, a real share in the church's living being and work, and, with every such step, you come nearer the pattern given in the New Testament, and furnish a better expression of the Christian spirit and aim.

But start, now, with the idea of our Lord, upon which he sought to found a new society among men: "all ye are brethren"; adopt the law, Thou shalt *love* God supremely and thy neighbor as thyself, as the organizing principle of your society, and an embodiment of its aim, which is, the perfecting its members and the whole world in that divine life of love which the law defines; in accordance with this law, make your society a *brotherhood*,—not like those of earth, in a temporal tie for a temporal end, but in an eternal bond and for an eternal end; cause all your methods and detail of rules and procedures to breathe the same spirit of divine brotherhood; arrange everything so as to express, infuse, and cherish this spirit; lean on this spirit—the indwelling of God; make this the life and power and hope and aim of your society; educate all its

members, not only to labor for such divine indwelling in themselves and others, but to be associated, so far as possible, in all this their labor and experience; do this wisely, i. e. by a systematic and orderly division and combination, under the counsel and lead of such as are best fitted by the Spirit of God for such leadership; do all this, and you have established and set in motion a true church of Jesus Christ, modelled after his own precepts and the example and teachings of the apostles—a body full of life, and exactly fitted for its work; a work that stands alone among all the doings of earth, single in its immeasurable importance, its essential grandeur, its infinite excellence, its eternal effect and power. It is not strange that such a work should require an instrumentality also peculiar. And it does; in all the world there is not another society like the church. The family comes nearest to it, but is still unlike. Every church, when rightly organized and rightly acting, is an organization in which the world cannot help seeing an embodiment of Christ. His spirit is its vital principle, and moulds every feature and motion into an expression of itself.

The “Jerusalem which is above” “is the mother of us all.” There are those who are fond of bestowing this endearing and venerable name upon an earthly and imperfect society. So far as any such society can justly be viewed as one with the church universal, the honor is not misapplied; but in proportion to the discrepancy which may in any case exist, it becomes an abuse of terms. There are theories, however, which seem to demand it. It is natural for those who in effect limit the term “church” to certain privileged individuals constituting a teaching and ruling hierarchy; in whose theories the church is viewed as seated on high, aloof from the multitude, whom she governs and feeds with a certain superior and matronly condescension; it is very natural for such to speak of the particular denomination of their love as “mother church”; for when they laud and magnify her authority and dignity, they are

thinking of the authority and dignity attributed to these higher "orders," from whose consecrating touch is supposed to flow the very essential power and substance of God; the mass of believing mankind being, thus, rather members off, than of, the church — dependent, not constituent.

Thanks be to God for a revelation of the truth; which sublimely contradicts these creations of a lordly fancy, unveiling "the mystery," so long concealed, that it is the very end and consummation of God's kingdom here, that all partition walls having been broken down, this divided race should be made one in Christ, whose last commandment, "love," "as I have loved," shall then define the terms of human relation and intercourse. The prevalence of a habit of life in accord with this command is the prevalence of the church. When it has been reached, and our Lord has drawn all the race after him into brotherhood, and the tired world has rested on her Sabbath-day, and the heavens and the earth are ripe for renewal, then shall "the Jerusalem that is the mother" welcome all her earthly children home, with a public greeting and the fulness of her impartial love.

We, too, believe in "Mother Church"; and, lifting that name above its lower use, we dedicate it to the church invisible, immortal, universal; while our beloved fellow-disciples here, we delight to look upon as a *brotherhood*. Bound in tenderest ties of equality and oneness, all confessing, a like, just condemnation, trusting in the same redemption, sustained by the same hope of eternal life, together striving against sin, bearing one another's burdens, rejoicing together in tribulations, helpers of each other unto the end, and crowned at last with one joy of their Lord, every company of believers on earth, and the whole together, is a true household of Christ — a brotherhood. Nor do we confine this intimate and endearing name to the church on earth; for THE CHURCH is all a glorious brotherhood — militant, triumphant — martyred, crowned — with garments stained, and garments washed white — through weary centuries here, throughout eternal ages of rest — it is one

undivided family, an *eternal* brotherhood. And it is with peculiar joy that we remember, that many who have been counted among "the last" here, and have meekly borne their lot of poverty and toil, shall shine as stars there, and stand noble pillars in the temple of our God; that all things shall blessedly be "made even" there—they that have mourned shall be comforted, all that have hungered after righteousness shall be filled, and the pure in heart—many of them so doubtful and timid in time—in eternity shall see God.

Beautiful and glorious, exceedingly, is the church, seen thus in her proper image, as designed of God; holy, full of worship and of Christly labor and sacrifice, a home of souls, fragrant with piety, an atmosphere of truth, a spring of healing wherein Christ's living waters flow for all that have sinned; a peaceful shelter for the weary, the tempted, the broken-hearted—outcast from a scornful world; the sacred and pure temple of God wherein his presence shines with a lustre unknown and impossible to suns and stars or to forms of merely sentient being; God's hand, with which he blesses his creation; Christ's body, clothed with his beauty, fulfilling his work, entering into his joy; the dwelling-place of the Holy Ghost; the blessed Brotherhood of the Just.

Organisms material and finite, have finite times. But this, in which God takes man into union with himself, shares God's day.

The principles and duties which we have been contemplating, as we have turned our thoughts upon that ever-glorious kingdom, the church of the blessed Redeemer, are full of sublime consolation and incitement. Here is a peaceful harbor. Here an endless, satisfying work. Meditation on these things is communion with God. We cannot have too much of it. No man can make such thoughts too familiar, or inculcate them too earnestly. The doctrine of the church is of the very substance and richness of the gospel; and is essential to the gospel's prevalence, not only

throughout the world, but throughout any local community. And more, a church whose communicants are not duly instructed in their privileges and duties as members of Christ's body, cannot itself maintain a proper Christian steadfastness or joy. The truths embodied in the "doctrine of the church" are essential to the progress and to the stability of the church. Wherefore "thou shalt *teach* them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up."

"Ye that make mention of the Lord, keep not silence."

ARTICLE VII.

THE HISTORIC CHARACTER OF THE PENTATEUCH.

BY REV. S. C. BARTLETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THAT the five books of Moses retain their hold on the confidence of intelligent men, certainly is not due to any special forbearance with which they have been treated in modern times. For a long time, and more particularly during the present century, much of the ablest scholarship in the world has been engaged in assaults, direct and indirect, upon their credibility and authority. And last of all, the appointed expounders and sworn defenders of the word have gone forth from the interior of the citadel to aid the enemy.

Let the sacred books be subjected to every legitimate test. Only let there be judicial fairness. Let no man come with a theory which absolutely precludes evidence of facts in advance, or prescribes to God that he cannot interpose in the world that he made. No man may *assume* that the narrative of a miracle is proof that that account is "not

contemporary with the alleged event," or pronounce it "absurd to suppose that one man [Moses] could have created beforehand the epico-historical, the rhetorical, and poetical style in all their extent and compass, and perfected these three departments of Hebrew literature."¹ Let no man ask us to heed his mere arbitrary assertion that the alleged length of patriarchal life is "intrinsically impossible."² We cannot be expected to accept in advance the result of the modern dissection of the Pentateuch, till its latest, ablest, and most dogmatic advocates can unite on some *result* — whether with Tuch (in 1838) they will recognize an Elohist and his supplementer the Jehovist, or with Gramberg (in 1828), two documents and a compiler, or with Hupfeld (in 1853), three documents combined by a later editor, or with Knobel (in 1861), a ground-writing, a law-book, a war-book, a Jehovist, and a "Deuteronomiker," or with Ewald (in 1851), seven different narratives modified by other subsequent writers, or with Hartmann (in 1837), a multitude of fragments, greater and smaller, strung together. We might, perhaps, be more profoundly impressed beforehand by the names arrayed against the Mosaic authorship of the books, could the deniers but agree on their date and authors within eight hundred or a thousand years.³

We do not wish to deny or conceal the fact that many difficult questions can be raised concerning the record as we now have it. They are mostly difficulties of detail, often arising clearly from brevity and omission, sometimes apparently from errors of transcription. The means of solving difficulties of the latter class are greatly restricted, because we cannot, as in the New Testament, have recourse to the earlier manuscripts. After the final settlement of the Masoretic text, about the eleventh century, the ancient

¹ De Wette's Introduction to the Old Test., Parker's Trans., Vol. II. pp. 36 and 161.

² Bunsen's "Egypt's Place in Universal History," Vol. IV. pp. 391, 395.

³ Thus, in the year 1860, Delitzsch holds that the Pentateuch was completed by some of the elders who outlived Joshua, while, in 1861, Knobel (on Numbers, etc.) places the author of Deuteronomy in the reign of Josiah.

copies were allowed to perish; so that now we cannot go back of the Masoretic revision and the various readings which it furnishes.¹ While there is no reason to believe that the preservation of the older manuscripts would have made any *essential* difference in the readings, there is as little reason to doubt that it would have aided in solving some minor difficulties; for there are many instances in which the judgment of these editors was at fault in regard to the text as it stands.

Meanwhile we may properly demand time for the removal of difficulties on those subjects which are still under investigation. And on points where, from the brevity of the narrative and the remoteness of the transaction from all other means of knowledge, we can expect no further information, we may sometimes rightfully fall back upon the legal and common-sense principle, that, when once the main facts are established and the chief details found unexceptionable, in the absence of evidence a plausible or even possible solution is a sufficient answer to a theoretical objection or a minor difficulty.

It is proposed in the present Article to set forth the Historic Character of the Pentateuch, with a view to the still more important question of its inspiration.

In approaching these writings, the first question that meets us relates to the character of the record. Are we dealing with a sober narrative, with a pure fiction, or with a fiction founded on fact? Give us a fixed starting-point, from which, among other uses, we may be able to estimate the internal testimony of the record in its own behalf. Is there any evidence of the general credibility of the book? It has been quite customary for modern critics to draw the

¹ Davidson's *Biblical Criticism*, Vol. I. pp. 131, 370. De Rossi assigns one MS. (Cod. 634) to the eighth century, and one (Cod. 503) to the ninth and tenth centuries. Pinner found at Odessa a MS. purporting to have been corrected A.D. 580, but bearing marks of having been written at a much later date. Besides these, no others are assigned to a period earlier than the eleventh century.

line between history and legend as late, at least, as the reign of Solomon, because from that time forward collateral proofs are more abundant, while in earlier times the record has been thought to proceed for ages alone. De Wette terms the early narrative of the Pentateuch a "a theocratical mythology."¹ Tuch regards it as hovering between the "saga" and the "myth."² Mr. Goodwin complacently remarks that, while the narrator of the creation "asserts so solemnly and unhesitatingly that for which he must have known that he had no authority," yet "we are not on that account to doubt his perfect good faith," inasmuch as he gave us his view of the "probabilities" of the case, and that view, though now proved to be "physically untenable," has "for ages satisfied the wants of man, and formed a sufficient basis of theological teaching."³ Colenso maintains "that the Pentateuch as a whole cannot possibly have been written by Moses, or by any one personally acquainted with the facts it professes to describe; and further, that the (so-called) Mosaic narrative cannot be regarded as historically true"; and more particularly that "the narrative of the Exodus is full of contradictions" which "affect the entire substance of it."⁴

We affirm, then, that the evidences of the general credibility of the Pentateuch, of its genuine historic character, are abundant and irrefutable. We speak of it, for the present, *as a whole*, leaving some of its details for further consideration.

I. There runs through the whole narrative a main line of well-established facts, and these chiefly test-facts of the volume.

1. Foremost of all, science has now, in almost every particular, fully confirmed the Bible narrative of the course or order of creation. We speak advisedly of the events in

¹ De Wette's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 22.

² Tuch's Kommentar, Einleitung, pp. 8-10.

³ Essays and Reviews, Am. Ed., pp. 277, 278.

⁴ Colenso on the Pentateuch, pp. 49, 206.

their order. The real state of the case has been largely kept out of sight by disproportionate discussion of the word "day." Waive that discussion for the present, and let the word, whether as used in a broad sense (e.g. as in Gen. ii. 4), or as a definite term symbolically representing a protracted period,¹ be understood as the narration not only permits (since the first days were not measured by the light of the sun), but as its exigencies seem to require — a day corresponding to God's day of rest, and allowing time (which twenty-four hours do not) for the flowing of the waters (Gen. i. 9) to their place. Accept the optical or at least phenomenal nature of the description, indicated in verses 15th and 16th, where the relations of the sun and moon are described simply according to outward appearance, and not according to scientific principles.² Accept also the obvious principle, that, when such immense transactions are described in the compass of thirty-one verses, it must be done

¹ We are not staggered by either mode of view. One consideration, which would go far to justify the former or figurative meaning is, that, in describing things strictly unique, a term must be employed in a corresponding manner. The word *יְהוּמָה* in the second verse, for example, can hardly designate such a "deep" as in its ordinary use. The day of creation may as well be peculiar as the day of visitation or of salvation, or the day of judgment. Still, the emphatic repetition, with the constant enumeration of its constituents, "evening and morning," inclines us to the view of Professor Barrows (Bib. Sacra, Jan. 1857), that the word "day" is to be strictly taken, and the *thing* symbolic. We aid our apprehension in this mode: Suppose the revelation to have been visional. A series of views, like a moving diorama, is separated by darkness with ensuing light — evening and morning. The transcription of the scenes forms the narrative. Now as the scene present to the vision (the map, so to call it, before the eye) represents the vast area of almost boundless space, so would the alternating darkness and light passing over it — the evening and morning that constitute a day — represent an indefinite period. This at least would conform to such a supposed method of revelation, and would seem to be the only mode of indicating intervals of time in such a mode of disclosure.

² A narrative of the creation on scientific principles would have been an insuperable obstacle in the way of the volume, almost, if not quite, down to the present time. Hence the marvellous wisdom of this narrative. It should be remembered that the palpable phenomenon marks a great underlying fact. As the statement, "the mercury is twenty degrees below zero," marks a great severity of cold, and involves many concomitants, so the appearance of the sun and moon in the heavens involves vast changes on the surface of the earth.

by broad outlines rather than by minute specifications and limitations. The record then stands forth unimpeachable.

We have the following remarkable chain of correspondences, which we state in the briefest form, and in the words of a thoroughly responsible authority. "The Bible says that man was the last creation; geology says the same. The Bible says that quadrupeds next preceded man; geology says the same. The Bible says that inferior animal species, up to reptiles, were created before quadrupeds; geology says the same. The Bible says that there was, earlier, an age without animal life; geology does the same. The Bible says that after the earth had been long in formation (for its three days), the sun, moon, and stars appeared in the heavens. Geology makes this an event long after the earth's beginning; and it may be shown to be probable, though not actually demonstrated, that this occurred after the earliest dry land appeared. The Bible says that vegetation was created with the first appearance of land, before animal life. Science gathers but indistinct records from the earth on this point, yet plainly has no counter statement; and as far as there are any indications, they favor the above.¹ The Bible says the world had a beginning; geology, by its very system of progress, points to a beginning."²

To this should be added the surprising anticipation of modern science in declaring the creation of light, independent of and prior to the light of the great luminaries; for modern science declares that the first result of chemical or molecular action in the chaotic mass would have been the production of light.³ Moreover, by the assignment of

¹ See this point expanded in Dana's *Geology*, p. 146.

² Prof. J. D. Dana, *Bib. Sacra*, July, 1857. The same positions are maintained in his *Geology* (Philadelphia, 1863), and in great measure in the views of Guyot, *Bib. Sacra*, Vol XII. p. 324, seq.; and in part in Hugh Miller's *Testimony of the Rocks*. We can only give conclusions, and refer to those discussions for details. The strength of the case can hardly be appreciated from an outline.

³ See particularly Guyot and Dana on this point, in the Articles referred to. And yet Dr. Williams repeats the obsolete cavil, *Essays and Reviews*, Am. Ed., p. 246.

man's creation to the close of the same day in which the quadrupeds were formed, with no intervening "evening," the narrative corresponds to the fact now known to science, that the origin of man was not immediately preceded by any great and general catastrophe to the previous races. And in tracing back these successive stages of creation, up to the first chaotic condition, while we cannot absolutely prove, we are led in the strongest manner to infer, by the argument of Progressive Approach, the original creation of the earth itself, as recorded in the narrative.

So remarkable is the conformity of this grand outline to the latest discoveries of science. The eminent writer from whom we have quoted, does not hesitate to call it "profoundly philosophical as a scheme of creation," and to add, "It is both true and divine."¹

Connected with this great test-fact, or rather group of facts, lie various other declarations, sustained, not by the same evidence — for the case does not admit of it — but by the only kind of testimony possible with reference to such a narrative, going back so far beyond all other history.

2. Contrary to the outward appearance, and to the common heathen doctrine of inferior and superior races, the Pentateuch boldly pronounces all men the descendants of one pair; Eve is the mother of all living. Coincident with this are the traditions of the race. "As far as I know," says Max Müller, "there has been no nation upon the earth,

¹ The only point omitted is the second day's work, as not sufficiently agreed upon. Guyot regards it as the resolution of a nebula into our solar system; Dr. Gaussen and others, as the creation of the atmosphere. We doubt the former for one strong reason — to say nothing of the forced signification of "waters," "above," and "under" — because the narrative is now confined to the earth, and does not include "the heavens," which had been already created, and from which this verse expressly distinguishes. To the view which identifies the "firmament" directly with the atmosphere, we object that it is too scientific. Our impression is, that this is a phenomenal description of the condensation of the waters, which for a long time could have existed only in the form of vapor on the heated planet, so that they formed a liquid covering around its crust, and now the waters "beneath" were divided from those above the visible welkin. Of course the phenomenon *involved* much.

which, if it possessed any traditions on the origin of mankind, did not derive the human race from one pair, if not from one person."¹ The record and the tradition are confirmed by the researches of the comparative philologist and physiologist. Not that we would claim absolute unanimity among learned men. But the constant movement of philological research has pointed more and more to a common origin of languages, while the anatomist and physiologist have been as constantly removing every objection to a common descent.

Dr. Carpenter gathers up the great voice of physical science on this subject—himself one of its most eminent exponents,—when, after an elaborate discussion, he pronounces the general conclusion “from all the anatomical, physiological, and psychical facts now known,” to be “that all the human races may have had a common origin, since they all possess the same constant characters, and differ only in those which can be shown to vary from generation to generation.”² Alexander von Humboldt utters his decided testimony, and adds that of the eminent physiologist Johannes Müller, in endorsement of the received doctrine that the diversities of the human race are but permanent varieties, and not specific differences, that “the different races of men are forms of one sole species,” and “not different species of a genus.”³ Here, also, is found the weight of such names as Buffon, Cuvier, Blumenbach, Haller, the Wagners, Prichard, Owen, Forbes, Dana. Not only have counter attempts failed to agree upon or even define the dividing marks of different human species,—so that, in the words of Dana, “if more than one species be admitted, there is scarcely a limit to the number that may be made”;⁴ but in the human species all the outward diversities are

¹ *Science of Language*, p. 341.

² *Varieties of Mankind*, in the *Cyclopedia of Anatomy and Physiology*, p. 1345 (A.D. 1852). See also a discussion by the same author in the *Edinburg Review*, October, 1846.

³ *Cosmos*, Vol. I. pp. 352, 354, Ottè's trans.

⁴ *Geology*, p. 584.

positively shown to be variable and interchangeable; the peculiar test of distinct species—sterility of the hybrid offspring—is entirely wanting in the human race; the actual differences of mankind have been shown to consist in those very characteristics in which a domesticated race of quadrupeds tends to form permanent varieties;¹ one of the chief modern arguments for a multiple origin, namely the analogical argument resting on the supposed multiple origin of animals, has been shown by Professor Edward Forbes (in 1854) to rest on a premise more than doubtful in point of fact;² while Dana further maintains that the very analogy of the animal world—each higher genus having fewer and fewer species—requires us to expect but one species in man.³ Agassiz stands out somewhat solitary in his maintenance of a diversity of “protoplasts,” and his endeavor to reconcile it with a “unity of mankind.” Carpenter explicitly declares that the theory “is not required to account for the extension of the human family over its area, and it does not afford any assistance in accounting for the phenomena of their existing distribution.”⁴ Dana rejects it, and in his last work declares that the investigations of Darwin set aside objections to an origin from one stock, arising from the diversities of the races.⁵ How lacking in scientific qualities is the reasoning of Agassiz on this subject at least, and with how

¹ Carpenter, *Varieties, etc.*, p. 1314. The characteristics are, “stature; general conformation of the body; conformation of the skull; quantity, texture, and color of the hairy covering; psychical character, as shown in the increase of intelligence, in the acquirement of new methods of action, and in the disappearance of some of the natural instinctive propensities.” Dr. Carpenter shows (p. 1338) the futility of the attempt of Dr. Browne, of Philadelphia, to maintain that the oval section of hair is peculiar to the white, the cylindrical to the Indian, and the elliptical or flat to the negro.

² Cited at large in Cabell’s *Unity of Mankind*, pp. 183, etc. He maintains that “the species of opposite hemispheres, placed under similar conditions,” as well as “species occupying similar conditions in geological formations far apart, and which conditions are not met with in intermediate formations, are *representative*, and not identical.”

³ *Geology*, p. 584.

⁴ *Varieties of Mankind*, p. 1364.

⁵ *Geology*, p. 584.

little consideration, not to say respect, it is viewed by such eminent naturalists as Quatrefages, Godron, and Wagner, the reader may learn from a recent number of this periodical.¹

Meanwhile the researches of comparative philology are yearly extending the bonds of national affinities, and pointing towards a full demonstration of the common descent of all the races of man. It was an epoch in the history of the nations, when Schlegel first grouped, under the name "Indo-Germanic," that great family of affiliated nations extending from India to England, and from the old Sanscrit down through the Greek and Persian to the modern Celt; another great stride of science when Lepsius, in 1836, successfully traced the numerals through the Indo-Germanic, Semitic, and Egyptian languages. And now many radicals have been traced through these and the Turanian tongues also; while an authority inferior, perhaps, to no other, pronounces it entirely supposable that the grammatical elements, too, of those great diverse branches of speech should have had a common origin. The strength of the case is greatly increased, as it is well put by Dr. Carpenter,² by the fact that "the linguistic affinity is often strongest where the physical conformity is weakest, and weakest where this is strongest"; the first instance being illustrated by "the Malayo-Polynesian and the American races," compared with each other; the second, by the "Chinese and typical Mongolian nations." Difficulties in the way of admitting the common origin of languages are constantly removing as the study advances; and the most eminent philologists, such as Max Müller, Latham, Grimm, Bunsen, Lepsius, are nearly as well united on this subject, as are the naturalists on the unity of the species.⁴ When

¹ Bib. Sacra, July, 1862, p. 607, seq. See also a discussion in Cabell's *Unity of Mankind*, p. 149, seq.

² Max Müller's *Science of Language*, p. 340.

³ *Varieties of Mankind*, p. 1347.

⁴ Professor Pott is the most eminent exception.

we cast into the scale the perfect psychical and moral correspondence of the human race, also the common historic traditions which, as will presently be shown, extend through the world, we may fairly consider the statement of the Pentateuch as sustained by a greater weight and variety of evidence than ordinarily can be arrayed for the facts of human belief.

3. Coincident also with the Biblical ascription of the origin of the week and of the sabbath to the earliest history of the race, is the well-known diffusion of the hebdomadal division of time among nations who can have had no communication with each other within historic periods. Astronomers (Bailly and Laplace) pronounced it the oldest monument of astronomical science.¹ It had a very wide and early diffusion among the nations. Without attempting to determine very precisely its extent, we may accept, as sufficient for our purpose, the statement of Sir J. G. Wilkinson,² that it existed in ancient Egypt, was common to all the Semitic nations, and to those of India.³ It has no obvious foundation in nature, not being the aliquot part of a month or a year, nor the multiple of any number. It has been sometimes explained as the proximate quarter of a

¹ Stated on the authority of Whewell, *Elements of Morality*, Vol. II. p. 145.

² Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. II. pp. 115, 582. We might instance other nations, as the Nigri of Africa, on the authority of Oldendorp (*Jahn's Biblical Archaeology*, sec. 102), and the inhabitants of Java on the authority of Sir Stamford Raffles (cited in *Prescott's Mexico*, Vol. I. p. 111). The *Encyclopædia Britannica* (eighth edition) asserts generally, "that this division has been employed from time immemorial in all eastern countries."

From the usual enumeration we must exclude Peru, on the authority of Prescott and others. Nor can we accept the attempt to find a seven-day period among the early Greeks (with Gurney on the Sabbath, and O'Hanlon, *Bib. Sacra*, July, 1856) on the strength of a quotation from Hesiod, that "the seventh day is sacred," and a similar mode of expression in Homer. The passage in Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 768) refers to the seventh day of the month. Moreover, he says (v. 817), "midday is pre-eminently holy." With Homer any day was *ἑρδὴν ἥμαρ* (Il. 8, 66. Od. 9, 56, etc.).

³ The separate days of the week were even named by the ancestors of the Hindoos, and these names are substantially the same as in modern Europe. See the Article by Rev. Mr. Burgess in this Periodical, Oct. 1858.

lunation; but the lunation is twenty-nine days and a half. And while we might suppose that some one tribe or nation would be satisfied with such a rude approximation, the improbable thing is that a number of nations should have done so without a common derivation. As an independent custom, a week of ten or of five days is a much more obvious arrangement; for the former divides the month almost exactly, and the latter even divides the year without a fraction. As matter of fact, the week of seven days has actually prevailed by the side of both these more convenient divisions; as in Egypt, where the month was divided into three decades, and in the island of Java, where the week of five days also existed.¹ In connection with this fact, we cannot well overlook the singular correspondence of the word "sabbath" with the numeral *seven*, in a wide range of languages: Sanscrit, *saptan*; Zend, *hapta*; Latin, *septem*; Greek, *ἑπτά*; Gothic, *sibun*; old Egyptian, *sefech*; Arabic, *sabatun*; Ethiopic, *sabechatu*; Hebrew, שַׁבָּת.² The sanctity of the number seven stands incorporated into the Hebrew language itself, from its origin, so far as we can judge, in the word נִשְׁבַּע (Niphal of שָׁבַע), to *seven* one's self, or to swear. Nor is it, perhaps, unsuitable to mention the physiological fact attested by so many witnesses, that the human constitution was so formed as to accomplish, on the whole, as much labor in six days as in seven.

4. The Pentateuch teaches an original state of blessed union between God and man, interrupted by the fall. In

¹ Rawlinson's Herodotus, Vol. II. 111, 282. Prescott's Mexico, Vol. I. 111, note. We adhere to Wilkinson's statement concerning Egypt, against the counter assertion of Humboldt, Cosmos, Vol. III. 95.

² The Hebrew שַׁבָּת is confessedly an obscure formation (see Delitzsch on Gen. ii 3), and is generally treated as a simple derivative from שָׁבַע. The resemblance of both to the numeral is obvious, and it is evident from Lactantius (Instit. vii. 14) that in his day they were supposed to be kindred with it, as though שַׁבָּת, "the Sabbath day, which took its name from the numeral in Hebrew, whence seven is the lawful and complete number." Delitzsch recognizes the derivation as one of two alternatives. The loss of שׁ would not preclude it, since שׁ sometimes changes into א; e.g. אָגַם for אֶגַם, תָּאֵב for תָּאָב, פָּחַם from פָּחַשׁ; or it disappears, e.g. בָּל for בָּלַשׁ.

remarkable harmony with a narrative which accounts for the present state of things, are the ancient wide-spread legends of the human race. It is necessary only to refer to the Greek and Roman traditions of a "golden age" of innocence, when disease, pain, sorrow, and care were unknown, when the earth brought forth spontaneously, and man had every good. But when Prometheus stole the fire which the gods had withholden, they, in punishment, sent Pandora to the earth, bringing countless evils to the human race.¹ The Persian legend describes Meschiia and Meschiana, the parents of the human family, as pure and blessed, till they were seduced by Ahriman to sin. Ahriman sprang from heaven to earth in the form of a serpent, and the first pair forfeited their happiness by eating fruit. The same legend speaks of the death-repelling tree, Hom, and states that after the fall the first pair clothed themselves with the skins of beasts.² The Thibetian tradition ascribes the loss of Paradise to the eating of a sweet herb. Thence came shame and the necessity of clothing. Necessity drove men to agriculture; virtue was lost; murder, adultery, and all other crimes came in.³ The Indian mythology describes a certain wonderful tree and Krishna's struggle with the snake, whose head he cut off.⁴ The Chinese have traditions of similar purport.⁵ The Mexican legend describes a golden age of blessedness under the reign of the god Quetzalcotl. He incurred the displeasure of one of the principal gods, and was compelled to abandon the country. In his skiff of serpent-skins he departed with the promise that he and his descendants would hereafter return.⁶ There was also a goddess Ciocoatl, the first goddess who brought forth, who bequeathed the sufferings of childbirth to women, and by

¹ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 90 seq., 103 seq. Theog. 583 seq. Lucian, *Saturnalia*, sec. 7. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, I. 89 seq. Tacitus, *Annals*, III. 26. Horace, *Odes*, I. 3, 25.

² Tuch and Knobel on Gen. ii. and iii., who cite the reliable authorities.

³ Tuch on Gen ii.

⁴ *Ib.*

⁵ Knobel on Genesis, p. 45.

⁶ Prescott's *Mexico*, Vol. I. pp. 59, 60.

whom sin came into the world. She was usually represented with a serpent near her, and was called "the serpent-woman."¹ The wide-spread practice of serpent-worship, found among the Egyptians and Phenicians, in India and Ethiopia, among the Germans, Finns, and kindred nations, has been justly connected with the same ancient story, the worship having originated in a desire to propitiate the evil principle and escape its wrath.² "Almost all the nations of Asia," says Von Bohlen, "assume the serpent to be a wicked being, which has brought evil into the world."³ And Tuch remarks that in all antiquity the serpent was the symbol of cunning, baseness, and seduction.⁴ In nearly all the myths to which we have referred, it is remarkable how the serpent, or the woman, or both of them, stand connected with the great calamity of the race. They are older than history; they must be older than the separation of the nations.

5. Among the Biblical transactions of the period succeeding the fall, was the institution of sacrificial offerings. In wonderful accordance with the alleged earliness of origin, is the general, if we may not say absolutely universal, prevalence of bloody sacrifices among the nations of the earth. It would be difficult to specify the nation that has not practised the rite.⁵ No doubt the lasting *hold* of such a practice on the conscience of the nations must be ascribed to the deep sense of sin, and of the need of some vicarious interposition; but the *origin* of it as a universal fact can be

¹ Prescott's Mexico, Vol. III. p. 381,

² Delitzsch on Genesis, p. 45, who both vouches for the fact and endorses the explanation. So also McDonald, Introd. to the Pentateuch, Vol. I. p. 399. The Phenicians had converted the serpent into an *ἀγαθοδαίμων*.

³ Alte Indien, Vol. I. p. 248. Quoted from Hävernicks Introduction to the Pentateuch, p. 101.

⁴ Kommentar, p. 84. Knobel connects with this whole subject, and with the passage in Genesis, Aesop's ascription of knavery (*πανουργία*) to the serpent (Fab. 70), and Aristotle's description of the whole serpent tribe as servile and treacherous, *ἀνελεύθερα καὶ ἐπίβουλα* (Hist. Anim. I. 1, 14).

⁵ For a full and able statement concerning human sacrifices, and collaterally animal sacrifices also, see the discussion of Lasaulx, Bib. Sacra, Vol. I. p. 368.

explained only by some institution lying far back in the history of the race, and thence striking its roots profoundly into the thoughts and practice of the succeeding nations. It seems to be a universal standing monument to the truthfulness of the record. We have now nothing to do even with the traditions which are supposed by many to be a far-off echo of Biblical transactions; as in the Grecian story of Phryxus, the first-born of king Athamas, about to be immolated by his father, but saved by the ram of the golden fleece—and other instances—wherein some have found resemblances to the patriarch Abraham and his son Isaac.¹ We are dealing, now, with *facts* of world-wide extent, explicable if the early origin alleged in the Pentateuch be true; inexplicable otherwise.

6. We pass various less established matters, such as traditional heathen testimonies to the early longevity of the race,² and the supposed mention of the first two patriarchs, which Frederick Schlegel³ declares to be found in the sagas of the Indians and other Asiatic nations, to specify another of the great test-facts of the narrative. We refer to the Deluge. Waiving now the question of its territorial extent, the fact of a deluge which once destroyed the whole race (with the exception of a few individuals), is one of the best proved events in all past history. It is sustained by an array of evidence as strong as is possible in regard to an event which lies so far back of all written memorials—more impressive, indeed, than mere documents could furnish. It has been *branded into the memory of the nations*, and has come down from time immemorial, in all parts of the globe. The ancient legends of the North American Indians, the Indian tribes along the Orinoco in South America, the

¹ Philo Judæus makes the comparison, by way of contrast (II. 26, Mangey's ed.); Lasaulx recognizes the resemblance. Magee (Atonement, Vol. I. p. 266) finds a resemblance to Abraham's offering in the mystical sacrifice of the Phenicians.

² Josephus, *Antiq.*, I. 3. 9.

³ *Philos. of History*, p. 96, Bohn's ed.

Mexicans, the Peruvians, the Brazilians, and South Sea Islanders, no less than those of Wales, Greece, India, Burnah, China, Egypt,¹ Phrygia, the old Scandinavians, the Persians, the Chaldeans, and Phenicians record the great event.² Many of the details, even, are included in some of these accounts; and Kalisch has truly remarked, "there is scarcely a single feature in the Biblical account which is not discovered in one or several of these traditions."³ The drift of them is: a wicked world, destroyed by a flood; one righteous man and his family saved in an ark, together with animals in pairs; the ark resting on a mountain; birds sent out to learn the condition of the earth; an altar built and sacrifices offered. Several of these points are included in the Greek story of Deucalion.⁴ In the ancient vedas of India it is written that Manu, the patriarch of the race, received warning of the flood, and direction to build an ark and to enter it with seven other holy sages. The flood came and destroyed all the race. When it subsided, the ark remained upon a mountain. He offered sacrifices and went forth to repeople the world. The Chaldean legend is remarkably full. It describes the warning given to Xisuthrus, directing him to take his wife, children, and nearest relatives into an immense ship (five stadia long),

¹ Bunsen denies the existence of the tradition in Egypt; but Diod. Sic. (I. 10) and Plato (Timæus, 22, 23) seem to be against him.

² Many of the details are easily accessible. Hugh Miller gives many of them, *Testimony of the Rocks*, p. 283 seq. Delitzsch gives a good, though brief, summary.

³ Commentary on Genesis, p. 205.

⁴ See Ovid, *Metamorph.* I. 125 seq. Singularly enough the fullest Greek accounts of the flood are given by Lucian, who repeatedly declares them to be Greek traditions. Thus (*De Syria Dea*, 12), he relates that the former race of men were destroyed for their extreme wickedness; that the earth gave forth water, great rains fell, the rivers rose, and the sea swelled, till all things became water, and all men perished. Deucalion alone was saved for his piety. He built a great ark (ἀρναξ), entered it with his wife and children, brought in, by pairs, hogs, horses, lions, serpents, and all other creatures, and remained there with them, in a divinely-established friendship, so long as the water prevailed.

⁵ Bunsen's *Egypt, etc.*, Vol. IV. p. 432. Also Rev. E. Burgess, *Bib. Sacra*, Oct. 1858.

to provide them food, and take with him all sorts of animals and birds. He did so. The flood came; and when it ceased, three times in succession he sent out birds to ascertain the state of the earth. Then he took out some of the planks, and saw that he was on a mountain in Armenia. He left the ship, prayed, built an altar, offered sacrifice, and went on his way.¹ The Aztecs of Mexico related that two persons, Coxcox and his wife, survived the deluge. Their heads are represented in ancient paintings, together with a boat floating on the waters at the foot of a mountain. A dove also is depicted, with the hieroglyphical emblem of languages in his mouth, which he is distributing to the children of Coxcox, who were born dumb.² The neighboring people of Michuacan had a still further tradition that the boat in which their Noah (Tezpi) escaped, was filled with various kinds of animals and birds. After some time a vulture was sent out, which fed on dead bodies and did not return. Then the little humming-bird was sent, and it returned with a twig in its mouth.³ The tradition on the Island of Cuba included the raven and the dove of the Biblical account.⁴ The Peruvians relate that after the deluge, seven persons issued from a cave where they had saved themselves, and repopled the earth.⁵ Schoolcraft affirms of the various North American tribes: "the Indians relate, generally, that there was a deluge at an early period, which covered the earth and drowned mankind, except a limited number."⁶

And as the event was recorded in a picture in Mexico, so it was commemorated by coins in the old world. The famous Apamean medals (unquestionably genuine) repre-

¹ Bunsen's *Egypt, etc.*, Vol. IV. p. 369.

² The allusion to the subsequent confusion of tongues is to be noticed.

³ Prescott's *Mexico*, Vol. III. 379. Prescott is not quite satisfied with the authority for the latter tradition, apparently because it is so much like the scripture account; but Humboldt, as he mentions, accepts it without distrust.

⁴ Von Raumer, cited by Delitzsch on *Gen.* vi.

⁵ Prescott's *Peru*, Vol. I. p. 88, note.

⁶ *History and Condition of the Indian Tribes*, Vol. I. 17.

sent a floating chest, inscribed with the name *Noe*, within which are seated a man and a woman. Toward them a bird is flying with a twig; while another bird is seated on the ark.¹

Without going further into details, we may add that these accounts are, of necessity, entirely independent of each other and of the Bible. Their differences are as striking as their analogies; and yet they all concur on the great fundamental facts, and supply the fragments of the whole event recorded in the scriptures. Such a coincidence of testimonies from the four quarters of the globe, destitute of a foundation, were a greater marvel than the flood. Bunsen is constrained to say, in connection with his examination of these legends: "Our previous researches will not permit us to doubt that the oldest Hellenic tradition about the flood of Deucalion, was a legendary reminiscence of *that great historical deluge*."² And we may, without hesitation, adopt the closing statement of Delitzsch: "A survey of all these traditions assures us that the flood was an historical event which had struck deep root in the memory of the nations; that the recollection of it extended from Armenia to Britain, and from China across Eastern Asia to America; and that the Biblical narrative of this event, in its freedom from all mythological and merely national elements, is the most faithful and purely historical representation of a tradition which had spread through all the nations of the world."³

¹ Kitto's Cycloped. of Bib. Lit., Article "Ark." It belongs to the time of Septimius Severus. Winer's Real-Wörterbuch, "Noach."

² Egypt's Place, Vol. IV. p. 435.

³ Delitzsch, Die Genesis, p. 245. He calls attention to the traditional reference to the rainbow's significance in the Greek *ἶρις*, from *εἶρω*, to connect (a derivation sanctioned by Passow), Iris being the messenger between gods and men; in the German legend, which makes the rainbow the great bridge, created by the Gods, connecting heaven and earth, which must be broken in pieces before the earth can perish; in one Indian tradition, which calls it Indra's weapon, which he placed by his side after the battle with the demons, and in another Indian legend which makes it the path of the gods. He also takes notice of a remarkable agreement of the Babylonish and Chinese reckoning of

7. Of the confusion of tongues and dispersion of mankind, some traces are also found in the mythologies of the nations. It is, substantially, the story of the Pentateuch: bad men, building a tower in defiance of the gods, overthrown and made to speak different tongues. Such, in part, is the myth which is found in Plato, in the Sibyl, and in Berosus, and is admitted by Tuch to be an independent myth.¹ Von Humboldt finds a similar tradition among the inhabitants of Chiapa and Soconusco, concerning Wotan (grandson of the man who saved himself from the deluge), who commenced the erection of large buildings, during which time ensued a confusion of languages, war, and dispersion of races.²

We do not propose, in the present case, to speak so particularly of these traditions, as of the clear evidence which modern ethnology furnishes of a dispersion of the nations, and of a common centre of radiation. These researches are strongly confirmatory of the Biblical narrative. It is noticeable how that narrative places both the landing of the ark and the subsequent point of departure entirely outside of the Jewish territory, in Western-Central Asia. It has long been settled that the Indo-European or Aryan races, extending from India to Ireland, can be traced to a former home in that vicinity (somewhat eastward); and modern investigations of languages and mythologies have been yearly finding greater evidence that the original and radiating point of the nations was in the general region indicated in the Pentateuch. Bancroft, the historian, twenty years ago, arrived at the conclusion, which may now be considered as admitted, that the North American tribes had an Asiatic origin.³ Bunsen, as the result of his investigations, asserts that the "two imperishable records, language and mythology," force us to look for the origin of all the old

the date of the deluge with that of the scriptures; the former placing it 2500, the latter 2297, years before Christ.

¹ Tuch's Genesis, xi. 1.

² Cosmos, Vol. IV. p. 98.

³ Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. III. p. 318.

historic races to Central Asia, and adds : " Hence there is nothing more certain than the historical character of the record which has been preserved in the Bible, taken in its general leading features."¹ Sir H. Rawlinson says of the different races in Western Asia, " that if we were to be guided by the mere intersection of linguistic paths, and independently of all reference to the scriptural record, we should be led to fix on the plains of Shinar as the focus from which the various lines had radiated."² Dr. Carpenter closes his discussion by repeating, " with additional confidence," his long held conclusion, that " High Asia " was " the centre of radiation of man to every quarter of the habitable globe," a view sustained, he says, by the " very curious fact that the most ancient nations, of nearly every part of the globe, are connected with the nations of High Asia, more or less closely, by affinity of language or of physical characters."³ Von Raumer and Rud. Wagner have well shown " the importance of Mount Ararat, not only geographically, from its central position, but also in respect of civil and natural history, as being the central and starting point of civilization, of languages, of the various races of men, and even of domestic animals, and of all plants that are cultivated."⁴

8. The geneological table of the nations in the tenth chapter of Genesis, is another great landmark. Its statements have in some instances anticipated modern discoveries, and avoided modern errors. The affinity of that great class of nations, now called Indo-European or Aryan, first fully recognized by Prichard and Frederick Schlegel, was clearly anticipated (vs. 2) in the grouping together of Gomer (the Cimmerian, Cimri), Madai (the Mede), Javan⁵

¹ Egypt's Place, etc., Vol. IV. p. 478.

² Journal of Royal Asiatic Society. Quoted in Rawlinson's Hist. Ev., p. 287.

³ Varieties of Mankind, p. 1364.

⁴ Kurtz, History of the Old Covenant, Vol. I. p. 109.

⁵ We follow Knobel, who is acknowledged to have given the subject the most thorough investigation, and who has no weakness for the biblical narrative.

(the Ionian). The same record (vs. 8) declares the descent of Nimrod from Cush. So late as 1854 Bunsen denied any affinity "by blood" between the two, or the existence of any Asiatic Cush; but in 1858 Sir H. Rawlinson was able to prove, from the Babylonian documents, that the inhabitants of Southern Babylonia were of a cognate race with the primitive colonists both of Arabia and of the African Ethiopia.¹ In like manner, the much later founding of Nineveh than of Babylon, and the Hamitic descent of the early Canaanites which are asserted in that table, have been apparently established by late researches; and even the curious fact developed that there were two races of Arabs, one Semitic and one Hamitic, in accordance with the table, which makes אֲנָשִׁי (vs. 7) to be the descendant of Ham, and אֲנָשִׁי (vs. 28) of Shem.² A full examination of the statements belongs rather to a commentary than to a discussion like this. We subjoin the deliberate opinion of two competent judges. Sir H. Rawlinson pronounces that table to be "undoubtedly the most authentic record we possess for the affiliation of those branches of the human race which spring from the triple stock of the Noachidae."³ Knobel, after his scholarly and elaborate investigation declares it to be "beyond a doubt that continued investigations will ever more thoroughly establish the authenticity of this our oldest ethnography."⁴

9. When we come to the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with his twelve sons, we reach personages that are confessedly historical. Their direct relation to a great nation as the honored ancestry from whom their descent was traced, through whom their distinctive character and privileges were derived, and with whose lives the very localities of their land had been identified from the time of

¹ Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. pp. 353, 533. See also Knobel in loco.

² Rawlinson's *Historical Evidences*, p. 71. Perhaps this latter point should not be pressed at present.

³ Asiatic Society's *Journal*, quoted in Rawlinson's *Hist. Evidences*, p. 280.

⁴ *Genesis*, p. 107.

the events themselves, would seem the surest of all evidence; surer far than mere literary documents, for they are records inscribed on the heart and life and glory of a nation, and handed down upon the spot, by a people that held possession of the land till far down in historic times. In their tribal division they had a standing and perpetual monument, extending straight back to those ancestors.

Every newly discovered test which we can apply to those ancient narratives sustains their exact veracity. How unimpeachable is found to be their geography in every particular; whether it refer to the place (Bethel) from which Lot and Abraham viewed the whole land, even to the valley of Jordan, or to the scene of Abraham's victory over the four kings.¹ How the customs there delineated are confirmed by the inflexible usages of oriental lands to-day.² How the facts stated in the account of Abraham's journey to Egypt accord with what we have lately learned from the monuments of the state of affairs at that early period: the advanced and powerful condition of Egypt; the title of its kings; the existence of slavery there; the state of society which suffered Sarah to be seen without a veil, and which also prompted Pharaoh to take her to his harem; the absence then of all dislike towards shepherds; the nature of the gifts conferred by the king; and Abraham's acceptance of those gifts.³ Rawlinson believes that in Kudur Mapula (or Mabuk), "ravager of the West," he has found the Chedorlaomer with whom Abraham fought (Gen. xiv. 1)⁴; and the identification of Ur of the Chaldees is believed to have been made in Mugeyer, with its list of kings extending back two thousand two hundred and thirty years before Christ.⁵

¹ See Thomson's *Land and Book*, Vol. I. p. 320.

² See, for example, Thomson's striking comments on Abraham's purchase of the burial-place at Machpelah, *Land and Book*, Vol. II. p. 381. Also many other illustrations in the same work.

³ Hawks's *Egypt*, etc., p. 136, where this subject is presented in detail.

⁴ Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. pp. 348, 356. Rawlinson's *Hist. Ev.*, p. 281.

⁵ Loftus's *Chaldea*, p. 131.

From the nature of the case, Gentile allusions to Abraham were not to be looked for. Many references cited by Eusebius are dismissed on the supposition that they came ultimately from Jewish sources. Josephus however has quoted from Berosus a testimony clearly independent, and another probably so, from Nicolaus of Damascus.¹ There is reason for believing that many of the statements of the Koran concerning him and other patriarchs are derived from ancient Arab traditions independent of the Bible.² Meanwhile there stands in Hebron a building of the hoariest antiquity (as indicated in its architecture), which, time out of mind, has been declared to cover the burial places of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and their wives. There is in itself no reason why the identification should not be as certain as that which, from a still earlier date, connected the names of Cheops and Mycerinus with two Egyptian pyramids, and is at last proved true; but there is a far stronger reason, both inasmuch as the memory of a boasted and beloved ancestor is surer than that of a heartless despot,—as in the present instance, the region has been in possession of those who would cherish, and even revere, the recollection,³—as the place comprises a permanent natural object, “the cave of Machpelah,” in the vicinity of a most ancient city, and finally, as the place was made famous at intervals for two hundred years (from the death of Sarah to that of Jacob) by the successive deposit of six of the most venerated forms of the Jewish nation. That such a place, under the circumstances, should have lost its hold on the memory, would have been the incredible thing. Accordingly we can trace the veneration gathered round this enclosed spot, up through Maundeville (A. D. 1322), Ben-

¹ Josephus, *Antiquities*, I. 7, 2.

² Taylor Lewis's *Divine Human*, p. 393. In a letter to the present writer, Professor Lewis has kindly indicated the reasons for his position, which it is to be hoped he will, in due time, set forth as they lie in his mind.

³ It cannot be necessary to except even the Canaanitish occupation, when we consider the eminence and the estimation of Abraham, as well as of his son Isaac, and the virtual possession which was kept by the family meanwhile.

jamin of Tudela (A. D. 1162), Saewulf (A. D. 1102), St. Willibald (about A. D. 775), Arculf (A. D. 700), Antoninus Martyr (just before the Mohammedan conquest), the Bourdeaux pilgrim (A. D. 333), Eusebius and Jerome, to Josephus, in whose time monuments were shown in Hebron as having come down from the patriarchs themselves.¹ Under these circumstances we need not be surprised to find the soberest travellers and scholars concurring in the settled conviction that this venerable monument marks the resting place of the ancestors of the Jewish people. Robinson thinks "we may rest with confidence" in the view.² Thomson has "no doubt of it," and pronounces that "there is no room for scepticism" on the subject.³ Stanley declares that "the cave of Machpelah is concealed beyond all reasonable doubt by the mosque at Hebron."⁴ And Bunsen says: "I do not hesitate to avow my belief that similar remains [to the Assyrian] of the Abrahamico-Patriarchal times may yet be discovered; and I envy not the historical tact of the man who doubts about the truth of the narrative of the burial of Jacob the father of the Egyptian viceroy. The vast and peculiar ruins of Hebron prove, at all events, that the buildings there are of a hoary antiquity."⁵

The case is not so irresistibly strong in reference to the wells of Beer-Sheba, still known among the Arabs as Bir es-Seba, and Jacob's well at Shechem, "deep" now as it was in the time of Christ. Yet these objects stand invested with such peculiarities, that the same sober travellers deem them veritable monuments of Abraham and of Jacob.

¹ Josephus, Wars, IV. 9, 7, with Antiq., I. 14. The testimonies of Arculf, Benjamin of Tudela, Saewulf, and Maundeville may be found in Bohn's *Early Travels in Palestine* pp. 7, 45, 86, 161. The other authorities are cited by Robinson, *Researches*, Vol. II. p. 437, first ed.

² *Biblical Researches*, Vol. II. 439.

³ *The Land and the Book*, Vol. II. p. 385.

⁴ Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 148.

⁵ Bunsen's *Egypt*, Vol. IV. p. 163. To understand the meaning of the author, it should be remembered that the ancient enclosure surrounds a mosque, and the cave is alleged to be within the mosque. But since the Mohammedan conquest no explorer has been allowed within the enclosure.

10. A very remarkable confirmation of the scripture narrative of the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah has been brought to light in recent explorations of the Dead Sea. The account of their destruction, (Gen. xix. 23–28) indicates some great convulsion, and would most naturally comport with an earthquake accompanied by volcanic agency, as an instrument of the divine judgment.¹ Volcanic phenomena have long been recognized around that region.² Lynch fully established the fact, finding volcanic formations on the eastern shore and specimens of lava on various parts of the coast,³ sulphurous springs trickling down the rocks,⁴ scattered pieces of sulphur,⁵ and a nauseating sulphurous smell sweeping over the marshes.⁶ Here are still found quantities of bitumen, such as may have once aggravated the terrors of the burning. But it remained for Commander Lynch also to establish the singular fact that the southern portion of the sea, one quarter of its length, is of a very different formation from the northern part. The latter is a precipitous basin from 1000 to 1200 feet or more in depth. The former is a shallow sheet, nowhere more than sixteen feet, and along its southern margin scarcely one foot, in depth. In the words of Lynch: “The bottom of this sea consists of two submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the former averaging thirteen, the latter about thirteen hundred, feet below the surface.” The southern basin is manifestly of entirely different origin from the northern. It is evidently of more recent formation, and is so recognized by Lynch, Stanley, Ritter,

¹ Gen. xix. 25, 28; compare also xiv. 10. Some would find indications of earlier volcanic agency in the name Sodom, “burning,” and in Bela, “swallowed up,” the old name of Zoar. Robinson advocates volcanic action.

² Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 279; Robinson's *Researches*, Vol. II. p. 222.

³ Lynch's *Expedition to the Dead Sea*, pp. 280, 329, 369.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 268.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 319.

⁶ *Ib.* pp. 275, 298, 327.

⁷ Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 282; Ritter's *Erdkunde*, *Sinai*, etc., Vol. II. p. 779. Ewald is cited by Kurtz (*Hist. of the Old Cov.*, Vol. I. p. 138), fully endorsing the view that the Cities of the Plain were destroyed by a catastrophe, which submerged this southern portion. Kurtz adopts the view.

and even Ewald.⁷ It would correspond to the location of the vale of Siddim. The profound impression made upon Commander Lynch and his companions, after a thorough exploration of the scene, is thus recorded by himself: "It is for the learned to comment upon the facts which we have laboriously collected. Upon ourselves the result is a decided one. We entered upon this sea with conflicting opinions. One of the party was sceptical, and another, I think, a professed unbeliever of the Mosaic account. After twenty-two days close investigation, if I am not mistaken, we were unanimous in the conviction of the truth of the scriptural account of the destruction of the cities of the plain."¹

11. If we pass now to the residence in Egypt and the Exodus, we reach a train of events of which the general outline must be considered as among the great settled facts of national history. It is unnecessary to cling to questionable proofs. We may dismiss at once the singular painting at Beni Hassan, which some have supposed to represent the arrival of Jacob and his household, and their presentation to Pharaoh. We may also dismiss with Wilkinson,² as having no *special* reference to the Jews, the brick making scene in the tomb of Rochiscere at Thebes. Hengstenberg³ and others, after Rosellini, have strenuously declared it to have such reference, but fail to make good the statement. Enough that it is interesting as a general confirmation of the customs of Egypt.

(1.) But there are distinct accounts of the bondage, victory, and departure of the Israelites preserved to us from Egyptian historians. Josephus has given us, in his treatise against Apion, what he declares to be verbatim quotations from Manetho, Chaeremon, and Lysimachus. They are tinged with bitterness, and thus the facts they admit against their own nation are the more incontrovertible. They are inaccurate, as the statements of foreigners, ill-informed in

¹ Lynch's Expedition, p. 380.

² Wilkinson's Ancient Egyptians (abridged edition), II. pp. 194-197.

³ Hengstenberg's Egypt and the Books of Moses, p. 81.

details. They are confused, as the narratives of men endeavoring to disguise a scene of national calamity which could not be denied. Yet, through all this coloring and inaccuracy and confusion, the great essential facts stand out: A vast body of people in Egypt were separated from the rest of the nation because they were leprous [an allusion to the plagues they occasioned], eighty thousand being sent at one time to labor in the quarries. They occupied the town called Avaris [or Abaris, "Hebrew"] and revolted on account of their oppression. They were led by one Osarsiph [Joseph], afterwards called Moses. He gave them laws contrary to those of the Egyptians, and especially required them not to worship the gods, nor to abstain from the sacred animals of the Egyptians. They were joined by a body of shepherds numbering 200,000, from a city called Jerusalem, and marched against the Egyptian king. He committed his son to the charge of a friend, [here the apparent allusion to the first-born of Egypt], and, though provided with an army of 300,000, retreated before them into Ethiopia. The Jerusalemites and their polluted allies swept the country, and for thirteen years ruled it with impious cruelty, burning cities and villages, abusing the images of the gods, roasting the sacred animals, and driving the priests from the country. At length the king and his son returned with two great armies, and drove them to the borders of Syria. Such are, in brief, Manetho's statements. Chaeremon concurs in the outline, giving the original number of obnoxious persons as 250,000. Two scribes, Moses and Joseph, raised a force of 380,000 men and marched upon Egypt. The king fled, leaving his wife and a new-born son concealed in a cavern. The infant, when he grew to manhood, drove the Jews, to the number of 200,000, into Syria, and brought back his father. Lysimachus relates that the Jews in Egypt, being leprous and scabby, thronged the temples and lived by begging. The number of the diseased being very great, created a scarcity of food [the years of famine]. By direction of the oracle, the king

commanded to drown the leprous and to drive the remainder into the desert. As night was coming on, these people determined to kindle fires and keep watch, and on the next night by fasting to propitiate the gods. The next day one Moses advised them to venture on a journey to find a home; meanwhile to have no kind regards for any man, but to destroy all temples and altars of the gods. They did so, and journeyed till they came to the land called Judea, and built a city, first called Hierosyla, from their robbing temples, afterwards named Hierosolyma.¹ Diodorus Siculus quotes from Hecataeus of Abdera an account of the expulsion of the Jews from Egypt, their withdrawal under Moses, their conquest of Judea, the establishment of their laws and worship, and their division into twelve tribes, with various other particulars.² The hostile spirit and coloring of the statements, as Lepsius remarks,³ evidently betray an Egyptian source; and the testimony, of course, dates back to B.C. 500.

An independent set of testimonies to the same effect, is gathered up by the great Roman historian, Tacitus. His narrative is in many particulars so different from the statements just quoted, and in other particulars so ludicrously different from the Jewish records, as to show that his authorities were entirely distinct from either, and especially that they could not be Jewish.⁴ He indicates that he had made special and extensive inquiry; for he tells us what is the report ("memorant"), what some (quidam) state, what very many (plerique) say, what individuals (sunt qui) affirm, what others (alii) relate, and finally gives the statement to

¹ Josephus contra Apionem, i. 26, 28, 32, 34.

² Diod. Sic. XL. 3. See also XXIV. 1.

³ Lepsius, Letters from Egypt (Bohn), p. 408.

⁴ He states, e.g. that the journey from Egypt to Judea was accomplished in six days; that when suffering arose from thirst, a herd of asses led them to the fountains of water, from which circumstance they consecrated the image of an ass, and kept it in their sacred place, etc. His whole description is adverse to the Jews. Hist. V. 1-5.

which "plurimi auctores consentiunt:"¹ a plague having arisen in Egypt, the oracle directed the removal of this class of men [the diseased] into other lands, because they were hateful to the gods. They were accordingly expelled into a desert region. When all were paralyzed with grief, Moses put himself at their head, and, after a march in which they suffered greatly from thirst, they reached the land in which their city and temple are built, drove out the occupants, and took possession. This same Moses gave them rites directly opposite to those of all other men. They slay rams and oxen in contempt of Ammon and Apis. They abstain from swine's flesh, in memory of the foul disease from which they once suffered, and to which that animal is subject. They commemorate their former protracted famine by frequent fastings, and their snatched-up produce of the fields (*raptum frugum*) by unleavened bread.²

(2.) But after all, such testimonies as these, clear and unanimous, are of slight account, compared with the living testimony that came down from the most ancient times, embodied in the continuous living knowledge, the immemorial usages, and especially the commemorative observances of that ancient nation itself. We might as well dispute the great Turkish invasion, the irruption of the Northern hordes upon Southern Europe, or the Norman conquest, as the residence in Egypt, the oppression, the triumphant Exodus, the journey through the wilderness, and the conquest of Canaan. More easily indeed; for in the latter case, the great national observances *founded upon, and appealing to the national and contemporaneous knowledge of the facts*, constitute the highest possible form of testimony, and an absolutely insuperable barrier to the foisting in of fabulous statements at any period of the national existence.

a. Consider such observances as (1) the Passover, with its sprinkling of blood, its unleavened bread, eaten with

¹ Several of the previous opinions are entirely consistent with the testimony of the "plurimi."

² Tacitus, History, V. 1, etc.

girded loins and staff in hand, in perpetual commemoration of events of which the original participants are addressed as personal witnesses, and which they hand down from parent to child, with the observance and the testimony conjoined; (2) the Feast of Tabernacles, going down coëval with the nation's history, — the people dwelling in booths, "that your generations may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths when I brought them out of Egypt"; (3) the Feast of Pentecost, a memorial of the transfer to the land of "milk and honey," and containing in its perpetual formula (Deut. xxvi. 1–10), a reiteration of the doings in Egypt; (4.) the perpetual ordinance for the consecration and redemption of all the first-born, both of man and beast, in commemoration of a miraculous deliverance from the general slaughter of the first-born in Egypt; (5) the enforcement of the law of Sabbath rest by an appeal to their personal experience of Egyptian bondage (Deut. v. 15); — and it is evident that none but a whole nation of idiots could at any period of their history have been fooled into the reception of such ordinances *on such pretexts*, unless the pretexts were true. The thing may safely be pronounced impossible. We ought not to omit all mention of the ark of the covenant, which unquestionably remained in the nation an object of the greatest veneration till far into the times of the kings, and which had its name from the tables of the covenant therein alleged to be deposited.

b. Directly to our purpose, also, are the continual appeals, everywhere *inwrought with the fundamental law* of the nation, to remember the transactions in Egypt and the wilderness, which the original subjects of that law experienced in person. Such references are too abundant even to be quoted — they are continual. Thus in Deuteronomy, which (as is admitted even by De Wette)¹ claims to be

¹ Introduction to the O. T., Parker's translation, Vol. II. p. 159. De Wette, of course, denies the claim. Dr. Davidson recognizes and apparently admits it (Horne's Introduction, 10th ed., Vol. II. p. 614). Knobel simply assigns the book to the time of Josiah. It is for such men as De Wette and Knobel to

wholly the work of Moses as far as through the thirty-first chapter, the writer reminds them in detail of the choice of judges at Horeb (i. 6–19); of the selection of the spies, the murmurings, the Divine rebuke and threat at Kadesh-Barnea (20–39); of their refusal to turn into the wilderness, their attack on the Amorites, and their ignominious defeat (40–46). Thus he reviews their experience in the wilderness to the giving of the law itself, of which he recapitulates the circumstances to their recollection, adding: “The Lord made not this covenant with our fathers, but with us, even with us, who are all of us here alive this day. The Lord talked with you face to face in the mount, out of the midst of the fire. I stood between the Lord and you at that time to show you the word of the Lord, for ye were afraid by reason of the fire” (Deut. v. 3–5). Then in the repetition of the Decalogue, at the fourth commandment, he directs them: “Remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord brought thee out thence, through a mighty hand and a stretched-out arm.” In chapter vi. 16, he recalls to their recollection their murmurings at Massah; and in chapters vi. 12, 21, vii. 15, 18, 19, he reminds them of “the wonders, great and sore, upon Egypt, and upon Pharaoh, and upon all his household *before our eyes*,” and of “the evil diseases of Egypt which thou knowest.” In chapter viii. 3, 15, 16, he bids them remember the feeding with manna, the drought, and the water brought from the rock; in chapters ix. x. he reminds them of their continual rebelliousness, especially at Taberah, Massah, Kibroth Hattaavah, and Kadesh-Barnea, of his own sojourn forty days in the mount, of the golden calf, and the breaking and restoration of the tables of the law. In chapter xi. mentioning God’s miracles and “his acts which he did in the midst of Egypt unto Pharaoh the king of Egypt, and unto all his land; and what he did unto the army of Egypt, unto their horses, and to their chariots; how he made the

explain how such a stupendous literary forgery and national imposition was possible at that late day, 800 years after the alleged date of the composition.

water of the Red Sea to overflow them as they pursued after you, and how the Lord hath destroyed them unto this day; and what he did unto you in the wilderness until ye came unto this place; and what he did unto Dathan and Abiram, the sons of Eliab, the son of Reuben, how the earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up,"—the writer also declares (vs. 2, 7): "I speak not with your children which have not known, and which have not seen the chastisement of the Lord your God; his greatness, his mighty hand, and his stretched-out arm," "*but your eyes have seen* all the great acts of the Lord your God." He even reminds them familiarly of the practices to which they had been accustomed in the land of their bondage, in contrast to the changed circumstances to which they were going. "For the land whither thou goest in to possess it is not, as the land of Egypt from whence ye came out, where thou sowedst thy seed and wateredst it with thy foot, as a garden of herbs," etc. He reminds them, too, of the idolatrous abominations of which they had been witnesses in Egypt (Deut. xi. 10, 11).

It is important also to observe that the same laws which involved the history of the nation, embodied also peculiar guaranties for their own promulgation. We do not refer merely, or chiefly, to the express provisions for their reading and preservation, though these are important. Thus in that book of the Pentateuch which by De Wette's admission claims to be by Moses himself, the volume is solemnly committed in writing to the Levites (Deut. xxxi. 9), with the command that they place and keep it in the side of the ark (vs. 26), and with the additional injunction (vs. 10–13), that every seven years, in the year of Jubilee, it be publicly read to the people at the Feast of Tabernacles. The future monarchs also were strictly enjoined in advance, to have a copy, and keep it near them for constant use (xxii. 18). We refer, however, more particularly to the necessities created by their whole polity, from the beginning, for its constant use. That the Levites should be contin-

ually familiar with its contents, from the beginning, was rendered indispensable by the minute and circumstantial rules for their daily duties. It was equally necessary for all public officers, because it contained the whole *civil* law of the nation. The people were pledged to a vigilant regard for the volume, by the fact that it contained the arrangement for their tribal and family possessions, and the guaranty of all their personal rights and privileges. It was thus, substantially, their Ritual, their Statute-book, in a degree their Domesday-book,¹ and their Magna Charta, all in one. Never was so thorough and complex provision made for the constant knowledge and transmission of a record and its contents.

Now, even these appeals to the knowledge of living witnesses, embedded in the fundamental law which certainly formed the institutions of the nation, made most explicitly in the name of Moses himself, are facts which require the miracle-rejecting, yet wonder-working power of modern rationalism to conjure away; but the commemorative observances found in the national life at every epoch, coming down from fathers to sons with the story of the origin, as practised by each successive father on the same pretext, namely, the personal participation of the originators in the events commemorated, are utterly beyond that power. That such observances, *on such grounds*, could have been imposed on the first generation is impossible. That any succeeding generation could, for the first time, have been made to believe that they had received them from their fathers with these explanations, is equally impossible.

c. But these facts are far from exhausting the traces of that Egyptian history and of the journey through the wil-

¹ The Pentateuch itself, it should be said, contained only the beginning of the division of the land. It actually made an assignment to the tribes of Reuben and Gad and half tribe of Manasseh (Num. xxxii. 28-42), laid down the general boundary of the remaining tribes (Num. xxxiv. 1-13), and appointed a committee (vs. 16-29), to complete the division, which was carried into effect, and recorded Josh. xiii.-xxi. The assignment was made by families, so far as we can learn, only in the case of the Levites and of Caleb.

derness.¹ It was incorporated in the whole life, customs, laws, and literature of the nation. The costly tabernacle, alleged to have been built by Moses in the wilderness with the free-will offerings and labors of the people, both men and women, and dedicated with rich gifts, specifically described by name and inventory (Num. vii.), was still identified and venerated in the time of Solomon (2 Chron. i. 4, 13; 1 Chron. xvi. 39). The altar-plates within it were trophies of the destruction of Korah and his troop (Num. xvii. 38-40). The ark of the covenant was still extant at the dedication of Solomon's temple, and was then declared to contain the original stone tables of the law (1 Kings viii. 9). In or by the side of the same tabernacle had also been deposited Aaron's rod and a homer of manna, as memorials (Num. xvii. 7; Exod. xvi. 33). The opposition of the Moabites and the history of Balaam were perpetuated in the standing law (Deut. xxiii. 3-5) to exclude the Moabite for ten generations from the congregation, for that reason; and the fellow-suffering with the Egyptian populace, by the ordinance admitting their descendants after the third generation (vs. 7, 8). The overthrow of the Egyptian army by the hand of Jehovah, and the subsequent series of events were inwrought into the songs of the nation, from the song of Moses and that of Miriam at the Red Sea (Ex. xv.), and of Deborah (Judges v. 45), to those of David and of Asaph.² They were the foundation of constant appeals, reproofs, and allusions, through the whole history from the beginning.³ Whoever, therefore, would remove the proofs of the transactions in Egypt and the wilderness (including

¹ There is some reason to believe that when the present local traditions of the wilderness have been thoroughly explored and sifted by competent persons, there may be found, among their abundant chaff, some genuine memorials of the wanderings of Israel. At present we can pay no serious attention to them.

² Psalms cv., cvi., cxxxv., cxxxvi., ciii. 7, cvii. 4-7, cxiv. 1-3, lxxviii. 6-10, lxxiv. 13-15, lxxvii. 15-20, lxxviii., lxxx. 8.

³ Josh. ix. 9; xxiv. 4-10, 14; Judges ii. 12; x. 11; xi. 13; 1 Sam. iv. 8; vi. 6; xv. 6; 1 Chron. xvii. 21; 2 Kings xvii. 7; Neh. ix.; Isaiah li. 10, 15; lxiv. 10-12; Hos. xi. 1; xii. 13; Hag. ii. 5, etc.

even the *miraculous* elements), must take his stand in the time of Solomon and annihilate nearly all the great public ancestral observances of the nation, disintegrate their ancient fundamental law, eradicate their most venerated memorials of the distant past, expurgate their whole national literature, obliterate the national songs of five hundred years as well as of the generation past. He might as well obliterate the nation itself.

d. In connection with these things, and as evidence of the personal participation in Egyptian affairs, ought to be mentioned the minute and accurate allusions, with which the Pentateuch is sprinkled, to Egyptian customs, and the progress of Egyptian arts which is implied in much of the narrative concerning the handicrafts of the children of Israel in the wilderness. The discoveries of the present century have proved their singular correctness, to the discomfiture of cavillers. Our limits permit us only to refer to Hengstenberg's discussion in his "Egypt and the Books of Moses." And it is especially worthy of notice how every new form of antiquarian research is removing difficulties that may have hung over the statements of the Pentateuch. Thus Mr. Porter tells us that in reading the statement of Deut. iii. 3-5, concerning the taking of "three-score walled cities" in Bashan, "besides unwalled towns a great many," it had often seemed to him inexplicable that such a number should be found, at a remote age, far from the sea, in a region not larger than an English county. But he adds: "On the spot, with my own eyes, I had now verified it. Lists of more than a hundred cities and villages, in these mountains alone, I had tested and proved correct, though not complete. . . . Of the high antiquity of these ruins scarcely a doubt can be entertained, and the extent of the more important among them has been already estimated. Here, then, we have a venerable record more than three thousand years old, containing incidental statements and statistics which few would be inclined to receive on trust, and not a few cast aside as glaring absurdities, and yet

which close examination shows to be minutely accurate.”¹ It thus appears that, notwithstanding the remote antiquity of the events recorded in the Pentateuch, the good providence of God enables us to show conclusively, and in some points incontrovertibly, from outside evidence, the general historic authenticity of the narrative. A series of provable facts—many of them test-facts—runs, like the rocky peaks of a mountain-chain, through the record. These are environed by a vast mass of allusions, geographical, ethnological, and antiquarian, which modern researches are continually proving to be minutely and singularly exact.

It should be added, that the ablest modern scholars who make free with the narrative to suit their theories, are obliged to recognize the great facts of the residence in Egypt and the wanderings in the wilderness. Bunsen admits (and “has no hesitation in doing so”), “the personality and power of Joseph, and the immigration of the sons of Jacob, about seventy persons with their servants, as historical facts, and also the scriptural accounts according to which the fighting men, of twenty years and upwards, exceeded six hundred thousand men, at the Exodus.”² Lepsius, who is equally free with the chronology, fully accepts the general history of the Exodus, in his *Letters from Egypt*, and his *Egyptian Chronology*.³ Knobel admits the passage of the Red Sea, though disparaging the miracle.⁴ Ewald declares that the general truth of the wanderings in the wilderness is an essential preliminary to the whole of the subsequent history of Israel, and adopts the number of six hundred thousand warriors as authentic.⁵ Hitzig and Von Bohlen, even, are obliged to admit the wandering, though they would arbitrarily cut down the time.⁶

¹ “Five Years in Damascus” (1853), Vol. II. p. 206.

² *Egypt's Place in Universal History*, etc., Vol. I. p. 178.

³ Bohn's edition, *passim*.

⁴ Knobel on Exodus, p. 137. He admits the whole outline of later events.

⁵ Cited by Stanley, *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 25.

⁶ Quoted from McDonald's *Introduction to the Pentateuch*, Vol. I. p. 463.

We may also add, what a weight of evidence is given, even to the miraculous circumstances of the deliverance, by the admitted success of Moses's mission, in the face of enormous difficulties, political, social, and economical, which none have more amply set forth than the impugnors of the history. Our limits will not permit us to expand the topic.¹

II. When we proceed, still further, to look at the air and manner of the Pentateuch, it carries with it, in a remarkable degree, the characteristics of a faithful chronicle. We find the great outline of demonstrable facts filled in with a body of details, which (if we omit, for the time, the miraculous events) bear the most unmistakable marks of honesty and truth. Not Thucydides nor Tacitus, Bancroft nor Hallam, is more thoroughly stamped with the historic character throughout; less so, in truth; for the theorizings and partisanships, which more or less protrude through their narratives, are wholly wanting here.

1. The Pentateuch in its statements is marked by a perfect simplicity and sobriety. It is a straight-forward, business-like document. In its narrative it contains not a word of embellishment, of exaggeration, or of depreciation. It casts over all its facts a pure, "dry light." It records events without comments. It never bursts into admiration over its good men, nor horror over its bad men. It supports no theories. It takes no sides; it has no men whose faults it is bound to hide, nor any whose virtues it would conceal. In the dealings of Abraham and Abimelech, the latter certainly appears in an advantageous light. By nature Esau is, in some respects, a more attractive character than Jacob. In the difficulty between Sarah and Hagar, Sarah's magnanimity certainly does not appear. In the arrangements between the sons of Jacob and the Shechemites, the comparative honor of the latter and the infamy of the former are plainly told. Rachel, the favorite wife of Jacob, obtains no

¹ This topic is ably treated by Graves on the Pentateuch, Lect. VI., and by McDonald, Introduction, Vol. I. p. 444.

favoritism at the historian's hands. The beloved Joseph, though occupying so large a space in the life-time of the patriarchs, loses his prominence in the future history of the nation, and Benjamin still more; while Levi is marked for his cruelty in the affair with Shechem, though he was to be head of the priesthood, and Judah's profligacy in the case of Tamar, ancestor of Christ though he was, is fully recorded.

A severe simplicity constantly governs the style as well as the statements. The natural and the superhuman events are recorded in the same quiet way. What stupendous transactions are narrated in the first chapter of Genesis. How the imagination kindles at the thought. Yet not a word of comment even, except that God saw "it was good." So with the fall, the first murder, the flood, the deliverance from Egypt. Divine interpositions, even, are not multiplied for dumb show. They have a definite purpose, accomplish it, and cease. The details given in connection with them, have a sobriety in singular contrast with the wildness of the heathen legends. Thus in the Chaldean tradition of the deluge, the ark is five furlongs in length, and two in breadth. When it rests, Xisuthrus passes out through its seams and, after offering sacrifice, with his wife, daughter, and pilot, disappears forever; while a voice comes to the remainder of the ark's company from the air. Our record gives the practicable dimensions of four hundred and fifty feet by seventy-five; the patriarch and his family quietly go forth to repeople the desolated earth, and to live like other men. The difference is characteristic.

2. The Pentateuch consistently pursues a definite historic end. It opens the record of God's dealings with man, and of the facts adjacent: God's communications, the human channels of his mercies, and the reception which they met. It has, in no respect, the air and tone of a fancy composition; but the severe and unmistakable tone of a great utterance to and for sinning man. The air of authority, of severe earnestness, pervades it. It has nothing

merely to please the imagination, little to gratify the national pride or awaken romantic hopes. It is the record of a bad world, God's anger, a hard life, an oppressed and rescued, ungrateful and rebellious, nation. It is mainly the history of reproofs and judgments upon sin, efforts for the recovery of the fickle or the hardened, seasoned only with hopes of the future. It is not a poem; it is a history painfully life-like, and, to the people directly concerned, deeply humiliating. Nothing diverts it from its straight course. To its great historic end everything is subordinated. There are no expansions for the imagination or the curiosity. The amazing processes of creation—thousands of years, say the geologists—are dispatched in thirty-one verses; and when the relation of God to this world has been thus tersely declared, the narrative hurries on. The primitive condition, the ruin, its dire results and attendant promise, are briefly sketched; and the story glides over the range of fourteen hundred years with a simple registry of births, children, and deaths, to the grand catastrophe that relieved a burdened earth. In Noah again it seizes the clue of the promise; pauses only to indicate the scattering of the nations; then singles out the chosen line in Abraham, and, with ever-broadening sweep, goes forward to recount the special revelations to that people, till their organization in the appropriate form and establishment in the destined land, preparatory to the future coming of the great Deliverer. All the admonitions, experiences, organizations, institutions, and laws of the people who were to be the special channel of God's great work for man, *so far as they bear on the progress of the coming redemption*, are here gathered up, with a completeness and singleness of aim belonging to a strictly historic work. Except that their purpose is announced beforehand, it is hard to see that Prescott, Neal, or Napier more diligently or earnestly pursue a great historic theme.

3. The Pentateuch is pre-eminently a book of facts, figures, details. It is almost as statistical as an inventory.

It boldly commits itself to all the circumstances of place, time, number. The precise ages of the earlier and later patriarchs at the birth of their children, and at the time of their own death; the descent of the nations; the repeated and exact genealogies of the chosen people; the dwelling-places and halting-places of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; their wells, altars, oaks, and tombs; the minute particulars of all their family affairs; the names and homes of those with whom they had marriages, alliances, controversies, and conflicts; the circumstances of battles,—among which the oldest of all (Gen. xiv.) are related with the attending incidents; the history of the deluge, reading like a log-book, with the record of year, month, day, of the ship's dimensions, its precise occupants, and apparently the sounding of the waters (Gen. vii. 20); the full itinerary of the children of Israel; the census of their tribes and families; the order of their marching, the captains of the tribes, the names and families of the twelve spies; the exact size, form, and materials of their tabernacle; the offerings at its dedication, with the names of the givers, the order and minute items of the gifts (Numb. vii.); their early and remarkable calendar, and the regulation of all their proceedings by that calendar;—these are instances of its method throughout. How immensely different its clear and coherent statements from the hazy traditions out of which Thirlwall hesitatingly endeavors to construct the early history of Greece, or from the jungle of Egyptian royal names (*names* only), through which Bunsen endeavors to force a path. It is written with the freedom of a romance, yet often the exactness of a ledger. And though the method of modern history is very different, yet to this day it would be hard to mention the history which excels or equals the Pentateuch in the combination of freedom of statement and minuteness of details.

4. The narrative of the Pentateuch is pre-eminently true to human nature, both in its regenerate and its unregenerate condition. Even such sublime faith as that of Abraham and of Noah, in kind if not in degree, the world has long

since been forced to recognize as a fact. The attendant human weakness, whereby an Abraham could timidly equivocate and a Noah become intoxicated, the church in every age has sadly learned to be also true to life. They are real characters, not ideal creations. And the same inevitable conflict of the higher and the lower element appears in every good man there delineated, from Noah to Moses. And yet with what wonderful diversity of traits, and what unconscious delicacy of delineation. Here are father, son, grandson, and great-grandson. Abraham shines out like the sun in his strength, with spots on his disk; prompt, resolute, strong, wise, and conciliatory, able to make himself respected and feared, fully trustful in God when there was no human light, yet failing in firmness only when there was room for diplomacy. Isaac is plastic, timid, and imitative, as the son of such a father is prone to be; respected for his wealth, and apparently his quiet uprightness of character; clinging with a sort of feminine partiality to his generous and impulsive hunter-boy, Esau, yet when made to feel the overmastering purpose of God, rising from his weakness with wonderful strength and dignity to confirm the blessing unto Jacob, — “I have blessed him, yea and he shall be blessed.” Jacob, at first a keen and unscrupulous Jew, cast forth by a family feud and his own wrong-doing from his father’s house, in his loneliness chooses God for his guide. His sharp worldliness long protrudes, while his character is gradually softening, till at last God thoroughly mellows him by deep sorrow, and when we last look upon the venerable man in Egypt, he is ripe for heaven. How different in every respect is the character and history of the great grandson, Joseph; and yet again how thoroughly life-like. Granting his romantic rise to power — which is by no means unparalleled in despotisms, whether ancient Rome, France of the Middle Ages, or modern Turkey — we may perhaps safely say, that in artless verisimilitude and natural pathos it is admitted to be unsurpassed in the range of biography or fiction. The

brief sketches of Lot, Esau, Laban, Judah, Reuben, Balaam, Aaron, Miriam, and of the four wives, Sarah, Rebekah, Leah, Rachel; the passing notices of the sons of Noah, of Lot's daughters, of Hagar, Ishmael, Tamar, Caleb, Korah, Jethro, and others, will sustain the closest examination in their wide diversity and life-like reality. But what two wonderful portraits are those two characters that stand out at full height, front to front — Pharaoh and Moses — one in the iron fixedness of a hardened heart, the other in the adamantine firmness of a living faith. That circumstantial picture of a fearless irresponsible despot confronted by a shrinking man divinely upheld, in long and painful conflict, amid the sullen sufferings of one nation, and the murmurings and ingratitude of another, till the tyrant is humbled and crushed, and the oppressed go free, is either an actual verity or a creation higher than those of Aeschylus.

The special delineations of conduct are equally characteristic of humanity. The exculpations and inculpations of the first pair, their dread of God and their shame; the bold impudence and crushing remorse — *mere* remorse — of Cain; the presumption of Lamech upon Cain's impunity; the fearful heights of unpunished wickedness before the Deluge; the incredulity of Sarah and her denial of it; the strife between the herdsmen of Abraham and Lot; the moral influence upon Lot's daughters of a residence in Sodom; the airs of Hagar, the impertinence of Ishmael, and the jealousy of Sarah; the imbroglio of Rebekah, Esau, and Jacob; the impetuous ardor of Esau, dashing in the chase, heedless of his birthright, lifting up a "great and bitter cry" in his disappointment, fierce in his anger, yet generous in his final forgiveness; the collisions of Jacob and Laban; Jacob's weak partiality and the bitter envy of the ten brethren, the breaking out of their slumbering remorse during their trouble in Egypt (Gen. xlii. 21, 22), and their guilty fears after the father's death (l. 15); the envious opposition of Miriam and Aaron, the perpetual fickleness

and folly of the volatile people, in the wilderness; the tragic struggle in the breast of Balaam, ever protesting his scrupulous obedience to God's plain word, yet always pressing hard against the line of duty, and lured on by "the wages of unrighteousness" to destruction, — if such things as these are fictions, where are the facts of human nature?

If all these varied characters and life-like incidents are inventions, then who was the greater than Shakspeare that invented them? And who was the being of miraculous powers that palmed them off as true, and inwrought them into the deepest belief of a nation as the explanatory and, in large measure, contemporary facts of their own laws and institutions?

5. The Pentateuch is fearless and impartial in its tone; perfectly so. It does not pause to apologize or explain. It makes its brief statements with an air of truth and certainty; and sometimes when a word would have precluded a cavil, that word is withheld.¹ It is written in the interest of no set of men. It openly describes the sins and crimes of its chief personages, without a word of mitigation. There is not one of them (with the exception, perhaps, of Joseph) to whom great weaknesses are not imputed; and many of them are stained with foul blots. No excuse is offered for them, no blame transferred from them to their tempters. The people who form its chief human theme are exhibited in a very humiliating light, and their conduct is described with unsparing severity. Not a word of eulogium is found in the narrative.² On the contrary, neither the great lawgiver nor the first high-priest of the nation, are exempted from heavy censure, for which both of them

¹ E. g. the minute preparation for the march out of Egypt, the precise methods of the census, and several of the points made by Dr. Colenso, which will be considered in due time.

² This remark does not overlook *God's* expressions of approval for Noah, Abraham, and Moses (Gen. vii. 1; xviii. 19; Numb. xii. 7). The narrator's remark (Numb. xii. 3) is a simple explanation of the reason of God's interposition.

were excluded from the land of earthly promise. Let any one who would feel the judicial qualities of the narrative compare it with the account which Josephus gives of Moses¹ — the glorious halo that he throws around his childhood and youth, the singular eminence that he ascribes to his early manhood, the softening down of his unwillingness to be God's messenger, and the entire omission of the offence which excluded him from Palestine — and he may be satisfied. Josephus characteristically omits the murmurings of the people against Moses, the transaction of the golden calf, and other like things. The utterances of the Pentateuch are everywhere the declarations of the passionless witness, of the incorruptible judge. Out of the sacred volume, where can the like of it be found?

The Pentateuch thus carries, in the strongest form, every mark of a veritable history. No history can be named, ancient or modern, which in these several respects surpasses it, — may we not unhesitatingly say, equals it? If there were errors here and there, trivial or serious, they would no more destroy its historic nature than do the manifest mistakes of Tacitus, or any other historian, change the fundamental nature of his composition. They would only show it to be not an *immaculate* history; and would bear not so much on the question whether it is history, as whether it is *inspired* history. Whether such errors have yet been detected, will therefore properly be considered at a later point of this discussion.²

¹ Antiquities, Book II. Chap. ix seq.

² Among the several peculiarities of Bishop Colenso's volume, not the least noteworthy is his misapprehension of the point of his own reasoning. So far from "affecting the entire substance" of the narrative, his objections, if made good, would hardly invalidate the *substance* of any of those transactions. They bear only on the magnitude or precise methods of the events, and, perhaps, the question of *personal* knowledge on the writer's part. They are chiefly questions of numbers. The fundamental fact of the descent into Egypt is not affected by a difficulty as to whether Judah's grandsons were born before or after it, or even by an inaccuracy on that point. The great historic event of the journey through the wilderness would not be shaken even by a looseness in the account of the numbers concerned, any more than the still existing ignorance and mis-

Thus far we have argued mainly irrespective of the question of authorship. For a document may be none the less authentic, though its authorship cannot be certainly demonstrated — as we have occasion to admit in regard to more than one book of the Bible.

III. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, if it can be thoroughly sustained, carries with it a vast weight of evidence for its entire reliability. In that case, the last four books are invested, not alone with the general and minute credibility of Xenophon's *Anabasis* and Caesar's *Commentaries*, but with all that additional force of moral dignity wherein such a man as Moses towers above a Xenophon or a Caesar; and the earlier narrative of Genesis stands vouched for by the great promulgator of the decalogue and leader of God's chosen people. The prince of sceptics, Strauss, admits that "it would be an argument of decisive weight in favor of the credibility of the Biblical history, could it indeed be shown that it was written by eye-witnesses"; and moreover, that "Moses, if his intimate connection with Deity described in these books be historically true, was likewise eminently qualified by virtue of such a connection to produce a credible history of the earlier periods."¹

Accordingly those who oppose the whole supernatural element in the Bible, may well level all their batteries on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. For the admission carries with it miracles and prophecy and inspiration.

takes as to the numbers engaged and the numbers lost in General McClellan's Peninsula campaign affects "the entire substance" of that series of events from which a whole nation yet bleeds. The substantial fact that Moses spake unto all Israel might perhaps remain, if his voice was not heard by three million persons at one time, or if he did not pack six hundred thousand men in a space of ninety feet by one hundred and eighty. If it should appear that all the numbers throughout are erroneous or exaggerated, it would only place the events on the same level with *nearly all the battles of the present war*. The difficulties, at best, are modal, and not fundamental.

¹ Life of Christ, Eng. trans., pp. 55, 56. Quoted by G. Rawlinson, *Historical Evidences*, p. 57.

To concede the Mosaic authorship and then deny the contents of the books, would be to maintain a miracle of monstrosity more amazing than all the miracles of majesty, judgment, and mercy recorded in the volume — a leader promulgating, more than three thousand years ago, a moral law whose breadth and purity are above all criticism and all improvement, and maintaining his ascendancy till his death, in the presence of that law, yet all the while piling up falsehood upon falsehood, *deliberate* and *circumstantial*, heaven-high — and what is more, forcing or cajoling a whole nation to receive with reverence those falsehoods in matters the most public and palpable, in matters of which they were all witnesses and participants, and to hand them down embalmed in the most solemn observances to all coming time. The absurdity is too monstrous even for rationalism. The alternative is, to impugn the authorship.

We propose in the next Article to show that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is, on the ground of historic evidence, one of the best authenticated facts in all ancient history, and that the objections admit of ready solution.

IV. The Lord Jesus Christ and the inspired writers of the New Testament, abundantly vouch for the historic truth of the Pentateuch, by explicitly endorsing all its leading statements. The chief events from the beginning, are in positive forms re-asserted by them, and made the essential basis of their own arguments and instructions.

Thus the Saviour endorses the narrative of the creation, and union of the first pair in Eden (and thereby the narrative of which it forms an integral part), by quoting Gen. i. 27 and ii. 24, and establishing upon those statements the indissoluble nature of the marriage tie (Mark x. 6; Matt. xix. 4-6).¹ He cites "the blood of Abel" as the beginning of human bloodshed (Luke xi. 51; Matt. xiii. 35). He clearly affirms the temptation and fall, when he calls the devil "a murderer from the beginning." "a liar and the

¹ It will be observed that he cites what in modern parlance are termed both the Elohistie and Jehovistic portions of the record.

father of it" (John viii. 44).¹ He asserts specifically the entrance of Noah into the ark, and the coming of the flood that destroyed all besides (Matt. xxiv. 38, 39; Luke xvii. 26, 27). He declares that on "the same day that Lot went out of Sodom, it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all" (Luke xvii. 29). In one of his most solemn admonitions he warns his hearers to "remember Lot's wife" (Luke xvii. 32). He avers that "Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it and was glad" (John viii. 56). He founds his argument for the resurrection of the dead on the fact that "in the bush God spake unto him [Moses] saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob" (Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37). He inquires "did not Moses give you the law" (John vii. 19)? He declares that though Moses gave them circumcision, it is "not of Moses but of the fathers" (John vii. 22). He cites Moses's lifting up of the serpent in the wilderness (John iii. 14), and affirms "your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness" (John vi. 49).

He with deliberate preparation chose the great commemorative observance of the Passover on which to engraft his own perpetual memorial, the Lord's Supper (Luke xxii. 8, 15, 16). As to the substance of the law which Moses gave, Christ openly accepts it as the basis of his own moral teachings (Luke x. 25-28), positively declares that he came to fulfil it, and that till heaven and earth pass, one jot or tittle shall in no wise pass from the law (Matt. v. 17, 18). And when he says of the great lawgiver: "Had ye believed Moses ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me" (John x. 46); "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead" (Luke xvi. 31); and when he granted Moses the extraordinary honor of a reappearance on earth to partici-

¹ So all the expositors, from Origen and Chrysostom to Tholuck and Meyer, Germans included, except De Wette, Lücke, and a few minor writers, who refer it to Cain's murder. See a sufficient reply to this last view in Tholuck *in loco*, and a full list of the authorities in Meyer.

pate in his own transfiguration (Matt. xvii. 1, etc.), what is it but the emphatic assertion of Moses's superhuman knowledge and authority, the solemn recognition of the thorough historic reality of his character and life, and the most intimate association of his mission with his own? And that, too, the very Moses described in the Pentateuch; for neither the Jews, nor Christ, nor his disciples knew any other.

The sacred writers of the New Testament fill up the record.¹ The creation of the world by the word of God is affirmed in 2 Pet. iii. 5 and Heb. xi. 3. Matthew proves the descent of Christ by following the genealogies of the Old Testament up to Abraham (ch. i.), and Luke up to "Adam which was the son of God" (ch. iii. 1). Paul declares that "Adam was first formed, then Eve" (1 Tim. ii. 13); that "by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin" (Rom. v. 12 seq.), and that "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. xv. 22); that "the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty" (2 Cor. xi. 3); and that "Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived, was in the transgression" (1 Tim. ii. 14). John affirms that Cain "slew his brother" "because his own works were evil and his brother's righteous" (1 John iii. 12). Abel's acceptable sacrifice is asserted in Heb. xi. 4, and in the verse following (vs. 5), the translation of Enoch. Peter describes the destruction of the old world by the flood (2 Pet. ii. 5) and the saving of eight persons, including Noah, in the ark (1 Pet. iii. 19). So also Heb. xi. 7. Peter and Jude record the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah for their wickedness, and the deliverance of Lot (2 Pet. ii. 6-8; Jude 7). The life of Abraham is very largely asserted in detail: his summons to the land of Canaan (Heb. xi. 8); the particulars of his interview with Melchizedec (Heb. vii. 1-10); the name by which Sarah called him (1 Pet. iii. 6); the story of Hagar and Ishmael (Gal. iv. 20-30); the promises, general and special,

¹ In this sketch we purposely omit to quote from the full sketch of Jewish history in Stephen's speech (Acts vii.), not wishing to encumber the question with side issues.

that were made to Abraham (Rom. iv. 13, 17, 18 ; ix. 9 ; Heb. xi. 18 ; Gal. iii. 8, 16) ; the covenant of circumcision (Rom. iv. 11) ; his extraordinary age and Sarah's when Isaac was born (Rom. iv. 19 ; Heb. xi. 11) ; the offering of Isaac on the altar (Jas. ii. 21 ; Heb. xi. 17), and God's acceptance of his faith (Gal. iii. 6 ; Jas. ii. 23 ; Rom. iv. 3 seq.). Those writers also declare of Isaac that he was the child of promise (Gal. iv. 29 ; Rom. ix. 7, 9), was mocked by Ishmael (Gal. iv. 29) ; that Rebecca was the mother of his children, Jacob and Esau (Rom. ix. 10, 13) ; that before their birth God pronounced the superiority of the younger over the elder (ix. 12) ; that Esau sold his birthright for "a morsel of meat," and that his subsequent grief was unavailing (Heb. xii. 16, 17) ; and that Isaac "blessed Jacob and Esau concerning things to come" (Heb. xi. 20). It is asserted of Jacob that though heir with him of the same promise as his fathers, Abraham and Isaac, he like them sojourned in the land of promise as in a strange country (Heb. xi. 9) ; that when dying he blessed the sons of Joseph (vs. 21), and that Joseph in turn, "when he died, made mention of the departure of the children of Israel, and gave commandment concerning his bones (vs. 22). The dwelling of the people "as strangers in the land of Egypt," and their deliverance by God "with an high arm," is asserted by Paul (Acts xiii. 17) and by Jude (vs. 5), and in general "the affliction of the people of God" while there (Heb. xi. 25).¹ The outlines of Moses's history are stated as facts (Heb. xi. 23-29) : his concealment for three months by his parents ; his being called the son of Pharaoh's daughter, and renouncing the privilege when he grew up ; his departure from Egypt ; his institution of the "passover, and the sprinkling of blood, lest he that destroyed the first-born should touch them" ; the passage through the Red Sea ; and the drowning of the Egyptians

¹ We would call the reader's attention to the great fulness with which Stephen specifies the details (Acts vii.), at a time when he was "full of the Holy Ghost."

who followed; also (Heb. ix. 2-5), the structure and contents of the sacred tabernacle, and (xii. 18-21) the terrors of Sinai at the giving of the law. Paul authenticates God's declaration to Moses at the time of his gracious disclosure of himself (Rom. ix. 15, comp. Ex. xxxiii. 19), and his message to Pharaoh by Moses (Rom. ix. 17); the passage through the sea (1 Cor. x. 1); the eating of the "spiritual meat" (manna), and drinking of the "spiritual drink" out of the rock (vs. 2, 3); the overthrow of the people in the wilderness (vs. 5); their idolatry (vs. 7); their fornication and the consequent destruction of twenty-three thousand of them (vs. 8); their tempting God and being "destroyed of serpents" (vs. 9); their murmuring and being destroyed of the destroyer (vs. 10); the forty years in the wilderness (Acts xiii. 18); the destruction of seven nations from Canaan, to give the land, by lot, to Israel (Acts xiii. 19).

In this manner do Christ and the apostles *commit themselves* to the whole narrative contained in the Pentateuch. It cannot, for a moment, be pretended that these are mere allusions, containing no assertion of the facts. If these are not given as facts, where is there one fact of all the previous history of the nation to be found in these writers? For they contain no others than these and such as these, all drawn from those scriptures which they term the word of God. But they not only allude to them, they directly assert them. They appeal to them for their most solemn admonitions. They found upon them their own instructions. They assert them in the same connection and the same manner as the facts of Christianity itself. They propound them as the historic and prophetic basis of the Christian system. Strike them out, and the historic truthfulness of the Christian religion goes down by the same blow.

It is simply absurd to patronize the Saviour with commendations of his wisdom and moral elevation of character, and yet assail the verity of the facts which he both endorses and scrupulously incorporates into his system. If they are false, he should have known it, or should have immensely

moderated his pretensions. He cannot be excused on the ground that he could not be expected to know more of these things than "any other devout Jew of that day,"¹ for he claimed to know, on all subjects on which he spoke, more than all devout Jews and devout Gentiles, in all times. He uttered his messages, and founded his institutions, for "all nations," "to the end of the world." To affirm that he who said "Before Abraham was, I am," was in gross error as to the transactions both after and before the time of Abraham; that he who announced "I am the light of the world," "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life," was the victim and perpetual propagator of a mass of historic falsehoods and superstitions, is simply to pronounce him a pretender and fanatic. Such a character is not a compound of wisdom and dignity, but of folly and presumption.

It may be said that "to make use of such an argument is to bring the sacred ark itself into the battle field."² We answer: It is in the field already; and the simple question is: Will we abandon it, and all its contents, to the Philistines? Accordingly it will be observed that the writer who maintains the "unhistoric character" of the Pentateuch, apparently gives up all the *distinctive* elements of the Christian religion, and closes his book with a chapter of "Concluding Remarks," written from the level of sheer Deism, and nowhere rising one atom above it.

¹ Colenso on the Pentateuch, p. 32.

² *Ib.* p. 31.

NOTE ON THE DOCTRINES OF THE NEW SCHOOL. — The Fifth Article in our present Number will surprise many of our readers, by its apparently imputing to the New school of divines a scheme of faith which it is well known they do not hold. In justice, therefore, to the writer of the Article, we ought to state, that he did not intend to represent the New school in *general* as holding these objectionable doctrines; nor to charge these obnoxious doctrines upon the *majority* of such *New England* divines as are commonly denominated the *New school*. It is well known that the advocates of what has been, for about a hundred years, called the "new divinity," are divided into different parties, to only *one* of which does the author of the Fifth Article mean to impute these objectionable theories. Whether he be accurate in his representations of that *one* party, may appear in a future Article of the Series which allows each party to speak for itself, instead of being described by its opponents.—The Sixth Article of this Series will be devoted to the New school in the Presbyterian church.

ARTICLE VIII.

OWEN'S COMMENTARIES ON THE GOSPELS.¹

THE mere quantity of the literature of which the Bible is the subject, and the centre, irrespective of its quality, is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of literature. An English antiquarian has made a list of works, chiefly commentaries, on the Bible, or portions of it. He estimates their number to be not less than sixty thousand. Of these, some twenty-five hundred pertain to the five books of Moses, five thousand to the Psalms, and two thousand to the Prophecy of Isaiah. About six thousand volumes have been published on the four Gospels, three thousand on the Epistle to the Romans, and two thousand on the Revelation. These numbers are exclusive of commentaries on the whole Bible, or the whole of the New Testament. Add to this list of known works the greater number of books whose very names have been lost, and add to the commentaries the countless number of published and unpublished sermons that have been preached every Sabbath in all the pulpits of Christendom, all affixed to a passage of scripture, and more or less a development of its sentiment, together with all the unnumbered essays, criticisms, and controversies that have sprung, more or less directly, out of the scriptures, and how vast is the amount of intellectual activity which has flowed from this inexhaustible fountain. In this single point of view, the Bible well deserves its name. It is emphatically *the Book* — the *Book of books*.

And if we further take into consideration the quality of this literature, the moral excellence and moral power of these books and sermons, their lofty themes, their reach of thought, their instructive truths and commanding eloquence, their adaptation to move the masses, and the extent to which the masses have actually been instructed and moved by them in all the great nations that have existed since the canon of scripture was closed, there is nothing at all like it in the history of the world. The poems of Homer, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, have been widely read, and have given rise to not a few commentaries and criticisms. But these have reached only the chosen few, while what has been written and taught and spoken respecting the Bible, has been the daily food and drink of the multitude in every part of Christendom. Compare the Psalms of David with any other production of the Eastern World a thousand years before the Christian era! The latter is known only to a few scholars and antiquarians; the former is in the hands, on the lips, and in the hearts of the men, women, and children of every country that is acting any important part in history. Compare the Gospels, written for the most part by the

¹ A Commentary, Critical, Expository, and Practical, on the Gospels, for the use of ministers, theological students, private Christians, Bible classes, and Sabbath schools. By John J. Owen, D.D. Matthew and Mark, pp. 501; Luke, 400; John, 502. New York: Leavitt and Allen.

unlettered fishermen of Galilee, with any other history that was written,— we will not say in the East, but in the West, — anywhere, in the same age ! Who knows or cares for the histories, however interesting in their contents or classical in their style ? Who does not know and care for the Gospels ? Who has not seen them, read them, studied them ? Who does not possess some one or more commentaries, perhaps, a whole library of helps to understand them ? Who would have predicted such a result two thousand years ago ? When Tacitus was writing his description of the Jews, in the fifth book of his *History*, and loading them down with the most contemptuous and opprobrious epithets, as *despectissima pars servientium, teterrima gens, superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus adversa, projectissima ad libidinem*, etc. ; suppose some prophet had foretold to him that the sacred books of those despicable barbarians and slaves would almost supersede the admired history, poetry, oratory, and philosophy of the Greeks and Romans throughout the Roman Empire, and, long after that empire was extinct, would mould and shape the literature and religion of all the great nations of coming times ! The historian, and all his readers, would have pronounced the prophet mad. The Bible is not only a supernatural book in its contents, in its facts and thoughts and style and spirit, but the whole history of the book, in its preservation and promulgation through the world, is a standing miracle. So full of striking analogies to the book of nature as to prove itself a production of the same divine author, it has given rise to more study and thought, more reflection and research, more mental activity, than the book of nature itself. If, therefore, you would immortalize yourself and your productions (such is the prudential maxim suggested by the miraculous history of the book, as well as by its divine principles), link yourself to the Bible ; commit your name and fortunes to the keeping of him who has so manifestly kept the Bible from the beginning, and is thus pledged, by deed as well as word, to keep it unto the end. The man who could write a commentary so perfect that it should become a part and parcel of the Bible itself, would do a great and good work for coming generations, and secure his own immortality.

There are two kinds of commentaries, distinguished from each other by the purpose for which they are written, and consequently by the manner in which they are executed.

Those of one kind are written for scholars. They are based directly on the original Greek. They enter minutely into the criticism of words and phrases, discuss grammatical constructions and principles of interpretation, and state at length not only the results at which they have arrived, but the reasons and processes by which they have arrived at them. As a general fact, Christian doctrines and their practical applications are not made prominent in commentaries of this kind, though sometimes they are not only doctrinal but controversial and dogmatical in the extreme ; and sometimes, though more rarely, they indulge in preaching and practical observations to a greater or less extent. Such commentators are, or should be, like the explorers who search the bowels of the earth for the precious

metals; like the miners, who go down into the mines and bring up the solid ore, though too often they only scratch the surface, and mistake the mere tinsel and glitter of words for the gold, silver, and precious stones of divine truth. The Germans labor and excel especially in this kind of commentary; and, though they very often labor for that which is not bread, and expend much learning on that which satisfieth not, still their commentaries and introductions are storehouses of philological and exegetical lore which cannot be dispensed with by scholars, teachers, or preachers, who would rightly interpret the word of truth. Some recent English commentators, such, for instance, as Alford, Ellicott, and indirectly Trench, with less diffuseness and display than the German, but more good sense and reverence for the scriptures, have contributed some of the best specimens of critical and exegetical commentary. Professor Stuart has the merit of introducing the study and the writing of such commentaries into this country; and Professor Hackett, in his Commentary on the Acts, has carried it as near to perfection as can well be expected of human works, producing a model commentary for learned and clerical readers, while, at the same time, the unlettered laity may consult it to great advantage.

The other kind of commentary is designed for the use of the masses, and so founded directly on the scriptures in the vernacular tongue. Nothing forbids, however, indirect references to the original; and all the results of profound philological learning, without the detail of processes, may appear to advantage, if wisely and fitly incorporated, in commentaries for the unlearned. Being written for a practical purpose, they admit of "practical observations" by way of "improvement," though these become offensive excrescences, instead of vital organs, just so far as they go beyond the simple development and expression of the exact thought and spirit of the sacred writer. Englishmen have wrought with great zeal and considerable success, in this field. Henry and Scott are known almost as widely as the English Bible, and have doubtless contributed largely to a better understanding of the scriptures in multitudes of Christian families, though they have superadded quite too much of the mind of Scott and Henry to the simple mind of the sacred writer and of the Holy Spirit. Doddridge's Expositor approaches more nearly to the true idea of a simple unfolding of the true meaning and intent of the scriptures to the understanding of common readers, and is at the same time a remarkable anticipation of some of the best results of modern biblical criticism. Mr. Barnes's Notes, Explanatory and Practical, for the use of Bible classes and Sabbath schools, answer well the purpose for which they were intended. They partake, perhaps, of the nature of expository sermons (for which, also, many of them were actually delivered) too much to realize the perfect idea of a *commentary*; but the substantial learning and unaffected piety of the author, combined with his practical wisdom and his experience as a pastor, have given these Notes a place as deserved as it is high in the estimation of the churches.

Professor Owen's Commentaries on the Gospels correspond more exactly than any of these to the true idea of a *commentary* for all classes. The

plan is that of a simple *exposition* of the words and thoughts of the Evangelists, and this plan is, for the most part, consistently carried out, though the author is not always proof, and no commentator, perhaps, can be expected to be always proof, against the temptation to superadd, sometimes to obtrude, remarks of his own, that are not strictly exegetical. No commentator within our knowledge labors more faithfully to *develop* and *express* the exact import of every word in the sacred text in itself and in its connection. This is always done with reference to the original Greek, which is in reality the basis of the whole commentary. But the words of our common English version alone appear in the notes. A Greek word is very rarely seen, never obtruded on the attention of the English reader, who reaps all the benefit of a searching verbal criticism, and yet is annoyed with none of the technicalities or pedantries of biblical scholarship, nothing which is not familiar to his eye and level to his apprehension. Perhaps Dr. Owen carries this conscientious fidelity to *all* the words of the original author to excess, and sometimes burdens the reader with a minuteness of verbal criticism which wearies his attention without bringing a sufficient reward. But this feature exhibits the true spirit of a commentator, and, if a fault, it is better than a fault in the opposite direction.

A few preliminary remarks on the requisite qualifications of a writer of commentaries for the people, will enable us to estimate more justly the merits of the commentaries before us.

1. Learning. There is no kind of knowledge which is not valuable for the commentator, because there is none which may not be available, not to say indispensable, in the illustration of the infinitely diversified contents of the scriptures. The commentator on the New Testament must, at any rate, be master of the language in which it was originally written, not merely the classical dialects of the extant Greek literature, but that common and spoken language (the Hellenic) which combined the riches of all the dialects, and that peculiar form of the common language (the Hellenistic) which was spoken by the Greek-speaking Jews. The geography and history, manners and customs of Bible lands must also be familiar to him, almost, as those of his own country, that, like the author of that admirable commentary, "The Land and the Book," he may see every part of every gospel or epistle in the very light in which it was written. At first view it might, perhaps, be thought that such stores of classical and biblical learning are less essential to the writer of commentaries for the unlearned. Certainly it cannot be so rigidly demanded of such a commentator, that he know everything by his own personal observation or research. He must be allowed to take some things at second-hand. But he cannot reach the perfection of his art unless directly or indirectly, and to a great extent directly, he be master of all the knowledge that pertains to it.

2. Good common sense, practical wisdom, knowledge of men and things, and sympathy with them; especially with the masses of men and the things of common life. This is a gift or an acquirement which, though often deemed incompatible with extensive and profound learning, is not necessarily so; and which, however it may be dispensed with in commentaries

for the learned, is quite indispensable in those that are designed for the benefit of the common people. The Bible was written for men of all classes and conditions in life, and the commentator for the many, like the preacher, must address himself, not to that which is peculiar to any one class or condition, but to those elements of humanity which are common to all. If the Bible is adapted to any one class more than others, it is to the poor and humble — “to the *poor* the gospel is preached,” — and want of sympathy with that class especially unfits a man alike for understanding the sacred writers, and for interpreting their thoughts and feelings to those for whose especial benefit they wrote.

3. Sincere and earnest piety, reverence for the scriptures as the word of God, and cordial sympathy with the sacred writers in their faith, hope, and love as Christians. The Bible is to be interpreted according to the same general laws of language and of the human mind as other books. But the fundamental qualification for interpreting any book is sympathy with the author, especially in that which is most characteristic of him. A commentator who is not full of the same spirit that inspired the sacred writers, however profound his scholarship or abundant his knowledge of men and things, is just as unfit to interpret the Bible as a purely poetical genius would be to write a commentary on Euclid's Elements of Geometry, or a profound mathematician to see the beauty of the Paradise Lost; just as incapable of understanding it as the merest plodder in the practical business of life would be of comprehending the Dialogues of Plato. The commentator, like the preacher, if he would be full of power, must be full of the Holy Ghost; for the Holy Ghost is, in the highest sense, the author of the Bible.

In short, it is the commentator's office to *re-present* the exact thoughts and spirit of the sacred writers to modern readers; and, in order to this, he must reproduce them in his own mind and heart. In order to do his work perfectly he must put himself in their place, know all they knew, feel all they felt, be animated and possessed as it were by their spirit, and live over again their life. At the same time, he needs to know and feel all the wants, experiences, circumstances, characteristics of the age and people to whom especially he would open the treasures of divine wisdom contained in the scriptures. Of course this cannot be done perfectly; but this is the true ideal of an interpreter; and just in proportion as he approximates to this ideal, he realizes the proper aim and end of a commentary on the scriptures.

Professor Owen possesses, in a good degree, these fundamental qualifications of an expositor of the scriptures. His life has been spent in the study and the teaching of the Greek and Latin classics. His editions of Homer, Thucydides, and Xenophon, are favorably known through the country, and are used as text-books in the principal academics and colleges of New England. They are characterized by sound learning and good common sense. The *student* finds help in them just when he needs it, and is not encumbered with assistance when he can better go alone; while the *teacher* welcomes the editor as an intelligent guide who goes along with the pupil, leading the way, and pointing out the objects chiefly worthy of

attention and study, without superseding either the teacher's office or the exertions of the pupil. Long experience in teaching has acquainted him with the real wants of students, and he meets those wants with rare success, just because he manifestly has a cordial sympathy with students and a conscientious desire to do them good. At the same time he has a good measure of sympathy with the classic authors in general; though we do not think Dr. Owen possesses that warm sympathy with each particular author which in some commentators almost identifies them with the author for the time being, and so inspires their readers with something of their enthusiasm, and not a little of the author's sentiments and spirit, to say nothing of that power to reproduce and so to represent antiquity, which is the prerogative only of the highest order of genius. But industry and fidelity, a sincere love of truth, and a conscientious sense of duty are more reliable qualities in a commentator than even genius and enthusiasm; and these, with good common sense and a genuine sympathy for whatever is human, are never wanting in the editor of these editions of the classics.

The same sound learning, the same practical wisdom and good sense, the same conscientious love of truth and goodness and mankind, are distinguishing features of the commentaries on the New Testament.

The Greek language, in its lexical forms and its grammatical constructions, has been his special study. The habit of verbal and logical analysis, which he has formed by long practice in the recitation room, and which he has sharpened by his critical editions of the classics, follows him in his study of the scriptures, and conduces greatly to that independent investigation of their literal meaning which must be the foundation of correct exegesis. Such a scholar and teacher naturally approaches a passage on the grammatical side, and inquires, not what it is usually understood to mean, not what it must teach in order to square with a certain school of theology or system of philosophy, but what it does mean when interpreted according to the laws of language. The knowledge and experience of a classical teacher are also eminently conducive, not only to a thorough acquaintance with the facts of geography and history, but to a just appreciation of their subtle influence on the coloring of thought and the shades of expression.

At the same time, nothing can be further removed from the pedantries and frivolities of barren and heartless hermeneutics than these commentaries. The rules of exegesis and the learning of the schools are means, not ends, faithful servants, and not capricious tyrants, in the work of interpretation. Exegetical technics are admitted only where clearness and conciseness require, and when it were sheer pedantry to exclude them. Far-fetched interpretations have no charms. Original explanations are not preferred simply because they are original. On the contrary, other things being equal, the received explanation has the preference. The most obvious interpretation is rather *presumed* to be the true interpretation. In short, good common sense is the predominant faculty in the mind of Professor Owen, and the presiding genius in his commentaries; and it makes the most judicious use of all the stores which he has accumulated by many years of study and experience.

With his experience as a scholar and teacher, Dr. Owen manifestly combines a deep Christian experience; and that large common sense, which is a kind of outward eye for the correct observation of men and things, is but an entrance to the inner eye, that eye of the soul, which discerneth all things, even the deep things of God, namely, a large heart enlightened and sanctified by the Spirit, and filled with the love of God and man, without which all the lights of science, all the lights of outward observation and experience, fail utterly to illumine the sacred page, or man's pathway to a better world. "The light of the body is the eye," the light of the soul is the heart; and to the interpreter of the scriptures not less than to the preacher and the hearer of the word, the language of our Lord applies: "If, therefore, thine eye be single, thy whole body (soul) shall be full of light; but if thine eye be evil, thy whole body (soul) shall be full of darkness. And if the *light that is in thee* be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

Doctor Owen has a supreme reverence for the Bible as the word of God. His theory of inspiration is the same which manifestly underlies all our Saviour's citations of the Old Testament. What "the scripture saith," "God saith," whether it be by "the mouth" of Moses or the prophets, of apostles, or of our Lord himself. And a "thus saith the Lord" is to him the end of all controversy. It is refreshing to see a faith so implicit and unhesitating, so manifestly hearty and sincere in a writer of such scholarly pursuits and attainments, and in an age which is so infected with avowed or disguised scepticism. He is a cordial believer in the supernatural revelations of the Bible, and in the profoundest mysteries of the Christian scheme, essentially as they are understood and received by evangelical Christians. He believes them because they are clearly revealed on the face of the scriptures as their obvious and natural meaning, and also because they meet the wants of his moral nature, accord with his own inward experience, and are spiritually discerned by the eye of the inmost soul. He not only believes them as facts, but cordially receives them as eternal truths, conforms his own life to them as the great realities of the spirit world, and builds his own hopes upon them for time and eternity. Thus is he prepared to *interpret* them not only to the understanding, but to the inward consciousness and inner experience of the Christian who hungers for the word of God as for the bread of life. Professor Owen is even more at home in his commentaries on the Gospels than he is in his editions of the classics. His heart is more enlisted. He is in livelier sympathy with his author on the one hand, and his readers on the other, and so better qualified to be a medium of communication between them. We cannot but hope that great numbers of our young men who have found him a pleasant guide and a useful helper in the delightful fields of classical literature will follow him with still higher delight and greater profit into the broader and richer province of the Bible. And we hope he will be encouraged by the manifest success and usefulness of his labors to extend his studies from the Gospels into the Epistles. At the same time, the learned professor will pardon us for the suggestion that this is not a work to be entered upon with

slight preparation, or dispatched in undue and inconsiderate haste. The Epistle to the Romans is beset with verbal and logical difficulties beyond even the Gospel of John; and, while we look with admiration, and even astonishment, on the published achievements of Professor Owen's spare hours, after teaching so large a portion of the day, we cannot but think he has yielded to the temptation into which so many authors and editors fall of making books too rapidly. We have marked not a few inaccuracies and infelicities of expression in these commentaries on the Gospels, and we doubt not other readers have marked similar lapses, which would have been avoided by more time and more care.¹ A more careful revision of the whole commentary before printing would have prevented palpable inconsistencies between the notes on different chapters, and sometimes on different verses of the same chapter; such, for example, as the opposing explanations of "*the end*," in the notes on Matt. x. 22 and 23; the note on the latter distinctly implying what is as distinctly denied in the note on the former, that *the end* is the destruction of Jerusalem; and the inconsistency between Matt. x. 3 and xiii. 55, in the former of which James and Lebbeus are made the cousins, and in the latter the brothers, of our Lord. A cool and deliberate revision would, perhaps, strike out numerous egoisms; such, for instance, as "I like Alford's suggestion," commentary on John, p. 12; and "this strikes me," and "I am yet inclined to think," both on p. 15; and "I cannot agree with Alford," p. 41, which "strike" the reviewer as better suited to a review than a commentary, though this may be a matter in which tastes differ. The reading *Bethlehem*, on p. 55, is probably a mere typographical error. It should be *Bethshan*. The interpretation (commentary on Matt., p. 341) of 1 Thess. i. 16, 17, as if proving that the righteous will rise before the wicked at the general resurrection, though not uncommon among illiterate Christians, is so contradictory to the express terms of the passage, and to all respectable commentaries on it, that it must be the result of sheer thoughtlessness and forgetfulness. Our author's great *anxiety* to defend what he believes to be the truth (which is usually the orthodox faith), sometimes leads him to broad and sweeping statements which are hardly sustained by the facts in the case, and sometimes to labored and protracted arguments whose very length and labor throw suspicion on the doctrine. As an example of the former we would refer to the strong and rather dogmatic declaration (com. on Matt., p. 341), that the whole tenor of scripture, and the experience of our missionaries, is against the idea that any can be saved without the knowledge of Christ in this life; and, as an illustration of the latter, to the very elaborate and anxious argument (com. on Luke, pp. 388-396) touching the resurrection body of our Lord. To bring these friendly criticisms to an end, we cannot but observe, and we have heard the same remark from others, that, as there is sometimes a want of conciseness and precision in the language of these commentaries, so also there is too often

¹ For example, Commentary on John, p. 40, "correctness of his claims to the Messiahship," instead of the validity of his claims to be the Messiah. Matthew, p. 355, "none but *him* could hear." Repeated on p. 357.

a vagueness and indefiniteness of conception, which shows that the writer either wants the sharpness to discern the *exact* truth, or that he has not taken time and pains enough to look *all around* the subject. There are some of the highest gifts and most refined graces of an expositor which we do not discover in these commentaries. But they combine so many of the substantial and fundamental excellences of a commentary, both for students and for the masses, that we cordially recommend them "for the use of ministers, theological students, private Christians, Bible classes, and Sabbath schools."

W. S. T.

ARTICLE IX.

WORKS OF RUFUS CHOATE.¹

THESE handsome volumes are a deserved tribute to the memory of a most brilliant, accomplished, and fascinating man. The biography, which extends through considerably more than half of the first volume, has been prepared from the fullest materials now accessible, and with eminent care and judgment. The intimate relations of the editor with the subject of his Memoir, his sympathetic and admiring, yet thoroughly discriminating, appreciation of his character and genius, and the full contributions of correspondence, reminiscences, and other valuable matter by professional and personal friends, make it in all respects most adequate and most attractive. Especially do the letters and journals, together with the reminiscences of the closing chapter, reveal the charm of Mr. Choate's personal character and domestic life, as well as the wide variety of his professional labors and literary studies, and will bring a new delight to those who had only known and admired him in his public career. The whole portraiture of the man — the advocate, the orator, the statesman — is spirited, beautiful, and complete.

The remainder of the work consists of Lectures, Addresses, Speeches in the Senate of the United States, and Miscellaneous Speeches, with an Appendix containing Fragments of Translations from the Classics. These serve to give some idea, as far as words, without the magical voice and eye, and marvellous power of personal presence, can do, of the strength and richness of Mr. Choate's mind and his full-toned and most musical eloquence. They show a broad range of subjects, and an interest and enthusiasm in all good learning which may well claim for the volumes a notice in our Review. The author of the Lecture on the Power of the State developed by Mental Culture, the Address at the Dedication of the Peabody Institute, and the Speech on the Bill for the Establishment of the Smithsonian Institute, will have the affectionate thanks

¹ The Works of Rufus Choate; with a Memoir of his Life. By Samuel Gilman Brown, Professor in Dartmouth College. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 2 vols. pp. 558, 523.

of every lover of letters. Favorite, too, among his topics of study and popular address was our Pilgrim History, and in his overflowing library, as not a few will remember, theology, mediæval as well as modern, was represented, and in rare hours of leisure turned to with a love almost professional.

The Journals of Mr. Choate will be found, we think, among the most attractive portions of the Memoir, disclosing as they do, his methods of self-discipline and the generous breadth of his studies and tasks. They show how fondly faithful he was to his ideal of personal culture amid the most crowded and exhausting labors. Whether at home in his library, or at Washington, engrossed with the duties of a statesman, he never forgets his plan of study; first, the full and searching preparation for immediate professional or political duty; then the larger circle of readings, ancient and modern, for refining, enriching, and invigorating the whole mind; and all this seriously reviewed and measured (in his own words) "by a faithful and severe judgment on the intellectual and the moral quality of all I shall have done; the failure, the success, and the lessons of both." At one hour it is a classic author, with a brief translation or extended analysis or delicate criticism, full of feeling and insight; at another it is a reading from the Greek Testament or the Septuagint, minutely observant of language, with grammatical and exegetical remark; for example, "the Temptation in Matthew, Mark, and Luke; and then that grand and grave poem which Milton has built upon those few and awful verses, *Paradise Regained*;" at still another it is some English classic—Johnson or Burke, or Jeremy Taylor—or some French memoir from the Academy of Inscriptions, illustrative of Cicero, or even a dutiful lesson in the Greek Grammar, with the "practice of parsing every word in my few lines of Homer"; and then, once more to his regular work of preparation for the court or the senate. We cannot but heartily commend these suggestive and sometimes touching fragments to every sympathetic scholar. His own judgment of them disarms all criticism. "Those I love best may read, smile, or weep, when I am dead, at such a record of lofty design and meagre achievement; yet they will recognize a spirit that 'endeavored well.'" Brief, indeed, they are, and broken, pensive, at times to sadness, with the thought that so much of aspiration cannot be realized; yet unflagging, ardent, full of high moral purpose, and we may also add, beneath them all, though with characteristic reserve, rarely uttered even to himself, a reverent sense of the solemnities of religious truth and duty.

We have also been especially interested, as we cannot but believe our readers will be, in examining the translations from Thucydides and Tacitus, appended to the second volume. All scholars will turn with eagerness to note these fruits and proofs of classical scholarship and taste, long attributed, yet not always, except by intimate friends, fully accredited to the great advocate. It attracts us at once that, with all his own exuberance, Mr. Choate was drawn to such dense, compressed authors, and chose to lay himself out on them, rather than on others like Cicero, with whom he was

equally familiar, and whom, in some respects, he so much more resembled. We think his versions will be found to exhibit in an unusual field, some of the most marked characteristics of his mind and style. They are, what is not often seen in this department of literature, translations of powerful writers by a man of genius, a man, too, in whom insight and imagination were blended in a very unusual degree. As specimens, therefore, of a version which is not a mere version, but from original power, we are inclined to think they have seldom been equalled. We can only the more regret that they could not have been completed. It should be borne in mind, in reading them, that they were never revised by the author, but were thrown aside, and only preserved by accident. This will account for anything that may be thought an imperfection of detail; and yet they will be found to be singularly accurate and free from even minor blemishes. It will be seen at one glance that they were not designed to be literal, verbal translations, nor should we wish or expect them to be from such a hand. They are generally rather the large but studiously careful expansion of the thought of the original, fully alike and equal to it, although not barely identical with it. The translator evidently aimed to realize and present before himself the total meaning of his author. Sometimes, if he can consistently with English idiom and natural clearness, he preserves the original form. More often he varies it, evolves the closely-folded thought, unrolls it in many lights, holding it up now in this, now that shade of sense, striving to lose nothing, yet equally to add nothing, that is not really present, although it may lurk in some particle or prefix, or tense form or mere verbal arrangement, or logical implication. Thus the result is not a dry, prosaic paraphrase, but the fresh reproduction, faithful yet ample, of an appreciative, imaginative scholar. There is sometimes accumulation, or even repetition of words; but it is not merely to repeat the thought tautologically to the mind, but rather to present and re-echo it to the imagination or the feelings, producing in some cases an almost pathetic refrain; as when he renders *οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο* (Thuc. I. 2, 2), "men habitually and perpetually migrated without difficulty, without resistance, without regret," or individualizes *οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες*, into "nor so much as planting a tree or a vine." So *μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μετίτας ποιούμενοι* (18, 3) becomes more vivid in "as their place of exercise was not the parade but the field of battle," and the historian's fine prophecy of immortality (ch. 22) somewhat more proudly sonorous in the still, almost literal version, "since it is composed, not as a prize performance for a single reading or a single hearing, but for an everlasting possession." Indeed, in not a few passages the translator seems to us to illustrate well how much feeling and imagination have to do with interpretation; how great advantage a mind at once disciplined, impassioned, and affluent may have in penetrating and expressing the sense of a stern, compact, unyielding period in Tacitus or Thucydides. He evidently delighted in grappling with their most obscure and difficult thoughts, as in the archaeology and the speeches of the Greek historian; breaking down, enucleating, reshaping, expanding, but never weakening or diluting — rhetoric here, as always with him, never forgetting logic. Everywhere is

seen his keen sense of words, his anxious adjustment of the English to the Greek term, and his zest in an idiomatic, choice expression, as well as in a rhythmic order and harmony. Sometimes he can be as terse as his original, or even more sententious; especially in rendering the sharp antitheses of the Greek, as in 37, 4, "to take by force when strongest, by fraud when weakest"; and 36, 1, when, reversing his more frequent process, he *folds up* the meaning in a few strong words: "Better the power acquired by breaking than the security hoped for in keeping such a treaty." (Compare also the well-known parallel between the Athenians and Spartans, ch. 70.) And how simply yet nobly he gives the severity, sometimes pathetic, sometimes austere and grand, of Tacitus, as *Annals*, 3, 18: "To me, the wider the survey I take of the events of older or more recent times, the more do the jests of human life, turning its solemn things to derision and laughter, display themselves; for surely all men might seem to have been destined by fame, by hope, by veneration, to the throne, rather than he whom fortune was secretly cherishing for the future prince." Here and there, too, we trace, not without pleasure, the word or phrase or shaping of a sentence which a lawyer would naturally use; for it is not the mere scholar, but the practised man of affairs, translating the story of ancient life into the living language of to-day.

It will be observed also, in his occasional works, that he exemplifies some of the finer virtues of an interpreter; discussing and balancing evidence, judging, not from a dry, verbal analysis, but from the entire course of thought, holding at once in his mind, as so often before a jury, the whole case, and letting each historical or logical point throw light on all the others. He evidently prepared himself with care for his work of translation by historical and other illustrative reading. We have seen a fragment of a translation of Demosthenes on the Crown, preceded by a somewhat extended introduction, together with the opening of the speech of Aeschines, and showing with what research he sought to bring before himself the whole view and scene before he attempted to reproduce the spoken words. With what success he could thus make the fortunes and the eloquence of the Greek and the Roman orator live again before us, may be seen in his *Lecture on the Eloquence of Revolutionary Periods*.

It is this blending of a careful insight into thought with a clear and ample utterance, of trained and just precision with an affluence of expression never out of control, and always—to the last word of the farthest-rolling period—conscious of the thought it bore along, that constitutes a distinctive peculiarity of Mr. Choate's mind and style, and makes his writings a valuable study to public speakers. To some of these traits of style Mr. Tracy has called attention in his interesting criticism (*Vol. I. p. 298*), which will serve to correct an erroneous opinion sometimes expressed, that Mr. Choate's rhetoric overpowered his thought. That even in his most voluminous sentences he was mentally self-possessed, and steadily saw the purposed end from the beginning, cannot be doubted by those who knew his methodic self-discipline. That his characteristic exuberance may at times have overflowed the limits of an austere taste or a colder temperament,

may readily be admitted. Yet, that he could, at will, as readily be terse and brief, is not only proved, as we have seen, by his translations, but by many passages in his speeches, as in that on the Birth-day of Daniel Webster.

The reader of these volumes will find the classical tastes of Mr. Choate abundantly revealed, as has been already indicated in his *Journal*, in his fond recurrence to favorite ancient authors, his daily hour redeemed, somewhere and somehow, for such readings, his hope even of sometime producing a work on the history and culture of Greece. These all prove that his scholarship was no mere tradition of blind admirers, but authentic, the result of affectionate and assiduous study, seeking the best aids and knowing how to use them, applying the toilsome yet fruitful culture of the advocate to the understanding and interpretation of the great minds of antiquity, scientifically analyzing and chastising style with Quintilian, or refreshing and resting itself in the dreamy world of the *Odyssey*, the legends of that sea he loved so well. What new influence these studies must have had upon his natural wealth of thought and language — at once enriching and purifying, giving vigor and justness, yet comprehension and amplitude, and withal enduing with that fine gift of delicate allusion, that far-off music of the antique world of poets and orators which his hearers still remember with enthusiasm — needs hardly be said. Not often is it that one so overborne with professional and public labor will still be true to a scholar's love and duty; and yet that he could do and bear so much, was perhaps due, in no small part, to the relief he compelled himself to take, early or late, in these intellectual diversions. Who can forget the description he has given of the tired lawyer, coming home from his week's imprisonment in court to the society of his library and his favorite authors (Vol. I. p. 477) ! "With a superhuman effort he opens his book, and in the twinkling of an eye he is looking into the full 'orb of Homeric or Miltonic song,' or he stands in the crowd — breathless, yet swayed as forests or the sea by winds — hearing and to judge the Pleadings for the Crown; or the philosophy which soothed Cicero or Boethius in their afflictions, in exile, prison, and the contemplation of death, breathes over his petty cares like the sweet south; or Pope or Horace laughs him into good humor; or he walks with Aeneas and the Sibyl, in the wild light of the laurelled dead; and the court-house is as completely forgotten as the dreams of a pre-Adamite life. Well may he prize that endeared charm, so effectual and safe, without which the brain had long ago been chilled by paralysis or set on fire by insanity !"

To the preacher, the mind and methods of so eminent an advocate may well prove an instructive study. His preparations for the pulpit may perhaps borrow some side-lights of illustration from the lawyer's preparations for the bar. He may at least find here aids and suggestions, how to make all learning tributary to professional culture; how to amplify without enfeebling style; how to bring out the full riches of his noble language on sacred themes, which is one privilege of a Christian scholar; how to invest truths higher than those of the forensic orator or jurist in that perfect form of which they are surely the most worthy.

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ARTICLE I.

SIN, AS RELATED TO HUMAN NATURE AND TO THE
DIVINE PURPOSE.

BY REV. JOSEPH HAVEN, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY.

THERE is, perhaps, no one topic in the whole province of theological investigation that presents to the philosophic and thoughtful inquirer more, or more formidable, problems than the doctrine of sin. It meets him in every direction, and always with a difficulty. Whether he turn his thoughts to the divine or human side of theology, Godward or manward, in either case he comes directly upon this strange and unaccountable phenomenon. It stands like some fearful spectre in his path, barring further progress; and he may well exclaim, with Milton's angel:

“ Whence and what art thou, execrable shape,
That dardest oppose my way ? ”

There are two aspects in which this doctrine is of special moment to the theological inquirer: one is, the relation which it sustains to *the nature of man*; the other, its relation to *the divine will and purpose*. It is the object of the following pages, not to offer new opinions, or advance a new

theory, on these topics — that would be difficult to do, and of little use withal; but rather to gather up in a resumé, at once historic and critical, the leading theories which have been already advanced in respect to these disputed points. It is in this direction, perhaps, that progress can best be made, if made at all, in the science of theology, as regards matters which have been so long and so widely under discussion, as those now indicated. And first :

THE RELATION OF SIN TO HUMAN NATURE.

That human nature is corrupt is too evident to admit of serious question. The universal prevalence of sin ; its early manifestation and spontaneous development, under all possible varieties of condition and circumstance ; the difficulty with which it is in any case resisted and overcome ; the certainty with which it may be predicted in the future history of any human being just entering on a career of moral agency, all point in one direction, — all go to show that the evil is not accidental, but radical, and that its root is deep in our nature. The propensity to sin must be innate, else why these characteristics ? What better evidence can we have that any propensity, disposition, or trait of character is native than that which is thus afforded ?

The great problem is, not to *establish* the fact, for that is already clear ; but to *account* for it. Two questions, in fact, demand solution. Its *origin* : whence comes this innate propensity to evil in man ? Its *morality* : is such a propensity in itself culpable ? These are questions which no thoughtful mind will lightly ask, or answer without careful reflection.

1. *Its origin* : How comes man to have a nature thus corrupt ?

To this, many answers have been given. The several possible solutions may be resolved, if we mistake not, into the following : A. It is supposable, that this nature was *originally implanted by the Creator*. B. It is supposable, that it was *acquired in some previous state of being*, as

consequence of some sinful act on the part of each individual. C. It is supposable that it is *derived from a sinful ancestry*, in whose loss of innocence their whole posterity is involved. This latter, again, admits of threefold statement, according as we suppose this derivation of corrupt nature to occur: *a.* by virtue of the *generic unity* of the race, so that the sin of one man is the sin of the whole; or: *b.* by virtue of the *constructive unity* of the race with its first parent as representative or federal head; or: *c.* by virtue of *the laws of natural descent, like producing like*.

Of these several suppositions (A, B, C), each is possible, and one or other, it would seem, must be true. The innate propensity in man to sin must either be the work of God in his original creation, or else something which he has brought upon himself; if the latter, then it must have been in some previous state of being, or else by connection with a sinful ancestry in the present world.

Of these theories, the first (A) requires at present little discussion. To suppose God the author of a depraved constitution in man originally, is to make him really the author of sin. It is to suppose him planting with his own hand the seeds of evil, with absolute certainty of the result. God's work is not of that sort. What he makes is such that he can pronounce it very good. Man, as he comes from the hand of his Creator, is pure. How else could he be justly punished for sinning? It would be the height of injustice for God to endow man with a nature sure to lead to sin, and then punish him for sinning. Such inconsistency and injustice are surely not to be ascribed to the most perfect Being.

B. It is possible that the propensity in question comes over to us from a previous state of being, in consequence of sin there committed. This would seem to have been the view of Origen. It is advanced in our own time by two distinguished theologians, Dr. J. Müller of Germany, in his "Christian Doctrine of Sin," and Dr. Edward Beecher of this country, in his well-known "Conflict of Ages." Each, however, from a different point of view: Müller seeking

merely to account for the fact of universal sinfulness ; Beecher, to justify the arrangement, on the part of God, by which man comes into the world with a depraved nature. Both find in this theory the only satisfactory solution of their problem.

Of this theory it may be said that, while it is certainly a possible, it is by no means a probable, supposition. It supposes too many things — things which not only *are* not, but, in the very nature of the case, *cannot* be, established on reasonable grounds — things which do not admit of proof. It supposes : 1. that each one of the race has had a previous existence. 2. That in that previous state he was a moral agent. 3. That in the exercise of his moral agency he sinned. 4. That he did so without any previous bias or propensity to sin ; since this propensity is the very thing to be accounted for. 5. That his sin vitiated his nature. 6. That he brought that corrupt and vitiated nature with him into the present state of being.

Now all these propositions may be true ; but there is no evidence that one of them is so — none from reason, none from revelation, none from consciousness. The only argument in its favor seems to be that *if* true, it might relieve the subject of certain difficulties. But this in itself is no proof of the theory. It may be that other methods will also relieve those difficulties. The key in my hand may possibly unlock the door, but other keys may also do the same. It may be, also, that in the present instance the difficulties are such as are not fully met by any theory yet proposed. It is by no means certain that the key in question really will fit the lock and open the door so long closed to human entrance. It is by no means certain that the divine character is to be cleared up, and the divine proceeding justified, by any such method.

The real difficulty is to see how it could consist with the wisdom and justice and goodness of God to place man, while yet sinless, in such circumstances that he would be likely, and even sure, to sin. But this is a difficulty which

presses equally on the theory of pre-existence. It has no advantage over any other theory, in this matter, since it too admits and pre-supposes that man *did* sin in that previous state, and of course that he was placed in such circumstances that his sin was not only possible and probable, but *sure* to occur, for it *did* occur. If it is wrong for God to place men here in such circumstances, and expose them to such influences that they will be quite sure to sin, why not equally unjust for him to do it there?

Nay, the difficulty is not only not relieved, but actually augmented, by the theory under consideration. If the problem is to explain how one pure-minded, sinless being, Adam by name, came to sin, it is surely no help towards its solution, to be told that the same thing happened once to every individual of the race—that every human being is, in fact, Adam. This is simply multiplying the difficulty by just the number of the human family. If the problem is to show how God could be just, and yet leave man in Paradise so unguarded that he would certainly fall, it is surely no relief to be told that he left not one but all human souls in that predicament.

Nor does the justice of the procedure shine forth more conspicuously in the subsequent stages of the process. To take each soul when once it has fallen and sinned, deprive it of its consciousness, of all consciousness of the past, reduce it to a condition of infantile weakness, subject it, in this condition and under these disadvantages, to a new probation, with the absolute certainty that thus placed it will sin, and to hang over it the doom of eternal death if under these circumstances it should sin,—all this, moreover, as the penalty of that previous transgression of which it is wholly unconscious—this is surely no material relief of the difficulty, nor a very satisfactory clearing up of the divine justice.

The theory fails, then, inasmuch as it presents a series of suppositions unsupported by evidence, incapable of proof, and which, even if admitted, tend rather to augment than to relieve the real difficulty.

C. Since theories A and B fail to meet the case, we have this supposition, that the depravity of human nature is derived from a sinful ancestry, in whose primal loss of innocence their whole posterity is, in some way, involved. There seems to be no other reasonable and probable supposition. This seems both reasonable and probable. To judge *a priori*, it would seem not unlikely that if man should fall it would affect his posterity in just this way — that they would follow the fortunes of the parent; not unlikely that God would choose to have it so. We do not know, indeed, that without special divine interposition it could be otherwise. It is the universal law of nature that like shall produce like. As the tree, so the fruit. It is the great law of nature, moreover, that the innocent suffer with the guilty; that, in many things, the consequences of transgression reach beyond the immediate actor, and fall with crushing weight on those who are not personally responsible for the deed. It would be quite in keeping with both these great laws, were the vitiated and corrupt nature of fallen Adam to become the nature also of his whole posterity.

With this view both the teaching of scripture and the facts of the world's history correspond. In the narrative of the fall we have the only authentic account of the first entrance of sin into our world. It is an undeniable fact that human depravity has existed ever since that first sin of the first man, and that, without exception, all his descendants partake of that moral nature which belonged to him after that event. These facts indicate a close connection of the two things. Such a connection is evidently implied in the scriptures, and in some passages directly affirmed. We are told that by one man sin came into the world, and death by sin; and that the consequence was universal sinfulness and universal death.¹ In succeeding verses of the same chapter the idea is resumed and repeated. It was by the disobedience of the one that the many

¹ Rom. v. 12.

became sinners, even as it is by the obedience of one that many are justified.¹ In these passages the sinfulness of the race is plainly ascribed to the apostacy of Adam, as the occasion and origin of the same — the fountain whence that sad and terrible consequence has flowed, and is still flowing, through the long dark ages of the world's history.

This has been, accordingly, the view generally received in the Christian church from the first. In this the great body of those who adopt the Christian system agree, both Old and New school, Calvinist and Arminian. As to the *nature* of the connection, they differ; as to the *fact* of a connection, they agree.

To the different views respecting the nature of this connection, the manner in which the depravity of the race links itself with, and proceeds from, the sin of the first parent, let us now turn our attention. As already stated, the subordinate theories are these:

a. That of the *generic unity* of the race, as virtually one with Adam, existing in him, sinning in him — his sin their sin. This is probably the earliest theory on this subject. It regards the act of Adam as the act of the race. The common nature of the race existed in him. He was the genus, comprising within itself all the species and individuals subsequently to be, as the first oak contained within itself all future oaks. The race was in him, not indeed in an individual capacity, but generically, and so sinned in him not as individuals, but as to the generic nature. The theory is closely related to the realism of Plato, and the Platonic and new Platonic schools. It has found adherents, for the most part, among the admirers and disciples of that philosophy. It was thus with Augustine. Accustomed to the realistic mode of thought, trained to regard abstractions as realities, and to merge the individual in the genus, his theology on this point was simply the natural outgrowth of his philosophy. Misled, doubtless, he may have been, in part, by the Vulgate version of Rom. v. 12, in *quo* omnes peccaverunt, as he, in

¹ Rom. v. 18, 19.

turn, misled others (e. g. the synod of Carthage) by his exposition of that passage; but such a mind as his could hardly have been thus misled by any single verse or version, however faulty, had not a false philosophy, and a wrong habit of thought thus induced, prepared him to be easily thus misled. It is not so much the Vulgate version as the Platonic realism that speaks through Augustine in such utterances as these: "All men sinned in him, inasmuch as all *were ille unus*." "Those who were afterwards to be many out of him, were then one in him." "All were in that individual, and all those *were he*, none of whom as yet existed individually." "In which one all have sinned in common, previously to personal sins of each one as an individual."¹

The theory under consideration may be regarded as properly that of Augustine, to whom it is indebted for its leading features, if not strictly for its origin. It soon became the prevalent theory of the Latin Fathers, more especially of the African church. The theologians of the Middle Ages found it quite accordant with their speculative views. The Reformers, in many instances, adopted it. In the twelfth century, Odo, bishop of Cambray, gives it clear and precise statement. "My mind was in him [Adam], not as a person, but as a component part of the species; not in my individual nature, but in the common nature. For the common nature of every human mind was guilty of sin in Adam. Therefore every human mind was guilty of sin in Adam. Therefore every human mind is blame-worthy in respect to its nature, but not in respect to its person. Therefore the sin by which we sinned in Adam is to me a sin of my nature; in Adam it was a personal sin. I sinned in him, not as *I*, but as this substance which I am. I sinned as *man*, not as *Odo*," that is, as genus, not as individual.² Among the moderns we find Owen, a realist

¹ See for the above and similar passages, de Pec. Mer. I. 10; Op. Imp. IV. 104; Ep. 194, c. 6; de Civ. Dei, XIII. See also Münscher von Cölln and Wiggers (Emerson's Tr.) for similar statements.

² See Odo on Original Sin, Bib. Vet. Pat., Vol. XXI.

and Platonist, holding the same view. It is maintained by Dr. Baird, in his "Elohim Revealed."

In a modified form, this view is held also by President Edwards. The race is one with Adam, according to his view, not indeed as the genus is comprehensive of the species and of the individuals which it contains under it, but rather by an absolute, divinely-constituted unity, by virtue of which his sin is as truly theirs as the sin of a man to-day is his also to-morrow. It rests on the principle that God can make anything to be one and identical with anything else that he chooses. In common with the Augustinian theory, this maintains the essential unity of the race with Adam, so that his sin is really and truly, not by construction or imputation merely, the sin of all his posterity. All men are truly and properly guilty of his sin, and for it deserve eternal death.

With respect to the merits of this theory, it is scarcely necessary to remark that it is based on a false philosophy. The race is not one with Adam in such a sense as that here intended. His act is not, and cannot be, literally the act of the race. Whether we define sin as properly an act, or as both an act and also a state, in either case it is the act or the state of a personal moral being; none other can sin. It was as a personal moral being that Adam sinned. We, his descendants, were not then in existence as personal beings, and of course could not have sinned in his transgression, nor have shared the guilt of it. If it be said, human nature was summed up in him, we reply, a nature may be vitiated, as no doubt human nature was in him, its origin and fountain, but a nature does not sin, for it is not a personal being. To say that the race, as such, sinned in its progenitor, is simply to personify an abstraction. Abstractions do not sin.

Nor is it better to resolve the thing, with Edwards, into an arbitrary act of divine power. It is not within the province of Omnipotence to make things which are really distinct identical with each other. God cannot make the

act of Caesar or of Ghengis Khan to be, truly and properly, my act. He may impute it to me, treat me as if it were mine, punish me for it; but that does not make it mine. Nay, if I commit the very same sin, in other words do the same thing, it will still be true that the act of Caesar is his, and my act is mine, and no power in the universe can make them identical.

Further than this, we are disposed to ask why that *one* act of Adam, that is the first sin, should be ours also, more than any other, and all other, subsequent acts and sins of the same individual? If the race was in him, generically and seminally, in his *first* transgression, it was so in his *second* and his *third*. All his acts are our acts, as really as the first transgression, at least until the race begins to diverge into its separate individual life. Even then, for aught we see, the same law holds in the direct line of descent. The race lies as really summed up in Seth and Enos as it did in Adam. Are their sins also ours? Why not, on this theory? Did we not exist generically in Seth, and afterward in Noah? In fact, are not all the sins of all our progenitors in danger of coming down upon our heads, on this theory, unless we stand from under it? And still further, why are not all our posterity sinning in us, on the same principle?

From some passages in his writings, it would seem that these logical consequences of his theory did not escape the mind of Augustine, and that he was not disposed to shrink from them. He thinks it not *improbable* "that children are liable for the sins, not only of the first pair, but also of those from whom they are born," and that the sins of ancestors *universally* are the heritage of their descendants. "But respecting the sins of the other parents," he says, "the progenitors from Adam down to one's own immediate father, it may not improperly be debated, whether the child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied original faults of all, so that each one is the worse in proportion as he is the later; or that in respect to the sins of their parents,

God threatens posterity to the third and fourth generation, because, by the moderation of his compassion, he does not further extend his anger in respect to the faults of progenitors, lest those on whom the grace of regeneration is not conferred should be pressed with too heavy a load in their own eternal damnation, if they were compelled to contract, by way of origin, the sins of *all* their preceding parents from the commencement of the human race, and to suffer the punishment due for them.”¹

b. Passing from this, we have, next, the theory of the *constructive* unity of the race with Adam, as its federal head and representative, by virtue of a special covenant made with him to that effect. The sin of Adam is not *really* and *properly* that of the race, but only by *construction*. He acts for the whole by special divine arrangement. It is *as if* they were there and sinned, each in person. Such, it is maintained, is the relation of the race to the first parent, as to justify such an arrangement, and constitute the ground of it. In him the race stands its probation. He represents them in the whole transaction. In him they are tried, in him they sin, with him they fall. Forensically his sin is their sin. To them it is reckoned or imputed *as if* it were theirs.

The two theories (*a.* and *b.*) differ in this. According to *a.* the sin of Adam is *really* and *properly* the sin of the race, and is, therefore, imputed to all his descendants. According to *b.* it is *imputed* to them, and therefore, it is theirs. In the one case, it is mine because imputed; in the other, it is imputed because it is already mine.

The view now presented is that advocated in the Princeton Repertory, and in the Southern Presbyterian Review. It is, we suppose, the received doctrine of the Old school Presbyterian church. Among the Christian Fathers we find no distinct traces of this doctrine. It would seem to have originated with the schoolmen, and to have made little

¹ *Euchir.*, c. 46, 47, as cited by Emerson in Wigger's *Augustinism*. See also comments of the translator on the above passage.

progress until after the sixteenth century. It became the favorite theory of the German Reformed theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and was favored by some of the Lutherans of the same period.¹

To this view, it occurs as a serious, if not fatal, objection, that, if the relation of the race to Adam is not such as to make us really and justly chargeable with his sin, then it is not such as to be a just ground for treating us *as if* we were chargeable with it. If his sin is not, as the former theory affirms, and as this denies, really and truly ours, then it is certainly not right and just to charge it to us, and to deal with us *as if* it were ours. It is a manifest injustice to impute to any man what does not really belong to him, in the way of evil, and then to treat him as if he were what the charge implies; and no covenant, real or imaginary, can make it otherwise. The covenant that does this is unjust. It would be a manifest wrong to hold any living man responsible for the sin of Cain, of Noah, or of David. But if the sin of Adam may be imputed to us, without personal participation of our own, why not the sins of any other ancestor, or predecessor? If we did not share in the transgression, how can we share in the guilt? Or, if made to share the guilt in the one case, why not also in the others? We do not see anything in the mere fact that Adam stands at the head of the race, stands first in the line, that can essentially change the relation of the parties, or make it right for us to be charged with his sins, more than if he stood second, tenth, or fiftieth, in the line of progenitorship. The relation itself constitutes no ground for such a transfer of guilt, in the one case more than the other, nor in either case; and if such transfer of blame and responsibility be made, it must be by virtue of an arrangement purely arbitrary, and which in any other case men would not hesitate to pronounce unreasonable and unjust.

This injustice the previous theory escapes, by supposing

¹ Among the former may be mentioned Witsius; among the latter, Pfaff of Tübingen, some of the disciples of Wolf, Baumgarten, and others.

the race, as such, actually to have sinned in Adam, and so justly to be chargeable with the guilt of his transgression. The present theory admits that we did not really participate in his sin, and yet charges upon us the guilt of the transaction, as if we had been a party to the offence. Is this just?

It does not relieve the difficulty to be told, as in the Princeton Repertory, that imputation does not imply *transfer of moral character*, but only *exposure to punishment*; that the race did not really participate in the sin of Adam, nor in the moral ill-desert of that transgression, but only that his sin is laid to our charge, and we are punished for it. Charged with, and punished for, what we are *really* wholly innocent of! No transfer of the sin itself, none of the moral character, or blame-worthiness which attaches to all acts of transgression, since these pertain only to the transgressor himself, and cannot be transferred, but, in place of these, a transfer of the charge and of the punishment. But, does not the punishment belong to the transgressor, and to him only, as really as the sin? Is it a relief to any man's sense of injustice and wrong, to tell him, "we do not really think that you committed that offence, nor do we blame you in the least for any share of yours in the transaction, for we know that you had none; we only *charge* you with it, and *punish* you for it!"

But we shall be told that God is a sovereign, and has a right to make what arrangement he pleases—a right to stake the destinies of the race on the issue of Adam's probation, and, if he falls, to deal with the race as if they had individually fallen—a right to impute his sin to them as if it were theirs, and deal with them accordingly. We reply, God is, indeed, a sovereign, but that gives him no right to act unjustly; no right to punish one man for the sins of another, nor to impute to one man the acts of another. We are not to take refuge behind the throne of divine sovereignty with theories that will not bear the test of calm investigation, and that shock the common feelings of justice

¹ See Article on Imputation, in Princeton Essays, series first, Essay VI.

and propriety which Nature has implanted in the human bosom. This doctrine belongs not there. Away with it, and the like of it, from *that* place.

Shall we, then, with others, justify the imputation of Adam's sin to the race, on the supposition that God *presumed* that all his descendants would sin if placed each on trial as Adam was; and so, by an act of *generalization*, dealt with all as with him, on the principle *ex uno disce omnes*. This is the *scientia media* of the schoolmen. But this is a supposition wholly without proof; it is, moreover, a wholly unreasonable and arbitrary mode of procedure which is thus supposed. On the same principle, why not send the race at once to perdition, or to paradise, without individual probation, since to the divine mind it is evident, from eternity, that some will, and others will not, accept the offer of salvation through a redeemer, if the question be submitted to them.

It may be replied, that no objection from the apparent injustice of the procedure can set aside the plain fact, as revealed in scripture, that God *does* impute the sin of Adam to all his posterity. True, we reply; if it be a fact. But *is it?* *Does* the scripture teach this doctrine? If so, we have nothing more to say, but bow in silence to a dispensation which, upon any principles of human reason, we can neither justify nor explain.

But we look in vain for any such teaching. The word "impute," we do, indeed, find in the scriptures, but not in the sense here intended, that of transferring, or setting to the account of another what is not really and properly his own. Not an instance of this can be found. Abraham believes God, and it is imputed to him for righteousness. What is imputed? His faith. Whose faith? His own. Shimei prays David not to impute to him his guilt in cursing the King. *Whose* guilt? His own. On the contrary, do not the scriptures expressly deny any such transfer of guilt from one to another? Do they not, in the strongest and most explicit terms declare that, in the divine administration,

there is, and can be, no such principle of procedure? That "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."¹ The soul that sins, *it*, and *it only*, shall bear the punishment of its sins

But does not God visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation?² True, we reply; the children of ungodly parents suffer many evils in consequence of the sins of their ancestry. It is a principle universally true, a grand law, it would seem, of the moral universe, that sin involves the innocent along with the guilty in suffering and calamity. But there is a difference between suffering and punishment. To suffer in consequence of the sin of another, is not to be *punished for* the sin of another. If so, then, we are punished for the sins of our immediate ancestors no less than for the sin of Adam; nay, for theirs much more directly than for his; future generations, in like manner, will be punished for ours.

Should it be replied, that this is really all that is intended by the doctrine of imputation — that the consequences of Adam's sin pass over to his descendants in the shape of manifold suffering and evil, by whatever name we choose to call those consequences, whether calamity or punishment, — we have simply to say, that if this be all that is intended, then, in no proper sense is it sin that is imputed, nor the guilt of sin, nor its punishment; and it is a mere perversion and abuse of language to call it so.

We have dwelt, thus far, upon a single objection to the theory under consideration, the injustice of treating men as if they were guilty of a sin with which they are not in reality chargeable. It is furthermore to be objected to this view of the nature of our connection with the sin of Adam, that it rests upon an assumption, which is at once questionable and objectionable. That assumption is, that Adam

¹ Ezekiel xviii. 20. Compare Deut. xxiv. 16; see also 2 Kings xiv. 6.

² Deut. v. 9; Numb. iv. 18.

acted, and was, by special covenant on the part of God, entitled to act, as our federal head and representative in this whole proceeding.

This is the ground-work of the theory. The probation of the race, the grand problem of its destiny was submitted to his decision. He acted for us on trial, sinned for us, fell for us, and his sin becomes thus, in point of *law*, though not in point of *fact*, *our* sin. He was, in other words, agent for the race in the matter of probation. But this is an assumption which we are not prepared to concede. Upon what evidence does it rest? The advocates of this view speak of a covenant made with Adam to this effect, constituting him our federal head and representative. What, we ask, is that covenant; and where is it? What are its terms? Who are the parties to it? Where was it made? What evidence that any such covenant was ever made by God or man? These are perfectly fair and legitimate questions. We have the right to ask them, and to demand an answer.

Besides, with what propriety could Adam act for us in the manner now supposed? A federal representative is usually supposed to derive his authority from the consent and choice of those whom he represents. But it is a singular and most remarkable feature of this compact, that those most directly interested in it, and who are to be represented in the case, who are to be put on trial, and acquitted or condemned, in the person of their representative, whose eternal destiny depends on the issue of that momentous trial, are not, in fact, parties to the transaction in any sense whatever, not being then in existence. What sort of a compact or federal agreement is that in which the parties chiefly interested have no share? And where is the justice and propriety of such a compact and such a representation? Is it not a gross abuse of terms to speak of Adam as our federal representative, in the sense now intended?

There is a sense, and that a very important one, we are ready to admit, in which men do act for those who come after them. Every man acts for others, no less than for

himself, in whatever he does. The *consequences* of his acts extend to others, and affect them seriously, it may be permanently. Nor can it be otherwise. When the puritan colony set sail from Delfthaven for the shores of the new world, they were acting, not for themselves alone, but for us — for coming generations. When our fathers threw off the yoke of subjection to Great Britain, they acted for those who were to come after them. Thus are we acting in the great struggle of the present hour. In future years, when we are gone and forgotten, those who are to bear our name and inherit our virtues, or our vices, will reap the reward of our present sacrifices and sufferings for the land that we love. So universally; the child of the convicted felon inherits the disgrace of a dishonored name; the drunkard and the profligate bequeath to their children a vitiated sensibility and a disordered constitution. *In this sense* we are *all* the representatives of those who are to be affected by the results of our action. *In this sense* Adam may be said to have represented the whole race, at the head of which he stood. No man ever brought such fearful consequences on such a multitude who came after him, such a train of woes and evils on all coming time. In this sense did he act for the race; in this, and in no other.

As respects this theory, then, while we admit and maintain, that many evils resulting from the sin of Adam pass over to his posterity, not the least of which evils is a corrupt and vitiated moral nature, we cannot admit that in any proper sense his *sin* is transferred to us, or charged to us *as if* it were ours; while we admit that *in some sense* he acted for us, just as all men act for those who come after them, we cannot admit that he was in the proper and legal sense our representative, or that he acted for us in such a sense that his sin becomes by construction our sin, and that we are held in law responsible, and exposed to punishment, for the same.

Rejecting, then, both the views already presented under *a* and *b*, as to the nature of the connection between the

depravity of the race and the sin of the first parent, we have

c. The view which represents that depravity as resulting simply from the laws of natural descent, the child inheriting from the parent a vitiated and corrupt nature, prone to evil, in consequence of which he comes to sin as soon as he comes to moral agency. This nature, derived from Adam through successive generations, is the consequence of his original apostasy. His own nature, which became corrupt by the fall, is transmitted to his posterity, just as like always begets its like. According to this view, we are not constituted sinners by the mere act of Adam sinning, nor by the imputation of his sin to us, nor by any agency of our own, real or imaginary, in that transaction, nor by any compact or covenant made with him in regard to us; but only by our own moral act. We are not constituted sinners until we become sinners, that is, until we sin. Sin we do, however, and that uniformly, because of the corrupt nature thus inherited. That which is born of the flesh is flesh. Adam fallen begets a son in his own likeness, and so through successive generations the evil nature extends.

This is the view now generally entertained, we believe, by the New England theologians. It would seem to be the scriptural idea of native depravity, as it certainly is the most reasonable, the most simple and natural idea of it that we can form. The theory is simply this: like father, like son. As to most things we know that this is true. Why may it not be so as to moral nature? If a fondness for particular pursuits and professions, an ear and a taste for music, a propensity to mathematical studies or mechanical employments are, as we know they are, inherited; if the predominance of certain passions and appetites is to be traced to the same source,—if these things and the like descend from parent to child, why may it not be so with that peculiarity of the moral nature which we find to be universal in man, the propensity to evil? Why may not the moral follow the same general law which holds of the mental and the physi-

cal nature? Is not this precisely what we might expect and predict, from the simple observation of the laws of nature in regard to such matters?

II. Our second question now arises: *Is this depravity of our nature in itself culpable?* We have thus far directed our inquiries to the origin of the corruption which we observe in human nature. But what of its morality? Is this innate propensity to evil in itself blameworthy; in itself sin? Our question has reference, be it remembered, to the native disposition, not to human depravity in general, as manifested in the conduct of life; not to voluntary acts or voluntary states of mind, but to that vitiosity of nature itself with which we come into being, and which precedes and lies back of all voluntary acts and states, — is that culpable?

The answer, of course, will depend very much on the reply we make to the preceding question. If we brought this corruption of nature on ourselves by our own voluntary acts in some previous state of being, then it may be culpable. If we brought it on ourselves by personal participation in Adam's transgression, then it is not only *vitium* but *culpa*; it may justly be blamed and justly be punished. If it comes to us by constructive participation in his sin, then, by the same construction, we may be implicated in the guilt and in the punishment of that transgression and of its consequences, of which this is one. On the other hand, if the propensity in question be something which we have in no way, whether directly or indirectly, by personal act or by construction, brought upon ourselves; if it be, for instance, the creation of Deity in the original constitution of our nature, or if it be the natural result of the sins of our ancestors before we were born, in either case, the matter being wholly out of our control, lies also beyond the lines of our responsibility. Our calamity, our misfortune, it may be, but not our guilt. Blame attaches, and can justly attach, only where there is moral agency, and moral agency involves the choices and affections, the voluntary acts and states of mind,

of an intelligent rational being. But the nature with which a man comes into the world precedes all such agency on his part. It is no choice nor act of his, nor the result of any such act or choice ; on the contrary, in the present case, it is the result of something which occurred before he had any being, — centuries before he or his immediate ancestry existed. We do not blame a man in other cases for the nature with which he was born. Why should we in this ? It may be disagreeable to us : the color of the hair, the color of the eyes, the general cast of complexion and features, the dwarfed or distorted form, extremely disagreeable ; but we find no fault with the man on account of these peculiarities. He was so born. It is his misfortune, but not his fault. But is not the same true of the moral as well as of the physical condition and tendencies, in so far as they are strictly native ? How can blame attach where there is no responsibility, or responsibility where there is no agency in bringing about the result ? In respect to the physical traits that are strictly native, this is universally conceded ; wherein does the case really differ as respects the moral traits and tendencies that are also native ? Wherein am I really any more responsible for a native tendency to good or evil than for a native tendency to mathematical or musical studies, or for the particular color of the eyes or of the hair ? Had I any more agency in producing the one than the other of these peculiarities ? and how can I be held responsible for that which I had no agency in producing, and which it is wholly out of my power to prevent ? A defect it may be, and that a very serious one ; but am I to blame for that defect ?

But, reply the Princeton divines, sin is sin, however it originates. If a man is good, he is good ; if bad, he is bad, no matter how he became so. But it seems to us that it does matter how he became so, and that very materially. Otherwise, suppose that Deity himself, according to the supposition first made, did, by direct creative act, endow man with a disposition to evil ; and suppose him then to

charge that disposition to man as his own fault, and to punish him for having it. Does it make no difference now, how the man comes by that disposition? Would he not say: "It is hard, and seems unjust, to be punished simply for being what you made me"? Would it be sufficient and satisfactory for Deity to reply: "True, it seems hard, but then sin is sin, good is good, and evil is evil, wherever found, no matter how they originated! I must deal with facts as they are, without inquiring how they came to be so."

Suppose by some statute, human or divine, all men were required to have black hair and blue eyes, and that by some misfortune it happened to one of the aforesaid divines to be otherwise provided. The fact is patent, and the logic is irresistible: he is a violator of the statute, and must pay the penalty. "But it is not my fault," replies the culprit; "I was so born; I had no agency or choice in the matter." "True," replies the judge, "but I have read in your own writings that good is good, and bad is bad, no matter how they came to be so; and surely it is true that red hair is red hair whatever its origin. Is it not a tenet of your own philosophy that even the native dispositions and tendencies are culpable"? To which, of course, the theologian can only reply: "Verily it is so."

The question to be considered is not whether sin is sin, wherever found, nor yet whether all sin is blameworthy and to be punished, but whether the native tendency to evil in man is sin. To this the common sense of mankind, when fairly questioned and allowed to give true answer, makes but one reply. It recognizes nothing as truly and properly culpable which it is not in the power of man to avoid. It attaches blame only where there is responsibility, and responsibility only where there is some agency in bringing about the result. If a man bring upon himself, by his own vicious conduct, a tendency to insanity or disease, men say he is responsible for that result. If he transmits that tendency to his children, they lay the blame of the disordered constitution which those children inherit, not upon the chil-

dren themselves, but upon the parent who contracted and transmitted the evil. If a man, by carelessness or design, put out his own eyes, men say he is to blame and must suffer the consequences of his own carelessness and folly. If he is born blind he is never charged with it as any fault of his own.

But it may be asked : is not a tendency to sin a sinful tendency ? Sinful, we reply, in one sense, but not in the sense intended in the question ; sinful in the sense of leading to sin, not in the sense of being itself sin. The expression is ambiguous. But is not a disposition or tendency to sin, itself sin ? How can it be so ? we reply. Is a constitutional tendency to blindness or insanity, itself blindness or insanity ? Is a predisposition to decay and death, itself decay and death ? Is the tendency of a chimney to smoke, itself smoke ? Yet we call the chimney smokey, and so we call the disposition sinful, meaning, in either case, that the tendency is in that direction.

But it amounts to the same thing in the end, it may be said, whether men come into the world already sinful, or with a disposition that is sure to lead to sin ; in either case, sin is the result. It makes just this difference, we reply : in the one case the man is a sinner by no agency and through no fault of his own ; in the other case he is a sinner from choice, and by his own act. It is precisely the difference between a responsible agent and an irresponsible passive recipient ; between a voluntary doer and an involuntary sufferer. As regards the responsibility of man, it is the difference between something and nothing ; as regards the justice of the divine character, it is the difference between noon and midnight.

The view which we are maintaining would seem to be the most simple and obvious one — that which would commend itself to the reason and good sense of men. It is not, however, it must frankly be confessed, the view which has most widely prevailed among theologians. It was held by Zuingli among the reformers, and by Jeremy Taylor in the English church. It is the doctrine of the New Haven divines, and indeed of the New England theologians gen-

erally, at the present day, as well as of the New school portion of the Presbyterian church. The older and stricter Calvinists have uniformly maintained the opposite. Calvin himself holds that our corrupt nature is sin, because the seed of sin, and therefore odious to God and sinful in his sight; and that infants may justly be punished for it, irrespective of actual transgression.¹

The Helvetic and French confessions make our corrupt nature to be hereditary sin; and the latter even goes so far as to pronounce it deserving of eternal death in infants yet unborn. The Augsburg confession takes essentially the same view, regarding native corruption as inherent sin. Such is the view of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, in their various branches. The Thirty-nine Articles of the church of England make original sin the fault of the nature of every man by descent from Adam, and deserving damnation as such. The Princeton divines and the Old school theologians generally, of this country, regard our native corruption as itself sin. This inherent sin they hold to be the penalty for our sin in Adam, as our federal head and representative. Sin is thus made the punishment of sin. We are, in the first place, charged with a sin which we never committed, and for that sin we are punished by inheriting a depraved nature. But, further, that depravity is itself a sin, deserving eternal punishment. So that we are to be punished for being punished! Our sin is punishment, and our punishment is a further sin!

If we inquire for the opinions of the Greek and Latin fathers on this subject, we find no traces of the doctrine that our native depravity is itself sin previous to the time of Augustine. He was the very first to apply to this native bias or propensity to sin the terms *peccatum originale*. Previously Tertullian had been careful to designate it, not as *peccatum*, but as *vitium* and *malum*: "*malum animae ex originis vitio*,"² he denominates it in one passage; and Am-

¹ See Institutes, II. 1. 8; also Commentary on Rom. v. 12.

² De Anima, c. 41

brose calls it *contagium*: “antequam nascimur, maculamur contagio.”¹ The term *peccatum* indeed admits of this sense as well as of the other; it may be either *malum* or *culpa*; but as employed by Augustine it is taken in the stricter sense. After him it gradually found its way into the language of councils and of the Western church, not however without frequent dissent and protest. The distinction which, in the fifth century, began to be made between “*peccatum originale*” and “*peccata actualia*,” indicates a disposition to discriminate more clearly than Augustine had done in his use of the term. Later still, the schoolmen, accustomed to greater precision in the use of terms, preferred the more accurate expression of Tertullian, *vitium naturale*.

The position of Dr. Woods, late of Andover, in respect to this matter, is somewhat anomalous. In common with the theologians of the earlier school, he holds that there is in man “a wrong disposition, or a corrupt nature, which is antecedent to any sinful emotions, and from which, as an inward source, all sinful emotions and actions proceed,”² and that this disposition, or nature, is itself *morally wrong and sinful*. This he labors at considerable length to show. He goes further, and raises the question, “whether it may not be, partly at least, on account of this *degenerate nature* of Adam’s posterity, that God speaks of them, and in his government treats them, as *sinner*s, from the very beginning of their personal existence, and previously to any actual transgression.”³ This opinion he speaks of as one which has generally been maintained by evangelical writers, particularly Dr. Dwight, in his *System of Theology*, and thinks it *may be the true* opinion. “In our very *nature*, in the state of our minds from the beginning of our existence, God may

¹ Apol. David, c. 11; so also Cyprian, who in one place speaks of an infant as having committed no sin at all, but only inherited a depraved disposition from Adam — “contracted contagion.” Tertullian expressly calls children whose depraved disposition is not yet developed in action, “innocent”; and Clement of Alexandria says: “David, though begotten in sin, was not himself in sin, nor was himself sin.”

² Works, Vol. II. p. 328.

³ Ib. II. 326.

see a moral contamination, a corrupt propensity, which, connected as it is with the first offence of Adam, renders it, in his infallible judgment, just and right for him to treat us as sinners. May it not be," he asks, "that infants suffer and die on this account as well as on account of the one offence of Adam?" Yet he subsequently advances the opinion, as one which substantially unites the two conflicting theories, and which will, he thinks, be most likely in the end to be generally adopted, that the *disposition*, whatever it may be, is never really regarded and treated as exclusive of action. "What I mean is, that there is no such thing as a moral being who is actually treated as a subject of retribution while his moral nature is not in some way developed in holy or unholy action."¹ "While any one exists, and continues to exist, with a disposition or propensity which has not in any way been manifested by action, how can he be treated as a subject of retribution. Though his disposition is wrong (wrong as a disposition), he must ultimately be treated according to his actions, they being the true expression of his disposition."²

So we should say. But what then becomes of the proposition, that because of this disposition, prior to all acts of transgression, God may treat infants as sinners, and they suffer and die on this account? The two positions are manifestly and utterly at variance.

Dr. Woods strongly disclaims the idea that infants will be condemned to future misery merely because of native depravity. "I am not aware that any intelligent Christian can be found," he says, "who maintains the unauthorized and appalling position that infant children, who are not guilty of any actual sin, either outwardly or inwardly, will be doomed to misery in the world to come."³ But *why not*, if the native disposition is itself sin, morally wrong *per se*, "the essence of moral evil," "the sum of all that is vile and hateful;" why may it not be punished, and that justly?

¹ Works, Vol. II. p. 340.

² Ib. II. 342.

³ Works, Vol. II. p. 341.

Moreover, if infants actually do suffer and die, *as sinners*, because of this *nature* merely, though not as yet developed in moral action; if their sufferings and death are the actual punishment of that *inherent sin*, as the earlier writers maintain, and as Dr. Woods thinks may be the case, how do we know that they may not be punished also hereafter for the same offence? If their native disposition is such a sin as justly to bring upon them the greatest suffering and penalty in this world, may it not possibly reach over to the future, and involve them in like judgments there? An "appalling position" it may well be called, but not more appalling than the premise of which it is the logical consequence, that an inherent disposition or tendency to sin, though not as yet developed in action, is itself sin. If so, then it may be justly treated as such. Calvin was logically consistent in holding the doctrine and accepting the conclusion; Dr. Woods logically inconsistent in accepting the doctrine and rejecting the conclusion.

Nor is Dr. Woods more fortunate in his facts than in his logic. He does not seem to be aware that any one holds, or has ever held, this appalling doctrine. In the passage last cited, he thinks no "intelligent Christian can be found who maintains" the future misery of infants who have not committed actual sin. And, in his earlier letters to Unitarians, he holds the following language: "On this particular point our opinions have been often misrepresented. We are said to hold that God dooms a whole race of innocent creatures to destruction, or considers them all deserving of destruction, for the sin of one man. Now, when I examine the writings of the earlier Calvinists generally, on the subject of original sin, I find nothing which resembles such a statement as this."¹ Exceptionable language, he admits, may have been used in some cases, and erroneous opinions have sometimes been entertained, "but the orthodox in New England at the present day," he thinks, "are not chargeable with the same fault." Probably not; for they are not

¹ Letters to Unitarians, page 31, original edition.

chargeable with opinions which would naturally and logically lead to such a conclusion. They do not believe that a native tendency, not yet developed in action, is itself sin, and therefore deserves to be treated as such. They do not hold that the sin of Adam is, by imputation or otherwise, in any proper sense, the sin of his posterity, so that they may justly be punished for it. But what shall we say of the creeds and confessions already referred to, which do teach, at once, these doctrines, and their logical consequence? What of Calvin, himself, as already cited, to the effect that infants may justly be punished for the depravity of nature, irrespective of actual sin? What of the Helvetic Confession, which pronounces the depraved nature to be sin, and *deserving of damnation, even in infants yet unborn*? What of the Thirty-nine Articles, which make original sin the fault of the nature of every man by descent from Adam, and *deserving damnation* as such? What of the Augsburg Confession, which takes essentially the same ground, including imputed along with inherent sin? What of Dr. Hodge and the Princeton divines, who take the same ground? In fine, what shall we say of such distinguished writers as Abelard and Pascal, who go further than Calvin, and hold, not merely that God justly may, but actually does, condemn to endless misery beings not guilty of actual transgression?

We have considered, in the previous pages, the relation of sin to *the nature of man*. It remains to discuss *its relation to the will and purpose of God*.

Account for it as we may, or account for it not at all, the fact remains evident and indisputable. Sin does exist in our world. It is here, and it is here in some way by divine permission. It is here, and God has not prevented its being here. But why not? Here is the enigma. Looking at the omnipotence of God, we are ready to say he can prevent it if he will. Looking at his benevolence and holiness, we are ready to say, he will prevent it if he can. Yet he has not done so.

Various methods of explanation have been attempted by those who have sought to solve this enigma. Two suppositions, however, and only two, are logically possible; into one or the other of which all the suppositions and theories on the subject virtually resolve themselves. These are :

A. *That God cannot entirely prevent sin.*

B. *That for some reason, he does not choose to prevent it.*

As each of these propositions supposes what the other denies, — A, that God chooses to prevent all sin, but cannot; B, that he can, but chooses not, — they are virtually contradictory of each other; and, as such, by the laws of contradiction, and of excluded middle, while they cannot both be true, one or the other must be.

Each, again, may be presented under diverse forms. We may say that God cannot prevent all sin, *a.* in *any* system, *b.* in a *moral* system. Or, if we adopt the other theory, we may hold that God does not choose to prevent sin; *a.* because its existence is in itself desirable; or *b.* because, though not in itself desirable, it is still the necessary means of the greatest good; or *c.* because, though not in itself tending to good, it may be overruled to that result; or *d.* because, in general terms, its permission will involve less evil than its absolute prevention.

Taking the first theory in its first form we have this statement :

A. *God cannot prevent all sin* — *a.* in any system. This is possible, supposable, but not probable. His omnipotence is thus essentially surrendered. If he cannot prevent sin in any system which can be devised, if it is not in his power, in other words, to construct a system from which all sin shall be effectually excluded, then there is a manifest and essential limit to his power. This may be. But what evidence that it is so? What reason to suppose that the entire prevention of sin is a matter wholly beyond the sphere of the divine power? Might he not have given man a nature, for example, that would wholly have precluded sin? Or, endowing him with the present nature and mental constitu-

tion, might he not have kept temptation out of his way, and surrounded him with influences that would certainly have ensured his obedience? True, that would not be the *present* system, but it would be *a* system. Do we know that God could not have done this?

The question is not now whether such a system would be the best — whether it would be a wise and expedient method, or the reverse; but whether it might not be a possible thing; whether we know that it would not be possible. The theory under consideration is positive upon this point. The burden of proof rests on those who maintain such a position. In the absence of proof to the contrary, we have a right to infer that the power of God, which we find to be unlimited in other respects, is also unlimited in the matter of the prevention of sin; that he might, if he had chosen, have instituted a system from which moral evil should be wholly excluded.

As stated in its second form, the theory is, that God cannot prevent all sin, *b.* in a *moral* system. Such is the nature, it is supposed, of moral agency, that, under all influences which may be brought to bear upon him, the free agent may still sin, and God cannot prevent it but by destroying his freedom. But can this be proved? Doubtless, in a moral system, it must be in the *power* of the agent to sin if he chooses. But that is not the point. The question is not whether he *can* sin if he pleases, but whether he certainly *will* sin in spite of all influences to the contrary. Whether it is impossible for God to prevent his sinning without taking away his freedom. Of this it seems to us there is no proof. We do not see that there is anything in the nature of moral agency, or a moral system, to forbid the supposition that God, while leaving the power to sin complete in the free agent, may still secure the certainty of an opposite result. Is not the certainty of a given course of action perfectly compatible with power to the contrary? Such, at all events, is the philosophy of those who hold this theory. To say that man may sin, then, because he is a

free agent, does not prove that God cannot prevent him from actually sinning, and still leave him a free agent. The power to sin, and the exercise of that power, are two different things, and the one may exist without the other — the former without the latter.

What evidence, then, that God cannot prevent sin in a moral system? That he *has* not prevented it does not prove that he *can* not. There may be other reasons for his not preventing it besides the want of power to do so.

The supposition that God is unable to keep sin out of a moral system is, to say the least, an improbable one. He can do so many things, that it is certainly fair to presume, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, that he can govern moral agents. It is not probable that he would create a system which he could not control, a system which, when created, must be at once abandoned to moral ruin, or else destroyed. The wisdom of instituting a system, the working of which, in so essential a point, should be beyond his control, would be more than questionable.

Nor does the supposition fully and fairly meet the question before us. Why does God permit sin, we ask? Because he cannot prevent it in a *certain kind* of a system, viz. a *moral* one, is the reply. Very well; then why not adopt some other? Is he shut up to this alone of all possible systems? To reply that a moral system with sin is better than any other system without sin, is to change the ground. It is, then, after all, not from want of power to prevent it, but simply as a matter of expediency, that sin is permitted. The debate shifts at once to the second of the two leading theories.

Furthermore, if sin cannot be prevented in a moral system, then it cannot be prevented in any system. For, what is sin? Is it not something pertaining exclusively to moral beings, and so to a moral system? Is sin possible except under a moral system? If so, then, to say that God cannot prevent it in a moral system, is to say that he cannot prevent it at all. If he can prevent sin, then he can prevent it

under the only circumstances in which it can possibly occur, viz. in a moral system.

And why not, we ask again ; why may not sin be prevented in a moral system ? What is the insuperable obstacle ? The theory rests on some supposed inability on the part of God to influence the choices of free moral agents so as to secure given results. But of this there is no evidence. Nay, there is abundant evidence to the contrary ? It is not true that God cannot influence the choices, and so control the moral conduct of free agents. He can do this. He does it. He kept the holy angels. He keeps good men every day from falling. When the heart of man is renewed by divine grace, when the soul of the believer is purified and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, are not the choices of the man influenced, and is not his conduct controlled by the power that worketh in him, both to will and to do, according to his good pleasure ? And is the man the less a free agent because of this influence ? Whenever we pray for divine guidance and direction, for the renewing and purifying influences of the Spirit, when we ask to be made better, to be kept from sin, to be lead in the way of life, are we not, in fact, asking to be influenced and controlled as to our moral conduct ? All such prayer proceeds on the supposition that the moral choices of man are not beyond the reach and control of Deity. If God can keep the believer from falling into temptation and sin, he could have kept Adam in like manner.

But it may be replied, that while it is possible for God to prevent sin in any particular instance, as in the case of Adam, for example, it might not be possible for him to prevent it entirely. If repressed in one place, it may break out in another. Of this, however, there is no evidence. We do not know that Deity is reduced to any such alternative, having only the choice of time and place, but compelled to admit the incursion of moral evil at some point into his dominions. From the fact that he can and does prevent sin in particular cases, it is fair to presume that he can pre-

vent it in other cases, and in all, if he sees fit. There is no evidence that sin is a necessity of a moral system.

The most that could reasonably be maintained is, that it *may be* that God cannot entirely prevent sin in a moral system. This is the form in which the matter is stated by Dr. Taylor, of New Haven.

This, however, does not furnish an explicit answer to the question before us. We ask why God permits sin? To say, *it may be* he could not prevent it in a moral system, does not answer our inquiry, since it is equally true that *it may be* he *could* prevent it. If it cannot be proved that he can, it is equally difficult to prove that he cannot. It is virtually a confession of ignorance, an admission that we do not know.

Now, this may be the best we can do, and all we can do. A positive answer may be out of the power of mortals. Still, when our answer must be conjectural, there may still be a choice of conjectures. Other suppositions there may be with equal, or even greater, probabilities in their favor. It is not enough, then, to say, *it may be* God could not prevent sin in a moral system, and assign that as an answer to the question before us, without first inquiring what reason there is to think that he could not, and whether there is not more reason for thinking that the true answer may lie in another direction. As in reply to the objection against the divine benevolence, which is the use Dr. Taylor makes of it, the statement may suffice. To meet that objection it may be enough to say, we do not know that God *could* have prevented sin in a moral system. The burden of proof then falls on the objector. But, in answer to the general question before us, something more explicit is needed than a merely negative and conjectural statement. We ask evidence. We ask wherein this conjecture, or possibility, is preferable to any one of the many other possible solutions — wherein it is more likely to be the true one than they?

Dr. Taylor argues, that because a moral being has the *power* to sin, under whatever influences exerted upon him,

therefore it *may be* that he *will* sin ; in other words, it may be impossible for God to prevent him.¹ But this does not follow. May there not be a power to sin, and yet a certainty not to sin ? Is it not thus with the holy angels, and with the redeemed in heaven ? Have not good men on earth the power to do many things which it is quite certain they will not do, if they are led by the Spirit of God, and kept by divine grace ? Do not the sanctifying influences of the Spirit make the final salvation of the true believer a certain future event, while, at the same time, as all the warnings of scripture imply, it is possible for him to fall away and perish ? Nay, so far as power is concerned, has not God himself full power to do evil if he chooses ; while it is absolutely certain that he will always prefer to do the right ? On any other supposition, what becomes of the virtue or rectitude of the divine character ? When to any moral being it is no longer a matter of choice, but of simple necessity, what his conduct shall be, when he has no power to do other than he does, where lies the morality of his action, and what credit properly pertains to him for virtue and rectitude ? But if there may be the power of sinning, and yet the certainty not to sin, then the prevention of sin is not incompatible with the requisitions of a moral system. It does not follow that a moral being *will* sin because he *can* ; or that there is no way of preventing a given moral act but by rendering that act impossible. When God keeps a good man from some form of transgression, into which he might otherwise fall, he does it by influences bearing upon the choice, and not by taking away from the man the power of sinning. When he keeps Peter or Paul from utter apostasy, he does it not by depriving them of the power of falling away. But if men may be prevented from actually sinning while still having the power to sin, then it is not out of the power of God to prevent sin in a moral system.

Whether it would be, on the whole, better to prevent it, in other words, whether it could be prevented in the *best*

¹ See Lectures on Moral Government, Vol. I. Lect. VIII. IX.

system, may still admit of question. This point Dr. Taylor proceeds to discuss in his second argument, assuming the position that it may be God cannot prevent all sin in the *best* moral system. This is equivalent, however, to saying that he does not *choose* to prevent it, and finds its place, therefore, properly under our second general theory. The supposition now is that God chooses the best system; and, as sin is incidental to that system, he chooses to permit the sin rather than adopt another system. In other words, he regards its permission as involving less evil than would result from its absolute prevention. This proposition will be considered in its place.

Since it cannot be shown that God cannot prevent sin, we must seek the solution of our problem in the other direction.

B. *For some reason he did not choose to prevent it.*

a. Inasmuch as its existence is in itself desirable. This, however, can hardly be. Sin is never, *per se*, a desirable thing, but always hateful, and that only. God can have seen in it, in itself considered, nothing to recommend it. Otherwise, if it were a thing to be for any reason desired, and preferred to holiness in its place, God could no longer properly hate it nor consistently forbid it. The supposition, therefore, that God did not choose to prevent sin because its existence is in itself desirable, while logically possible, is morally impossible, and may be dismissed without further comment.

b. Inasmuch as it is the *necessary means of the greatest good*. This is supposable. It is quite possible that sin, while not in itself desirable, may still be the means of good; possible, even, that it may be the avenue by which the greatest good can be most directly reached; possible that in no other way could God accomplish so much good to the universe as by the permission of sin in it. Such is the theory; and it has seemed to a large class of minds, eminent for wisdom and piety, to be the most satisfactory solution of our problem. Thoroughly convinced of the benevolence of

God, and still met on every side with the palpable and gloomy fact of sin, it has seemed to them that somehow this fact must be no exception to the sublime rule of the divine benevolence; that somehow the goodness of God was at work, in and through this very gloom and darkness of sin, to bring about results of beneficence not otherwise attained. And, indeed, so much as this we must admit, or abandon the problem as a hopeless task. Doubtless the benevolence of God is somehow concerned in the permission of sin; somehow at work to bring about the best results from that permission. The question is *how*? whether directly, through the instrumentality of sin as a direct means of good, and a more efficient means than any other; or indirectly, and in some other way. Is sin, *per se*, the means of good? Is it the means of greatest good? Is it the necessary means of greatest good? These questions must be answered in the affirmative by the advocates of this theory; but on what grounds these answers can be maintained it is difficult to perceive. How can it be shown that sin has any tendency whatever to good? Are not all its tendencies evil, and toward evil? Left to its own natural working would it ever result in good? If not in good, how in the greatest good; and how is it not only the means, but the necessary means, of that greatest good?

Moreover, if it be, as now affirmed, the necessary means of greatest good, then is not God bound, as a benevolent being, not only to permit, but even to encourage, nay, to require and demand it? at all events, not to forbid it? But he does forbid it, and require holiness in its place. According to the theory, he requires what is really not for the best good of the universe, and forbids what is really the most direct and efficient means of good to the greatest number. What shall we say of his benevolence in making such a requisition; or of his wisdom, in contriving such an awkward and back-handed a system?

This theory, closely examined, differs not essentially from the preceding; since if sin is in reality the direct and neces-

sary means of the highest good, it is impossible to show why it is not in reality a thing to be desired, and to be more desired than anything else in its place. The greatest good is always a proper object of desire; and if we may rightfully desire any given end, we may also rightfully desire the means necessary to the attainment of that end.

c. Inasmuch as it can be over-ruled to good. God permits sin for the sake of over-ruling it, and bringing good out of it. It is a mark of wisdom to be able to turn a disadvantage to an advantage, and out of apparent defeat to organize ultimate and real victory. God shows his wisdom and power in baffling all the designs of Satan, and making even the malignant forces of evil march in the van of his own sublime purposes.

This may be so. But is it wisdom to introduce, or suffer to be introduced, a difficulty for the sake of overcoming it, a disease for the sake of checking it, a rebellion for the sake of subduing it? It is wise and well to heal the disorder; but would it not have been wiser and better to have prevented it? It is well and wise to put the fire out; but is it wise to set the house on fire for the sake of putting it out? What shall we say of the military leader who purposely allows defeat and disaster to overtake him in order to show how well he can remedy the evil; or of a physician who introduces a dangerous and fatal disease for the sake of showing his skill in subduing it?

But God shows his glory in meeting and overcoming the fearful evils which sin inflicts. True, but he does not show his glory in admitting sin for the sake of showing his glory. It would be a questionable mercy that should suffer some great calamity to occur, as war or pestilence, for the sake of showing mercy to the sick and wounded. Which is the truer benevolence, to keep a man from falling into the water, or to suffer him to fall in for the purpose of showing our compassion and our skill in rescuing him?

The theory under consideration becomes logically defensible only when we suppose the evil to be overruled, not

merely to good, but to greater good than would have been otherwise attainable. If the defeat of to-day tends to a victory to-morrow which shall more than compensate for the present disaster; if the disorder which prostrates the sick man can be not only healed, but so healed as to leave him a stronger and healthier man than he was before, or ever would have been but for the disease,—then the case assumes a new aspect. Thus modified, however, the theory virtually passes over into that last discussed. The sin, it is now affirmed, is permitted because in no other way can results so desirable, be attained as from admitting and then overruling it. In other words, its admission and subsequent overruling are the necessary means of the greatest good. It would be incumbent on the advocate of the theory, as thus modified, to show that greater benefits accrue to the universe from what has been done to counteract sin, and turn it from its proper purpose, and its legitimate results, than would have accrued from its absolute prevention; or, to revert to the figure already employed, that the patient is absolutely better for having had the disease. This is certainly supposable, but a proposition not easily to be established; nor do we perceive how, in case such a position could be maintained, it would be possible to avoid the conclusion that sin is really a thing to be thankful for, as being the occasion of the highest good, even as the patient has reason to be thankful for the disorder which has resulted in his improved condition. True, it is not the disorder itself, but the remedies used to counteract it, which have wrought the improvement. Still, as those remedies would not have been employed but for the disease, the patient is really indebted to the latter as the occasion of his receiving the benefit, and in one sense the cause of it.

d. Inasmuch as its permission, under the present checks and counteractions, will involve less evil than its absolute prevention; in other words, because he saw that, all things considered, it was better to permit sin, under its present restrictions, than to do more than he is doing to prevent it.

Not that it would be impossible to prevent it ; but that the system or plan which should absolutely exclude it would not, on the whole, be so good a plan as the present one. Why, or in what respect it would not be as good ; wherein the measures necessary for the entire exclusion of sin might be the occasion of more evil than its admission under present limitations, the theory does not undertake to decide. The statement is general rather than specific. We do not know, and therefore we do not say, according to this hypothesis, precisely what the reason is that sin cannot be absolutely prevented without, on the whole, doing more harm than is done by its present permission. Whether the difficulty lies in some peculiarity of moral agency, or a moral system, rendering it unwise to modify essentially the present method of dealing with the evil, or whether it lies in some other direction, we do not know. Enough that to the divine mind some such reason does appear. Enough that, all things considered, he perceives it to be not for the best, to do more than he is doing to prevent sin. Enough that such a supposition is possible and is reasonable. More definite than this we need not be, and cannot be with any certainty. So much as this, at least, we must maintain in order to vindicate the divine wisdom and goodness.

We see enough of God's holiness and hatred of sin to warrant the conclusion that he would prevent it if he could do so consistently and wisely ; if, in other words, it would be for the best to do so. The fact that he has not prevented it, is *prima facie* evidence that it would not be for the best ; that he could not in that way secure the best results. Of his wisdom, his holiness, his goodness, we have positive and sufficient evidence ; we have, on the other hand, no evidence that the entire prevention of sin would have been attended with better results, all things taken into the account, than its permission under all the checks and safeguards of the present system. We do not know that it would have been wise and good to have done more than he has done to prevent it. That being the case, the holiness

and benevolence of Deity stand fully vindicated, and the question, why is sin permitted by a good and wise and holy God, is answered so far as it is possible for man to answer it in his present state of being.

Is sin, then, for the best? No; but the non-prevention of sin may be for the best. It is not sin, but the purpose on the part of God not to do more than he is doing to prevent sin, that is for the best. It is the peculiarity of the present theory that it presents sin, not as a good, nor as the means of good, much less the necessary means of good; but rather as an evil, and that wholly and continually; while at the same time it supposes that there may be a greater evil than the present amount of sin under the conditions of the present system. It puts the existence of sin, not in the light of a greater good, but only of a lesser evil. Is not that the true aspect in which to view it? It supposes it quite possible that to place man under the influences of a moral system, with freedom of action, exposure to temptation, motives to obedience, with all the safeguards that are thrown around him in the shape of precept, warning, and persuasion, such and so many, but no more, may be better than either to change the system entirely, or even to multiply the motives to right action. Who will say that this may not be so?

Does God, then, prefer sin to holiness, all things considered? By no means. He hates sin, looks upon it never with complacency, prefers it never to holiness. It is not good; nor is it a means of good. But he prefers to suffer it, rather than to make such changes in the whole system of things as might be necessary in order to keep sin entirely out. He does not prefer sin to holiness; but he prefers the lesser of two evils: sin under the present system, to what might be in its place. He does not prefer tares to wheat in his field. But he prefers the present status of wheat along with tares, rather than a condition of things in which there should be no tares and no wheat, or even no tares and less wheat.

But here we shall be told that God is not limited, in his

operations, to a choice of evils. His method is perfect. It would not be perfect, if it took sin into the account, as part of the general system. Sin is not of God. This is the position taken by Professor Squier in his work entitled "The Problem Solved." The attempt is made to rule out the fact of sin from the system of divine government, as something in no way pertaining to the divine method or purpose; not included in his plan, something which has forced itself in from without, and for which God is no way responsible. To this we reply, sin is in the system, and the question is: how came it here? It is here, a great portentous fact, not to be ruled out or ignored by any artifice. It is here, and must come in, in some sense, by divine permission. Its coming in must have been foreseen by the omniscient ruler, and taken into the account. And now the question is: why was this foreseen approaching evil allowed to introduce itself into God's perfect system? This is the real question; and it is virtually, not to say studiously, ignored by Professor Squier. One of three things he must say in answer to this question. Either its coming was unforeseen on the part of God; or, foreseeing, he was unable to prevent it; or, for reasons relating to the general good, he did not choose to prevent it. If unforeseen, the fault lies with the divine omniscience. A wise prudence or sagacity should have kept better guard over the new creation. If, foreseeing the coming evil, he was unable to prevent it, his omnipotence is at fault; and we have now the spectacle of the Supreme Being standing at the door of his new world, besom in hand, vainly striving to keep out the intruding tide. If for wise reasons he does not choose to exclude the evil, then he permits it. The latter is the only really tenable position.

To this Professor Squier himself must ultimately be driven; since he must admit that it was at least in God's power to keep out sin by not creating moral beings; and that he can at any moment put an end to it, if in no other way, by destroying the system. He must admit that when God

chose to create such beings, he did it with the full knowledge that they would sin. It was for him to decide whether a race of moral beings who would certainly sin, should exist or not; that is, whether sin should exist or not; and he decided that question in the affirmative.

It avails nothing now to say, with Professor Squier, that sin is not of God; that his plan does not embrace it, nor his eternal purpose take it in; that his way is perfect, and can have nothing to do with evil in any form. Here are the facts. The question: is why is sin allowed to break in from without into the divine system? Why is such an inroad permitted? This is the real problem; and with all deference to the title of the work, we beg leave to say that this little problem is not solved by the statements of Professor Squier. It is not even touched by him. As against the position that God is the originator and author of sin, that he purposes it in the sense of contriving, procuring, becoming the efficient cause of it, the reasoning of Professor Squier is perfectly valid; and this would seem to have been the shape in which the matter lay before his mind. But that is not the question really at issue; nor is such the position of those who maintain the divine permission of sin.

To return to the theory under discussion. The difference between the theory now stated, and the doctrine that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, may be thus illustrated. Among the elementary ingredients of the air which we breathe is a certain gas, deleterious, nay fatal to human lungs, if inhaled by itself, which nevertheless in combination with other elements becomes useful, insomuch that the air is positively better with it than without it. It is there, not because God could not have created an atmosphere into which it should not enter, but it is there as essential to the best atmosphere. It is the necessary means of the greatest good. What nitrogen is to the atmosphere, such is sin to the general system of the universe.

But, says the objector, if this is so, how is it that God

hates this nitrogen, and pronounces it bad, and only bad, and forbids most absolutely all creatures to breathe it, or to breathe anything into which it enters, or to have anything whatever to do with it, except to shun and abhor it? Hardly consistent, this!

In place of such a theory he would prefer the following : Here is a block of marble, perfect in color, and fineness, and form, suitable every way for the purposes of the artist, save that, in one place, a stain has stricken through it, marring its otherwise snowy whiteness. This stain is, in truth, a serious defect. The marble were much better without it. To remove it, however, might be productive of greater injury to the marble than to suffer it to remain. On the whole, I choose this block as it is—choose it even in preference to other blocks that are without the stain, as on the whole superior to the others—choose it notwithstanding the defect, and in spite of it, not for the sake of it, nor for any good the stain will do, not to show my skill in removing it, not because I prefer the stain, in itself considered, to the absence of the same, but simply because, all things considered, this block, defective as it is, is better than any other which is presented to my choice. Sin is that stain on the best system ; admitted, not for its own sake, and not as means of good, but for the sake of the system to which it pertains ; suffered to remain because the means necessary to its extirpation might be productive of a greater evil in its stead.

But this, it will be said, limits the power of God. In a sense it does, and so do all theories which can be offered—this no more than the others. If we say that God could not have prevented sin in any system, or in any moral system, we directly limit his power. If we say he admits it for the sake of overruling it to greater good, we go on the supposition that he cannot secure that greater good as directly and as well in any other way. If we say it is the necessary means of the greatest good, the very term “ necessary ” sets a limit, at once and positively, to the divine

power. We no longer imply, but affirm, that it is out of the power of God to reach the proposed end by any other method. In fine, proceed as we will, we come upon essentially the same ground. On any theory there is this limitation, at least, that in the nature of things some methods of procedure, and some systems, are preferable to others, even for the Deity; that he can accomplish better results by certain means and methods, than by others — by the present system, for example, than by one from which sin should be wholly excluded. At least all theories under B stand upon this as essentially their common ground, and no one of them has a right to charge the other with limiting the divine power, while itself stands equally exposed to the same charge. As between the general theories A and B, there is indeed this difference, that the former regards the prevention of sin as beyond the power of God, and so directly limits his omnipotence; while the latter only supposes it out of his power to prevent sin and still secure the best results. But as between the several specific theories under B there is no such difference. To say that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, just as really imposes a limit to the divine method of operation, as to say that the permission of sin involves on the whole less evil than would result from its absolute prevention. The difference is, that in the one case the advantage of the system is attributed directly to sin itself, as the means of good, in the other it is an advantage attained in spite of sin. In the one case the introduction of sin is viewed as a positive good, in the other only as the lesser of evils. In either case the prevention of sin is supposed to be in the power of God, but not to be on the whole for the best. Each supposes that in the nature of things some methods are preferable to others. So far as this, and no farther, does either limit the power of God. To say that the permission of sin may involve less evil than its absolute prevention, and on this account God did not choose to prevent it, is the same thing as to say that he cannot prevent sin in the best system. But we do not

understand it to be the prerogative of Omnipotence to render all methods and measures equally advantageous. Even to Omnipotence there may and must still be a choice.

And here it may be asked : is God, then, less happy because sin is in the world ? If its admission is merely a choice of evils, as now represented ; if he permits it not as an instrument of good, but merely as the occasion of less harm than would result from its entire exclusion, then it may well be that sin, though suffered to exist, is still an object of displeasure and abhorrence to the divine mind. Its existence, therefore, so far from contributing to his happiness, can only detract from it. Indeed, how can it be otherwise ? Every act of disobedience on the part of the subject must necessarily be displeasing, in the highest degree, to the infinitely pure and holy God. And is he not less happy when displeased, than when pleased ?

This seems to place the happiness of God in the hand of the sinner. It puts it in the power of any moral being to add to or detract from the sum total of the divine happiness, according as he shall choose to obey or disobey the divine precepts. This is indeed a tremendous power. We may well shrink from a conclusion so fearful. But is it not, after all, an inevitable result of all moral agency ? Is it not a power which Deity confers on all his creatures when he makes them moral beings, and endows them with the fearful attribute of freedom ? Is it in the power of man or angel to sin against God, and not displease and offend him by so doing ? Would not the obedience, from this moment onward, of all created beings, be infinitely more agreeable to the divine will, and in all respects more pleasing to him than their disobedience, under the present moral system ? There can be but one answer to such a question. As the earth in all her course casts her broad pyramid of shadow far behind her, along the heavens, so sin involves not only the transgressor himself in the gloom of eternal night, but sends its shadow afar among the divine purposes. That shadow falls upon the celestial pavements, trembles upon the sea of glass, touches even the eternal throne.

ARTICLE II.

THE LAW OF NATURE'S CONSTANCY SUBORDINATE
TO THE HIGHER LAW OF CHANGE.

BY REV. EDWARD HITCHCOCK, D.D., PROFESSOR IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

THE SUBJECT LAID OPEN.

THE constancy of nature has ever been a prominent article in the creed of the philosopher and the divine. Indeed all classes of men adopt it as an infallible truth. They read it in mathematical lines upon the cycles of the heavens, and nature's manifold operations around them seem usually to proceed in an invariable order. So certain are we that this is a great law of nature and that every effect in nature has a cause, that when any unusual phenomena occur, such as an aurora borealis or a shower of meteors, although no known law, perhaps, will explain them, men in civilized lands never think of calling them miraculous, and confidently expect that ere long they will be found to be a part of the course of nature and controlled by invariable laws. Indeed constancy is supposed to be the great law of nature that extends to all worlds and all events, and controls, and ever has controlled, all other laws. The only exception is that made by the believer in Christianity, who maintains that its miracles interfered with nature's established laws for a time, but that time has now gone by. It is getting, however, to be somewhat fashionable even for professed recipients of the Bible to regard the order of nature as so unalterably settled that the idea of its interruption by such an event as a miracle is absurd. Says a recent able writer, a renowned professor of geometry in an English university: "The enlarged critical inductive study of the natural world cannot but tend powerfully to evince the inconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural order or supposed suspensions of the laws of matter, and of that vast

series of dependent causation which constitutes the legitimate field for the investigation of science, whose constancy is the sole warrant for its generalizations, while it forms the substantial basis for the grand conclusions of natural theology.”¹ Again, the same writer says: “In nature and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can possibly have, any evidence of a Deity working miracles; for that we must go out of nature and beyond reason.”²

But is this a true representation of the course of nature? We take different ground. When we study the manner in which the different laws by which events are brought about operate, when in antagonism with one another, as they usually are, and especially when we study the early geological history of life on the globe, we are forced to ascribe a mightier influence to the law of change than to constancy. We shall endeavor to maintain the following position:

The law of nature's constancy is subordinate to the higher law of change.

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS.

Preliminary to a presentation of the evidence on which this proposition rests, it may be desirable to define a few of the terms employed, that there may be no mistake as to our meaning.

Natural law is a power by which the same causes, both in the world of matter and of mind, invariably produce the same effects in the same circumstances, and the result is a settled and uniform course of events.

Some suppose that this power has been communicated to nature in the beginning, and is inherent in matter and mind, always operating invariably. Others suppose that the power lies in the will of God, and that a law of nature is merely the mode in which the Deity acts upon the universe. We prefer this latter view; first, because of its

¹ Powell on the Study of the Evidences of Christianity, Essays, etc., p. 124.

² Essays and Reviews, p. 159.

simplicity ; secondly, because we cannot conceive how any self-executing power can be imparted to a law independent of the agency of the law-giver ; thirdly, because to suppose such a power inherent in nature, effectually removes God from his works as a personal agent, and indeed renders his existence unnecessary.

The law of miracles is a force occasionally manifesting itself to counteract, intensify, or diminish the power of natural law : To counteract, as when a Lazarus was raised to life, or the waters of the Red sea formed a double wall ; to intensify, as at the deluge it rained forty days, or as a strong east wind laid bare the bottom of the Red sea ; to diminish, as when Christ stilled the boisterous winds and waves of the sea of Galilee. This law, also, is invariable ; that is, in the same circumstances the same miracle will occur. But in its action it contravenes natural law, and can thus be distinguished from it ; and as it is introduced only occasionally, and to subserve some important purpose, it is rightly regarded as a special interposition on the part of the Deity. Moreover, though a law, we cannot understand its nature.

There is considerable diversity of views in the definitions given of supernatural events by the ablest theological writers. Dr. M'Cosh, the eminent Scotch writer, says : " we would confine the word 'miracle' to those events which were wrought in our world as a sign or proof of God making a supernatural revelation to man ; to those signs, wonders, and miracles which were wrought by Moses and the prophets, by Jesus Christ and the apostles," etc. " We must even view creation as supernatural, but we do not speak of it as miraculous." ¹

We should feel no great objection to such a distinction, provided all would agree in limiting supernatural events to those special interventions on the part of God that are independent of nature and entirely inexplicable by its laws. Even Dr. M'Cosh does not find it "needful for his pur-

¹ The Supernatural, etc., pp. 146, 147.

pose," although writing "on the supernatural in relation to the natural," "to take any side in the controversy," whether the new creations of animals and plants made known by geology, including man of course, "can be accounted for by natural causes still operating," or "from natural causes undiscovered," or "from a supernatural power called in at once." So that, although it calls these new creations "supernatural," after all, they may turn out to be natural, although we and many others regard them as the highest and grandest exercise of special divine intervention of which there is any knowledge, and hence we want them designated by an unambiguous term.

Another fact shows how ambiguous the term "supernatural" is. Dr. Bushnell of this country, in his able work on "Nature and the Supernatural," brings all the acts of the human will into the latter class. "It is only the will," says he, "that is not under the law of cause and effect." "The very idea of our personality is that of a being not under the law of cause and effect, a being supernatural." "We ourselves, then, are supernatural agents." Now whatever be the truth of these views, the facts are certainly very different from what we would include under the term "miracles," and by using this term with the definition we give to it, we avoid the uncertainty of meaning that rests upon supernatural."

Dr. M'Cosh, also, objects to the idea that miracles are under the control of law. "It would be most presumptuous in us," he says, "to affirm that we can in every case discover the law to which the supernatural operations belong, or so much as be sure that there is a law. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that there may be some such law beyond our ken, but of what use can it be to appeal to a law unknown and unknowable? It is quite as conceivable that God may have wrought in our world an isolated occurrence, having no connection, physical, casual, or dependent, with any other mundane occurrence, except the profound relations which all things have to one another in the divine mind." Yet Dr. M'Cosh maintains that in the supernatural

dispensations of God "there is a grand system with subordinate systems," and that "all that God does must fall out according to a purpose in the divine mind," and according to "an order and a method." "There is evidently a rule in the divine mind, according to which miraculous interferences take place."

Now if God acts in miracles according to a "system" and a "purpose," and by "a rule" and "an order and a method," we cannot see why he does not act according to law; so that in the same circumstances he will do the same things; and uniformity of action is what we mean by law. We may not understand the law at all, and it may be independent of cosmical arrangements; yet, as we think Dr. Bushnell has clearly shown, we can prove its existence. By its very nature, also, it contravenes or modifies natural laws.

We should regret to be thought to differ much from the admirable views presented by Dr. M'Cosh in his work on the supernatural, when in fact we do not, save in terms, except in his hesitancy to ascribe the geological creations to special creative power.

A special providence is an event brought about apparently by natural laws, yet by such a previous arrangement of second causes, or, when necessary, such a modification of them out of our sight, as to produce a special end. It differs from miraculous providence in exhibiting no apparent counteraction or increased or diminished intensity of natural laws. It differs from common providence in showing a designed conspiracy of causes to meet a particular exigency. Yet events that seem to us merely incidental, could we see all their antecedents, might show such a conspiracy, and hence it is not easy to draw the line between special and common providence. Practically it is sufficient to regard all events as special providences where we can see evidence of any special arrangement to meet an exigency in the condition of organic beings.

The wise and striking adaption of parts and operations in nature, which are so common, differs from special provi-

dence as the means differ from the end. Special providence is an end, which always terminates in organic beings. Adaptations are the chief means by which those ends are secured. But this idea of selection or discrimination enters into that of special providence, implying something done for an individual, a community, or a race, that is not done for all; and done, too, under the direction of the Supreme Ruler over all. Adaptation shows no such discrimination, but merely a wise arrangement of natural laws and operations to secure the general harmony and well-being of the universe. Special providence directs these adaptations from the general current into side channels, and by conspiracy and otherwise causes them to meet particular exigencies.

The views above expressed as to special providence seem to us to correspond, essentially, to the notions entertained by Christians generally. But standard theological writers vary widely in their definitions of this phrase. One calls the providence of God "over the human family, special," and that "over persons distinguished for virtue, most special" (Storr and Flatt). Another calls that providence special "which relates to the church" (Buck's *Theol. Dict.*). Another, when "it relates to moral beings, to men and human affairs" (Knapp). We are glad, however, to find our views sustained by some eminent authorities. "In nature," says M'Cosh, "there is a special providence; for while God has so arranged his physical agents that general laws everywhere prevail, and prevail for the good of man, he has also so disposed them that by their combination or coincidence, crossing or collision, they produce individual incidents, which exercise a mighty influence on the world at large, or which meet the state and wants of individual men at momentous or critical times in their history."¹ "Special providence," says Professor Park, according to the notebook of one of his pupils, "consists, not in an interposition by God, but in such a control over events as secures phenomena when fitted to arrest attention by their peculiar and

¹ *The Supernatural, etc.*, p. 60.

striking adaptation to a moral design." It greatly encourages us to find our views coincident with those of such men on this important subject.

The law of change is a force sometimes manifesting itself in nature, by which its constancy and uniformity are modified. Its manifestations are made both through nature's ordinary laws and those of special intervention or miracles.

The normal operation of the law of change is effected through ordinary laws. But in order to produce change there must be interference or antagonism between them. The change is the resultant of these conflicting forces, and often the action is too complicated for human calculation to reduce to formulae.

The abnormal operation of the law of change depends upon special divine interposition. In this case the law of change is synonymous with that of miracles.

LAWS CONTROLLING THE COSMOS.

Let us now pass in review the principal laws by which the universe is governed in their relations to constancy and uniformity as well as to change. We can then judge which are the controlling and which the subordinate laws. These laws are all embraced in five classes: 1. Mechanical; 2. Chemical; 3. Organic; 4. Intellectual; 5. The law of Miracles. All these laws, except perhaps that of miracles, can be appealed to for examples of constancy and uniformity, as well as of change.

Mechanical Laws.

1. Take first the mechanical laws. These are most manifest in the great movements of the universe, and have been discovered and elucidated by such men as Kepler, Newton, La Place, and a multitude besides, almost equally eminent. They have been reduced to three: the centripetal, the centrifugal, and the repellant. The first two produce the annual and diurnal revolutions of the earth and the heavenly

bodies, and most of the other celestial phenomena, such as eclipses, transits, and occultations. The phenomena which these laws produce make the most powerful impression upon our minds of all nature's operations in favor of its constancy and uniformity. Periodicity is the lesson which they almost universally teach, even though some of the phenomena have a wide isolation. Yet so generally do we find the same facts recurring at regular intervals, or in cycles, that none but the most ignorant and superstitious pronounce the most unusual appearances miraculous, but expect rather that after a time they will fall under some fixed law. For thus far, in the world's history, such has always been the issue.

Repulsion, being antagonistic to attraction, manifests itself, perhaps always, as a means of change; but it is normal change. The two most striking examples to common observation are, the violent movements of the atmosphere and the production of the immense trains that are formed behind comets as they approach the sun. Yet the limits of both these phenomena seem to be fixed. They are no wider now, either in comets or atmospheric disturbances, than they were thousands of years ago. We hence infer that the force is under the control of fixed law. But on this point we shall have occasion to speak again.

As already observed, probably our strongest convictions of nature's constancy and regularity are derived from the usual phenomena of the celestial motions under the control of gravity and a centrifugal force. Nevertheless, these forces sometimes present a phase of action which is a remarkable example of the influence of change. The heavenly bodies must of course act upon one another and disturb one another's motions. But the effect is too feeble to arrest common observation, and demands for its full elucidation, not only accurate instruments, but long periods of time. And after the existence of these disturbances had been ascertained, even astronomers misapprehended their nature. Thus it was found that the moon's orbit is slowly

diminishing in size, and hence it was predicted that ere long that body would fall to the earth. So a slight diminution of the obliquity of the ecliptic to the equator was supposed to portend a final coincidence between the two circles, and consequently an end to all change of seasons. But it is now known that these minute changes occur in cycles or oscillations about a mean state; so that after increasing for a time, it may be for hundreds or thousands of years, the disturbing motion decreases, and continues forever to oscillate from one extreme to another. Already it is ascertained that the motion of the moon is affected by more than forty of these deviations from a normal state, and double that number probably exist.

What, now, is the ultimate effect of these numerous and ceaseless disturbances upon the regularity and permanency of the celestial motions? Precisely the reverse of what we might expect. From their long continued action we should naturally predict the ruin of the system, as in fact the earlier astronomers did anticipate. But when it was discovered that the perturbations were cyclical, the mathematicians were able to demonstrate that they would secure the permanence of any system like the solar, where the bodies move nearly in circles, and in the same direction, and in orbits but little inclined to one another. Hence the paradoxical statement becomes true, that the instability of such a system secures its eternal stability, if no other disturbing force interfere. Change is thus made the means of infallible constancy in the celestial revolutions.

But is there not another disturbing force manifest in the celestial mechanism? Certainly we may say that glimpses of such a force do appear. Certain of the periodical comets exhibit, at their successive returns, such an acceleration of their revolutions, as is most reasonably explained by the existence of a resisting medium in their paths. For such a resistance would give the centripetal force an advantage over the centrifugal, and thus reduce the size of the orbit, so as to shorten the time of revolution, even though it

retarded the motion. One of the comets, from this cause, has already shortened its time of revolution about two days, and advanced ten days on its orbit since the period of its discovery. At this rate it would fall into the sun in about thirty thousand years. The effect of such a medium on the solid planets would be vastly less than upon the thin vapor of a comet; but however slight, time enough being given, they too would find the end of their spiral journey in the sun, and the whole system would come to ruin in spite of the conservative influence of the cyclical perturbation already considered.

We know that some astronomers have doubted the existence of this disturbing and destroying medium. But we fancy that they doubt it more because it does not agree with their hypotheses than from want of evidence. Admitting its existence, and the ultimate ruin of the solar, if not the whole siderial, system can be prevented only in two ways; one is by the existence of some hitherto undiscovered agency to counteract the influence of a resisting medium. Such counteracting forces do indeed exist in nature; but in this case, not the slightest evidence of their presence or operation occurs. Indeed it is difficult to understand how such a tendency to ruin could be counteracted by any natural process. Divine interposition alone, we apprehend, could do it; and this is the second, and we judge the only way, in which ultimate ruin can be averted from the present material system, if there be no mistake as to the existence of a resisting medium in space. And who knows but it may be a law of the divine government, that particular systems of nature should come to an end after having subserved the purposes for which they were created? We shall shortly see that the early history of this earth gives us an account of several minor systems of this sort, which have disappeared and been succeeded by others. Why may not similar changes have occurred among extra-terrestrial economies?

While, therefore, the mechanical laws of the universe

furnish the most striking examples of nature's constancy and uniformity, they show us a higher law of change controlling that of constancy, and acting as a great conservative principle so long as perpetuity is desirable ; yet we obtain glimpses, also, of another law of change that demands special divine interposition to arrest its destructive operation, or to introduce a new system after the old one has been destroyed. And surely in such an exigency we may say *dignus vindice nodus*.

Chemical Laws.

2. We pass, next, to a consideration of chemical laws, including those of light, heat, and electricity, because in general these are indispensable agents in chemical changes. Chemical operations, as a general fact, are the result of the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion. Affinity and cohesion are the attracting forces, while heat and the polarities of electricity produce repellancy. The former would bind the particles immovably together ; the latter push them farther and farther asunder. But their joint action produces incessant change. Every animal and every plant is a busy laboratory. Chemistry is at work in the atmosphere. Not even the deep-seated rocks escape its metamorphic power. Nay, from the circumference to the centre of vast worlds, we have evidence of chemical action, producing mighty and entire revolutions. Yet most of this work is silent and unseen.

The result of this all-pervading agency is change ; change not only among infinitesimal atoms, but throughout the mass of entire worlds. There is not probably an ounce of rock in the entire crust of the globe that has not undergone metamorphosis ; nay, much of it has been repeatedly changed. The sound crystalline aspect of the deep-seated rocks, as we break them open, is no evidence that chemical metamorphosis has not passed through them all. Even geologists can yet scarcely realize the extent of these transformations as stubborn facts compel them to admit. And

this work is now going on everywhere, unseen and silent indeed, but surely and triumphantly, as the future will reveal. Of all things on this globe the solid rocks are the most changeable. The ocean, save in its mechanical movements, is comparatively permanent and unchanging; and the same is true of the atmosphere. But the rocks are ever in a state of flux.

If we extend our views beyond the earth, yet keeping its early history in mind, we shall find evidence that the great bodies of the cosmos are passing through a series of chemical changes. Some, as the nebulae and the comets, are in a gaseous condition, apparently from the effects of intense heat. Others, such as the sun and the planets exterior to Mars, are in a liquid condition; either in that of melted globes, or covered by a fluid like water. Others are in a solid condition, as Mars, the earth, Venus, Mercury, and the asteroids; having been apparently cooled down from a molten to a solid state; of which the moon furnishes a notable example. Now the history of the earth presents us with unequivocal evidence that it was once in a liquid condition from heat, and has within it still a vast incandescent ocean. We can trace back the earth's history with certainty to the state of a melted globe, and there is a strong presumption that at an earlier date the heat may have been intense enough to convert it into gas.

By thus comparing the condition of the cosmos at present with the earth's early history, we catch a glimpse of a great principle of chemical change, to which the bodies of the solar system, and probably of all systems, are subject. The earliest state is gaseous; they then pass into a liquid condition, and then become solid. Now if we knew of any mode in which a solid world could be converted into gas, as one of the phenomena of nature, we should make out a complete cycle of change among the spheres of the cosmos. But no glimpse of such a transition shows itself in nature. The cycle then is incomplete or broken; and we must conclude, either that when a planet has reached a solid state it

will forever remain so, or that any future change will require a special divine interposition. Almost all the analogies of the universe make future changes in its physical condition probable, and therefore the first supposition improbable. But we trust, ere we finish our argument, to show that many exigencies in the earth's history, many a *dignus vindice nodus*, have demanded and witnessed special divine interference. This may be one of them, and so is it represented in relation to this world, as we understand it, in the Bible. No law of nature, surely, can explain the earth's future destruction and renovation. For though there may be forces within the globe adequate in certain circumstances to destroy it, yet whence can the new earth originate, unless, as represented in the scriptures it "come down from God out of heaven"?

Atmospheric Changes.

We have deferred thus far making but slight allusion to atmospheric phenomena, because though in part dependent upon mechanical forces, chemical agencies are still more concerned, and electrical as well as optical influences often indispensable. We find here the elastic force of the atmosphere struggling against the compressing power of gravity; the perpetual struggles between heat and cold; the rush of cold and heavy air to restore the equilibrium with that which has been heated and rarified; the evaporation in one place and the condensation in another, of water by chemical and electrical agencies; and finally the influence of light upon the phenomena of clouds and the colors of plants and animals. When we reflect that the atmospheric phenomena are the result of so many conflicting and ever-varying forces, it is not strange, surely, that no mathematical formulæ can be formed that will tell us what that resultant is. Though we fancy that a solution of the problem by which the weather could be predicted, would be extremely desirable, we suspect that it was intentionally placed beyond the grasp of terrestrial mathematics.

Man's inability to work out this problem, however, does not result from any inconstancy or uncertainty in the action of the forces concerned. And the same is true in respect to all those chemical operations we have been considering. In its individual action each of these laws has all the certainty of mathematics, and we could calculate precisely its amount if it operated alone. But when numerous forces come into play, some of them in conflict and some in harmony, and the exact value of each cannot be known, no skill in calculation can reach a satisfactory result. Long observation, however, does enable a man to form an approximate estimate of the coming changes in nature that depend upon the complicated causes, mechanical, chemical, and electrical, that have been enumerated. Hence we may be certain that the apparently irregular play of the forces concerned is confined within fixed limits, and that chemical agencies and atmospheric changes are oscillatory or cyclical. It is possible, indeed, when the data have been reached by long and patient observation, that even the problem of the weather and of the seasons may be solved by the meteorologist. We know enough at present to be sure that all the forces concerned are controlled by laws as fixed and constant as those that produce the annual and diurnal revolutions of the earth.

If such be the case, how, it may be asked, are chemical or even atmospheric changes any exception to nature's constancy and uniformity? In a certain sense, indeed, every operation dependent upon unchangeable law is constant; that is, in like circumstances the same process will be repeated. In this sense, not only every natural event but even miracles are constant, for we believe them all subject to law. But those laws may be so arranged as to antagonize, diminish, or intensify one another, and then change, it may be entire change, is inevitable. When produced by natural laws, we have called it normal; when by miracles, abnormal. All the mechanical and chemical changes which we have pointed out belong to the former

class. The ample record of these events furnishes no example of a miracle; though in a few instances it does show us exigencies where miraculous interposition seems indispensable to save the system from destruction.

Natural changes, then, are consistent with fixed laws. Still more obviously so are constancy and uniformity. But the main question we would raise is: Which of these is the higher or controlling law? Constancy is certainly the most obvious result of mechanical laws. Yet it does not follow from hence that constancy is not controlled by change. And when we see how the latter secures the permanence of the celestial motions, we can hardly hesitate to give it the pre-eminence over the former. Still more manifest is it in the operation of chemical laws, that change takes the precedence. Indeed this is the almost exclusive manifestation of those laws in nature. The disintegration and metamorphism of the rocks remind us of change, not of constancy. So do the growth and decay of animals and plants. So do atmospheric phenomena, which are the joint action of mechanical, chemical, and electrical laws. In all these cases change is not only the higher law, but it is only by reasoning that we satisfy ourselves that there is constancy in the changes.

Organic Laws.

3. But the most important proof and illustration of the subordination of constancy to change in nature we hope to derive from organic laws; which, as a third branch of the discussion, we proceed to consider.

Organic laws embrace the commencement, development, and extinction of the various systems of life that have appeared on the globe. It will be convenient to speak, first, of the system which is now manifesting itself in existing animals and plants.

Perhaps we have already said enough as to the chemical and electrical operations connected with organism. They are abundant and incessant in every animal and in every

plant, and the result is unceasing change,—change of internal and external development, of form and size, and finally the changes of decay and decomposition. The principle of life does indeed accelerate or retard, or otherwise modify, these changes; but the vital as well as chemical and electrical forces concerned are all governed by fixed laws, and therefore the changes are normal; their limits are fixed, and though not periodical, they are so analogous in different individuals, as to show them invariable in their operation in the same circumstances. Should we turn the kaleidoscope for months, and never see the same figure recur, we should not hence infer that the permutation and combinations of that instrument were not regulated by invariable laws, but only that its possible modifications were beyond all human calculation. There is no more reason for excluding from the control of law the no less numerous aspects in which the phenomena of life present themselves. Ceaseless, and often apparently causeless, change is, indeed, about the only external manifestation of the phenomena; but we never doubt that for every new feature there is a fixed cause. In this sense there is constancy, but change predominates overwhelmingly. But what shall we say of that system of reproduction by which the races of animals and plants are continued in existence? Is it balanced by the system of death? Most certainly; for death is universal, and whether the number born be small or great, they pass away. But though the individuals die, the species, the family, the race, survive. A few examples can, indeed, be quoted in which species seem to have perished, in recent times, such as the *Dinornis*, the *Aepyornis*, and the *Dodo* of Mauritius, and a still larger number of the extinction of particular species in particular countries. Whether the disappearance of ever so small a number of species may not so disturb the balance of nature as to carry serious disorder through the whole system, is a question we have not time here to discuss. But the almost universal permanence of species, amid the universal destruction of individuals, is

another good example of constancy in the midst of endless change.

Early Systems of Life.

We have spoken of other systems of life on the globe before the present. They have been numerous, and have left the record of their existence and character in the rocks. The question is, whether the same laws of anatomy, physiology, and botany which now prevail, have always controlled the reproduction, sustenance, and decay of animals and plants; or has each new system of organism had new laws? All the records of the past afford evidence of the identity of these laws in all past periods. Hence the endless changes, within fixed limits, which we witness in the present system of life have been manifested in all previous systems.

But though the laws have been the same in these successive economies of life, not so the character of the animals and plants. Each of the great geological formations has been characterized by peculiar groups, found neither in the rocks below nor above. They belong, indeed, to the same great classes which extend through all the formations. But when we examine the smaller groups, we find sometimes new orders or families, more often new genera, and most often of all new species, introduced with each new rock; so that each formation has its peculiar and characteristic animals and plants. Some have maintained that the new species have been introduced one by one, towards the close of each formation, to take the place of species that drop out one by one, so that the entire change is gradual, and we could not tell from the fossils exactly where to draw the line between the two formations. But the ablest paleontologists make an entirely different representation. They admit, indeed, that in a few cases there is some commingling of species for a short distance from the junction of two formations. But this is reasonably explained by supposing that the catastrophe, or whatever cause terminated the general system of life in the inferior formation, might not

have been sufficient to destroy some of the more hardy species, which therefore continued to live on in connection with the newly-created species. Professor Pictet thus enunciates the general principle: "Contemporaneous species of the same locality, or contiguous localities, in an immense majority of cases, have disappeared and appeared together. Sometimes we see a non-fossiliferous bed between two formations; but we never find, or almost never, a deposit containing at the same time, and in a normal condition, fossils of the bed beneath mingled with those of the bed above. The species born together, and having lived together, have ordinarily disappeared together."¹ "It results from these facts," says M. Alcide D'Orbigny, another eminent paleontologist, "of which all the world affords evidence at all the geological epochs, that each of the stages that have succeeded one another on the globe has had its peculiar fauna, well-marked and distinct from the faunas below and above, and that these faunas have not succeeded one another by change of form, or by gradual replacement, but by sudden destruction. We meet nowhere, indeed, a transition of one specific form into another at the contact of two successive periods; but the organisms on the surface of the globe have succeeded one another, not by modification of animal forms in the passage, but rather by the extinction of existing species and the renewal of species at each geological period."²

These writers impute the destruction of the successive faunas and floras to the disturbances that have taken place in the earth's crust. Says D'Orbigny: "We have seen that every time in the earth's history when there has been a dislocation of the crust, capable of producing a great displacement of the seas, the existing fauna has been destroyed by the prolonged movement of the waters at the dislocated points, and even elsewhere; that the separation of distinct and successive faunas which we find in each formation or

¹ *Traits de Paléontologie*, Tome I. p. 44.

² *Cours Elementaire de Paléontologie*, Tome II. p. 252.

geological stage, is therefore but the visible consequence of dislocations of various magnitude, which the consolidated crust of the globe has undergone in every part."¹

Other distinguished geologists and paleontologists do not admit such an entire correspondence between catastrophes and the extinction of faunas, which they suppose has taken place gradually, especially among the higher races, by the slow changes which have occurred in the condition of the surface, as to climate and food.

We are persuaded that the truth lies between these extremes of opinion. We are certain, from stratigraphical geology alone, that great disturbances in the earth's crust took place at the close of many of the periods of deposition corresponding to the formations. They were such dislocations as must have destroyed life over wide surfaces, if not over the whole globe, as is evident when we look at the great discordance of dip and strike between consecutive members of the older formations. In such cases there must have been a sudden disappearance of the old faunas and floras, and those which succeeded must have been new. But in some other cases the new races seem to have been introduced without much disturbance, and we should expect that many of the old species would be continued and mixed with the new ones. For a striking example we refer to the alluvial period.

There is no geological evidence that any great disturbance preceded the introduction of the existing races upon the earth, although it is the most extensive and perfect of all the systems of life that have appeared. None of the living species are found buried more than a hundred feet in depth except a few species that reach back certainly as far as the tertiary. Hence we place the commencement of the Historic Period only so far back as that hundred feet implies, though the whole thickness of the alluvium cannot be less, probably it is more, than five hundred feet. The great delicacy and complexity of the existing races would not

¹ Cours Elementaire de Paléontologie, Tome II. p. 253.

perhaps have been consistent with much disturbance just before their introduction, and therefore the surface had been kept comparatively quiet ever since the Cretaceous Period. The new races, especially man, demanded long preparation for their accommodation. And it accords with what the whole history of the earth teaches us of divine wisdom and benevolence, to suppose that the requisites for their full development and happiness should be provided.

It is to the alluvial or pleistocene formation that Sir Charles Lyell chiefly appeals to sustain the doctrine that species have not appeared and disappeared together and suddenly at the beginning and close of each formation, but have dropped out and been replaced by others at intervals through the whole period of deposition, and hence he infers that between the older formations, where the consecutive deposits are totally unlike in fossil character, there was probably a wide interval during which no rocks were laid down in the spot observed, though in other regions formations were accumulating.

It is true that the fossils of alluvium, and more or less those of the tertiary, might give plausibility to such a supposition. For it is not easy to fix upon the precise period when the existing races were introduced. Yet if we admit on inspired authority that they were generally the contemporaries of man, all those whose remains occur deeper than his in the formation must be supposed to have been created at an earlier epoch, and to have survived whatever catastrophe might have immediately preceded his creation. This would make quite a large number of the existing species pre-Adamic. But what is there, either in scripture or observation, to make such a statement improbable? The former represents large numbers of animals and plants as created on the third, fifth, and sixth demiurgic days; that is, as we understand the history, they were essentially man's contemporaries. But the Bible does not say that no species of previous creations were still living; or, more probably, it intends to include in its history

all of every period, making those alive with Adam the representatives or models. What matter, then, though many species had an earlier origin than the Adamic creation? They are all included in the Mosaic account, and it was not necessary to inform us that some species are the survivors of an anterior creation.

In these statements we can see a reason why more species are common to the Adamic creation and two or three others that preceded it, as low as the eocene tertiary, than in respect to any of the earlier demiurgic periods. The world had reached a more statical or settled condition, and catastrophes were less frequent and violent, and not as destructive to organic life. Hence not a few species were able to survive them, so that, in the opinion of most paleontologists, some existing species began their race as long ago as the eocene tertiary. But we are not justified in making these facts as to the latest creations a standard for the earlier ones, because we have evidence in the lithological character and unconformable position of the latter that they have been subject to such agencies and catastrophes as might have entirely destroyed life. Hence it is unphilosophical to interpolate between such formations periods of respite from the work of deposition in particular places long enough to connect the fossils in other localities into an uninterrupted series, as between the Adamic and more recent pre-Adamic formations. Circumstances are so changed in the modern periods, that we cannot safely make them a standard by which to judge of earlier economies.

Moreover, the evidence relied on to prove that in the present economy of life species are continually dropping out and new ones introduced, so that the whole system may in this way be changed, seems to us entirely insufficient. All we can show is, that a few species of birds and quadrupeds, having a limited range, have become extinct chiefly through man's agency; but not a single example has ever been found of the introduction of a new species. The law which

we find almost everywhere dominant is, that species are persistent and permanent, while the few cases of extinction may probably all be explained by local circumstances. The fair conclusion is, that probably the species of the historic period, like those of all previous periods, will live on together till the will of Providence causes them to perish together. Yet, for the reasons already given, a larger number may survive and pass into another life-period, should another analogous to the present succeed. But surely its history thus far does not authorize the conclusion that a law of nature is dropping out some species and introducing others, so as finally to change the whole. Much less can we infer from what is now passing that all past life-periods have, in like manner, graduated into each other insensibly, and not by sudden transition.

But even should we admit these uniformitarian views — this slow transition of one life-period into another — the essential fact, so far as religion is concerned, would still remain, viz. that the species in different formations are unlike, and the new ones, whether introduced together or singly, whether constituting the entire fauna and flora, or only a small part of them, would equally demand the interposition of divine creating power. If, for instance, man were the only new species in the alluvial period, in no way but by resorting to absurd hypotheses, could we account for his introduction without an infinite Creator.

It is well known that a great deal is said, at this day, about recent discoveries which indicate a great antiquity to the human species, from the remains of man found in caves in Belgium, England, and the south of France, and flint instruments found in the gravel deposits of the Somme and elsewhere, with the bones of extinct mammoths and the woolly rhinoceros. The discussion has brought out numerous publications, the two most important of which are "The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man," by Sir Charles Lyell, and the "Pre-historic Man," by Professor Daniel Wilson of Toronto. Admitting the facts to be cor-

rectly understood, of which there is great reason to doubt,¹ the facts we have detailed show us a very plausible explanation of the admixture of human remains with those of extinct animals, without resorting to extreme antiquity. *For we do not know when the fossil species became extinct, and we do know that some of them were alive at a quite late period.* There are other modes of meeting the difficulty; but this is perhaps the most probable.

Tabular Illustration.

The important bearing of the facts that have been briefly described, upon the subject under discussion, has led us to construct the adjoining tabular illustration of the successive systems of life that have appeared on the globe. Their thickness, as thus far ascertained, has been laid off from a scale, chiefly to show how much thicker were the earlier than the more recent systems, and how that thickness has gradually decreased.

Our diagram represents these life-systems according to two plans of arrangement. In the left hand column, the rocks are divided into groups so large, that with the exception of the Alluvial and the Tertiary, no species is common to any two of them.

The lowest or Paleozoic system is 47,600 feet thick, or more than nine miles. This vast group is characterized by the entire absence of birds and mammiferous animals; also by the presence of numerous chambered shells, called cephalopods, of such a structure as is not found in the higher rocks, and by the existence of very peculiar crustaceous animals, called trilobites.

The next or Triassic system has a thickness of only about 3,000 feet, but its animals and plants form a peculiar group, whose character can be learnt only from a detailed description. Among the larger animals, peculiar and gi-

¹ Especially since the recent discovery of the very curious trick which the workmen have played upon the geologists in regard to the arrows and bones in the deposits of the Somme. See *London Times* for April 25, 1863.

SUCCESSIVE SYSTEMS OF LIFE ON THE GLOBE.

ALLUVIAL			Historic, 100 feet.
			Quaternary, 400.
TERTIARY			Pliocene
			Miocene
			Molasse
			Upper Eocene
			London Clay
			Plastic Clay
CRETACEOUS			White Chalk
			Upper Greensand
			Gault
			Neocomian.
JURASSIC			Wealden, 1800.
			Superior Jurassic.
			Coral Group.
			Oxford Group.
			Grand Oolite, 780.
			Lower Oolite, 570.
TRIASSIC			Lias, 1100.
			Saliferous, 1600.
			Trias, 1500.
			Permian, 1000.
PALEOZOIC			CARBONIFEROUS,
			10,000.
			DEVONIAN, 10,000.
			UPPER SILURIAN,
			7600.
			LOWER SILURIAN,
			20,000.

gantic reptiles begin to show themselves, and a few quadrupeds or mammiferous animals have been found. The fishes in this formation differ from all those below, in having tails with equal lobes, called homocereal, such as nine-tenths of existing fishes possess, but which are not found below the Trias. The plants are easily distinguished from the remarkable flora found towards the upper parts of the paleozoic rocks.

Next follows the Oölitic or Jurassic system, 3,300 feet thick, which presents us with an enormous development of huge reptiles, such as the *Iguanodon*, the *Ichthyosaurus*, the *Pterodactyle*; and small marsupial animals represent the mammals. These, it is well known, are the lowest in organization among quadrupeds, and therefore we should expect them to lead the way in the introduction of this class of animals into a progressive world. In the lowest part of this formation, most probably, are found those remarkable fossil footmarks in the valley of the Connecticut river, which Hugh Miller says "are fraught with strange meanings," and which certainly reveal an extraordinary assemblage of animals in that valley in ancient times. Among others are not a few tracks apparently of birds, some of them of fabulous size. This is the first time we meet with any traces of this class of animals as we ascend in the rocks. Although the Triassic group below seems to have been a period very deficient in life, the Jurassic period was very prolific of animals and plants, and of a decidedly higher organization than had before appeared.

The Cretaceous group, which succeeds the Oölitic, was 3,700 feet thick. Being for the most part a deep sea deposit, its plants are not very numerous or important; but its animals are very abundant, though mostly marine. The beautiful chambered shells, called *Ammonites*, of which more than three hundred species appeared in the Oölite, were almost equally prolific in the chalk. Another class of animals, generally microscopic and very low in the scale of organization, called *Foraminifera*, were so abundant as to

form a large part of the chalk. The usual building stone in the city of Paris is largely composed of them, as are several of the pyramids of Egypt.

The Tertiary group, that succeeds the chalk to a thickness of more than 9,000 feet, seems to have been deposited in rather shallow seas and estuaries, which however were of wide extent; as, for instance, a wide belt along the coast of the United States, from New York to Texas. There is a total change in the faunas and floras; the animals and plants having an aspect more like existing species than those in the older rocks. Many of the fossil trees bear a strong resemblance to those now growing in the forests, though most of them have a tropical character. But the most striking characteristic of the tertiary, is the great amount of mammiferous animals of higher grades than the marsupials, and some of them of gigantic size and colossal proportions.

The Alluvial period embraces all the deposits above the tertiary. Its most striking peculiarity is the appearance of man towards its close, with the vast multitude of associated races that now cover the earth. But most of the species—ninety-eight out of one hundred—that are found in the lower part of the alluvial period are still alive. The same is true of some hundred species in the tertiary, though some distinguished zoölogists maintain that none of the tertiary species correspond with those of the present creation. If they are distinct, all we can say is, that in consequence of the little disturbance that occurred at the close of the tertiary period, and in the alluvial period before the present creation, many species were enabled to live on through successive periods. One might almost doubt whether any new creation took place at the close of the tertiary period; and that we might, as one eminent paleontologist (D'Orbigny) contends, connect the Pliocene tertiary with the lower part of the Alluvial. But a comparison of the mammals in the two groups, according to Pictet, leads rather to the conclusion of distinct creations.

A popular representation of the great life-periods, which we have now gone over, assigns the Paleozoic period to the reign of Fishes, the Secondary period to that of Reptiles, the Tertiary to Mammals, and the Alluvial to Man. This, however, is only a poetic way of describing the wide prevalence of certain important species.

In the right-hand column of our chart the same great life-periods are represented as in the left. But they are subdivided into many others; because, according to our best paleontologists, life has been renewed on the globe many more than six times. Says D'Orbigny, "a first creation took place in the Silurian stage. After that was annihilated by some geological cause, and after a considerable time, a second creation took place in the Devonian stage, and successively, twenty-seven times, have distinct creations repopled all the earth with plants and animals; following, each time, some geological disturbance, which had totally destroyed living nature. Such is the certain but incomprehensible fact, which we are bound to state, without trying to pierce the superhuman mystery that envelopes it."¹

Other eminent paleontologists, such as Pictet, Owen, and Agassiz, may differ from D'Orbigny as to the precise number of times the earth has changed its inhabitants; but all of them maintain the distinctness of life in different formations. Says Owen, "the sum of the animal species at each successive geological period has been distinct and peculiar to such period."² Says Agassiz, "one result stands now unquestioned: the existence, during each great geological era, of an assemblage of animals and plants differing essentially for each period. And by period I mean those minor subdivisions in the successive sets of beds of rocks which constitute the stratified crust of our globe, the number of which is daily increasing, as our investigations become more extensive and more precise."³ In our diagram we have

¹ *Traits de Paléontologie*, Tome II. p. 251.

² *Palaeontology*, p. 411.

³ *Contributions to the Natural History of the Northern States*, Vol. I. p. 96.

followed, with one exception, the divisions of Pictet, which are twenty-five. He says, "many geologists admit at least twenty-five to thirty distinct stages, and consequently an equal number of faunas."

The Paleozoic rocks are divided by Pictet into five well-known groups, viz. Lower Silurian, Upper Silurian, Devonian, Carboniferous, and Permian. Distinct faunas and floras undoubtedly exist in all these great groups, and some believe that they are distinct in most of the thirty subdivisions which are established in these vast formations, and probably such will be proved to be the case.

The Triassic group is divided by Pictet into two distinct life-periods, the Trias proper and the Saliferous group. The Jurassic he subdivides into seven groups, reckoning upwards, viz. Lias, Lower Oölite, Grand Oölite, Oxford Group, Coral Group, Superior Jurassic, and the Wealden. The Cretaceous Group comprehends four groups, viz. the Neocomian, Gault, Upper Greensand, and White Chalk. In the Tertiary Group are six subdivisions, viz. Plastic Clay, London Clay, Upper Eocene, Molasse, Miocene, and Pliocene. Of the Quaternary or Alluvial he makes but one group, embracing the existing races. We should follow D'Orbigny rather, in making a group above the Quaternary, which we call the Historic Period, and which contains the remains only of the animals and plants now alive. We do not, however, extend this period as far down as the *Terrains contemporains, ou Epoch actuelle* of their author. For he embraces drift in it, and of course all those beds of modified drift above it that contain at least some extinct fossils. We carry back the period no further than the creation of man and contemporary races; whereas drift, and a large part of the stratified deposits above it, are immensely older. We know of no example where man and contemporary species have been found buried as deep as one hundred feet, except that comparatively small number of species which are found in drift and modified drift along with extinct races. These we suppose to have been created after the

close of the Tertiary and at the beginning of the Quaternary Period, and that no geological disturbance took place at the close of the Quaternary sufficient to destroy but a few of these species, and therefore they have lived on into the Historic Period, and ought not to be reckoned as a part of the latest creation. But we ought not to place the period of the creation of man, and of the vast numbers of existing animals which are found only a little way down in the alluvial deposits, as early as the drift, until we can find their remains in it. The presumption, in view of the facts, ought to be, that the great majority of the existing races were a new creation introduced at a period vastly more recent than drift, and that the few living species found below the burial places of that majority belong to an earlier creation.

The occurrence of man, the most remarkable of all animals, near the close of the alluvial period, would be, alone, sufficient to establish the historic as distinct from all other life-periods; sufficient at least to create a strong presumption that the epoch of his appearance was distinct from all that preceded it. But it strongly confirms this presumption, that while a hundred thousand species of animals, at the lowest calculation, are man's living contemporaries, geologists reckon only about fifteen hundred as fossil in the whole alluvial formation, including drift. All the living species are indeed buried as low down as man is; but their relics are so recent that they have not been called fossil. Even, then, though all the fifteen hundred fossil species were created earlier than man, it would leave an immense number which, by geological evidence, were introduced along with man; and thus should we have, at the commencement of the historic period, not only a new creation, but one more varied and perfect than any which has preceded it. Even though no convulsion or destruction of the species then existing took place, and we should be obliged to resort to records in the hands of man to show when the new creation occurred, its reality and importance would be none the less certain, especially since we can see in the greater

delicacy and perfection of organization of the historic period a good reason why its introduction should not be prefaced, like the earlier economies, by convulsion and dislocation.

How many times has the earth changed its inhabitants ?

We may set it down, then, as one of the best established facts of paleontology, that the earth has several times changed its inhabitants; as many as six times at least so entirely, that with the exception of the Tertiary and Alluvial, not a species is common to two adjoining groups, and as many as twenty-five times have the faunas and floras been so distinct as to prove their origin equally distinct. In such cases, says Pictet, "we find generally, in two successive faunas, the same genera represented by different species. Consequently we require, in order to characterize a special fauna, that the differences extend to all the important types: for instance, the Cephalopods, the Gasteropods, the Acephala, and the Brachiopods among the Mollusks, should have distinctive characters." By the application of such a rule, already as many as twenty-five distinct life-periods have been demonstrated, and doubtless further research will discover others.

There is another fact respecting these life-periods, more important in this discussion than their number. It is the wise and benevolent adaptation of the new races to the altered circumstances in which they are placed. The physical condition of the earth has ever been slowly but constantly changing, varying the temperature and the means of subsistence. Hence there must be a correspondent change in the nature of plants and animals, to preserve that wise adaptation to circumstances which existing nature everywhere exhibits. Now this has been done so perfectly that every change of animal structures has served to help them in the performance of their functions, and contributed to their happiness. No instance can be pointed out where opposite effects have been produced.

Another object seems to have been provided for in these

life-changes, and that is progress from the less to the more perfect. There has been improvement in the physical condition of the globe from the earliest times, and organic nature needed a corresponding advancement. Hence the lowest tribes of animals and plants abounded most in the lower formations, and successively higher and higher races were introduced, till the culmination was reached in the existing races. Particular races, indeed, have deteriorated at times, but upon the whole the progress has been upward, and the population of the globe is now immensely in advance of what it was in early times.

Still another object seems to have been kept in view. Amid these endless changes and upward progress, it was needful that unity should be preserved, so that all the minor systems of life should be harmoniously blended into one all-embracing organic system. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary that certain relations of the most delicate kind should be established between the several minor systems, and maintained in spite of stupendous physical revolutions; so that, while striking diversities should be manifest between the different systems, a golden thread of unity should be seen running through them all, and binding them into one harmonious whole.

Nor, in this connection, should the immense length of time it has required to develop and perfect these changes, be overlooked. An inspection of the various life-periods, as shown in juxtaposition upon our diagram, conveys no idea of great length of time; but it does make the impression that the history of the earth is little else than a succession of revolutions. But how wide of the truth are both these impressions! We are forced, by the most incontrovertible evidence, to the conviction that the period between the earliest brachiopods and zoöphytes of the Silurian seas and man's appearance, may be reckoned by hundreds of thousands if not millions of years; and this not as a flight of imagination, but a deduction of sober reason. Such a view separates the epochs of convulsion widely from one

another, and shows us that the earth's history is that of quiet and uniformity, and revolutions only the widely separated exceptions. Thus it is now, and thus it has always been since the first appearance of animals and plants; and thus it must be to prevent the destruction of so many delicate organisms. But how nicely adjusted must everything be to carry on and carry out so vast and complicated a system of organization as we have described through these almost interminable ages, and the occasional conflict of stupendous forces!

How have the Changes been effected?

Such are the leading facts respecting the successive systems of life that have appeared on the globe. We naturally inquire by what agency have these remarkable changes been brought about? Has it been by natural laws, or by miracle?

We have seen that naturalists find no great difficulty in accounting for the disappearance of the successive systems of life by natural causes. Sir Charles Lyell contends, as we have seen, that the slight changes now taking place as to food, climate, and by man's encroachments and the struggle between species, are sufficient to show how, one by one and at long intervals, they drop out, until at length all are gone, and new ones, in the like quiet and unobserved manner, are substituted. But the ablest zoölogists and paleontologists regard these views as inadequate to explain the facts. They find such evidence that the species which have lived together during a formation have generally disappeared together, that they must impute their extinction to catastrophes, to sudden elevations or depressions or inundations.

It seems to us that these latter views are the true ones, with perhaps some exceptions in the newer strata. But on either theory it is not necessary to call in miraculous intervention to explain the destruction of species.

But not so easy is it to explain the introduction of new

species, whether singly or by groups, by natural law. Yet this has been attempted; and in modern times a vast amount of ingenuity and erudition has been employed to sustain what is called the Development Hypothesis, or the hypothesis of Transmutation, or the Origin of Species by natural Selection, or known by various other names. Though we find fragments of this hypothesis, *disjecta membra*, in various writers, from Democritus downward, yet very few authors have attempted to bring out a complete system. La Place has given us what may be called the cosmogony of the subject, in his Nebular Hypothesis, which takes matter in its gaseous form, and as he supposed needing no Deity, transmuting it into spheres, which gradually became solid. Lamarck and other French zoölogists, attempted to show how animals and plants might spring, by the force of law, from particles inherently vitalized, which may be called the zoögonny of the hypothesis. And the same writers, and many others since, have labored to show how animals and plants once started might, by law also, pass upward from one species to another to their culmination in man. This may be called the zoönomny of the subject. No work has brought out the entire hypothesis so fully, and we may add so ably, as the anonymous work entitled "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," though its zoönomny has been more extensively and ably illustrated by Mr. Darwin, in his work on the Origin of Species. The grand conclusions at which the latter writer arrives are, "that animals have descended from, at most, only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number." "I should infer," says he, "from analogy, that probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed."¹ This primordial or fundamental form, the zoögonist tells us is a globule having another globule forming within it, to which electricity imparts life. And thus the process is started and carried on, from stage to stage, with-

¹ Origin of Species, p. 419.

out the aid or the need of a Deity. We would not, indeed, charge all the advocates of these views with an intention to sustain atheism, though if adopted in full we do not see any necessity for a supreme Creator. But some of these writers, while they believe in full in the transformation of species, even to the extent advocated by Darwin, do yet admit that the process was started by a Creator. What Darwin's views are on this point does not appear; for though the principles of his work, as most men view it, tend to subvert the fundamental principles both of natural and revealed religion, we have noticed in it only one allusion to the Deity, and to religion none at all. It is quite possible, however, that he may maintain that the law of natural selection, which with him is the universal, omniparient power in nature, may have originated with a personal Deity; but we should rather presume that a scientific mind like his would see that there is no necessity for this, if his views be fully adopted; for he who can believe that the ten thousand exquisite diversities and marvellous adaptations of organic nature can have resulted from a mere blind law of selection, might with quite as much reason admit that the "one primordial form," which is little more than a vitalized mass of jelly, might have been started by electricity or some other law. This however is not the worst feature of the Development Hypothesis, because it does allow of a professed belief in theism. The chief anti-religious aspects of the hypothesis, especially to a believer in revelation, are the following:

1. It renders doubtful and unnecessary the existence of a Deity.

2. It leads inevitably to the grossest materialism. Those advocates of the hypothesis who start the organic process from albumen and electricity, cannot surely find anything in the subsequent developments but matter and its functions; for any immaterial principle introduced would require Divine interposition. So if we start with a "primordial form," it must be an Acaleph, or some other organism of the

simplest kind; yet all subsequent races, including even man, must have been derived from it, and unless we suppose the *Acaleph* an animalcule, or a sponge for instance, to possess mind, how can it be obtained for any of the higher races by mere selection and transmutation? The consistent advocate of the hypothesis must therefore adopt materialism.

3. In the third place, for a like reason he must reject the doctrine of man's immortality, or admit the very lowest forms of life, the *Radiates*, the *Acalephs*, the *Amorphoræ*, the invisible animalcules, *encrinites*, *trilobites*, mollusks, fishes, and so on, to be also immortal. For these are man's progenitors, from whom he was derived by direct succession; nor will the hypothesis admit a break anywhere in the chain where a mental and moral nature might have been introduced. Rather than admit the immortality of all these lower forms of life, many of whom it is difficult to distinguish from plants, the logical mind will say man is not immortal, but perishes utterly at death.

4. In the fourth place, the same reasoning destroys human responsibility to God, or imposes it upon all the inferior animals. No man will admit the latter alternative; for no being except man shows the slightest marks of possessing any moral powers. But as he was derived from them by the principle of selection, if they are not accountable to a superior being, neither is he.

5. Fifthly, by this hypothesis man cannot be a fallen being, as both reason and revelation testify. For, on the contrary, he has been continually rising, physically, intellectually, and morally, and is steadily advancing to his culmination.

6. Finally, the doctrine of an incarnate Redeemer and Saviour is absurd. For no such intervention is needed.

Such are the natural fruits of this hypothesis. If in any case they do not follow, it must be the effect of education, of common sense, or other influences. But if men adopting this hypothesis are consistent, they will not stop short of

this creed, or rather this absence of all creed; for with such views we do not see what can be left worth calling religion.

But after all, the real question is, not whether these hypotheses accord with our religious views, but whether they are true. We cannot find space to go into this discussion; nor, after what has been written upon it in volumes and periodicals, is it necessary. The most important point in it relates to organic remains. For if the doctrine of transmutation of species be true, we ought to find ten thousand intermediate varieties in the successive formations. Instead of pointing out a single example of such transition links, Darwin lays himself out to impress his readers with the imperfection of the geological record, on the pooriness of our paleontological collections, and on the intermittence of the formations, explaining every case of the sudden appearance and disappearance of species by supposing long periods to have intervened between the deposits, during which the transmutation may have occurred somewhere by natural selection, and the new species may have been disseminated by migration. Thus without a single positive example to sustain transmutation, and in the face of a vast number of cases of sudden and entire change of life, we are called on to believe in this doctrine on the strength of mere hypothesis. No wonder that Mr. Darwin regards the absence of all "intermediate links" as the "most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against my [his] theory." He need not wonder if others regard it as insuperable.

It is a significant fact that very few of the advocates of the transmutation hypothesis refer to man as an example of it. Yet if it be true, man ought to be a conspicuous illustration of it. For in his case we have the most perfect of all animals and vastly the superior of them all, appearing suddenly at a very recent period; for though geologists may contend about the precise period of his appearance, all agree that it was very recent, and none contend that it was earlier than the alluvial period. Whence came he? If he

is only one of the lower animals metamorphosed, we ought surely to find a multitude of intermediate varieties. But not one has ever been brought to light. The monkey tribe must have been his immediate progenitor. But only a very few species of these have been found fossil, and none below the Tertiary, and all of them differ as much from man as do the living monkeys. Lamarck had the boldness to attempt to describe the process by which the monkey was transformed into a man. But the picture was so absurd and ridiculous that few have attempted to make a sober philosophical defence of it. Yet if it fails in a species so conspicuous as man, it fails as to all others. But it is less revolting to common sense and experience to represent obscure radiate or articulate or molluscous animals as slowly transmuted from one species into another, than to bring man into the same category. Therefore silence in respect to him is the wisest course. For what philosophic mind, free from bias, can believe such a being, the highest of all animals in anatomical structure and intellect, and possessed of a moral nature, of which no trace exists in any other animal, is merely the product of transmutation of the radiate monad through the mollusk, the lobster, the bird, the quadruped, and the monkey, either by Lamarck's principle of "appetency," and "the force of circumstances," or Darwin's principle of "selection"? The fact is, man's appearance at so late a period in the earth's history, and so independent of all other species, seems a providential testimony to the absurdity of this hypothesis.

Opinions of Eminent Naturalists.

We have seen, however, that it has been adopted by some naturalists. How is it with the distinguished paleontologists and zoölogists to whom we have referred as the highest authority on such questions? We quote first from Professor Pictet, who says, "the theory of the transformation of species appears to us entirely inadmissible, and diametrically opposed to all the teachings of zoölogy and

physiology." Says Agassiz, "nothing furnishes the slightest argument in favor of the mutability of species; on the contrary, every modern investigation has only gone to confirm the results first obtained by Cuvier, and his views that species are fixed." "It cannot be denied that the species of different successive periods are supposed by some naturalists to derive their distinguishing features from changes which have taken place in those of preceding ages; but this is a mere supposition, supported neither by physiological nor geological evidence, and the assumption that animals and plants may change in a similar manner during one and the same period. On the contrary, it is known that the evidence furnished by the Egyptian monuments, and by the most careful comparison between animals found in the tombs of Egypt with the living specimens of the same species obtained in the same country, that there is not the shadow of a difference between them, for a period of about five thousand years. Geology only shows that at different periods there have existed different species; but no transition from those of a preceding into those of the following epoch has ever been noticed anywhere."¹

Says Owen, referring to the hypotheses of Wallace, Darwin, and others, "observation of the effects of any of the above hypothetical transmuting influences, in changing any known species into another, has not yet been recorded. And past experience of the chance aims of human fancy, unchecked and unguided by observed facts, shows how widely they have ever glanced away from the golden centre of truth."²

Compelled thus by the principles of true philosophy to discard an hypothesis so unreasonable, these distinguished savans have felt as if special acts of creation by Divine power were the only alternative to account for the successive introduction of new groups of organisms upon the earth's surface. "The two first explications" (that of the

¹ Contributions to the Natural History of the Northern States, Vol I. p. 51.

² Palaeontology, p. 406.

displacement of contemporaneous faunas — *deplacement des faunas contemporaines* — and that of transmutation), says Pictet, “being inadmissible, there remains the third, which is known under the name of *the theory of successive creations*, because it admits the direct intervention of creative power at the commencement of each geological epoch.” But though forced by his philosophy to admit this theory, it is obvious that his religious views, or something else, make him feel desirous of getting rid of it, and therefore he makes a suggestion of the possibility of some other explanation, which we shall notice shortly.¹

Professor Owen is more decided. “We are able,” says he, “to demonstrate that the different epochs of the earth were attended with corresponding changes of organic structure; and that in all these instances of change the organs, still illustrating the unchanging fundamental types, were, as far as we could comprehend their use, exactly those best suited to the functions of the being. Hence we not only show intelligence evoking means adapted to the end, but at successive times and periods producing a change of mechanism adapted to a change in external conditions. Thus the highest generalizations in the science of organic bodies, like the Newtonian laws of universal matter, lead to the unequivocal conviction of a great First Cause, which is certainly not mechanical.”²

With still stronger emphasis does Agassiz speak of the origin of animals. “All these beings,” says he, “do not exist in consequence of the continued agency of physical causes, but have made their successive appearance upon the earth by the immediate intervention of the Creator.”³

To the unsophisticated mind, untrammelled by theories, the inevitable conclusion from all these facts is, that the successive appearance of numerous groups of animals and plants on the globe, forms so many distinct examples of

¹ *Traits de Paléontologie*, Tome I. p. 87.

² *Palaeontology*, p. 414.

³ *Contributions to the Natural History of the Northern States*, Vol. 1. p. 135.

miracles of creation. For in the view of all except the advocates of the Development Hypothesis, they demanded a force above and beyond nature in her ordinary course, and this is the essential thing in a miracle. What believer in the Bible ever doubted that the creation of man and contemporary races was a miracle in this sense? Indeed what stronger evidence of miraculous intervention have we anywhere than the creation of organic beings, especially of man? and his introduction is one of the facts of geological history. But the mere creation of these successive races is not the whole of the matter. For they were nicely adapted to the altered condition of things at the different epochs. They showed, also, a gradual elevation on the scale of being, as we rise higher and higher. If it was not a miracle to introduce succeeding groups under such circumstances, that is, a special divine intervention, then we despair of finding a miracle anywhere. Even the creation of matter out of nothing might as reasonably be excluded from the class of such events, as the creation of organic beings. Indeed, if we admit that the latter fact is not a miracle, we think the term would ere long become obsolete, both in philosophy and theology, unless it be retained in the limited sense given to it by M'Cosh.

New Hypothesis against Miracles.

Strenuous efforts, however, are made at this day to exclude these events from the class of miracles or special divine interpositions. And what is most remarkable is that these efforts originate chiefly from men who are the professed friends and commissioned defenders of revealed religion. The following statements will give an idea of their main hypothesis.

Professor Pictet, as we have already intimated, has suggested the leading points of this hypothesis, though he mentions it as merely possible. "The phrase *successive creations*," he says, "has the inconvenience of not giving latitude enough, and excluding, for instance, the possibility

that the beings of each successive fauna might proceed from those which preceded it, as the effect of some unknown law, different from that of normal generation, of which the doctrine of *alternation of generations* might give an approximate idea — a law of nature which should manifest itself at remote intervals, but with regularity, and which might be unknown to us because we live in one of these intervals.”¹

It is essentially the same theory that is advanced by Rev. Professor Powell in the following passage from his *Order of Nature*. “The same assurance applying to existing life must also be equally extended to all those marvellous changes in species which geological epochs disclose to us, and which, occurring as a part of a regular series, and giving rise to equally regular results, connected on every side with other events going on by natural causes, must themselves be equally referred to natural causes.”²

Professor Powell believing, as we have seen, that “in nature and from nature, by science and by reason, we neither have, nor can have, any evidence of a Deity working miracles,” and not being quite ready to fall in with the Development Hypothesis, though he treats it with great respect, we might expect would adopt the preceding theory as a provisional escape from the doctrine of miraculous creation. But it is more difficult to understand why the ingenious author of the work entitled “the Stars and the Angels,” whose conclusions so generally accord with evangelical religion, should have given it his countenance, as he does in the following passage: “It is by no means discordant with the analogies of nature to suppose it quite possible that the successive creations of the pre-Adamite world were not the products of miraculous power, but the natural results of the operation of some great law, of the nature of which we are at present ignorant, and of which we cannot perhaps form even a conception.”³

¹ *Traits de Paléontologie*, Vol. I. p. 87.

² *Order of Nature*, p. 171.

³ *The Stars and the Angels*, p. 148.

Though, as we have seen, Dr. M'Cosh represents this subject as a "controversy," which he hesitates to decide, and says that the advocates of the hypothesis "have certainly explained much in this way," yet he should not by any means be reckoned as its advocate, although it would not be strange if its friends should claim so distinguished a name. But he reluctates strongly against the leading points of the hypothesis, and says distinctly, "that natural causes certainly seem utterly incapable of producing such a being as man." We trust that ere long the distinguished theologian will become as decided on this point, which we regard as of vital importance, as are such men as Agassiz, Owen, and Hugh Miller, who judge simply as naturalists, without any theological biases.

It is indeed quite remarkable that while we find a few orthodox theologians hesitating whether to call creation miraculous, the distinguished philosopher "Leibnitz expressly includes in the class of miracles, properly so called, creation, annihilation, and the incarnation of the Son of God."¹

Since the hypothesis opposed to that of Leibnitz as to creation, suggested by the writers named above, is essentially the same, we shall have reference to them all in the remarks which we offer. They all seem to us to labor under certain false notions about miraculous interposition, by which we wish it to be borne in mind, we mean special Divine intervention, inexplicable by natural law.

1. In the first place, they admit in the geological creations all that is essential in a miracle. They concede that these events are explicable by no known laws of nature. And surely this is the essential thing in a miracle. It is an event that requires the intervention of some other power than that of nature. The question what the new power is, ought not to embarrass the subject; for since everything originates with God, we may be sure that this creative force comes from him. It is a power introduced by him in

¹ Powell's *Order of Nature*, p. 206.

contradistinction from the laws of nature. If this is not miracle, what can be?

2. These writers assume that any events brought about by the operation of law, and which therefore may recur at intervals, cannot be miraculous, but must be natural.

This conclusion results from the very common opinion that miracles are not under the control of law at all, but special divine interferences with nature, having no connection with anything that precedes or follows. But even if this be admitted, it would not prove these isolated occurrences independent of all law, but only that we could not comprehend it. For, what is necessary to prove an event subject to law? Uniformity of recurrence in the same circumstances is all. But will any one doubt that, in precisely the same circumstances in every respect, the Deity would perform the same miracle? To doubt this would be to suppose the Deity to change his mind upon reflection, and thus to assail his perfections. Suppose exactly the same reasons for raising a dead man to life should recur every thousand years, as existed in the case of Lazarus, so that we could even predict the time of its occurrence, would the event be any the less miraculous provided it always required divine intervention, and could not be explained by natural law? Or, to make the case more nearly parallel with the geological creations, suppose the event to occur once in a hundred thousand years, so that the record of one resurrection should all be lost before the recurrence of another. It would still be governed by law, and yet be strictly a miracle. Indeed, what action is there of a Being of infinite perfections that is not under the control of law? that is, would he not always act alike in the same circumstances? To deny this is to assail his perfections, and this we do virtually, as it seems to us, when we refuse to acknowledge miracles to be subject to law. It is not strange, therefore, that such master minds as those of Wollaston, Butler, and Babbage have maintained that there is a law of miracles as well as of common natural events.

The ground we take is, that miracles are events resulting from the introduction of a new and perhaps broader law at such exigencies as the Deity pleases in contravention of nature's ordinary laws either to oppose or intensify or diminish the force of nature. Even if the miracle should never be repeated, it would still be according to law; that is, it would be repeated if the same exigency should recur.

Do you say that it destroys the idea of a miracle to suppose it controlled by law? It is rather an arrest of nature's laws by a special act of the Deity, irrespective and independent of law.

It is indeed a special intervention of the Deity at such time and manner as it pleases him; neither is there any inherent force in the law of miracles any more than there is in natural law. Both are only a name for the uniform mode in which the Deity acts; and we say that the very nature of the Deity requires him to act uniformly, always, in like circumstances. The essence of the miracle lies in the interference with natural law, in God's own time and manner, nor has the fact of its subsequent recurrence anything to do with its nature.

Professor Babbage, in his Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, has ingeniously illustrated this subject by reference to his renowned Calculating Machine. But we have not time to go into the details.

But it may still be objected that if we take the definition of "natural" as given by bishop Butler, viz. as something "stated, fixed, or settled," it must embrace miracles if they are introduced by law. It might be so if we could understand the laws of miracles as we can those of nature. This was Butler's view. He says, "persons' notions of what is natural will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity in supposing that there may be beings in the universe whose capacities of knowledge and views may be so extensive as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural; that is,

analogous or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of his creation; as natural as the visible, known course of things appears to us."¹ Butler, however, did not suppose that in this world men are able so to understand the laws of miracles as that they should be placed in the class of natural events. Yet he declares it "supposable and credible that God's miraculous interpositions may have been all along by general laws of wisdom."² He does not seem to have imagined that this view converted miraculous interpositions into natural events even by his definition of what is natural. For though to superior beings they may appear "stated, fixed, or settled," they have not that aspect to men, but seem rather to be interferences with natural laws, although they may in fact be as much subject to law as nature is. These views of Butler appear to us to be mainly true, though we should prefer a modification of his definition of what is natural, so that it should embrace only such events as seem to human view to be "stated, fixed, or settled," so as not to include others (miracles, for example) which are really but not apparently so.

Is it not clear, then, that we may admit a law of miracles and their recurrence in the same circumstances, without making such events a part of the course of nature. But we need not, after all, resort to such a doctrine in order to prove the successive geological creations miraculous. For no two of them have ever been exactly alike. They have all of them been adapted to new circumstances, nor have the intervals between them been the same; and as the condition of things has been constantly changing, no two of them have ever been exactly alike. Certainly the nature of the animals and plants has varied widely with each new creation, so that at the different demiurgic epochs there has been no agreement except that a new creation has always taken place. These events, therefore, have not been a repetition of one another, but independent acts of creative power, corresponding to the general idea of a miracle as an insu-

¹ Analogy, Part I. Chap. i. p. 129.

² *Ib.*, Part II. Chap. iv. p. 252.

lated act of divine intervention. In another connection we have gone into fuller details on this subject. We say enough here to show, first, that even if the geological creations have been exactly repeated, and therefore subject to law, they are none the less miraculous; and secondly, to show that they never have been exactly repeated, and therefore may be regarded as insulated and independent miracles.

3. The second argument by which the advocates of this hypothesis would exclude the geological creations from the class of miracles, is their connection in a harmonious series with natural events. The argument, as already quoted, is, that the introduction of new species, "occurring as a part of a regular series, and giving rise to equally regular results, connected on every side with other events going on by natural causes, must themselves be equally referred to natural causes."

This reasoning seems to imply that a miracle can have no connection with the course of nature without becoming a part of that course. For example, the creation of a world cannot be a miracle, because it is necessarily connected with all the natural processes that ever take place in such a world. So the production of successive races of animals and plants starts the various natural processes by which they are continued from generation to generation, and therefore, whether we can explain it or not, the process must be natural. But how is it possible to disconnect any miracle from a regular series of natural events? Christ's resurrection was the starting point of the church, which by natural laws has changed the entire aspect of the world. So the cloud by day and pillar of fire by night in the wilderness of Arabia, was indispensable to the safety and prosperity of the Jews and the spread of religion in the world by a regular series of natural means. The ability to speak languages never learnt gave the grand impulse to the series of natural means by which the gospel has been spread. Yet by this reasoning none of these events could have been miraculous. Can there be any doubt that the

reasoning must be false that leads to such absurdities? The matter of fact is, that God has always adapted miraculous interposition to the natural processes, and the more perfect the adaptation is, the more wonderful should we consider the miracle to be, instead of doubting whether it is a special intervention. The only question is: do the events under consideration require some power above and beyond nature to produce them; that is, are they explicable by natural law? If not, the fair inference is that it was an exigency that required the introduction of the law of miracles. The geological creations form the commencement of vast natural processes, but the processes could not start themselves, nor could anything else short of special divine power and wisdom. Why should the wonderful adaptation of these interventions to the harmony and perfection of the subsequent natural developments throw doubts over their miraculous character? If that character can thus be taken away, it can, for the same reason, be taken from every known recorded miracle; nor would it be possible to prove any miracle, because every sublunary event must have a connection with every other.

4. Finally, the advocates of this hypothesis do, as it seems to us, unwittingly describe the law of miracles when they impute the geological creations to some "unknown law," "of which we are at present ignorant."

They admit that these creations cannot be explained by any known law of nature, but imagine one to exist adequate to produce the phenomena, though we do not know its nature. Now in our view a prime distinction between the laws of nature and the law of miracles is, that we can understand the former but not the latter. If we could understand it, as Butler suggests superior intelligences may, it would indeed cease to be miraculous, if we take his definition of what is natural. Hence we should hardly want a better description of the law of miracles than the author of "the Stars and the Angels" gives, when he imputes the geological creations to "some great law of nature, of which

we are at present ignorant, and of which we cannot perhaps form even a conception." If he had not expressly disclaimed the miraculous character of the geological creations, we should conclude, after reading this sentence, that the difference between us was only in the use of terms. But of one thing we are certain, that after he has acknowledged that stupendous creations may have taken place as the result of some undiscovered law of nature, he can no longer defend any of the miracles of revelation against the sceptic who should impute them to some hidden and yet unknown law of nature; for none of them, setting aside the Mosaic creation, are half as wonderful as the creations of the geological record. We do not suppose that this author meant thus to make all miracles doubtful; yet not a few others at this day aim at nothing less than the entire overthrow of the doctrine of miracles in religion. Geology, we think, is the battle ground where this contest is to be decided. Hence we have dwelt long on this subject; for we fancy that those who go against miracles will either adopt the Development Theory, or the hypothesis which denies the miraculous character of the geological creations. Should this last view prevail generally, a disbelief of miracles of every sort will, we think, follow, and, of course, of Christianity as a miraculous dispensation. This is the consummation aimed at by the scepticism of the present day; not, as in days past, to prove the Bible a miserable fable, but allowing it to be a very venerable, respectable, and useful book, only it is not miraculous nor infallible. But before such a consummation is reached, we fancy that the geological record must be proved false.

Intellectual Laws.

4. We proceed to a consideration of a fourth class of laws, viz. the intellectual, or those which govern mind.

That the laws of mind are as certain in their operation as those governing matter, cannot reasonably be doubted. Yet with many the idea that their mental operations are sure to move in a fixed path, which could be marked out by

an Infinite Mind as readily as that of the sun in the heavens, is a repulsive thought; for they connect it with the idea of fate, and feel that it must destroy the freedom of their wills. But free as the will is, is it not determined by something, either by a single motive, or by many, or by the predominance of some over others? And have not these motives all been weighed in the scales of Omniscience, and their exact dynamical power estimated, so that their single or combined effect is known to such prescience? To us, indeed, human decisions and other mental operations seem often arbitrary and independent of all law; but if they really are so, we are driven to the absurdity of admitting effects without a cause. But we will not attempt to discuss such a subject in this place, although aware that we should find powerful opponents to the positions laid down above.

The movements of the mind bear an analogy, so far as mental processes can be paralleled by those that are material, to those of the atmosphere. Rarely do the various faculties act unitedly and with full power; but there is generally more or less of conflict and unequal action among them. The result is, that mental processes, like atmospheric phenomena, manifest unceasing change, apparently independent of all law, just because the forces are too numerous, and their action too complex, for our feeble foresight to discern the resultant.

But the point of this subject which we would make most prominent, is the influence which one mind is able to exert upon another, especially that by which the Uncreated Mind is able to affect and control those which he has created. We know well that human decisions are modified and entirely changed by the influence that comes in a thousand ways, directly and indirectly, from their fellows; and we know, too, how deeply and how widely the decisions of the human will affect the temporal and eternal welfare of man, and sometimes produce important effects even upon the course of nature. Can we doubt that the Infinite Mind is able to produce, in created powers, changes still more

radical and extensive? Who can have such intimate access to such minds as their Creator? Who can know, so well, how to touch the chords of influence? Who can throw before them such mighty motives as he who knows all things? Who but God can so enlighten the reason, mould the will, and vivify the affections, that a man's feet shall be infallibly turned into the right path?

We know that many show great sensitiveness when divine influence is represented as so mighty over the human heart and will, on the ground that they are thus converted into machines, and their free agency destroyed. But does it infringe upon the freedom of their wills when they are influenced by their fellow men voluntarily to change their opinions and adopt new courses of life? So long as they act voluntarily, do they not act freely? And that is just the state into which divine influence brings them. So the Christian scriptures represent it: "My people," says God, "shall be willing in the day of my power." "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure." Our reason teaches us that God could thus make men willing to do whatever he desired, and the Bible shows us that he actually exerts this power. And who will say that what a man does of his own choice, is inconsistent with liberty, or any other attribute of free-agency?

But if God does thus interpose, we know not how often, what a mighty agency for changing human purposes and modifying events is thus introduced into the affairs of this world! We may be convinced that the laws and operations of the human mind are invariable; but here is one extraneous influence coming in to baffle all our calculations, and by unexpected changes to control all the affairs of men. Here, then, constancy is subordinate to change.

Combined and Mutual Influences.

5. We proceed, in the fifth place, to consider what changes may be effected by the combination and mutual action of those laws on which events depend.

In treating of the laws of organism we have adduced the most important examples of special or miraculous intervention in nature. The appearance of successive systems of life on the globe teach us all that we know from natural religion respecting the law of miracles. They teach us that this law is a force coming in to take the place of natural law at such times as God chooses; and they show us that as often as the same circumstances occur, we may expect the same miracle, although as a matter of fact, precisely the same circumstances never have recurred in the earth's history; and therefore there has been no repetition of precisely the same miracle, as we have more fully shown in another place.

We need not, then, go into a further consideration of the law of miracles. But the subject announced under this fifth head will need full illustration; for it shows us the most important means by which the purposes of divine Providence are accomplished, without miracles. So linked together are all the events of this world, great and small, that divine wisdom is generally able to accomplish its purposes without disturbing the settled order of nature, yet with all the certainty of miraculous intervention, but without its inconveniences. We have examined the separate action of the great laws of nature. But still more important is it to consider their combined action, because herein lies the grand instrumentality by which God's providential government is carried on.

The assertion of bishop Butler, that "any one thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other,"¹ has an air of extravagance to those who have not thought much of the wonderful connection and influence of events. But we believe it to be literally true, and that it might have been announced in a more positive manner. The fact is, very few if any events in this world, happening to men, result from a single cause; and if we were to trace out their antecedents,

¹ *Analogy*, p. 201.

we should find them exceedingly numerous and complicated. Indeed by running back only a short distance, we should find so many lateral streams of influence coming in on either hand to modify the main current, leading to a particular event, that we should despair of mapping out the whole, and could easily be made to believe that every single thing in our personal history may have been connected with every other thing that has gone before us.

Various illustrations of this wonderful connection of events have been attempted, all of which give only a partial and inadequate view. One supposition is, that events in this world resemble a network, no single mesh of which can be formed or altered without affecting the whole. Another illustration supposes a hollow sphere, through which a vast number of balls are flying, in all directions and with various velocities. Constant collisions must of consequence occur, by which the course of the balls will be changed, perhaps again and again, nor can any mind but the Infinite determine when or where they will reach the circumference of the sphere. But Omniscience sees the whole complex movement, and knows the effect of every collision, and can, therefore, determine the exact course and termination of every movement. Nay, in the great sphere of the universe God may, in the beginning, have so arranged events and their causes, that the final resultant of all the movements shall be the exact fulfilment of some wise and special providence.

The Sea of Life.

Another illustration represents events to be the result of an indefinite number of forces, or streams of influence, acting upon one another at all angles and with various degrees of intensity. Were this the proper place, it would be easy to draw out an allegorical illustration that should strikingly impress this subject. It should represent the "sea of life," on which every human voyager must sail, with its safe and unsafe harbors, its rocks and shoals, its straits and bays, its favorable and unfavorable currents, its prevalent winds and

storms, and its beacons and lighthouses. From "hope harbor" every one goes forth in life's morning, buoyant with anticipation. But some, almost without lifting sail, float away into "indolence lagoon," and never emerge from thence. A current, however, from the "stream of knowledge" sets sometimes strongly across the harbor's mouth, so as to strike if possible every voyager and give him an influence in the right direction. Another from the same stream sets in the same direction, and bears some vessels onward with such force that no after influence can turn them from "learning's retreat," on the opposite side of life's sea, where some spend life's evening, not doubting but it is heaven's vestibule. Out of "ambition's inlet" comes a strong current also, that bears away not a few voyagers towards the palaces and towers of "earth's pinnacle." Not a few, however, struck by unfavorable winds and storms, are driven aside into "disappointment straits," where they miserably go to pieces on the rocks, except now and then one who is able to double "cape humility," and with new experience to venture out again upon the open sea, where they sometimes fall into a current which sets out of "grace inlet," said to be fed from the "upper springs," and which sweeps around the whole sea, so as to strike every voyager and turn his course towards heaven's gate. A little beyond "ambition's inlet" rises "passion's submarine volcano," said to be fed from the "nether springs," which pours out a constant stream of hot water, which sweeps with great violence across the whole sea, and turns many a noble ship out of its course, hurrying it into the "gulf of infamy." Still farther along enters the "ice floe of scepticism," which, fed from an "arctic sea," sets across the whole sea of life, and piles up its bergs and ice islands all around "hope's grave." Now and then a noble craft gets so entangled in crossing this floe, that it is drifted onward till it disappears in hope's grave, where no life-boat is ever seen.

In the midst of life's sea rises an island on which stands "Bible lighthouse," whose revolving lights illuminate every

part of the sea (for the fog-covered islands of heathendom are here left out of the account), show every dangerous shore, all the breakers and the shoals, all the safe and unsafe harbors, and especially concentrate a strong light upon the entrance to heaven's gate, which is situated opposite "hope harbor," and in which every voyager, as he leaves the harbor, expects finally to cast anchor.

Nearly all the crews that man the different vessels feel themselves fully competent to act as pilots, not only out of "hope harbor," but over the whole sea. Their incompetence, in most cases, is the cause of many a wreck. Take one or two examples :

A very forward pilot, called Imagination, sometimes seizes the helm, as the voyager goes out of "hope harbor," and he always steers first for "Fancy's look out," which is a commanding eminence a little to the left of the harbor. Through the telescope, which Fancy has mounted on that hill, it is easy to persuade the voyager that he sees in the far-off horizon most enchanting regions, mountains of surpassing grandeur, and vales of paradisaical loveliness. Imagination undertakes to guide the ship thither. But ere long a region of alternate calms and storms is encountered, the vessel gets aground among the sand-bars of "poverty shoals," and the voyager finds that his delectable mountains and vales are only fog-banks. His ship becomes unseaworthy, and he is cast on the island of desolation, where he spends the residue of his life poor, disappointed, and broken hearted.

Upon another vessel leaving "hope harbor" we find Lucre at the helm, and he of course steers directly for the "gold coast," which lies a little beyond Fancy's look-out. This is one of the most populous regions around the whole sea ; for it is not only a place for digging gold, but for carrying on the various pursuits of commerce and manufactures by which large fortunes are secured. Whenever this is accomplished, the voyager re-embarks, and steers for "Dives's retreat," on the opposite side of the sea, borne onward by strong winds always blowing towards that spot, and called

the "trade winds." Sometimes, however, when Pleasure is the pilot, the vessel anchors in "temptation bay," where the riches of the voyager melt away, and if the vessel ever gets to sea again, it is only to be swept by Passion's stream into the gulf of infamy. But if another approaches Dives's retreat, it is frequently attacked and robbed of all its treasure by the hard-hearted inhabitants of "pirate's island," and then the ship goes to pieces on "poverty rocks." A marvellous escape, however, sometimes happens to the broken-hearted voyager; for as he is floating about on some fragments of the wreck, he falls into the stream from "grace inlet," and is borne gently onward into the very gate of heaven.

But the voyager whose highest wish is to find his way to the gate of heaven, need not be subject to these wrecks and failures. Let him put Conscience at the helm when he starts, and have Reason and Self-denial and Faith and Perseverance among his crew, and take care to steer close along by "Bible lighthouse," and he may go safely across all hostile currents, weather all the storms, and early anchor at the gate of heaven. Alas, how few voyagers are thus wise and happy!

How easy would it be to multiply a hundred-fold these allegorical representations, which should find their complete parallels in human life! We have given enough, however, to show the thoughtful mind how incalculably great is the number of influences by which the time, place, and manner of life's important epochs and its termination, are modified and determined. All the events of life are indeed but the resultant of these unnumbered forces, too complicated for any but a celestial arithmetic to calculate. Amid complications and mutations so endless, where can we find any constancy of which our mathematics can give the formulæ? True, we can see that all is under the control of law, and taking certain leading principles as our guide, we can predict with some confidence certain general results; for example, that virtuous conduct will lead to hap-

piness, and vicious conduct to misery. But by means of the conflicting influences that have been described, God keeps the condition and destiny of each individual in his own hands. How easy for that Infinite Mind, who in the beginning drew out this whole net-work of our lives, so to have arranged every influence and every result as best to accomplish his purposes, secure our welfare, and the highest good of the universe, without interfering with our free-agency, without working miracles, and without any failure or mistake.

This, this is a divine arrangement, that throws miracles into the shade, and that puts the whole warp and woof of human life, nay all the vast affairs of the universe, from the greatest to the least, under the supreme control; and yet all is brought about so easily and quietly that the divine purpose and the divine control are unperceived. Surely this is the culmination of the law of change, where we see it rising above, not only the law of constancy, but also the law of miracles. It lays bare the controlling principle of this and all other worlds, and reveals change, resulting from the mutual action of events, as the Deity's right hand in the moral world.

CONCLUSIONS.

The leading conclusion to which we are brought by this discussion is the proposition with which we started: That the law of nature's constancy is subordinate to the higher law of change. Is not the proof of it satisfactory? We have, indeed, found law everywhere, controlling every event, and each law acting alone is constant; but the combined or antagonistic action of two or more laws produces change, and though constancy be manifest in the great revolutions of nature, yet change is the leading characteristic of the world, both material and spiritual. It overmasters and throws into subordination what is called the settled order of nature. Some natural changes we can indeed predict with certainty; but in respect to most of them, especially the

operations of the human mind, prophecy is only vague guessing. Miraculous change, also, has so often interfered with nature's constancy in times past, by again and again peopling the world anew, that a presumption hence arises of future special interpositions. Everywhere, indeed, change triumphs over constancy, giving full proof that it is the higher law of the universe.

Admitting this as an established principle, and comparing it with the earth's past history, we arrive at other conclusions of deep interest, to some of which we invite attention.

Permanence and Change.

1. And first, we see how permanence and safety have been secured to organic beings, in a world whose history is one of ceaseless change and stupendous revolution.

Organism must have permanent quiet and constancy, or it could not survive and flourish. And such a state has been secured by interpolating long periods of repose between comparatively brief periods of disturbance. An inspection of our diagram, illustrating the successive systems of life that have appeared on the globe, conveys the impression that those systems have succeeded one another so rapidly as to make the surface the scene of almost constant catastrophes. But it is because we have here necessarily brought into juxtaposition events separated in fact most widely. If we look into the history of each separate formation, we shall find evidence that during an immense period quiet and security reigned, and races lived and flourished which very slight sudden changes would have destroyed. Take the system now passing. For how many ages have only such changes been allowed as would not seriously affect the delicate organization of animals and plants! Though change is incessant, as we have shown, it has generally been confined within narrow limits; and if there has been any deviation from the general constancy, it has been so slow as to be unperceived, without bringing into comparison periods of thousands of years, and such as

would not destroy organization. Thus the impression we get from passing nature, is that of constancy and permanency, and so it would seem to us had we lived during any of the periods that make up the long roll of the earth's history. How beautiful an example of divine wisdom and benevolence, so to arrange and balance causes as to reconcile things so incompatible as change and quiet, catastrophe and constancy, because the welfare of sentient beings demanded it!

Miraculous Intervention.

2. The scientific history of our globe shows us that nature's constancy has been several times interrupted by special miraculous intervention.

We of course refer to the numerous new species of animals and plants that have been introduced upon the earth, either singly or by groups, since life was first manifested. In the proper place we have given a detail of the facts, perhaps sufficiently prolix, and also an account of the various modes by which some have endeavored to avoid the conclusion just stated. A summary of the points discussed will be all that we shall introduce in this place.

One method by which it has been attempted to throw doubt over the miraculous origin of species, has been to maintain that the new ones have never been introduced by large groups, but singly from time to time, to replace old species, and probably by some unknown law of nature.

The reply is, that such a mode of introducing the new species, that is singly at intervals, is admitted only occasionally by the ablest paleontologists. But if it were true, the creation of a single species would demand special divine intervention as really as that of a group. It is something above and beyond nature, and though the result of an unknown law, it must be a law of miracles, and not of nature; for her whole record shows no analogous power.

Not satisfied with such views, not a few at the present day of philosophic mind, if they do not adopt the hypothesis of organic development, yet look with great respect upon it,

and hope that it may prove true. Perhaps they pass over, as a delicate and difficult point, the origination of the first monad or primordial form. But assuming its existence, they think they can trace out the steps by which all the new species have been derived, one from another, in upward series, and all by natural law. The force of circumstances and natural selection are supposed capable of working out the most marvellous transmutations and adaptations, and there is no longer need of special divine intervention. Indeed it is not necessary that the Deity, if there be one, should have anything to do with the process except, as some would say, originally to ordain the law. And when a man has once brought himself to believe that all the wonderful diversity and mutual adaptation of organic nature have been the result of natural law, independent of any special acts of creative power, he will not long hesitate to adopt the dogma, no more improbable, that the primordial form might have been albumen, vitalized by electricity or some other natural force.

But in spite of the great array of learning which has been adduced of late to sustain this hypothesis, very many who unite good common sense to strong reasoning powers, even though not unwilling to see religion undermined, cannot adopt as truth such dreamy speculations. Others, also, who by the study of the mathematical laws of the universe, have come to the conclusion that special interference with these laws, such as miracles suppose, is impossible, and yet feel the need of something more substantial than the transmutation hypothesis, have tried hard to devise some other mode of explaining the geological creations than by special intervention. At last they have made an appeal to our ignorance of the hidden powers of nature. True, we know of no natural law that can create new species, if we set aside the Development Hypothesis; but there may be some such law among nature's arcana. The fact that these new creations are repeated at intervals, and seem to form a part of a series of operations, which we know to be natural,

makes it quite probable they also are natural. Perhaps this unknown law will by and by be discovered, as many new laws have been to explain phenomena once supposed to be miraculous because anomalous and inexplicable.

We have gone into a somewhat extended examination of this new mode of setting aside the miraculous character of the geological creations. For though put forth hypothetically by most of its advocates, it is obvious that they rest upon it, and that it will undoubtedly become the resort of all who do not like to admit the miracles of successive creations, and cannot adopt the Development Hypothesis. Moreover, some sincere friends of revelation, and perhaps some theologians, have seemed favorable to such views, not aware, we apprehend, that they were thus yielding up the main argument for every kind of miracles.

In discussing this subject we have endeavored to show that the advocates of this hypothesis labor under certain false notions as to miraculous intervention. In the first place, while they admit all that is essential to a miracle in the geological creations, viz. that they cannot be explained by the laws of nature, which indeed they contravene, they think their recurrence at the commencement of the different formations shows them to be subject to law, and that this idea destroys the notion of a miracle. We have replied by maintaining, first, that there is a law of miracles as well as of natural events, and that indeed the Deity never acts without law. But secondly, the geological creations are not exactly alike at different epochs; indeed no creation of this sort has ever been a repetition of one before it. The interval between them has probably never been twice the same, and since the organisms have always been wisely adapted to the changing condition of the world, they never could have been the same at any two demiurgic periods. As the physical character of the world has been constantly improving, so have the animals and plants introduced been advancing from the simple to the complex, and the progress has always been at such a rate as to connect all the minor successive systems

of life into one general system, harmoniously correlated in all its parts, On these several accounts, each creation must have been unlike and independent of all the rest, and therefore corresponding to the more common idea of a miracle, which regards it as an event different from everything that has preceded it.

The vast intervals between these creations should also be taken into the account. They occurred only at the commencement of the geological periods, as most geologists suppose; and who that is familiar with the subject will undertake to tell us their length as measured by years? They must heap myriads of years upon myriads to satisfy the conditions of the problem. If we suppose rational beings to have existed during each life-period, they could have witnessed no repetition of the miracle with which each of those periods was begun, nor have had any evidence, unless revealed by the rocky strata, that it had been manifested in a previous period. Each successive creation must have appeared to such intelligences as an insulated interposition of almighty power, inexplicable by any natural law, and disconnected with anything anterior save divine energy, and therefore miraculous in the strictest sense. And even to a superior being, say an archangel, whose eye could run over the whole range of the successive creations, each interposition, for the reasons that have been given, must appear unlike every other, and therefore in reality an independent miracle.

But it is contended that the connection of these creations with so many series of natural operations affords a presumption that they also are natural. But on what ground is such an inference made? With what else but natural operations can any miracles be connected in this world? Such a connection *alone* enables us to prove that they are miracles, and that they were intended to subserve some benevolent purpose, and to meet exigencies which special divine intervention could alone supply. All the miracles of sacred history are connected in the same manner with natural operations, precisely as are the geological creations, so that

if the latter are on this ground to be denied a miraculous character, the former must share the same fate. This is doubtless just what some who advocate these views are aiming at, but we cannot believe it of all.

But why is it not as reasonable to suppose that some natural law will hereafter be discovered that will explain the geological creations, as it was a half century or a century since, to presume that eclipses, comets, the aurora borealis, and meteoric showers would be found to be the result of some undiscovered natural law? The difference is just here. The geological creations are not merely inexplicable by natural laws, but they contravene or modify those laws, and therefore must be the result of some force coming in to interfere with those laws, or at least to modify their power; whereas the phenomena alluded to show no such interference and want of harmony with nature, and therefore it was reasonable to wait to see if a more thorough acquaintance with the phenomena, and a better knowledge of the more hidden forces, of nature, such as electricity, galvanism, and affinity, would not furnish a rational explanation on natural principles, and the result has in a good measure justified such an anticipation. But what approach has been made, by all the discoveries of modern science, towards solving the phenomena of life and intellect by any natural law? Surely none unless we adopt in full the hypothesis of natural development.

Let us illustrate this subject by an example. The most striking object in the last geological creation was man, with an organization somewhat superior to that of any other animal, and with mental powers far above all others, to which is superadded a moral nature, of which all others are entirely destitute. Geology shows us that man did not exist till a very late period in the world's history; for his remains are found only in Alluvium, and though there is some diversity of views as to the exact part of Alluvium where he is first found, scarcely any one contends that he existed anterior to the alluvial period. All scientific men would agree in say-

ing that he was among the very latest of the animals created, and that none nearer to him in character than the monkey preceded him. He was introduced suddenly in the full perfection of all his powers. Yet man was intimately connected with all the series of organisms that went before him, of whom he was the antitype, and with all the series that have followed. By one of the hypotheses we have been considering, therefore, man's creation should not be regarded as a miracle, but as the result of some unknown natural law. His appearance, although inexplicable by any known law, should be regarded as the first appearance of a comet or a meteoric shower, and we should wait patiently for the physiologists to discover the hidden law of nature by which he was produced.

Now, without saying anything of the biblical history of man's creation, which represents it as the grandest of miracles, is there any man acquainted with the facts of science and the laws of philosophising, who would seriously teach or believe that the creation of such a being might be the result of some unknown natural law? Even though one might imagine some of the lowest forms on the scale of life to have such an origin, yet the case is altered when we have before us a being not only at the head of animal organization, but endowed with lofty intellectual and moral powers. Yet if the other geological creations were not miracles, man's introduction must be placed in the same category. How much more consonant with philosophy and common sense the conclusion that they were all miracles!

This we believe will be the ultimate verdict of science; and certainly that would be a strange theology which should reject the miraculous character of man's creation. For a time, indeed, men of sceptical tendencies, who would gladly see all the miracles of revelation rejected, will strain their ingenuity to wipe them all out from the records of nature. For they know very well that if the latter are admitted, so must the former be, and if the one be rejected, so must the other be. The point in religion which is most vigorously

assailed at the present day is, perhaps, the doctrine of miracles. Scientific sceptics are becoming fully aware of the necessity of making out the geological creations to be only natural events. Hence they resort to the absurd hypotheses that have been described, and which would really be subjects of ridicule were they not seriously propounded by learned men. But somehow or other they must silence the guns which their own labors have helped to place upon the ramparts and to supply with ammunition.

We have little fear, however, that anything more than partial and temporary success will attend this crusade against religion. So far as Christianity is concerned, the doctrine of miracles is indeed *articulus stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiae*. But the geological record is too full and decided to be long obscured and mystified by physiological or transcendental speculations. Miracles! Why all the great chapters of nature's history begin with them, and if the Christian dispensation were destitute of them, it would be out of harmony with the course of things in the natural world. Geology has, indeed, been supposed to lay open a fruitful magazine of weapons for the gladiatorship and tournaments of scepticism. But it is no longer easy to suborn or silence the testimony of that science. Not now throttled in the pillory of false philosophy, nor ventriloquized by a superficial scepticism, its free natural voice is found to blend in wonderful harmony with that of revelation.

Special Providence.

3. Thirdly, this discussion shows us how, in spite of nature's constancy, and without any miracle, God can bring about any event which special providence requires.

Let it be remembered that special providence implies some special arrangements of causes to meet particular exigencies in the condition of living beings. Inorganic natures may furnish the forces which may be made to conspire to a special end, but the object on which they meet is always organic, or rather, it is only those endowed with

life. They may rest on an individual, a family, a community, a nation, a continent, or even all the inhabitants of a world, in distinction from those of other worlds. For the idea of selection is always implied on the part of God. He does something for one individual or race, etc., which he does not do for others; and this constitutes the speciality. The result may be for producing happiness, or for punishment, or for discipline; but it is always for the highest good of the universe. But all such events seem to come in the way of natural cause and effect, and never miraculously. Let us now see what means for accomplishing such ends are afforded by the agencies of change which we have described.

Let us first suppose the Deity standing beside the great machine of the universe, with one eye upon its complicated agencies, and the other upon every individual living being. Suppose his power ready to modify the springs of every movement as his wisdom shall see to be necessary to answer the ends of his special providence. Let him touch only those springs that are out of our sight, and though that would modify those within sight, it would not produce any abnormal action, and therefore there would be to man's view no miracle. If he were, for instance, to change the forces on which molecular action depends, the endless variety of chemical operations around us and within us would be modified, just as far as was necessary; yet we should see no violation of natural law, and suspect no interference. Again, how many secret forces on which vitality and organism depend, might God modify to lengthen or to shorten life, or to increase or diminish its power, and make the body more or less fit for the residence of the soul, and thus accomplish unnumbered ends in his special providence? If desirable, also, he might put forth a secret influence on the human mind, that should shape events unnumbered in human history, and even in nature. Yet here, too, we should see nothing but nature's regular sequence of cause and effect. More especially by modifying the complicated network of influences by which the course and destiny of

organic beings are determined, how easy to accomplish almost every purpose of his special providence, even if all the other means to this end which we have mentioned should fail. This principle, indeed, puts into the divine hand a power to accomplish his providential designs superior to what a constant succession of miracles could give.

But this representation is rather popular than philosophical. A created contriver and designer might thus stand by his machine and alter its parts to improve them or accomplish special ends. But with an infinite Creator everything would be made perfect at the beginning. His first conception of the plan of the world in eternity, would embrace every instance of special providence from first to last, and of course every arrangement and modification of second causes necessary to its perfect accomplishment. How could it be otherwise with a being of infinite knowledge, with whom improvement by an after-thought is an absurdity. He might, indeed, make it a part of his plan to introduce modifications in the second causes, in the manner suggested. Still it would be only the carrying out of his eternal plan. Since, however, such special interventions would be unnecessary, the most probable view is, that the original plan would be so arranged that the wants of every special providence should be met by natural operations.

With many, however, such a view of the divine pre-arrangements seems to bind all events with the iron coils of fate, and to exclude free-agency, and render human efforts nugatory. We do not sympathize with such views, though we do not purpose here to enter into the discussion of such difficult subjects. But we lay it down as a principle, from which it would seem no logical mind could dissent, that when God made the world he must have had a plan of it in his mind; and if so, no event however insignificant could have been excluded, and consequently it must have embraced every act of special providence, and every voluntary effort necessary on the part of the creature. To deny these truths is to fly in the face, not only of philosophy and reve-

lation, but of common sense. We may not be able to see the connection and harmony of these truths with all other principles; but this proves not that they are untrue, but that our faculties are too limited to grasp the whole.

Another common resort of scepticism is, to deny that there is any such thing in the divine government as special providence. Because law controls all events, it is supposed there can be no speciality in any of them.

Strange that any man should have reached adult years, and not have seen enough in his own personal history to satisfy him that an overruling Power had marked out and controlled his condition, and led him in a path which he knew not! Strange that he should not have seen enough in passing events, both in relation to individuals, communities, and states, to prove that an unseen hand was shaping their destinies! Strange that any one can read the past history of individuals and nations, and not see the pillar of cloud and of fire going before them! But alas, how purblind is unbelief! It is difficult for a created being to form a clear idea of the manner in which a plan is formed in an Infinite mind. But let us suppose the Creator, in eternity, to be forming the plan of the universe, as a created mind would do it. He would perceive that certain exigencies in the history of nations, races, communities, and individuals, would need some special provision to bring about these exigencies at the right time and to make them subserve the purposes of happiness or discipline or punishment. Hence all the antecedents of such events would be so arranged by infinite wisdom as would ensure these results; and after they had been brought about, finite faculties would be able to see the conspiracy, in other words, the special providence. Other events in the history of communities and individuals might be important and be made certain in the same plan. But we cannot see what objection there is to the supposition that some, on account of their importance or peculiarity, may have been more specially provided for than others, either in the original plan in eternity or by modifica-

tions in time. Why, then, should we not expect special providences?

The inference we are now dwelling upon, if admitted, casts a bright and pleasant light on the subject of prayer. For an answer to prayer is a special providence, or rather prayer is one of the principal means by which special providence is developed. But how fatal a stab to the comfort of the Christian has often been given by the specious suggestion of scepticism, that prayer for any good dependent upon natural law is useless, because God will not work a miracle to gratify his most loving and devoted child. Nor need he, if our reasoning be correct. For he has only to employ some of the unnumbered agencies of change, which ever stand ready to do his will, and every evil which threatens us will be averted, and every good we need will be bestowed, even though nature's sternest laws must be neutralized. Much specious and subtle reasoning has been employed to undermine and tear away this pillar of the Christian's faith and hope, and to leave him to struggle despairingly in the iron grasp of law and fate. But the principles developed by this discussion rescue him from this gloomy dungeon, knock off the fetters of false philosophy, and bring him into the embrace of a loving Father, who has an ear ever open to his cry, a heart full of compassion, and an arm strong enough for his deliverance in every exigency.

4. Fourthly, we see in this discussion why, in the divine plan of the universe, natural laws are allowed to interfere with one another, and produce irregularities.

Bishop Butler does, indeed, intimate that such interferences may be a necessity in the nature of things. But surely the Deity could have ordained such laws as would not interfere. The result would have been endless uniformity and constancy, unless broken in upon by special miraculous intervention. But, as we have endeavored to show, the interferences in the existing system result in normal change, a higher and more important law than that of constancy; for it is essential to the permanence of the inani-

mate world, and to the happiness of animate creation. To be more specific, four important objects are secured by the interferences of natural laws.

The first is permanence in the planetary and astral revolutions. The minute perturbations, which the struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal forces produce, seem to be the grand means by which the stability of the solar system is secured. But this subject has been so fully considered in another place, that we need not go again into details.

A second important use of this arrangement of laws consists in the means it affords of executing the great designs of Providence without miracles. Man might, indeed, suppose that special intervention would be better. But it would have the inconvenience of leaving us in uncertainty as to what is before us, so that we could lay no plans which we could depend upon, and besides, we could not prepare ourselves for the new exigencies into which miracles might throw us. As it now is we can judge, to some extent, from the past what to expect in future. Yet by means of the complicated net-work of conflicting forces, which we have shown to exist in nature, God can as certainly and surely fulfil his special purposes as by an incessant repetition of miracles. There is not a law of nature which cannot be counteracted, intensified, or diminished in its action, just as much as is ever needed, by a wise arrangement of the various forces in nature on which events depend, and yet everything shall happen in accordance with natural law, without any appearance of counteraction, intensification, or diminution. This is certainly more wonderful than the most complicated system of miracles could be; and it shows how much superior to man's is divine wisdom. We could not imagine beforehand how things so unlike as nature's constancy and special adaptation to every want of individuals, could be reconciled. But the system of interferences among laws is one of the means by which it has been done,

and the history of nations and individuals shows how effectually.

A third important object accomplished by the interferences of nature's laws is discipline. With such natures as we possess, we must either be forced to go through a variety of discipline or be ruined. If the body be not hardened and strengthened by conflict with various natural forces, it will be too feeble and sickly for the dwelling place of a vigorous and healthy mind. So if the mental powers do not have to struggle with cross currents, they can never do anything but float unresistingly down the stream, a mere coiled-up, undeveloped germ. Most of all do the moral powers need to be forced into stern conflict with the various adverse forces that lie, as it were, in ambush along the path of life, and suffer none to pass unassailed. By every assault, if we maintain our ground, our powers are strengthened for meeting stronger enemies, and thus are they fitted at length for every earthly conflict and for a fuller development in a higher sphere.

A fourth important object secured by conflicting laws is the happiness of sentient beings. They produce this result in two ways: the discipline which they impose enlarges the capacity for happiness, and the endless variety which they spread through heaven and earth feeds that capacity to the full. For the love of novelty is one of the strongest passions certainly in the human breast, and its gratification one of the richest sources of enjoyment. But of this we shall speak more fully under our next inference.

Such benefits at least are the result of those interferences and collisions which exist among natural laws, and others doubtless are manifest to higher intelligences. Yet this is a feature in the divine plan that seems at first view a defect in nature. But how obviously it is a mark of consummate wisdom and benevolence.

5. Finally, we have reason to expect that change will continue to be the higher law forever.

Why should it not be? For in this world, thus far, it has

ever been the grand means of happiness. If we look back upon the earth's early history in the light which geology and astronomy cast upon it, we shall see that the result of the mighty changes it has undergone, has been an improvement of its condition; and with this came in an increase of happiness by the introduction of higher natures, capable of greater enjoyment. The Brachiopods, Echinoderms, Crustaceans, and Polypi of the Silurian seas had less capacity for happiness than the fishes of the Devonian period; and these less than the reptiles, fishes, and Cephalopods of the Permian and Triassic eras; and these less than the birds and marsupials of the Jurassic period; and these less than the more perfect mammals of the tertiary aeons; while far above them all stands man with the associated species of the existing creation. From the beginning the capacity for enjoyment, and the number of beings capable of it, have been increasing, so that the tide of happiness has never flowed in so deep and broad a channel as now. Infinite benevolence has ever stood ready to increase the sum of enjoyment as fast as the capacity of the world was enlarged, and that depended upon change.

The variety and beauty of existing nature are dependent chiefly upon chemical and organic changes. And to show how essential these are to human happiness, we have only to take up our abode where almost everything is monotonous and unvarying. Let the day, however beautiful, stretch itself over weeks and months, with the sun in his meridian glory; or, let the most lovely of the seasons become unchangeable; or, let man be made sure that his social condition, however pleasant for the time, admits of no improvement, and you have aimed a fatal blow at human happiness. It needs, in fact, but an imperfect experiment of this sort to convince any one that the physical, intellectual, and moral constitution of man was expressly adapted to change by his Creator, and that this is one of the chief aliments which we crave. Entire monotony is, indeed, the most terrible of all punishments. We should imagine that the slow dropping of

water upon our head would be a trifling matter. But in fact it soon becomes more terrible than the guillotine or the stake.

True, many of the changes witnessed in this fallen world become sad and painful. And we are prone to connect the great and salutary changes of the universe with our own dissolution, and fancy that suns and planets, like our own bodies, are hastening to ruin. With morbid sensibility we exclaim,

“What does not fade?

This huge rotundity we tread grows old,
And all those worlds that roll around the sun ;—
The sun himself shall die, and ancient night
Again involve the desolate abyss.”

Oh no! it is not so. Revelation discloses a brighter view. Suns and planets shall not be annihilated, but renovated. There shall be new heavens and a new earth; and judging from what has been on this earth, it shall be a rejuvenated and more glorious world, fit to become the abode of righteousness only, a paradise lovelier than Eden. Our bodies, too, and those of our friends, which must moulder back to dust, shall not sleep in the grave forever, but be raised spiritual, incorruptible, and immortal.

“See truth, love, and mercy in triumph descending,
And nature all glowing in Eden's first bloom;
On the cold cheek of death smiles and roses are blending,
And beauty immortal awakes from the tomb!”

Now, does the analogy of nature allow us to suppose that a principle which has hitherto been mightier than any other in the government and preservation of the universe and in promoting its happiness, will be dropped out from the economy of the new earth? We know, on the testimony of revelation, that this principle will make some of its most wonderful manifestations in bringing forth a new and a spiritual body from the grave, in changing the corruptible into the incorruptible, the mortal into the immortal, and in developing from the ruins of the present world a new

heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. Will God, then, introduce everlasting monotony and permit no changes in heaven? Rather would analogy lead us to conclude that it may be a succession of higher and higher economies of life and enjoyment, into which the law of change shall introduce us. We conjecture not what these new developments may be, nor would we form so low an estimate of that world as to fancy them a repetition of the most beautiful flowers and fruits and gems and landscapes which earth now contains; but rather objects far more attractive and glorious; such as could not be understood and appreciated by our present powers, but such as an infinite God knows how to produce, and such as infinite benevolence will delight to scatter in rich profusion all along the upward pathway of our immortal existence.

ARTICLE III.

DOCTRINES OF THE NEW SCHOOL PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

BY REV. GEORGE DUFFIELD, D.D., DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

THE design of this Article is to answer a question often asked: "What is the difference between Old and New school Presbyterians?" Ecclesiastically, they form two distinct and independent bodies. Denominationally, they are known to be prosecuting different and separate interests. Yet they hold the same Confession of Faith; adopt and profess attachment to the same system and form of ecclesiastical government; have the same modes and forms of discipline; and designate themselves by the same popular and corporate name, "the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America," and seem to be, and to be known in law, as the true and

rightful successor of the body so called, which originated in accordance with the previous action of the synod of New York and Philadelphia, and was duly organized in 1789. Their ministers extensively exchange with and preach for each other; and the mass of their hearers say, we see no difference in their preaching, either as it regards the doctrines they teach, the morality they inculcate, or the spiritual experience they seek to develop in the religion of their congregations.

It is not therefore surprising that many curiously inquire: "In what do they differ?" The Old school¹ have for years had their publications circulating, some of which did much to forestall public sentiment, and to prepare the way for the rupture which took place in 1837. "A series of numbers," originally published, about the time of that rupture, in the *Protestant and Herald*, of which paper the Rev. N. L. Rice, D. D., was then an editor, were republished by the Old school Board of Publication, in 1853, as his "exhibit of the most important differences in their doctrine and church polity," between "the Old and New schools," thus reviving and perpetuating the allegations they contain. Other publications of ephemeral character have appeared, which have found favor and been circulated among Old school Presbyterians. Little effort has been made by New school Presbyterians to correct or counteract the fallacies they contain. Nothing has been published on the subject with the formal sanction of their General Assembly.

In the weekly religious gazettes, which have contained discussions, and refutations of charges of error made in the days of heated controversy; in the published accounts of the trials of the few arraigned before their presbyteries on such charges — two only of which processes found their way to the supreme judicature by appeal, and in disputations contained in Quarterly Reviews, must the curious reader search

¹ The terms "Old school" and "New school," throughout this Article, are used simply as current and convenient forms of speech, in popular use, for designating the different bodies, and with no other real or intentional significance.

for the records of the times, in relation to these differences. The Presbyterian Quarterly, a few years ago, published several successive Articles, prepared by a former member of the New school "Committee of Publication," intended to circulate information on the subject. The American Presbyterian, a weekly sheet, still later afforded its columns to another member of the same committee whose papers editorial were afterwards published, and are for sale at the bookstore of the publishing committee, in tract form. Beyond them, we have no knowledge of publications, didactic or polemic, save one or two,¹ to which we would refer any inquirer for information relative to the differences between Old and New school Presbyterians. The generation that has risen since the division between them finds no authentic sources of such information readily accessible. It is therefore thought that the statement this Article furnishes may be as useful as it seems needful. Even this statement cannot be satisfactory or intelligibly made in mere didactic dogmatic form. A reference to historic events connected with the development of whatever differences existed and manifested themselves in the discussions of the day is indispensable.

HISTORY OF THE DIVISION.

It is just one quarter of a century since the General Assembly, in 1837, passed what is justly called its unconstitutional excinding act, by which the four synods of Utica, Geneva, Genessee and the Western Reserve — containing 28 Presbyteries, 509 ministers, 599 churches, and 50,489 communicants as reported — were excluded from their ecclesiastical rights, and relation to the Presbyterian church. This was done by a party represented in that body, who that year gained ascendancy and controlled its councils. For

¹ These are, *The History of the Presbyterian Controversy*, etc., by H. Woods, Louisville, 1843, and *The Alleged Doctrinal Differences of the Old and New School examined by an Old Disciple*, Auburn, 1855. The author is the Rev. W. Bacon, of Auburn, N. Y.

several years previously that party had labored for the avowed purpose of frustrating what they believed to be the unpresbyterian views, both as to doctrine and polity, which had generally directed the sympathies and measures of the majority of delegates in the General Assembly.

In the year 1837, the controlling majority in that body was of Old school predilections. It was secured, partly by zealous, interested efforts of leading men, securing pecuniary contributions to defray the travelling expenses of ministers and elders, appointed commissioners, and coming pre-advised and prepared for dismemberment; and partly and principally by the sudden and alarming financial and commercial crisis in the early spring of that year, which extensively absorbed the attention and awakened the anxieties of business men in the northern and eastern portions of the country, and which especially prevented a full representation of elders from the presbyteries of the state of New York, within the bounds of the four synods already named, where what was called New school views and measures prevailed, and whence also, it was believed, were derived their numerical strength and potent influence in swaying the councils of the General Assembly.

There had existed since 1801 "a plan of union between Presbyterians and Congregationalists in new settlements," which was first proposed by the General Association of Connecticut, and mutually adopted afterwards by that body and the General Assembly. It was an arrangement, accepted and acted on in good faith, in which the higher obligations of morality and Christian love were more regarded by the parties than those originating in ecclesiastical or conventional authority. The western and northern parts of New York, and the Connecticut or Western Reserve in northern Ohio, were regions, in which its provisions had operated for the rapid growth and prosperity of numerous churches, which had sprung up among the settlements formed by the great tide of emigrant population penetrating extensively the western wilderness. For a third of a century it ex-

erted its influence, and was accepted and acknowledged as possessing the authority of common law in the Presbyterian church.

In process of time, and in the conflicts and collisions incident to various domestic missionary enterprises and organizations, it became the occasion of disputes and misunderstandings among those who preferred the distinctive forms of Congregationalism and Presbyterianism. Many of Old school Presbyterian affinities, in the Middle, Western, and Southern states, began to believe that there had been a departure from the fundamental principles and constitutional forms of Presbyterianism through the influence of Congregationalism, where that element had entered into, and become incorporated with, churches and judicatories of the Presbyterian body, as in the districts of country above named. It was also believed and alleged that, incident to the great and extensive revivals of religion, especially in 1831 and thereafter, throughout those and other regions, there had arisen great irregularities in relation to the manner of preaching and measures adopted for their promotion. The policy and modes of missionary operations, both foreign and domestic, furnished exciting topics of debate, and led to rival efforts and enterprises, — some preferring voluntary and others ecclesiastical organizations for such purposes. Both methods had been in use, and were cordially aided throughout the congregations, presbyteries, and synods of the General Assembly. The American Home Missionary society had originated, and, to a very great extent, either absorbed or superseded different local associations for domestic missions. The General Assembly's Board of Missions, which had operated from the earliest period, enlarged its field of labor, and quickened its activity, under a revived organization and more zealous administration. The rivalry and strifes incident to the attempt, for several years allowed and favored by the General Assembly, to secure the benefit of both systems, contributed to develop and invigorate the zeal and labors of their respective friends and advocates.

The first manifestations and movements of parties seeking ascendancy in the General Assembly were in connection with this subject. Becoming unmistakable soon after the reorganization of the General Assembly's Board of Missions, with a view to its greater efficiency, the emulations and antagonisms that had been engendered began to exhibit themselves in those differences in sympathy and effort which, after a few years of conflict, resulted in separation. The terms "New" and "Old" school became the familiar designations of the parties then growing into maturity.

Their original differences were mainly those of polity, especially in relation to missionary and benevolent operations. The voluntary and the ecclesiastical had each their zealous advocates. The attempt to make the one or the other the exclusive polity proved disastrous to the peace and unity of the Presbyterian church. Different elements of strife, in the progress of controversy, developed themselves. Differences of sentiment and feeling, as between Congregationalists and Presbyterians, distinctively so denominated, became more and more apparent; also as to those opposed to American slavery and those disposed to tolerate or apologize for it, as it was still countenanced in southern congregations and practised among their members; also, as between those who pressed the responsibility of the churches for reform in relation to this thing, and for its removal from them, and those who denied the practicability and necessity of such measures, inevitably conflicting with the slave codes of different states; also, as between those whose theological views and modes of preaching were claimed to be more conducive to revivals of religion than were theirs who suspected their genuineness and regarded them rather as transient and dangerous excitements. It was not until the strifes of party were approaching their culmination in division that particular prominence was given to erroneous doctrines, as alleged by the Old school against those of the New. Neutrals and medium ground were pronounced inadmissible by those who began to feel that they

were called to save the Presbyterian church from the inroads of error and irregularities by some attempts at reform, and for its liberation from dangerous elements which they believed and declared had been injuriously tolerated in it.

A minority of the General Assembly, in concert with others, who assembled shortly after its adjournment in 1834, prepared and signed what they called their "Act and Testimony," and recommended a convention to be held in Pittsburgh, Pa., the next spring, in pursuance of the design expressed in that document. It was designed to be a test of orthodoxy, and in its spirit evinced a determination to rule or rend the church. The convention assembled in Pittsburgh, May 1835, a week previous to the meeting of the General Assembly. A list of grievances was made out and a memorial prepared and forwarded to the General Assembly, in which, among other things, "an outline of the system" of error was given, and against which the testimony of that body was earnestly invoked. The neutral and moderate men, opposed to party strife, were forced into ranks. The nullifying "Act and Testimony" gained the ascendancy; and at last the work of schism was carried forward with fearful despatch, in the excising acts of 1837, and the reform acts and ordinances of 1838.¹

They were in violation of the Constitution, revolutionary in tendency and design, and, establishing a new basis, consummated a plan of secession for the Old school, from those who maintained the union and government of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America, as its discipline had been administered and its policy developed for one third of a century and more, in accordance with the fifth and seventh of the fundamental principles stated in the first chapter of its "Form of Government." In 1837 the minority entered and recorded their protests against the revolutionary proceedings of the General Assembly of that year. In 1838, despite of the resistance of the Clerks and Moderator,

¹ The History of the Presbyterian Controversy, by H. Woods, p. 74. Louisville, 1843.

in their attempts to carry out the revolutionary principles introduced and adopted by the majority of the previous year, the meeting of the General Assembly was organized upon the basis of the Constitution. The right of representation by *all* the Presbyteries comprising the ecclesiastical body, and by their delegates regularly and constitutionally convened, constituting "the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America," was recognized and formally declared. The Old school revolutionary party subsequently organized their General Assembly upon the new basis they had adopted. Having the officers and a majority of the members of the different organic Boards in their interests, the archives and funds were retained in their possession. Soon after a suit was instituted before the supreme court of the state of Pennsylvania, upon a writ of *quo warranto*, that led to a full and careful investigation and trial by jury, for the determination of the question: "Which of her parties was the constitutional Presbyterian church, and entitled to its corporate powers and property?"¹ The Hon. Milton C. Rogers, presiding judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after a careful investigation, during a trial lasting twenty days, pronounced the opinion, that the plan of union, made the pretext for the excinding act or the majority in the General Assembly of 1837, so far from being unconstitutional, was "an agreement or regulation which the General Assembly not only had power to make, but one which is well calculated to promote the best interests of religion"; that, if it were unconstitutional, there is no evidence that the excinded synods were formed under it; and that the resolutions of excision are "not only contrary to the eternal principles of justice, the principles of the common law, but at variance with the constitution of the church," "*unconstitutional, null, and void.*" So he instructed the jury, who, "after a short absence, returned into court, and rendered verdict that they find the defendants guilty." The effect was, to pronounce the General Assembly organized

¹ M'Elroy's Report, pp. 512, 514, 530.

in 1838 by the New school, in despite of the resistance of the Moderator and Clerks, "the true General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States of America under the charter."¹

Application was made for a new trial, and argued before the court in bank, chief justice Gibson, and justices Rogers, Kennedy, and Huston on the bench. The chief justice and a majority of the court concurring, gave an opinion adverse to the decision of justice Rogers and the claim of the Constitutional Assembly, and granted a new trial. Justice Rogers then said, "After the patient and impartial investigation by me of this cause, at Nisi Prius and in bank, I have nothing to add, except that my opinion remains unchanged on *all* the points ruled at the trial."¹

The moral and popular effect, however, of this trial was deemed sufficient for all the principles and interests which the Constitutional Assembly sought and cared to establish. Before the trial therefore came on, they instructed their counsel to withdraw the suit. It was done; and they have left the excising party in undisputed possession of the property and funds, to which New school Presbyterians had very largely contributed.

Several suits in different states—two in Pennsylvania, and others in New York and Ohio—have been brought by parties in the interest of the New basis or Old school Assembly against corporations in connection with the Constitutional or New school Assembly. The verdicts have always been rendered in favor of the latter. And what is most worthy of remark is, that when the case of the party at York, Pa., was carried, upon appeal, before chief justice Gibson, he affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had given the property to the Constitutional or New school party. In explaining his opinion rendered in the previous case, he took occasion to correct the misapprehensions that had grown out of his former decision, and denied, as some had construed it, that the New school had forfeited name, rights, property, and all,

¹ M'Elroy's Report, p. 628.

clearly expressing the opinion that the acts of the New basis or Old school Assembly were those of revolution, and saying that the order for a new trial was granted because the Old school, at the time, were "the stronger party!"¹

The above history is given with as much brevity as possible, to render intelligible the influence and procedures resulting in the dismemberment of the Presbyterian church by its division into two distinct denominations, commonly called Old and New school. It is matter for Christian congratulation that at the sessions of the Old school General Assembly last spring (1862) incipient measures were adopted for fraternal intercourse and correspondence by delegates with the New school. The General Assembly of the latter had adjourned finally before knowing this fact; but had adopted resolutions expressive of their desire and readiness for such correspondence. Communications on the subject have passed between the Moderators of the two bodies since their adjournment; and it is very probable that, notwithstanding the great distance at which the two Assemblies will next convene, an interchange of delegates will take place before the close of their sessions next May,² which, initiating a fraternal intercourse, may lead ere long to a much desired re-union.

The question, therefore, may very pertinently be asked by

¹ Christian Observer, Jan. 25, 1841. The reason here assigned by the chief justice Gibson for his decision in the case is in accordance with his well-known political and revolutionary opinion, unfolded in an elaborate argument prepared by him and published in the *American Quarterly*, edited by Robert Walsh, Esq., of Philadelphia, for some years editor of the *National Gazette*, viz, that written constitutions, neither really nor rightfully, politically nor morally, can or should have power to control beyond the popular will, thus placing a minority at the mercy of a majority, without any guarantee of security for their rights whatever. This doctrine of irresponsible democracy may suit the tastes and interests of demagogues and despots, who can contrive to form and control public opinion for their purposes; but it is at war with all our American ideas of rational and political liberty, bounded and regulated by law, divine and human, and is especially opposed to all those ideas of constitutional liberty which have ever been characteristic of, and cherished in, the Presbyterian church, the zealous defender of responsible representation; in other words, an enlightened, virtuous republican government.

² This Article was prepared for the last January number. — Eds.

some : Why trace lines of difference probably to be obliterated by a restoration of ecclesiastical unity ? It may suffice to reply, that doctrinal differences may or may not be essential ; and since those only that are, afford justifiable grounds of separation, if it can be shown that there is in reality no radical antagonism between the views of Old and New school Presbyterians, it may conduce to co-operation and unity in the spirit of love to trace wherein they disagree, and thus relieve from misapprehensions tending to alienation and strife.

The intelligent Christian needs not to be told that theology and faith are by no means identical. The one is of man, the other of God. The one, the teachings of human science, the other, the power of a divine life. The writer of this Article has for many years been convinced that the doctrinal differences between Old and New school Presbyterians are wholly theological, by no means involving radical error in respect to vital points of faith. With such conviction he has more readily consented to the urgent request that has induced him to prepare this Article. It is his hope in doing so, not only to subserve the general cause and interest of theological science, but to promote the reciprocities and courtesies of Christian confidence and fraternal fellowship. In the nature of things, from the very constitution of the human mind, there ever have been, and must ever continue to be, different modes of apprehending the same facts, and different forms of phraseology in stating them. If the fact itself can be well and accurately stated, so as to be readily apprehended by faith, the statement, when made in the spirit of good will and brotherly love, must just as certainly conduce to agreement and union as do theological discussions too often to alienation and strife.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

The differences in doctrine between Old and New school Presbyterians may be stated, in general, in one word : they are differences in philosophy, not in faith. By philosophy

some understand the veritable *ratio rerum*. This, if we may so say, is God's own divine philosophy. It however is not always patent to the human understanding. The reasons or causes of natural phenomena are not made known by divine revelation. Observation, experiment, logical demonstration, careful analysis and investigation, leading by processes of induction to great general results and laws, are the appropriate and only proper means to be employed in the study of nature and in the acquirements of science. The explanation of phenomena; the tracing of effects to their proper causes; the classification of great general facts or truths; the arrangement of them in simple, harmonious system, for the better and easier apprehension; all are the work of the human reason or created intelligence. It is appropriate to the domain of science.

In matters of religion, it pertains to theology — the highest sphere of science — to state, explain, elucidate, and systematically arrange, in their just and proper relations, the facts or truths, whether revealed to faith or discoverable from nature, and hence called revealed or natural theology. With the latter, this Article has no concern, there being no distinguishing doctrines, characteristic of either school in this department of theological science. Their doctrinal differences relate to what may be called the theology of revelation. By this we do not mean to intimate that the truths or facts revealed in the sacred scriptures are given to us by God to be arranged by the church, or any teachers in it, into a system of consecutive propositions, or logical deductions, on metaphysical or philosophical principles or assumptions, to be made the tests and exponents of the faith essential to salvation. Creeds, confessions of faith, systems of theology, commentaries, may be of use within their proper sphere; but they have no authority divine, as theological dicta, however valuable they may be as aids for human teaching, exponents of according sentiment or belief in churches, text-books in the science of religion. A man may be thoroughly versed in them all, an accom-

plished expert, casuist, and doctor of theology, and yet be devoid of the faith which is unto salvation.

Faith concerns itself with the matters of fact reported or made known by infallible inspiration, to be believed, simply and exclusively on the ground of God's veracious testimony, whether communicated directly by himself or through divinely authorized messengers or witnesses. The facts, or what we otherwise call the truths, of revelation as apprehended by the human mind, affecting and influencing the sensibilities, controlling the conscience, and regulating the conduct, form the ground-work of religion, whether as developed in the experience and life of individuals, or as set forth in creeds and confessions of faith, or as specially modified and characterized by ritual forms and ecclesiastical and social prescriptions, tactics, customs, sympathy, and assimilation. The genuine developments of vital godliness through the faith of Christ, and the spurious forms and phases of Christianity so variously professed in the world and in the church, to the production and promotion of which moral philosophy and scientific theology have greatly contributed, are often so associated and intermingled, that it becomes difficult to trace the lines of difference between them. Every church has felt more or less of this difficulty, and found it utterly impracticable, in judging of the qualifications of membership, to separate between the true and the false, the precious and the vile, the wheat and the tares. Theology has concerned itself with these matters; but only to increase the perplexity and difficulty in forming a right judgment. How much of error there may be, and how far it may determine and shape the use and application of the great facts or truths revealed to faith, and lead to false ideas of Christianity, and false judgments of personal piety, and false professions of religion, the disclosures in the great day of final judgment will make known. Didactic and polemic theology both fail to furnish infallible tests of character, as well as infallible rules of faith and practice. Misinterpretations and misapplications of the

great facts and truths of scripture, dependent on, and determined often by, casual external circumstances, partial ignorance, false metaphysical philosophy, the imperfection of language, the influence of pride, prejudice, and various passions, popular opinion, state patronage, ecclesiastical authority, and other such like things, have rendered the theology of the schools, in the lapse of ages, an entangled net-work of subtle distinctions and contradictions. Yet, amid all the bald and naked facts, which form the marrow of the gospel, i. e. the great fundamental truths essential to the faith that saves, as they are stated and taught by God in the Bible, are believed by many simple, uneducated hearers and readers, with sanctifying and saving results. The Lord Christ rejoiced and gloried in this fact: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."

It is not, therefore, out of place here to notice that the Presbyterian church, while in the ordination of its ministry it pledges them to its Confession of Faith, "as containing the system of doctrine taught in the holy scriptures," has never prescribed any doctrinal test or form to be applied and used in the admission of members into its communion; but always recognized that with the Session rests that responsibility, in the exercise of their best judgment, applying the rules and tests of Christian faith and practice as laid down in the sacred scriptures. It is the office of Christian charity, in all such exercise of judgment, to distinguish between the doctrines, traditions, and commandments of men, and the teachings of God; between mere knowledge of theology, and the faith that saves; and cheerfully to concede the largest liberty consistent with the cordial practical submission of the mind and will to the divine authoritative teaching of the word by the Spirit of God, in matters of essential faith. God forbid that the revived sectarianism of late years should ever induce the Presbyterian church in the United States of America to depart from this lofty catholic ground.

DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES.

We have deemed the foregoing preliminary and explanatory remarks necessary for the better understanding of the points of doctrinal difference between Old and New school Presbyterians, to the statement of which we now pass. In brief terms it may be remarked, that the differences are nearly allied with those discernible between the Scottish and New England theologies, as they have been sometimes styled. But the theology of New school Presbyterians cannot be identified with the latter, any more than with the former. It is especially characteristic of New school Presbyterian apprehensions and statements of the radical, essential truths of scripture, that they are those mainly of common sense, and less technical and scholastic than of either of the theologies just named. The "faith once delivered to the saints," i. e. the simple truth as it is in Jesus and revealed to faith, is regarded of more importance and value than as it is taught in systematic theology, whether as it was a quarter of a century ago at Andover, New Haven, or Princeton, by Drs. Woods, Taylor, Alexander, and Hodge, or by Drs. Edwards, Hopkins, Bellamy, Emmons, and other theologians of an earlier day. All have severally contributed their share in shaping what has been called New England theology, of whom President Edwards and the younger of the same name were better known and held in higher repute among Presbyterians than any after them. But if any name particularly deserves to be noticed as of higher authority, and exerting more influence, in giving form and character, not to say originating, New school views of truth, and especially on the subject of regeneration, it is that of the renowned Dr. John Witherspoon, who though a Scotchman by birth and education, became thoroughly American, and nobly and gloriously broke loose from the shackles of party and the tyranny of schools, to enjoy, commend, and establish liberty of thought and conscience, in both church and state. The pertinency of this remark will appear as we proceed.

The doctrinal differences between New and Old school Presbyterians relate mainly to the topics of human depravity, involving the imputation of guilt and original sin, regeneration, the agency of the Holy Spirit, the atonement of Christ, justification by faith, human ability, and the sovereignty of God in the salvation of sinners.

IMPUTATION OF SIN.

The answers to the twenty-fifth and eighteenth questions of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms set forth the Presbyterian views of "the sinfulness" of human nature. It is described as comprising "the guilt of Adam's *first* sin," "the want of original righteousness," viz. "the righteousness in which he was created," "the corruption of man's whole nature, which is commonly called original sin," and "all actual transgressions." The use of the word "estate," which is by no means now, nor was in the days of the framers of the Catechisms, a perfect synonyme, or identical in meaning with the modern term "state," as well as the comprehensive range of the answer, we think, already indicates, that under the general idea of "the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell," was comprehended the totality of human corruption, or wickedness in the world from the first rebellious act of our first parents, throughout the entire generations of the race, in all time.

The word "guilt" was used by theological writers of a former day, to denote obnoxiousness to punishment, as contradistinguished from moral turpitude or personal demerit. Inasmuch as all the generations of the human race are subject to suffering and death, and inasmuch as "death," as the apostle Paul declares, "reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression,"¹ the question of the derivation of moral corruption by his posterity has involved necessarily more or less of direct or implied theory, or attempts of philosophy at a satisfactory solution of the fact or phenomenon. Imputa-

¹ Rom. v. 14.

tion of guilt and original sin are accounted by Old school Presbyterians adequate *fontes solutionum* of whatever mystery there may be in the fact of moral corruption derived by the race from our first parents. They are properly theological theories, deserving respectful consideration for their antiquity and authority in the schools, but unknown to many who have believed to the saving of the soul. The doctrine of imputation is employed by Old school theologians to explain or account for the facts stated by Paul, that "as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life."¹ Their idea is, that the one act of Adam's disobedience in eating the forbidden fruit became, to all legal intents and purposes, the act of each and every one descending from him by ordinary generation. He is regarded as the federal or covenant head, the legal representative, acting by God's appointment for each one and all of his fallen race, so that the condemnation and punishment he deservedly incurred were justly, by the very same sentence, transferred to them. The disobedience of Adam was his crime, and rendered him obnoxious to death, its ordained punishment. According to the theological theory of the Old school, that crime was imputed to his posterity, and being so imputed, involved them in his guilt, and rendered them obnoxious to the same punishment, that is death.

"In imputation," say the Princeton reviewers, "there is first an ascription of something to those concerned; and secondly a determination to deal with them accordingly."² "To impute sin" they say, with Dr. John Owen, "is to lay it to the charge of any, and to deal with them according to the desert, i. e. punish them for it." "When Adam's sin is said to be imputed to his posterity, it is intended," say they, very explicitly, "that *his* sin is laid to their charge, and they are *punished* for it."³ New school Presbyterians, dispense with this and every other theory by which to explain the moral relationship of Adam and his posterity. They receive it as

¹ Rom. v. 18.² Bib. Repertory, II. 435.³ Ib.

a fact divinely revealed. Preferring the language of common sense to theological technicalities, they are contented to say, that, as the result or in consequence of Adam's transgression, his posterity became mortal and morally corrupt. There is no difference between them, so far as their belief of the fact is concerned. Even the author of the treatise entitled "*The Old and New schools,*" which has contributed much to give currency to mistaken opinions concerning the New school, says: "When therefore we say that the guilt of Adam's first sin was imputed to his posterity, the meaning is, not that there was between them and him such personal identity as that they really committed the same act, which is grossly absurd, but simply that God treats them *as if* they had committed it — they suffer all the consequences of his sin. *This* is precisely the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, and *in this sense* they 'sinned in him and fell with him.' This too, as we shall presently see, is the doctrine of the Bible."¹ The intelligent reader cannot fail to see that the disputes and differences here relate to what theologians call the federal headship of Adam, and to their attempts to explain his moral relationship to his posterity. Cognate and intimately connected with the theory of the imputation of guilt is that of original sin, which topics must be noticed as correlate in giving a full and faithful statement of the views of the different schools.

ORIGINAL SIN.

Such a statement, however, is attended with this serious difficulty, that, apart from the differences between New and Old school Presbyterians, theologians of the latter are not only far from being definite and perspicuous in their ideas and language, but actually differ among themselves. The phrase "*Original Sin,*" occurs in the Confession of Faith, Chap. 6, Sec. 6, and in the answers to the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth questions of the Larger, and the eighteenth of the Shorter, Catechisms. It is quoted there as a popular form

¹ *The Old and New Schools, etc.,* by Rev. N. L. Rice, D.D., pp. 21, 22.

of speech, current in the days of the Westminster Assembly, to designate the corruption of man's nature. In "The Confession of the Faith and Doctrine believed and professed by the Protestants of Scotland, exhibited to the Estates of the same in Parliament, etc., August, 1560, ratified and established in 1567, as the public and avowed Confession of Faith of the Church of Scotland," *the act* of our first parents in eating the forbidden fruit is stated, at that day, to have been "commonly called original sin." In "Craig's Catechism," adopted and recommended by the General Assembly of the church of Scotland 1590, 1591, and 1592, "Original sin and natural corruption" are distinguished and affirmed to be *two* "things which came to us by the fall of Adam from God."² The confession of faith, adopted by both Old and New school Presbyterians, affirms that "*every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God,*"³ etc. The New school Presbyterian believes this to be strictly accurate according to the plain meaning of the words, holding that original sin, if the term needs to be used, is unmistakeably reaffirmed in the confession, a transgression of the righteous law of God, and therefore voluntary on the part of a morally accountable creature. He does not, as did the Princeton reviewers, perplex himself with any theological theory of imputation of guilt, ascribing to one what belongs to another, by which to explain the confession as above quoted. When its advocates are themselves perfectly agreed as to what original sin exactly is, it will merit, and doubtless receive, stricter attention.

Augustine, to whose philosophy the Christian church is indebted for much of its didactic and polemic theology, explains original sin to consist in "an innate disposition derived from the voluntary transgression of the first man."

¹ See Art. 3 of that Confession.

² A Form of Examination before the Communion, questions 3 and 4.

³ Chap. VI. sec. 6.

He calls it "an inborn vice," and compares it to "an hereditary disease." The Manichees affirmed that there is an evil substance in man, of which God is the author. This he denied; for he would not make God the author of sin. But while denying that original sin is a *substance*, he attempted to explain it by calling it a *quality* of the affections, an evil accruing from the ancient sin, an accidental evil, as infirmity or weakness in the body is not a substance but a vitiation. His metaphysical subtilty, with whatever good intent employed against the philosophical and infidel emperor Julian, would to the generality of readers at this day be as unsatisfactory to their common sense as offensive to their modesty.¹ Turretin says that the phrase "original sin" was first introduced in the church by Augustine, in his controversy with the Pelagians, and being found a convenient form of speech for expressing the nature of the sin, was ever afterwards retained. The reader will find in the note below the rationale of its import² as stated by Turretin, who calls it "some inherent vice propagated from Adam to all his posterity, by natural generation."³

Different theologians of later date have expressed their views differently, explaining original sin to be "an inclination to evil," "a corrupt disposition," "a propensity to do wrong," "a depraved nature," "an hereditary tendency to sin." Zuingli called it "a disease, not sin;" as Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologiae*, had done. Whether original sin consisted in a habit, or was the result of the want of original righteousness after the fall, or the loss of

¹ See August. de Nupt. et Conc., I. 25. Comp. C. Jul. VI. 18.

² Ita vero dicitur, non ratione *originis primae*, quam habuit homo a Deo creatus, sed ratione *originis secundae*, quam habet a primo parente; tum ratione *principii sui*, quia est a *peccato originante* (viz. concupiscentia); tum ratione *modi propagandi* (viz. generationis naturalis), quia ab origine nobis inhaeret; tum ratione *effectorum suorum*, quia est origo peccatorum actualium. Tur. Inst., Tom. I. p. 569.

³ Vitium aliquod inhaerens, quod peccatum originale dicitur, quod ab Adamo ad omnes ipsius posteros naturali generatione ab eo oriundos propagetur. Tur. Inst., Tom I. p. 570.

harmony in the parts and powers of the moral creature man; whether it was a mere privation, and therefore not an evil *per se*; whether a *prava vis*, a causative power *sui generis*, of its own sort, like instinct in animals or the impulse of the passions and affections; whether this *prava vis* was their propension, rendered sinful by irregularity and excess; or whether it was a positive taint or *lues* consequent on the loss, and taking the place, of original righteousness, in which consisted the moral equilibrium of the soul; just as sickness is a disordered state of the body and its functions, arising from the loss of the equal temperament in which health consists, — were questions discussed with great subtilty in the schools; questions wholly of metaphysical theology, the discussion of which can never be shown to be essential to the faith which is unto salvation. Far distant be the day when such refined theological subtilties as those of Andradius and Gerhard and Chemnitius, and the doctors of the schools, shall be revived and made occasions of dispute and contention in the Presbyterian or any other Christian denomination.

The intelligent inquirer into the history of polemic and dogmatic theology will not fail to see that mere opinion and theory have much more to do with the differences on this subject than the simple belief of the facts as they are reported in the sacred scriptures. To the origin and development of these different opinions or theories the attempts, by various analogical illustrations, to explain these facts have greatly contributed. The Old school Presbyterian prefers the language of Luther, Calvin, Turretin, Stapfer, Edwards, and other renowned theologians, accepting their illustrative analogies and phraseology. The descent and development of original sin, in the successive generations of mankind, have been compared to the streams proceeding from a fountain; to pollution of blood in the parent, transmitting a taint or virus to the offspring, by the physical laws of reproduction; to original unity, evolved by seminal propagation; to the root, giving life and character to the growth

from it; to the sap, carried into the trunk and eliminated in the branches, and to other such like operations in nature. And it has been claimed that the very illustration of Christ himself, in which he avers, that the character of the fruit, whether good or evil, depends on that of the tree,¹ sanctions, if it be not itself, just such divine philosophy. The remark of the Saviour, however, is but the statement of a fact in plain, common-sense terms, viz. that according to men's principles of action will be their character and conduct. Grapes are not to be found on thorn-bushes, nor figs on thistles. "By their fruits ye shall know them." He is speaking of diversities of character and conduct among men, and not of the nature of original sin.

Analogies between moral or spiritual and natural things, must ever fail to convey ideas of exact identity. They can never lead to philosophical or correct logical definitions. For the things themselves are in their very nature radically different. The "*union* of representation in Adam" is a form of speech which has by some been regarded as involving the idea of personal identity. Old school theologians have found it difficult to determine exactly among themselves what is meant by calling Adam "a public person," "the federal head," "the representative of his posterity," as united to him by natural generation, whether by anticipation in the purpose of God, or *de facto*, by seminal propagation. The Princeton reviewers disavowed, so far as they were concerned, — and they assumed to be the defenders of Old school Presbyterianism, — that they held any philosophy or theory of imputation which involved "the notions of personal oneness, community in action, or transfer of moral character"; yet they did not deny that there have been those who "philosophized on this subject," and "taught a *mysterious union* of the race."²

This, if it be not altogether taking the same ground with New school Presbyterians, is so very near an approach to it, that practically we can see little or no difference. The lat-

¹ Matt. vii. 17, 18.

² Bib. Rep. II. p. 438.

ter disregard all attempts at philosophical explanation of the *quo modo* of the facts; and are contented to receive in simple faith the Bible statements of them. They believe that Adam, as the first and father of his race, became a sinner, and by his transgression, not only forfeited his own paradisaic life and estate, but subjected his posterity to the loss of the same, so that they are born into this world devoid of any righteousness of their own, or right of inheritance through any original or transmitted righteousness from Adam; are exposed and subjected to all the consequences of his first transgression, and through a natural bias thence arising incline to sin, and become sinners as soon as, in the language of Edwards, "they are capable of it." The reader is referred to the protest offered by the New school minority in the General Assembly, and recorded on their minutes in 1837,¹ which he will find in the margin below, and in which their views were tersely stated, not only in reference to orig-

¹ DOCTRINAL VIEWS OF AMERICAN PRESBYTERIANS, *from the Protest of 1837, re-adopted unanimously by the Auburn Convention, August 17, 1837.*

We protest, finally, because, in view of all the circumstances of the case, we feel that while we were prevented from uniting in the final vote with the majority in their testimony against error, for the reasons above stated, we owe it to ourselves, to our brethren, to the church, and to the world to declare and protest that it is not because we do, directly or indirectly, hold or countenance the errors stated. We are willing to bear our testimony in full against them, and now do so, when, without misapprehension and liability to have our vote misconstrued, we avow our real sentiments, and contrast them with the errors condemned, styling them, as we believe the true doctrine, in opposition to the erroneous doctrine condemned, as follows, viz.:

First Error. "That God would have prevented the existence of sin in our world, but was not able, without destroying the moral agency of man; or that, for aught that appears in the Bible to the contrary, sin is incidental to any wise moral system."

True Doctrine. God permitted the introduction of sin, not because he was unable to prevent it consistently with the moral freedom of his creatures, but for wise and benevolent reasons which he has not revealed.

Second Error. "That election to eternal life is founded on a foresight of faith and obedience."

True Doctrine. Election to eternal life is not founded on a foresight of faith and obedience, but is a sovereign act of God's mercy, whereby, according to the counsel of his own will, he has chosen some to salvation; "yet so as thereby neither is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or con-

inal sin, but to all the points on which they were charged by their Old school brethren as holding and teaching erroneous doctrines. The document is one of such historical value, as

tingency of second causes taken away, but rather established"; nor does this gracious purpose ever take effect independently of faith and a holy life.

Third Error. "That we have no more to do with the first sin of Adam than with the sins of any other parent."

True Doctrine. By a divine constitution, Adam was so the head and representative of the race, that, as a consequence of his transgression, all mankind become morally corrupt, and liable to death, temporal and eternal.

Fourth Error. "That infants come into the world as free from moral defilement as was Adam when he was created."

True Doctrine. Adam was created in the image of God, endowed with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness. Infants come into the world not only destitute of these, but with a nature inclined to evil, and only evil.

Fifth Error. "That infants sustain the same relation to the moral government of God in this world as brute animals, and that their sufferings and death are to be accounted for on the same principles as those of brutes, and not by any means to be considered as penal."

True Doctrine. Brute animals sustain no such relation to the moral government of God as does the human family. Infants are a part of the human family; and their sufferings and death are to be accounted for on the ground of their being involved in the general moral ruin of the race induced by the apostasy.

Sixth Error. "That there is no other original sin than the fact that all the posterity of Adam, though by nature innocent, will always begin to sin when they begin to exercise moral agency; that original sin does not include a sinful bias of the human mind, and a just exposure to penal suffering; and that there is no evidence in scripture that infants, in order to salvation, do need redemption by the blood of Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Ghost."

True Doctrine. Original sin is a natural bias to evil, resulting from the first apostasy, leading invariably and certainly to actual transgression. And all infants, as well as adults, in order to be saved, need redemption by the blood of Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Ghost.

Seventh Error. "That the doctrine of imputation, whether of the guilt of Adam's sin or of the righteousness of Christ, has no foundation in the word of God, and is both unjust and absurd."

True Doctrine. The sin of Adam is not imputed to his posterity in the sense of a literal transfer of personal qualities, acts, and demerit; but by reason of the sin of Adam, in his peculiar relation, the race are treated as if they had sinned. Nor is the righteousness of Christ imputed to his people in the sense of a literal transfer of personal qualities, acts, and merit; but by reason of his righteousness, in his peculiar relation, they are treated as if they were righteous.

Eighth Error. "That the sufferings and death of Christ were not truly vicarious and penal, but symbolical, governmental and instructive only."

True Doctrine. The sufferings and death of Christ were not symbolical, gov-

well as so pertinent to the design of this Article, as to render the presentation of it appropriate, if not in this statement necessary.

ernmental, and instructive only, but were truly vicarious, i. e. a substitute for the punishment due to transgressors; and while Christ did not suffer the literal penalty of the law, involving remorse of conscience and the pains of hell, he did offer a sacrifice which infinite wisdom saw to be a full equivalent. And by virtue of this atonement overtures of mercy are sincerely made to the race, and salvation secured to all who believe.

Ninth Error. "That the impenitent sinner is by nature, and independently of the influence or almighty energy of the Holy Spirit, in full possession of all the ability necessary to a full compliance with all the commands of God."

True Doctrine. While sinners have all the faculties necessary to a perfect moral agency and a just accountability, such is their love of sin and opposition to God and his law, that, independently of the renewing influence or almighty energy of the Holy Spirit, they never will comply with the commands of God.

Tenth Error. "That Christ does not intercede for the elect until after their regeneration."

True Doctrine. The intercession of Christ for the elect is previous as well as subsequent to their regeneration, as appears from the following scripture, viz. "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for they are thine. Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word."

Eleventh Error. "That saving faith is not an effect of the operations of the Holy Spirit, but a mere rational belief of the truth or assent to the word of God."

True Doctrine. Saving faith is an intelligent and cordial assent to the testimony of God concerning his Son, implying reliance on Christ alone for pardon and eternal life; and in all cases it is an effect of the special operations of the Holy Spirit.

Twelfth Error. "That regeneration is the act of the sinner himself, and that it consists in a change of his governing purpose which he himself must produce, and which is the result, not of any direct influence of the Holy Spirit on the heart, but chiefly of a persuasive exhibition of the truth, analogous to the influence which one man exerts over the mind of another; or that regeneration is not an instantaneous act, but a progressive work."

True Doctrine. Regeneration is a radical change of heart, produced by the special operations of the Holy Spirit, "determining the sinner to that which is good," and is in all cases instantaneous.

Thirteenth Error. "That God has done all that *he can do* for the salvation of all men, and that man himself must do the rest."

True Doctrine. While repentance for sin and faith in Christ are indispensable to salvation, all who are saved are indebted from first to last to the grace and Spirit of God. And the reason that God does not save all, is not that he wants the power to do it, but that in his wisdom he does not see fit to exert that power further than he actually does.

It is unnecessary to burden our pages with quotations, setting forth the views of those who were denounced as erroneous, because they did not express themselves in the technicalities of the Old school theology. It was done amply in the controversial publications current a quarter of a century ago. It may suffice to extract the following from the "Warning against error, adopted by the Presbytery of Detroit at their session at Northville, Michigan, Sept. 29th, 1847, and afterwards by the synod of Michigan at their session at Kalamazoo, Oct. 13th, 1847, and ordered to be published for the benefit of the churches under their care."¹ "The successive generations of the race," say the presbytery and synod, "are born, not holy, under a violated constitution, with no security for motive influences to induce right and holy choices, but with a *tendency to sin*. It is this tendency to sin, in this state of things, which our standards call corruption and original sin. It is not the moral depravity induced by each one's personal crime, but that selfish tendency induced through the loss of original righteousness, and the derangement of the

Fourteenth Error. "That God cannot exert such influence on the minds of men, as shall make it certain that they will choose and act in a particular manner, without impairing their moral agency."

True Doctrine. While the liberty of the will is not impaired, nor the established connection between means and end broken by any action of God on the mind, he can influence it according to his pleasure, and does effectually determine it to good in all cases of true conversion.

Fifteenth Error. "That the righteousness of Christ is not the sole ground of the sinner's acceptance with God; and that in no sense does the righteousness of Christ become ours."

True Doctrine. All believers are justified, not on the ground of personal merit, but solely on the ground of the obedience and death, or, in other words, the righteousness of Christ. And while that righteousness does not become theirs, in the sense of a literal transfer of personal qualities and merit; yet, from respect to it, God can and does treat them as if they were righteous.

Sixteenth Error. "That the reason why some differ from others in regard to their reception of the gospel is, that they make themselves to differ."

True Doctrine. While all such as reject the gospel of Christ do it not by coercion but freely; and all who embrace it do it not by coercion but freely, the reason why some differ from others is, that God has made them to differ.—Min. of Gen. Assem., 1837, pp. 484-486; New Digest, pp. 315-318.

¹ Warning against Error, p. 71.

primitive constitution by the sin of Adam. It would no doubt have been different had he obeyed; how, it is not for us to say. But as it is, we, through the fall of our first parents, come into being devoid of holiness, destitute of that state and tendency of mind in which they were created, and which inclined them to obedience, and naturally, therefore, begin our existence in a "sinful estate." "We mean, what our standards affirm, that in all we inherit from Adam there is no provision made for our holiness and salvation; but, on the contrary, it is morally certain we shall sin." A fuller statement on this subject renders it necessary to notice the differing views of Old and New school Presbyterians as to

The Nature of Moral Depravity, or the Corruption of our Moral Nature.

New school Presbyterians thought that their Old school brethren, in setting forth their views of original sin, regarded as the corruption of our moral nature, believed, and by their language and illustrations implied, that man's natural depravity, as a moral and accountable creature, is something, if not physical, so inwrought or involved in his constitutional nature as to be transmitted like any other corporeal faculty or quality, *lege procreationis* by "ordinary generation." Although this was denied, yet their language and modes of illustration led unavoidably to the inference, that moral corruption was believed by them to be some psychical peculiarity, property, or cause—something in the very constitution of the soul or mind—determining, by necessity of nature, to sin, and therefore itself sinful. This view New school Presbyterians could not reconcile with the fact, as affirmed by the Confession of Faith, that God is not the author of sin, nor with the nature of God's moral government, the freedom of the human will, and the accountability of the moral creature.

The Old school Presbyterians, on the other hand, charged their brethren who dissented from their theological ideas as to the nature of moral corruption, with denying "that Adam's posterity inherit from him a depraved nature," and

also "that there is any such thing as "a corrupted nature" distinct from *voluntary* acts.¹ The ground of controversy here lies in a *terra incognita*. New school Presbyterians care not to explore it, objecting to the vague, ill-defined use of language on the part of metaphysical theologians, and not to the scriptural statements of the facts. It is appropriate to metaphysics and philosophy to discuss such questions of theology, as whether moral corruption is an entity or a quality; whether it is a resultant of organization, or an element of being; whether it is developed by the same physical laws that regulate the procreation of the human species, or has its incipency in a generic state of mind, rendered morally certain by a tendency to evil, consequent on the sin and fall of our first parents; and whether selfishness be the sin of our nature; or, the lusts of the mind and the lusts of the flesh are characteristically different and reciprocally affect and stimulate each other. Less heat of controversy in such matters might conduce to clearer theological light. But who does not know that such inquiries are not essential to saving faith, and are eschewed by ninety-nine hundredths of spiritual-minded, simple-hearted Christians?

Were such phrases as "nature," "moral and total depravity," "corrupted nature," "corruption of our whole nature," "inherited depravity," "corrupt inclination," "sinful disposition," "evil propensity," "depraved heart," and such like, — so current as loose, convenient forms of speech, — always accurately defined, and carefully and perspicuously used, without varying shades or degrees of significance, the theological differences between New and Old school Presbyterians might soon be adjusted. To do this is not appropriate to this Article or its design. It is sufficient to remark that men's ideas of the nature of human depravity, moral corruption, a depraved nature, etc., will, and must be, mainly determined or regulated by their notions and definitions of sin. New school Presbyterians are satisfied with the scriptural definition, and that of the Larger and Shorter catechisms.

¹ Dr. Rice's *Old and New Schools*, p. 71.

The apostle John has accurately defined it. "Sin is the transgression of the law." "All unrighteousness is sin."¹ And Paul says, "By the law is the knowledge of sin." In exact accordance with this divinely inspired definition is that of the catechism: "Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature."² The knowledge of sin by the law does not involve, directly or indirectly, the idea that simple existence is sinful; nor that sin is a property of man's created nature, physiologically or psychologically regarded; nor that sin is predicable of the faculties and constitutional nature of man, in themselves considered, irrespectively of their exercise; nor that it is the necessary result of any law of nature, physical or psychical, material or immaterial, which God has created or ordained. The author of it is a reasonable creature, a moral agent, whose will God has "endowed with that natural liberty, that," as the Confession of Faith³ affirms, "it is neither forced nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good or evil." "In this," says Dr. Witherspoon, "the sin of man originally consisted; and in this the nature of all sin, as such, doth still consist, viz. withdrawing the allegiance due to God, and refusing subjection to God."⁴

Believing this, however, the New school Presbyterian does not deny that, in loose, general terms, the rational creature, the moral agent, human beings, may be called sinful, and so characterized, as well as those acts and exercises of which this property or quality is more immediately and accurately predicable. The Old school Presbyterian, in charging him with making sin to consist exclusively in *actual transgression*, and with maintaining that "all moral corruption consists of voluntary acts or choices," both mistakes and misrepresents the meaning and sentiments of his brother. "All *unrighteousness* is sin," and unrighteousness may and does exist through the want and

¹ 1 John iii. 4; v. 17.² Larger Catechism, Q. 24.³ Confession of Faith, Chap. IX. sec. 1.⁴ Witherspoon's Works, I. 146.

failure, neglect or forgetting, to will and act as the law requires. Volitions and purposes, acts and exercises, of the moral agent, may secretly exist in the heart, known only to God and the individual's consciousness, which are never embodied in outward expression and deed. So the Saviour has taught, Matt. v. 24, 28. New school Presbyterians concede that, both by omission and commission, it is natural to fallen man to sin. But when required by their Old school Presbyterian brethren, as does Dr. Rice,¹ to adopt his metaphysical theology and technicalities, and — with “Dr. Owen and the old Calvinists, to speak of original or indwelling sin (moral corruption) as a *principle* or SOMETHING which has the efficiency of cause, and which exists in men *anterior to any acts performed by them*,” he demurs, and resists such a trespass on his liberty in Christ.

When required by proper authority, or when it may be necessary for the interests of truth, to employ language with metaphysical import, and precision in theological discussion, and to speak of sin as an *effect* related to its direct and efficient cause, he prefers, instead of the vague terms of “principle” or “SOMETHING” (?) to designate supreme selfishness, distinguishable from instinctive self-love, as the primary originating cause or source of all developments of moral corruption. He can trace the voluntary acts and exercises, of which he predicates sin, to the demands and control, or impulse, of a generic, governing purpose; or, to use the language of the catechism, “the chief end,” which being for self, and not “to glorify and enjoy God,” is itself a transgression of his law, and the fruitful cause of endless forms and manifestations of moral corruption. In so explaining his theological views, he feels that he conforms more closely to the teachings of the Bible and the Presbyterian standards than do his Old school brethren; and also that he is far less liable to be suspected of believing that moral depravity and sin are “something” physical, resulting from a necessity of nature, or from any cause whatever

¹ Old and New Schools, p. 73.

inconsistent with, and destructive of, the voluntary agency of a reasonable and moral creature, justly held responsible by God, in all his "thoughts, words, and deeds," perfectly to keep his commandments. That the Old school Presbyterian believes differently here, we will not affirm; for many of them deny that they accept the inferences others draw from their theological teachings. They certainly differ in the processes by which they arrive at their ultimate results in their analyses of moral corruption. The faith that saves cares not to penetrate the usages of metaphysical and philosophical theology. When Old school theologians will show — what they have thus far failed to do — *how sin exists in* a moral creature anterior to, and separate or distinguishable from, any or all volitions or voluntary exercises of intelligence and will, or actings of the passions and affections, then may they, with greater show of theological acumen, as well as aid to Christian charity, accuse their New school brethren with denying what, by such ill-defined and vague theological technicalities, they either do or design to teach about innate corruption, inherent depravity, a corrupted moral nature, a deep-rooted principle of depravity, and the like. Till this is done frankly and fully, the teachings of the Presbytery of Detroit and the Synod of Michigan on the subject must be deemed satisfactory by all who prefer the language of common sense to that of scholastic theology.

"In the language of common sense," say they, "men attribute to the moral being, whose general state of mind manifests itself in uniform choices and prevalent governing emotions and passions, the same character they do to these its manifestations. Both the general state of mind and its specific manifestations — as well in uniform, habitual choices as in occasional ascendant passions, affections, or propensities — are regarded as developments and attributes of character, which are to be predicated of the person or moral agent; strictly speaking, of the rational, responsible mind or soul in which they exist, either as habitudes, or as

acts or events, rather than of the specific faculties, susceptibilities, affections, or passions. This man and the other is called revengeful, malicious, lewd, lascivious, deceitful, covetous, avaricious, and the like, according to the ascendant passion, affection, propensity, or habit of mind, which determines his choice and conduct, and in so doing, develops his character. In the same way, we say of men in general that *they* are sinful; because of the manifestations of something wrong or sinful in the state of mind and heart, the passions, affections, habits, and purposes which determine their choices and conduct. So, too, we commonly speak of a 'sinful nature,' meaning those constitutional attributes, intellect, susceptibilities, and voluntary powers which in all the appropriate circumstances of man's being will only and uniformly be acted out or exercised in sin. The same moral quality by which we characterize the actings or choices of a moral being, we predicate, in ordinary style of speech, not only of the being himself, but also of that which determines him thus to choose and act. Hence it is common to speak of sinful dispositions, sinful affections, sinful words, sinful conduct, as sinful choices, not as sinful *per se*, i. e. in themselves, by a mere necessity of being, but as related to sinful choice, that is to say, the dispositions, affections, etc., influencing the sinful choices of sinful beings. The language of the sacred scriptures is in conformity with this usage. Thus we read of 'men of corrupt minds,' who evince their corruption or moral depravity by 'perverse disputings' and by 'resisting the truth'; also of 'the old man which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,' and of 'corrupt words,' 'corrupt communication,' and 'corrupt doings;' of the mind being 'corrupted from the simplicity of Christ;' and of 'the corruption that is in the world through lust.'"¹ A correct knowledge and careful discernment of the difference in the import of terms, when analogically or literally to be understood, would contribute

¹ Warning against Error, pp. 58-60.

greatly to allay the heat and violence of angry theological controversy.¹

REGENERATION.

From this statement of differing views as to the nature of moral corruption, we pass appropriately to that of regeneration. It is not necessary here to compass the whole ground of theological discussion and theories on this subject. The design of this Article restricts us to the differences between Old and New school Presbyterians as to its nature. Those who believe, with Dr. John Owen and the theologians of his day, that the essence of moral corruption is "something physical," or with Dr. Woods, in words much less perspicuous, "in the settled constitution of our nature," must, by a logical necessity, conceive regeneration to be something physical, or wrought, implanted, or settled in the constitution of the nature by the power of God. Dr. Owen says explicitly: "There is a real *physical* work of the Spirit on the souls of men, in their regeneration."² "There is not only a *moral* but a *physical* immediate operation of the Spirit, by his power and grace, or his powerful grace, upon the minds or souls of men in their regeneration."² Accordingly he understood and used the phrases "new creature," "new creation," "created anew," in their strict, literal sense, and not either metaphorically or analogically, to denote resemblance in a moral point of view. He attributed it to the same Omnipotence, which is exerted in every department of the material creation. Hence, to deny the reality and necessity of the intervention of this divine Omnipotence in regeneration he accounted a fatal heresy. So, too, averred Old school Presbyterians.

His theory as to the nature of life, and his want of discrimination in the use of terms, whether in their literal or analogical import, necessarily, by logical sequence, led him

¹ See Brown's Treatise on Divine Analogy, — the author of "The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of the Human Understanding."

² Owen on the Spirit, Book III. chap. v. pp. 307, 311.

into confused ideas¹ as to the nature of regeneration. The theory of the eminent German chemist and physiologist of that period, Dr. Geo. Ernest Stahl, as to the nature of life, had not only influenced extensively medical practice, but was well received among theologians. It made all the vital functions and phenomena in man to depend on the absolute dominion of mind or the will over the body. The soul, in fact, was regarded as the vital force, or cause of all vital actions in the body. This idea was readily and naturally adopted by Dr. Owen and theologians of his day very extensively for the illustration of spiritual life. The life of the soul of the moral creature man, beginning in or with regeneration by the power of God, was referred to the implanting in the mind, heart, or soul a new principle, as the proximate and efficient cause of holy sensibilities and spiritual actions constituting the life of the new creature, of the sinner born again. This "principle of holiness," created by the physical omnipotence of God, according to this theory of regeneration, when implanted in the mind and heart, formed the life of the soul, just as the soul itself was believed to be the life of the body. New school Presbyterians cannot understand this life-theory of regeneration, as we take the liberty to call it, according as Old school Presbyterians employ it for illustration, in any other light,

¹ It is with some deference that we speak thus derogatively of one for whom, in common with many Old school Presbyterians, the writer entertains a high respect; but the cause of truth requires it. His style and want of precision of thought render his writings often wearisome, though enriched with much valuable erudition and breathings of ardent piety. The truth of the following anecdote happens to be known to the writer, having received it from a very dear friend of early days, eye and ear witness of the scene, viz. the lamented M. Bruen. It is given in justification of the judgment above expressed. The late justly renowned Dr. J. M. Mason, than whom there were none in his day superior in theological lore and force, was engaged in conversation with the equally renowned Robert Hall of England on theological questions. The merits of Dr. Owen passing under review, of whom the latter spoke rather disparagingly, Dr. Mason remarked: "Well Mr. Hall, whatever you may think of Dr. Owen as a theologian, you must confess that he is very profound, and dives deep." "Yes," replied he, very promptly in his wit, "he does indeed dive deep, but brings up a continent of mud."

than as intended to teach that the *very same* sort of physical omnipotence by which God raises a dead body to life, is exerted and requisite to infuse spiritual life into the dead sinner by the work of regeneration.

Dr. Owen denounces those who deny the literal reality of such an effort of physical omnipotence in creating the sinner anew in Christ Jesus, as utterly subverting "all the glory of God's grace." To say that such expressions as "quickened," "alive to God," and the like, are metaphorical, is, in his declared opinion, equivalent with making the whole gospel a metaphor; and so have some zealous Old school Presbyterians judged and expressed themselves.

"If," says he, "there be not an impotency in us by nature unto all acts of spiritual life, like that which is in a dead man unto the acts of life natural; if there be not an *alike* power of God required unto our deliverance from that condition, and the working in us a principle of spiritual obedience, as is required unto the raising of him that is dead, they may as well say that the scripture speaks not truly as that it speaks metaphorically,"¹ We see not how any other idea could have been intended by such language, than that the *same sort of physical omnipotence* which gives vitality to material organisms, is both real and necessary in imparting spiritual life to the sinner in regeneration. This is the theology of Old school Presbyterians on the subject, who talk of implanting and infusing into the soul a principle of spiritual life². But that the New school Presbyterian accounts philosophic theory, and a very fallacious one also.

¹ Owen on the Spirit, Book III. chap. v. p. 329.

² Dr. Rice defines mind to be "a *substance* which thinks, feels, and determines." These he regards as its "properties" (acuter metaphysicians prefer to call them its *acts*, or, as he does elsewhere himself, *exercises*). "Of the *intimate nature* of mind we know nothing. This is equally true of matter. Then if we know nothing of the physical nature of mind, except that it is adapted to produce thought, feeling, and choice, it is reasonable to *suppose* that we can know nothing of its moral nature, except that it gives a certain character, good or bad, to moral conduct. But it is as rational to deny that the mind possesses a physical nature adapted to thinking, feeling, and choosing, as to deny that it

The difference between them here lies within a very narrow compass. It is a difference in the use and interpretation of language; the Old school Presbyterians using terms in their literal signification, while the New school Presbyterians understand them in a figurative or tropical sense as metaphors, or, more correctly and properly explained, as analogically employed. This analogical import of language grows necessarily out of the fact that God has so constituted us as intelligent creatures, comprising, as Paul says, "soul, spirit, and body," that we have no direct intuition of things spiritual and divine, but must derive our knowledge of them from or through some revelation; and even the divine revelation of things spiritual, beyond the sphere of human sense and consciousness, "does not exhibit to us any direct view or knowledge of the real, *true nature* of things divine;

possesses a moral nature adapted to give character to its exercises." "There is in every moral agent a moral nature, distinct from his acts, and which gives to them their character, or which causes him to act as he does."

"This doctrine throws much light, not only upon the necessity but upon the nature of regeneration. For if there is in man what our standards call original sin, or a corrupted nature, regeneration, which is the beginning of sanctification in the heart, and the cause of the first obedience in life, must be the removal by the Holy Spirit of this corrupted nature, at least in part, and the implantation of a new nature or disposition, which will lead to obedience to God's law."—Old and New Schools, pp. 82–84. Yet Dr. Rice a little further on, seems to admit that such language must be taken only in its analogical import, and not literally; for he qualifies the above remark, repeating "There is in regeneration a new creation, not indeed of any physical faculty, but of a new heart or moral disposition; so that the regenerated man is in his moral character as really a new creature, as he would be in his physical character if the natural powers of his mind were radically changed."—*Idem*.

The New school Presbyterian would find no difficulty in admitting the reality or truth of such a change thus analogically expressed, that is, by way of resemblance; but inasmuch as Dr. Rice and Old school Presbyterians have not even accurately explained in precise terms, in any definition, what they mean by the words "heart" and "moral disposition," the New school Presbyterian would prefer to express himself more explicitly and perspicuously, as not intending to intimate that the great and radical change which the Spirit of God produces in the sinner when he believes and becomes morally a new man, metaphorically a new creature, although really an effect secured by the "mighty power of God," is accomplished by the same sort of divine omnipotence which is exerted in creation, literally speaking.

yet it lays before us such lively resemblances of them, that from thence we *necessarily infer* the existence of their substance and *correspondent realities* ; and that *these* become the subject of our *faith* and our *hope*. This is *seeing* them as the apostle speaks, *through a glass darkly.*"¹ Our knowledge, in other words, of things abstract and spiritual, beyond the observation and sphere of our senses, is attained by reflection, by means or through the aid of ideas obtained originally through the senses, which ideas the mind employs as representative of such things or truths, spiritual and divine, because of some assumed resemblance or analogical similarity between them. This being the fact, there should, therefore, ever be great care, courtesy, and forbearance, as well as the utmost caution and precision in the use of language by which we communicate our ideas to each other, that in matters of doubt, difference, and difficulty of apprehension we do not misapprehend or misrepresent each other.

The intimate nature of things or truths, spiritual or divine, which theology undertakes to discuss and teach, can never, by any direct process of intuition or consciousness or philosophical theorizing, be perfectly understood by us. We may aid each other by a comparison of ideas ; but beyond the fact or truth affirmed and revealed to us by God in the use of human language, it is rash, presumptuous, dogmatical, tyrannical, to adventure and require unqualified assent. It is substituting human philosophy for the truth of God ; and disputes here must partake more of the logomachy of theologians and the persecuting spirit of dogmatic bigots than the charity of the gospel.

The Old school Presbyterian may employ his life-theory, if he chooses, for the expression of his ideas of regeneration and illustration of its nature, exercising his liberty in this matter. But when he demands that his New school brother shall receive the terms of his moral and metaphysical philosophy, of necessity having but an analogical import, in their strict literal meaning, and as the *ipsissima dicta* of God him-

¹ Brown's Divine Analogy, p. 58.

self, he should be reminded that he trespasses upon the liberty of Christ's house, the law of love, and becomes an usurper of authority never conceded to him either by God or his brethren. The persecuting tyranny of the Roman Catholic church, which has required the Saviour's metaphorical language in the eucharist, "this bread is my body," etc. to be understood as literally declaring it to be "his body, soul, and deity," is only a more glaring exhibition of the dangerous excess to which men may run when they undertake to interpolate or involve their theories and philosophy in the plain, common-sense language of the Bible.

There have ever been different attempts among theologians to explain the nature of regeneration. New England divines have had their "taste-theory." Dr. Dwight has said "This change of heart consists in a *relish* for spiritual objects, communicated to it by the power of God,"¹ His successors at New Haven, have had their modes of explaining the fact, by stating and unfolding the transforming influence on character exerted by a change of the ruling purpose, or chief controlling end. Disputes and differences have prevailed among Congregationalists, as well as among Presbyterians, in relation to the metaphysics of regeneration. The writings of Drs. Hopkins, Bellamy, Emmons, Dwight, Woods, Taylor, and other New England divines, have had more or less influence among both Old and New school Presbyterians. But few, if any, have had greater authority, or done more to put a distinctive stamp upon the theological views of New school Presbyterians, on the subject of regeneration especially, than the renowned, learned, and patriotic Dr. John Witherspoon, President of Princeton College, and a member of Congress and signer of the Declaration of Independence.

"I am sensible," says he, "that regeneration or the new birth is a subject at present very unfashionable, or at least, a style of language which hath gone very much into desuetude."² Of the Saviour's remark to Nicodemus on the subject, he says: "It deserves the serious attention of every

¹ Dwight's Theology, p. 418.

² Witherspoon's Works, I. 97.

Christian, that, as this declaration was made by our Saviour in a very solemn manner, and by a very peculiar metaphor, so this is not the single passage in which the same metaphor is used.”¹ The expressions “new creature,” “workmanship,” “created in Christ Jesus unto good works,” and similar, he regarded also as metaphorical, remarking, “as I would not willingly strain the metaphor, and draw from it any uncertain conclusion, so it is no part of my design to run it out into any extraordinary length.”² Having noticed various comparisons used in the sacred scriptures in referring to it, he says: “It appears that regeneration, repentance, conversion, or call it what you will, is a very great change from *the state* in which every man comes into the world.”³ Noticing various partial changes which take place in men’s characters from different causes, he groups all under one generic class, and remarks: “There must always be some governing principle which, properly speaking, constitutes character.”⁴ Of the true change of character, entire and universal, which begins in regeneration, he says: “it may be fully comprehended in the three following things, *giving a new direction* to the understanding, the will, and the affections.” “As therefore the change he infers is properly of a moral or spiritual nature, it seems to me properly and directly to consist in these two things, 1st, that our supreme and chief end be to serve and glorify God, and that every other aim be subordinate to this. 2nd, That the soul rest in God as its chief happiness, and habitually prefer his favor to every other enjoyment.”⁵ “Till this be wrought, the person is in sin, and can do nothing but sin. The reason of this is very plain; that the supreme and governing motive of all his actions is wrong, and therefore every one of them must be so. Upon the whole I suppose, if they were to *explain* themselves *fully*, this is chiefly meant by those who insist that there is an essential difference between special and common grace.”⁶

¹ Witherspoon’s Works, I. 100.³ Witherspoon’s Works, I. 103.⁶ Witherspoon’s Works, I. 145.² *Ib.* p. 101.⁴ *Ib.* p. 112.⁶ *Ib.* p. 176.

In this view of the nature of regeneration Dr. Witherspoon confines himself within the range of human consciousness ; he adventures not back of it, into the *terra incognita* of the essential or intimate nature of the soul or spirit of man which speculative philosophic theology has attempted to penetrate. In this he stands a fair representative of the great body of New school Presbyterians.

Neither the Confession of Faith, nor the Catechisms, Larger or Shorter, define regeneration. Whatever is to be found in them relative to its metaphysical nature is contained in the chapter of the former and the answers of the latter on the subject of Effectual Calling. Dr. Witherspoon does but develop the ideas therein expressed, by aid of the answer to the first question of the Catechisms, viz. "What is the chief end of man." His illustration, so far as the metaphysics of regeneration are concerned, differs widely from "the life-theory" of Dr. Owen, and may be called that of "the generic purpose." Dr. Taylor and the New Haven theologians, whose views on the subject greatly alarmed many Old school Presbyterians, might have appealed with great force to this renowned father of the Presbyterian church, if not as authority, yet by his plain, common-sense illustrations, taken from the range of human consciousness and expressed often in the language of the Catechisms, as sanctioning similar ideas, not to say identical, with those much more extensively, carefully, and metaphysically elaborated in the Spectator's review of "Dr. Spring on the Means of Regeneration."

THE NATURE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT'S AGENCY.

If regeneration be a *new creation*, in the literal sense of the terms, then the agency of the Holy Spirit—which both Old and New school Presbyterians admit to be necessary to a radical change of heart and of moral character—must be that of his physical omnipotence. This many of the former, along with Dr. Owen, believe and declare ; yet a different style of speech is preferred by others, shall we say more astute theologians among them. They talk of a "*direct*,"

"*immediate*" agency of the Spirit in the work of regeneration; expressions employed to intimate the idea that it is without instrumentality. But as the Bible undeniably teaches that God "of his own will begat us with the word of truth,"¹ they themselves, in rather awkward and infelicitous terms, saying, "we are far, however, from denying that in regeneration the Holy Spirit operates *in connection with the truth.*"² How in connection? whether by mere juxta-position, or as "over, above, and beyond the truth," — favorite phrases with some, — or, plainly and frankly, by means of the truth? The answer to this question would not be so embarrassing as it is to the Old school Presbyterian, if he did not believe the agency of the Spirit to be other than *through*, that is *by means of*, the truth. The word of God is the sword of the Spirit, and is so called by the apostle. The New school Presbyterian accordingly believes it to be appropriately and fitly the instrument of his mighty power. He looks for and apprehends the presence and aid of the Spirit — his agency in renewing, sanctifying, enlightening, comforting, etc. — just as he consciously accepts, yields unto, confides in, and does what God speaks to his mind, heart, will, and conscience in his holy word. How the Holy Spirit's agency "makes the word effectual" in him, or in one and not in another, is a question, not of faith, but philosophy with which he will not perplex himself. He knows, both from the testimony of the scriptures, and as confirmed by his own experience, that "the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than a two-edged sword,"⁴ etc.; also that "the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds, casting down imaginations⁵ (vain reasonings), and every high thing which exalteth itself against the knowledge of Christ, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ."⁶

The truths or facts revealed and reported to us in the

¹ James i. 13.

² Dr. Rice's Old and New Schools, p. 87.

³ Eph. vi. 17.

⁴ Heb. iv. 11.

⁵ Λογισμοίς, vain sophisms of philosophy

⁶ 2 Cor. x. 4, 5.

sacred scriptures originally by the miraculous inspiration of the Holy Spirit, are the means of his divine and gracious agency which he employs to produce faith in us, as Dr. Witherspoon says, "regeneration, repentance, conversion, or call it what you will." The apostle Paul regarded himself, in and by his teaching and preaching the great truths of the gospel, a subordinate instrumentality employed by the Holy Spirit in the work of saving sinners. "In Christ Jesus," says he, "I have begotten you *through the gospel*";¹ and sanctification, commenced in regeneration, as we learn from the Saviour's prayer, is carried on by the same instrumentality. "Sanctify them *through thy truth*; thy word is truth."² Hence the scriptures uniformly represent that faith, from its very incipency to the end of this mortal life, indicates both the agency of the Holy Spirit and the degree of its power in the mind and heart. Faith is the cordial belief of the truth on our part,—the yielding to, and relying of the whole heart upon the teachings or testimony of the Spirit in the word of God. The fact of faith being the means of that agency of the Spirit brings his operations in us within the range of our consciousness. For the instrumentality of that agency—the truth as it is in Jesus, of which the mind and heart takes cognizance—is adapted to move, excite, direct, regulate, and control the rational sensitive nature of the moral creature man. Hence the apostle Paul utterly rejects all ritual, tactual appliances of the ceremonial law, and yokes of bondage imposed by man, as vehicles of the Spirit's agency. He installs faith as the great and efficacious means through which personal holiness—all that is appropriate and of value in the character of the renovated man—is to be developed. "In Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but *faith which worketh by love*."³ This love is itself holiness, and its possession and directing and determining power, renders us "partakers of the divine nature." For, "God is love,"⁴ and "his divine power hath given to us *all things*

¹ 1 Cor. iv. 15.² John xvii. 17.³ 1 Gal. v. 6.⁴ 1 John iv. 8.

that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue ; whereby are given to us exceeding great and precious *promises*, that *by these* ye might be *partakers of the divine nature*, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.”¹ In exact accordance with this blessed and saving office of faith — the effect and index of the Spirit’s agency in our minds and hearts — the token of his abode with us and power in us, the apostle Peter declared before the synod at Jerusalem, when speaking of God’s “giving the Holy Ghost” to the Gentiles, that his renewing and sanctifying energy was exerted through faith,” — “purifying their hearts through faith.”² And long after, in addressing “the strangers scattered” in Gentile lands, he appealed to their own conscious experience, as having been renewed by the Spirit through their belief of the truth, and urged to increased “zeal and activity in the cultivation and manifestation of that holiness without which no man shall see the Lord.” “Seeing,” says he, “ye have purified your souls in obeying³ the truth through the Spirit, unto unfeigned love of the brethren ; see that ye love one another with a pure heart fervently, *being born again*, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, *by the word of God*, which liveth and abideth for ever.”⁴

The conscious experience of every Christian certifies to him that there is no other way to “overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil.” If he looks for an agency of the Spirit to save him, lying back of and beyond the sphere of his own conscious exercise of faith in Jesus Christ, of hope toward God, it is a thing of which he has no direct cognizance and cannot with the utmost efforts of his philosophy explore ; and he therefore may become the dupe of his own deceitful heart, through false inferences, mystical, perplexing, bewildering, distracting, or fanatical and foolish, like the

¹ 2 Pet. i. 3, 4.² Acts xv. 8, 9.³ ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας, by affording willing ears to the truth, a periphrasis for faith.⁴ 1 Pet. i. 22, 23.

pagans that sought the afflatus or furor of their inspiring god. The apostle John's testimony on the subject is in exact accordance with that of Paul and of Peter. "Who-soever is born of God overcometh the world, and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith."¹ All here are in perfect harmony.

The agency of the Spirit is not physical, not literally creative, but in perfect consistency with man's free moral agency as a rational, accountable creature, held rightfully under obligations of obedience to the law of God. It is such as in its nature may be, and often is, resisted; and, exerting its power through the truth, becomes cognizable by us through our consciousness, according as we believe or resist what the Spirit teaches. The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father, Christ says, "will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you."² "When the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak."³ Whatever excitement of the affections and imaginations, impelling to action, is not produced through the truth, and cannot, as to its causes, be apprehended by the rational mind as the legitimate results of truth believed, may be set down to the account of sympathy, superstition, disease, a disordered state of the stomach and nervous system, and such like, but not to the Spirit of God, as its author. For he is the Comforter, and his office is to minister light, conviction, reproof, comfort, joy, peace, holiness, and salvation to his moral agents through their belief of the truth.

While the agency of the Spirit in the order of nature must of necessity precede the action of the sinner, and is prior to, and the efficient cause of, the change which occurs in his regeneration, yet that change does not actually take place, that is, the sinner is not *de facto* changed, so as to be rightly and truly called, metaphorically or logically, "a new

¹ 1 John v. 4.² John xiv. 26.³ John xvi. 13.

creature" in Christ Jesus, a sinner "born again," unless and until, with his own free will and consent, he yields to, and concurs with the blessed divine Spirit, who is seeking to turn him to God from the error of his ways, and translate him from the kingdom of darkness into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. His office is not only thus to change the heart and character and state of the lost and ruined sinner that believes to the saving of his soul, but ever thereafter to abide with, watch over, keep, sanctify, and bring unto everlasting life those who commit themselves to his teaching and care, knowing in whom they have believed. But in the very nature of things, from the instant in which the sinner is born again and passes from death to life, there must be the concurrence or combination of the agency of the free moral agent man with the agency of the Holy Spirit of God. He that first subdued the rebel soul, and brought it to the feet of Jesus, will ever thereafter take care of those "who first trusted in Christ, in whom after that they heard the word of truth, the gospel of their salvation, and after that they believed, were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession, unto the praise of His glory."¹ They are just as really dependent on the Spirit's grace and sanctifying care after the commencement of their new life as they ever were in the days of their unregeneracy; for without Christ we can do nothing. But while "we, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of righteousness through faith,"² "we are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time."³ Such, as far as we have ever understood them, are the views of New school Presbyterians on the subject of the saving agency of the Holy Spirit of God.

If Old school Presbyterians do not believe that the agency of the Spirit in regeneration is physical, like that of his physical omnipotence in creation, they have failed to make themselves understood. We confess ourselves utterly un-

¹ Eph. i. 12-14.² Gal. v. 5.³ 1 Pet. i. 5.

able to get any other idea from such language as this : “ the *formal efficiency* of the Spirit, indeed, in the putting forth the exceeding greatness of his power in our *quickenings*, is no *otherwise* to be comprehended by us than *any other creating act* of divine power.”¹ Dr. Rice, the exponent of Old school views, insists upon there being “ a moral nature or disposition, distinct and anterior to its acts,” produced, of course, by a *new creation*,² “ so that the regenerated man is, in his moral character, as really a new creature as he would be in his physical character, if the natural powers of his mind were radically changed.”³ If, in understanding such language as above stated, the New school Presbyterian does the Old injustice, it is what the Old does the New by charging him with believing and teaching, according to his views, that the agency of the Spirit is *wholly* that of moral suasion.

This phrase was used by Dr. Owen and others to denote the influence which one human mind can and does exert, by instruction, argument, and eloquence, upon another. The New school Presbyterian believes that the moral suasion of the Spirit of God — although the phrase is seldom used by him — which, it cannot be denied, he has exerted by the truths revealed in the Bible, and enforced by exhortations, remonstrances, appeals, motives, and considerations of varied character therein contained, is just as much more mighty, *as God employs them* in applying them to men’s minds, hearts, and consciences, and gives them force and efficiency, than anything man can do by *his* moral suasion, as the omnipotence of God exceeds the power of man. In so doing he is far from admitting, and utterly denies, what is charged upon him by Old school Presbyterians, that the Spirit’s agency, in the regeneration or conversion of the sinner, is merely *objective*, consisting only in the presentation of truth before the mind — first by originally inspiring the scriptures, and second by the preaching of the gospel.

¹ Owen on the Spirit, Book III. chap. I. p. 225.

² Old and New Schools, p. 89.

³ *Ib.* p. 84, 85.

The divine, miraculous inspiration of the sacred scriptures, as matter of fact, he believes and teaches. But as to *how* this inspiration was accomplished, any further than as they themselves have declared it to be, in such way as to make God responsible for the truth to be received by faith, he does not philosophize or speculate. A "thus saith the Lord" is sufficient for his faith, by whatever process or in whatever way the Spirit of God may have first spoken or revealed the truth, and employed the minds, words, and pens of prophets and apostles to deliver them to their fellow men. Theories as to the nature and processes of justification, are accomplishing much evil, and subverting the popular respect for the truth and authority of the word of God, as a standard of appeal in all matters of faith and practice. Some of them are but disguised infidelity—the kiss of Judas in the betrayal of his Master.

He that at first made known his will, whether by dreams, visions, oral communication, prophetic inspiration, assisting memory, directing thought, or in whatever way he chose, and threw into the minds of prophets, apostles, and holy men of old the truths he designed and moved them to declare to others, in intelligible terms, of ordinary or excited speech, is just as able to make use of the same, and give them his own living potency at this day, to sway and sanctify and save them that believe, so as to be "the author and finisher of our faith." New school Presbyterians believe that no created mind can ever use the word of God with the efficacy and power which "the Spirit, who searcheth all things, yea even the deep things of God," can alone give it, when he is pleased to make it his two-edged sword. Their prayers, public and private, as well as their teaching, preaching, and the publications they have put forth, prove their conviction that the clearest and most vivid presentation of the truth which man can present, cannot alone turn the sinner to God and renovate his heart.

"It is the province of the Spirit of God, and his office as provided for in the gracious scheme of redemption through

Jesus Christ." says the Synod of Michigan and Presbytery of Detroit, "to help our infirmities, to come in with the aid of *his* motive power, to induce us to renounce our selfishness, and make choice of God and holiness. If left to himself, without the Spirit's aid, as provided for by the scheme of redemption, no sinner would ever repent and turn to God, or fly for refuge to Jesus Christ." "In what way precisely it is that the Spirit gives energy to the truth and renders it efficient, so that he becomes the author or cause of the sinner's regeneration, it is in vain for us to inquire." "The fact of his agency is asserted in the scriptures, and that is enough for our faith;"¹

HUMAN ABILITY.

We pass, naturally in order, from the consideration of the nature of the Spirit's agency to that of the sinner's ability. It has been a main and prominent point of difference between Old and New school Presbyterians. To deny man's free-agency, and regard him literally as dead and destitute of all ability as a block of marble or wood till a new life is created within him, is in keeping with the theory of the Spirit's agency in regeneration being that of physical omnipotence. The language of Old school Presbyterians on this subject has led many to believe that the inability they predicate of the unrenewed sinner is of this nature. For many of the most zealous among them have utterly condemned and denounced the distinction made by theologians of past and present times, between natural and moral ability. Among both Old and New school Presbyterians, however, at this day, the distinction is acknowledged; and far less of discussion and dissension, for some ten years past and more, has prevailed upon the subject. The terms "natural" and "moral ability" are by no means of as frequent occurrence. The distinction is one that exists in the very nature of things; and though not in metaphysical terms expressed, is made by all classes of persons. Dr. Wither-

¹ Warning against Error, pp. 77, 79.

spoon expressed his strong desire that his hearers would consider it. "O that you would but consider what sort of inability you were under to keep the commandments of God. Is it *natural*, or is it *moral*? Is it really want of *ability*, or want of *will*?"¹ Neither New school nor Old school Presbyterians deny the fact of men's natural and total depravity in their unconverted state. Both believe that the sinner's dependence on God for his aid is such that without it he can do nothing morally good, nor even exercise aright any of the functions of his constitutional nature. Neither assume that by the sin and fall of Adam the human soul or mind was deprived of any faculty essential or appropriate to man as a free moral agent. However the exercise of them may be impeded and frustrated by reason of depravity, both believe that the obligations to obedience have not been impaired, and that whatever may be the sinner's inability, it is sinful and inexcusable. Thus far there is no difference between them. Their preaching and exhortations are much the same, proceeding on the assumption that their hearers are not devoid of all ability to comply with the terms of the gospel. It is only when they attempt theological explanations that they are found at variance.

The incompatibility of two diametrically different states of mind, or the impossibility of two antagonistic choices or volitions, existing together at the same instant, are facts which should never be lost sight of by those who would correctly interpret the ordinary, common-sense language of men. There are certain things which, in their very nature, it is impossible for a finite creature to do, as, for example, to know all things, to put forth the force of Omnipotence, to transfer itself into ubiquity, etc. There are absolute limitations of finite power in the creature, who is infinitely removed from that of the Creator. There are some things too which transcend the highest capacities of created intelligence. There are other things which can be done by one class of creatures and not by another. Capacities or abil-

¹ Witherspoon's Works, I. 215.

ities vary endlessly. The human mind cannot by the eye, unaided by telescopic and microscopic powers, analyze the nebular universes, or discern the feathers on the wings of a butterfly. By instrumentalities we can greatly extend the reach of our natural capacities, and become able to accomplish what otherwise would be impossible, as is well understood in science and the arts, by the use and combination of the mechanical powers, and of the forces of heat, steam, electricity, etc. To say that what man cannot do without such instrumental aids he cannot do with them, would be to contradict universal observation and experience.

A man has no capacity or power, like the bird of passage, to cross the ocean; but by ship or steamer he can. In certain relations we have ability which in others we have not. Our natural capacities may fail altogether in one and be surprisingly extended in another set of circumstances. Exercise, education, science, skill, enable us to accomplish wonders. Why then should it be denied that men's natural capacities in relation to actions of a moral nature may also, by appropriate aid, be rendered effectual to do what otherwise would have been impracticable?

Both Old and New school Presbyterians say that independently or without the aid of the Holy Spirit, the natural man — man in the exercise merely of his own natural capacities — never *will* comply with the commands of God. But this is a vague generality. To be absolutely true, it must mean *perfect* obedience. For it is obvious that it is one thing to obey the whole moral law, all the commandments of God *perfectly*, and another to do imperfectly this or that which God requires. The law says: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might,"¹ and "thy neighbor as thyself."² These, as the Saviour teaches, form the sum total of its requirements.

Adam was endowed with capacities adequate to this; and was placed in circumstances favorable and conducing to

¹ Deut. vi. 5.

² Lev. xix. 18.

it. But the tempter interposed his motive influence to alienate him from his obedience to God, He succeeded in changing the state of his mind and heart, by overcoming his ruling purpose, as directed by the love of God. He exchanged his confidence in God, by which he remained loyal and true to God, for that in his wife and the tempter; taking and believing their counsel in preference to the divine command. The change was instantaneous. From love and devotion to God, the state of his mind became that of alienation and antagonism to his supreme authority. By that very fact, perfect obedience became forever just as absolutely impossible as it is to identify failure and perfection. His offspring came into being in relations and under circumstances and motive influences that, from the earliest period of their moral agency, embarrass, disincline, and prevent them from exercising their natural capacities in obedience to God. It is a matter of very little practical moment whether we say they will not or they cannot perfectly keep the commandments of God, under the circumstances and in the relations in which they came into being. Left to themselves in their natural condition and relations, it is morally certain they will sin. What they may or can be brought to do through the agency of the Spirit of God and a change of relations is a very different question. Related to Adam and the original moral constitution with him, there is no redemption, no recovery, no means of restoration and salvation for them. They succeeded to an estate of moral degradation, corruption, and ruin. But through Christ, the second Adam, provision has been made for redemption and recovery from corruption and ruin. He has secured an agency of the Holy Spirit of God for the renovation and salvation of men. Hence he says: "Without me ye can do nothing;"¹ and "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him."² He introduced a new economy of grace, "God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that who-

¹ John xv. 5.² John vi. 44.

soever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life.”¹ Provision has thus been made in Christ for new and saving agency and motive power to be imparted. “Now,” says he, “is the judgment of this world, now shall the prince of this world be cast out; and I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me.”² He procured, and now sends, the Comforter, of whom he said: “When he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin because they believe not on me.”³ Under these circumstances he declares that the damning guilt, the cause of everlasting death among men, wherever his gospel is preached, is their neglect of his salvation, their refusal to come to him by faith and partake of life. “Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.”⁴ Salvation is not impossible.

There are, however, certain things in this work impossible for men. There are certain others which are not. It is of importance here carefully to distinguish, and not view or speak of things in false relations. Thus it is forever impossible for a sinner to atone for his own or for others’ sins; “none of them can by any means redeem his brother, or give to God a ransom that he should live forever.”⁵ Nor can any man, by his good works or deeds of righteousness, justify himself before God; “by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.”⁶ God alone provides the atonement. It is his prerogative to say whether, after having sinned and come short of his glory, any of our fallen race shall be pardoned; and under what circumstances, in view of what considerations, and in what relations he will exercise his pardoning prerogative. In Christ the atoning sacrifice for the remission of sins, “the righteousness of God” for the justification of sinners, have been provided. That which is forever impossible with man is possible with God.

The gospel announces this gracious and glorious fact, that Jesus Christ “hath power on earth to forgive sin;” that “his

¹ John iii. 16.² John xii. 31, 32.³ John xvi. 7–12.⁴ John v. 40.⁵ Psalm xlix. 7–9.⁶ Gal. ii. 16.

blood cleanseth from all sin;" and that in him "have we righteousness and strength." He is "the gift of God" to a lost world for salvation, and the dispenser of the Spirit for purposes of salvation unto everlasting life.¹ Thus constituted "a Prince and a Saviour to give repentance unto Israel and remission of sins," he brings to us the motive power needed to turn sinners to God, and renders that possible for us which without him we never, by any effort of our own, could have attained to. What, without the gospel and its divine aid, would have been for ever impossible is so no longer. Here is an instrumentality for us, united to our weakness and wretchedness. Perfect obedience is no longer required of us as the means of eternal life. But believe and ye shall be saved are the assurances of Christ. We have all the requisite constitutional faculties necessary for the exercise of faith in our fellow-men. The same capacities bring us under obligations and adapt our minds to believe God. There is no natural impossibility to prevent us from setting to our seal that God is true, and accepting the offers of grace and salvation, made freely to us by Jesus Christ. Whatever difficulty or inability there may be, grows out of a dominant state of mind and heart, utterly incompatible with faith, love, and repentance toward God. Aversion, dislike, opposition, prevail and govern. But, in the nature of things, it is no more impossible that these may be overcome and superseded by love, preference, and obedience, than it was that Adam's holy obedience should have been exchanged for rebellion. It is the Spirit secured by Christ that accomplishes the change; but he operates on man not as on matter. The change takes place as the sinner—operated on and moved by the Holy Spirit through the truth, exciting to the exercise of the capacities of his constitutional nature, viz. mind, will, affections—is induced to believe on Christ, to deny himself, to renounce his sins, and consecrate himself to God. Such is the ability of man in the matter of working out his own salvation, making to himself a new heart,

¹ John iv. 10; vii. 37-39.

believing, repenting, and turning to God “with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience,” which New school Presbyterians believe he has, placed, as he now is, under the gospel of the grace of God and the dispensation of the Holy Spirit.

There may be, and are, theologians who believe and teach that man in his natural state, independent of the gospel and Spirit of Christ, has ability and power perfectly to obey all the commandments of God. New school Presbyterians no more believe and teach this than do the Old school. The former understood the latter’s denial of all ability on the part of the sinner to believe and repent, as equivalent with a denial of the capacities or faculties requisite for moral agency, essential to moral obligation. The latter were offended with such an intimation, and in their turn charged the former, who insisted on the sinner’s ability — meaning his natural constitutional capacities to believe and repent — with holding that men are able in this life perfectly to keep the commandments of God. A better understanding prevails at present.

The analysis of man’s ability — a complex idea — into its constituents of capacity, faculty, susceptibility, motive power, and efficient volition, and the discussions which of late years have taken place upon the subject, have rendered it no longer the *questio vexata* it once was. “In estimating ability, we are in the habit of giving more or less import to the word, according to the nature of the subject and of the case; at one time meaning by it the natural faculties or capacities for a given class of actions; at another time, the instrumental agencies requisite; and at a third, the moving power appropriate and necessary to excite, determine, and restrain the successful exercise of those faculties. It is in this last sense the Saviour says: ‘No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him.’” But this he does by the influence of the Spirit, who brings the mind and heart into that state which disposes and inclines it to make

¹ John vi. 44.

choice of God and holiness, and to come to Jesus Christ for 'grace and strength to help in every time of need.' In doing so, the Spirit employs the truth as his instrument; and that not at man's will, but of his own will."¹

The dogma of "entire sanctification," "or sinless perfection," which Old school Presbyterians sometimes charged the New with holding, never formed an article of their belief. Nor does it follow as a logical result from their views of ability. While teaching and insisting, as important essential evidence of true Christian character, that "whosoever is born again, doth not commit sin," that is, manufacture sin,² yea, and cannot deliberately make choice of, and allow himself to do, what he knows to be sinful,³ or refuse to do what he knows to be his duty, we nevertheless admit that, as matter of fact, through weakness of faith and the bewildering influence of temptation, "in many things we offend all," so that "he that saith he hath no sin, deceiveth himself and the truth is not in him." The love of God may be supreme, but that does not prove it perfect. Integrity or uprightness of character, sincerity of purpose, transparency of conduct, and outward moral perfection in the sight of man, as the apostle uses the word and speaks of the thing, fall far short of that perfection in the sight of God which his law requires.

JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

We think it can be safely said, that there never was so large a body of ministers and people so well and so entirely agreed on the subject of justification by faith as those embraced in the Presbyterian church before its division. The history of the last twenty-five years has not proved that there is any radical difference on the subject between its branches, Old and New. Different forms of speech and modes of illustration, as a matter of course, have existed, and will continue to do so. But separation has not impaired the unity of their faith.

¹ Warning against Error, p. 78, 79.

² ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ, doth not make a sin.

³ 1 John iii. 9.

Both agree that, on the ground of innocence or deeds of the law, no flesh living shall be justified; that pardon of sin and acceptance with God can never be merited by sinful man; but if ever and wherever they are enjoyed, must proceed from the riches of his grace; that the ground or reason of his justifying grace is the redemption in Christ Jesus; not because of the sinner's morality, good works, repentance, and return to obedience, but solely on account of the obedience unto death of the Lord Jesus Christ; that the way or means by which a sinner can be justified is faith alone, without the deeds of the law; that justification, being an act of God's grace, takes effect in this mortal life, immediately when the sinner believes in Christ, and is not to be awaited or looked forward to as a future good, but accepted as a present boon; that the relation of the sinner who believes in Christ, and is justified by "faith in his blood," is so thoroughly changed to the law, that he passes from under its condemnation into the glorious liberty of the sons of God, and is accepted as if he were righteous, and adopted into his family, only for the righteousness of Christ and through the grace given in him; that justification is one sovereign, gracious act of God, done once and forever, and begins immediately upon believing to produce the fruits of the Spirit — peace, love, joy, the spirit of adoption, and access with confidence into the favor of God, etc.; that simultaneously with being justified the sinner believes in Christ, becomes renewed, "the workmanship of God, created anew unto good works," and begins to lead a life of holy obedience; and that, while loving, grateful obedience proves both his regeneration and justification, neither his regeneration, nor good works, nor holy obedience, nor love, nor faith, nor repentance, form the ground of his justification before God, but the righteousness of Jesus Christ alone, which God so accounts to him as to regard him as righteous, i. e. accepts and treats him as if he were so, agreeably to the gracious provisions of that covenant of redemption in which the Father stands engaged to Christ, and through him to all his seed.

It is mainly in relation to this last item that differences between the two schools may be traced; but like all we have already noticed, not in point of faith, but of philosophy or theological explanation. The Old school Presbyterian insists upon using the *ipsissima verba* of the Confession and Catechisms when they speak of the righteousness of Christ being "imputed by faith." The New school Presbyterian is not tenacious about this technical term of theology, but prefers to express the idea intended to be conveyed by it in the plain language of common sense. As to what is meant by the word "imputation," the reader will have gathered from what has already been brought into view. The ideas of Luther and other early reformers — not Calvin — differ very far from those of Old school Presbyterians; who would be equally averse with the New to use his language expressive of the imputation of our sins to Christ. It is unnecessary to notice the differences on this subject among Old school writers, or on other questions connected with it, such as — whether Christ's sufferings during his life, or only those producing his death, or both, formed his atonement; whether his "active obedience" as contra-distinguished from his "passive obedience," made part of the righteousness on account of which we are justified; whether his incarnation and mediatorial work must enter into the estimate to be made of his obedience, by which many shall be made righteous; whether justification is entirely an act of grace, a perfectly gratuitous thing, with God, or whether it eventuates on strictly legal principles as the award of justice, the grace of the transaction lying back of the act, in the provision of mercy made through Christ for its exercise; and how the justice of God appears in the act of justifying the ungodly. No sliding-scale here would mark the lines of difference as between Old and New school Presbyterians, and the members respectively of either. The main questions of difference between them relate to the real nature of the formal character of the justice of God involved in forgiving the sins, and accepting as righteous the persons, of them that

believe. In stating them we must necessarily present the differing views of Old and New school Presbyterians in relation to the atonement of Christ.

THE ATONEMENT.

The answer to the seventy-first question of the Larger Catechism, as to "how justification is an act of God's free grace," is cordially accepted and believed by all Presbyterians, Old or New. It speaks of the full satisfaction to God's justice, in the behalf of them that are justified, made by the obedience and death of Christ, and traces the grace of God in the substitution of a surety, "imputing his righteousness to them, and requiring nothing of them for their justification but faith, itself the gift of God. It says nothing of the nature of the justice of God, which has received a proper, real, and full satisfaction by the obedience and death of Christ. The ground is left open, and is legitimate, for the investigations of theology. Would that they had always been conducted in an humble and fraternal spirit!

The consideration of the nature of the divine justice to which satisfaction has been rendered, necessarily suggests the inquiry: In what light or character is God, in the exercise of his justice therein to be viewed,—whether as a judge who hears, examines, and decides in a case according to law, or as a governor who exercises supreme authority in maintaining the laws and promoting the general and greatest good? The distinction is well understood in this country, and respected in our constitutional arrangements for the distribution of the functions of governmental authority into legislative, judiciary, and executive. God has revealed himself to us as judge, lawgiver, and executive ruler or governor, acting severally and distinguishably in these capacities, relations, or characters. They should not be confounded, notwithstanding the different functions are exercised by the one Supreme Lord and Creator of all things.

Old school Presbyterians regard the satisfaction rendered to the justice of God by the obedience and death of Christ

as explicable upon principles of justice recognized among men in strict judiciary procedures. While they concede that there is grace on the part of God in its application to the believer, inasmuch as he has provided in Christ a substitute for him, they nevertheless insist that he is pardoned and justified by God as judge, and as matter of right and strict justice in the eye of the law, inasmuch as its claims against him have all been met and satisfied by his surety. The obligations in the bond having been discharged by his security, the judge, according to this view, is bound to give sentence of release and acquittal to the original failing party, the grace shown being in the acceptance of the substitute. Their ideas of the nature of the divine justice exercised in the pardon and justification of the sinner because of the righteousness of Christ, are all taken from the transactions of a court of law. New school Presbyterians, equally with the Old, concede the grace of God in the substitution of Christ, the whole work of his redemption to be the development of "the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindness toward us through Jesus Christ"; but they prefer to regard and speak of the atonement of Christ, his obedience and death, by which he satisfied the justice of God for our sins, as the great expedient and governmental procedure adopted by the great God of heaven and of earth in his character of chief executive, the governor of the universe, in order to magnify his law and make it honorable, rather than as a juridical plea to obtain a sentence in court for discharging an accused party on trial.

There are two constituent parts of justification, or benefits accruing to the believer through the atonement and righteousness of Christ. These are pardon of sin and acceptance as righteous. Pardon is an act of sovereignty; to grant it is the prerogative exclusively of the highest executive functionary of government, whether of our State or national constitutions. God, the sovereign ruler over all, claims it as his (Mic. vii. 18; Isa. xliii. 25). He only can release the sinner from the penalty of the law. This grace

and mercy he exercises in the person of the Son of God, to whom, in his mediatorial office, "all power and authority in heaven and on earth are given."¹ The other constituent of justification is the acceptance of the person of the sinner believing, so as to treat him as righteous. He is not indeed treated as if he were innocent; for he suffers and dies, like the great ancestor of our race, who forfeited by his transgression all rights and immunities guaranteed only to perfect obedience. As a transgressor the sinner can lay claim to none of these, nor have any rightful ground of hope to escape from the exaction of the forfeit to his everlasting ruin and death. By justification through faith in Christ his relation to the law is changed. The forfeiture of eternal life and exclusion from the favor and friendship of God are not exacted. By faith we enter into the family of Christ, and become the children of God and recipients of the benefits received by his perfect obedience, viz. forgiveness of sin, acceptance with God, and a title to eternal life. The believers' faith is "imputed to him for righteousness";² it does for him what he never would have secured by his own righteousness, inasmuch as by the grace of God it places him in a new relation to his law, and entitles him to all the immunities and benefits forfeited by Adam, but restored and enlarged by Christ. "the second Adam."

Neither pardon nor righteousness can ever be claimed by the sinner as due to him; no suffering or repentance or good work on his part can ever atone for his past sins. He must for ever be indebted to Christ for "the atonement." In like manner, by no possible effort or righteousness of his his own can he ever justify himself before God. To the obedience of Christ unto death must he look for this. Here both Old and New school Presbyterians agree. But the questions, how Christ's sufferings and *death* atone for sin, and how his obedience avails unto justification through faith, as they do, — the philosophy of the way of salvation, — receive from them different answers and explanations, accord-

¹ Matth. xxviii. 18.

² Rom. iv. 22.

ing to their views of the nature of justice and their theories of government. The simple faith that saves needs none of them, nor asks for them. They are not therefore essential to Christianity. Whatever merit they may claim as human attempts to explain facts in their nature mysterious, their admission or adoption should never be made tests of faith and terms of Christian fellowship.

The theory of the Old school Presbyterians relative to the satisfaction rendered to divine justice by the sufferings and death of Christ, accords with their ideas and illustrations of justice, taken partly from commercial and partly from penal transactions. Some affect to despise the distinctions, as to the nature of justice, of which the younger Edwards and later theologians have availed themselves in their discussions on the subject of the atonement. They speak of three kinds of justice, more properly it should be said of three different relations and classes of circumstances calling for the exercise and manifestations of justice. The general idea of justice admits of no dispute. All agree in regarding it as the attribute or virtue, which determines one to render unto others their due. It is but another phase of the righteousness which determines its possessor to do right under all circumstances. These circumstances vary according to the relations in which one is held to others. There are the relations of debtor to creditor, in endless variety of circumstances; of the criminal to the law and government, and that in endless respects; and of those in authority to the general interest or public good. In human governments, the legislative authority enacts the laws designed to secure just and righteous conduct between man and man, and courts of justice decide in matters of doubt and dispute, and determine awards and punishments; and rulers, executive officers, are employed for enforcing the laws and maintaining their authority and promoting the public good. The justice concerned with commercial transactions, as between buyer and seller, debtor and creditor, is called commutative or commercial justice; that required in the decisions and awards of courts for the punish-

ment of offenders, is called distributive or retributive and punitive justice ; and that by which the ruler or executive is required and determined to maintain the honor and integrity of the government and advance the public good, is called general or public justice. The merits of theological discussions on the difference between Old and New school Presbyterians as to the atonement turn upon the question : In which of these three relations and respects, are the sufferings and death of Christ to be regarded as a satisfaction to the justice of God ?

In assuming the first, the Old school Presbyterian takes his notions and illustrations of the justice of God from the justice exercised among men in their commercial transactions. The sinner is spoken of as a debtor to God, and Christ as the surety or security in the note or bond. His sufferings and death are regarded as payment in full for all the sinner owes to God. The payment having been made in full by the security, the law has no further claims, and justice demands that the bond be cancelled and the debtor released from all further obligations. This analogy may represent the completeness of the satisfaction rendered by Christ to the divine justice, and of the deliverance of the sinner ; but it can hold good no further. The justice of God which demands satisfaction for sin, is different from that of the creditor, who justly requires payment in full according to the terms of the bond, and when paid is satisfied, whether that payment be made by the debtor or by his security. It is a justice that takes cognizance of criminal and not of commercial matters.

Old school Presbyterians aware of this, avail themselves also of illustrations taken from the several sorts of justice above referred to, viz. distributive justice, which acquits innocence and punishes crime. As in human governments punishment is sometimes commuted, as banishment or solitary confinement for death, or release from imprisonment by the payment of a pecuniary fine, so in the government of God, his justice, it is contended, admits of commutation,

and is satisfied as fully if the penalty be inflicted on a surety or substitute for the transgressor as upon the transgressor himself. The sufferings and death of Christ are accounted, according to this view of justice, by Old school Presbyterians, to be the penalty of the law for sin, inflicted on him as having stood "in the room and stead" of his elect.

The analogy here is far from being perfect or correct; for the commutation of one form of punishment for another is a very different thing from the substitution of the person of the innocent for the person of the guilty. It is the same guilty person that really suffers in human government in sustaining either form of punishment, except indeed where the punishment is commuted for a debt or pecuniary obligation, which the criminal by his friend or security may discharge. This however is to confound or identify crime with debt, which are distinguishable, and are not always or necessarily united. The Old school Presbyterian's idea of the substitution of Christ is, that his person is commuted for the persons of the elect, and therefore his sufferings and death were the very same punishment in penalty, in law, which might have been exacted personally from them in their eternal sufferings and death. To deny this, they account a denial of the vicariousness of Christ's sufferings and death, and of their real expiatory virtue.

The New school Presbyterian does not so understand it. It is contrary to the very nature of distributive justice — which has reference to personal character and conduct — to punish innocence and protect crime. No legal fiction can ever make it possible to transfer the personal properties of guilty sinners to the innocent Son of God, so that he should assume their character and become guilty and merit their punishment. The substitution of Christ and his vicarious sufferings and death he does not believe to have been a procedure either of commutative or distributive justice. He suffered and died, "the just for the unjust," the holy for the unholy, not according to law, but according to the agreement or covenant between him and the Father, in pursuance

of which he offered himself as a substitute for the infliction of the penalty, to which penalty the sinner only is or can be deservedly subjected. His sufferings and death take the place in the divine government of the endless punishment of any and every sinner of the human race who should believe in him.

Hence there arises a difference between Old and New school Presbyterians as to the applicability and extent of the atonement; the former limiting it to the persons of the elect, as the ransom paid specifically by name for each one, and designed for them only. The definite nature of the atonement is a logical sequence of the assumption, that the substitution of Christ's person was made for the persons of the elect, so as to entitle them, on principles of either commercial or of distributive justice, to exemption from punishment, because the penalty was endured by their surety. This Old school view of the definite nature of the atonement is felt, by many besides the New school, to throw embarrassment in the way of the free and universal offer of pardon and salvation in the preaching of the gospel. It is but just, however, to say that all Old school Presbyterians do not deny the indefinite nature of the atonement. Some believe and preach its availability for all, affirming its infinite sufficiency, as in itself adequate for the whole human race, though not designed by God to be actually applied to all. Others, adopting the views of "the marrow men" of Scotland, proceed a step further, and affirm that, on the ground of the infinite sufficiency of Christ's atonement, God has been graciously pleased to make a royal grant of him as a Saviour for sinners of the lost races of mankind, so that by virtue of this "deed of gift," an interest in him is conferred upon every one, and it becomes the duty of all who hear the proclamations of grace in the gospel to receive and appropriate Christ as his or her Saviour, — "the gift of God" to him or her for purposes of salvation.

The truth and theological consistency of these views, were formerly objected to by many in the Presbyterian church who, with Dr. Bellamy and other American writers of the

last century, condemned the language and ideas of the "Scotch seceders," viz. the Erskines, Boston, Wilson, and "marrow men" generally, on the subject of "the appropriation of faith;" but particularly as advocated in Dr. Hervey's "Theron and Aspasia," a work of extensive popularity in its day. Dr. Robert Smith of Pecquea and Leacock, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, father of the celebrated S. Stanhope Smith D.D., LL.D., president of Princeton College, and Dr. John McKnight, pastor of the first Presbyterian church of New York, and others, have left in published treatises their dissent from the seceder views as above stated. Yet they, in common with Dr Witherspoon, Dr. Davies, Dr Green, Dr. Miller, Alexander, and others, affirmed the infinite sufficiency of the atonement of Christ, in itself, for the salvation of the whole world, if God should see fit to apply it.¹ Although the New school Presbyterians would perhaps prefer the technical forms of speech, such as indefinite or

¹ The writer of this Article hopes he may be pardoned for noticing a small item of history, illustrative of the opposition once entertained by many in the Presbyterian church against the view of the seceder churches and "marrow men" of Scotland. When a student, under the care of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, from 1813 to 1815, he was subjected to repeated and rigid trials, because of his views on the subject of the infinite sufficiency of the atonement being the ground of God's gift of Christ to a lost world for purposes of salvation; and of that gift being so proclaimed in the gospel as to afford a warrant to every sinner hearing it to receive and appropriate Christ as his personal Saviour. Although his views were made the occasion of protracted discussion in the presbytery, and some hesitated whether to license him, a majority sustained all his trials, and he was licensed without any retraction of his sentiments whatever, and some years afterward permitted to see a large portion of the seceder ministers and churches cordially admitted into and incorporated with the Presbyterian church of the General Assembly. It has also been no small matter of satisfaction to observe, that the Old school Presbyterian Board of Publication, having their press and active members under the very eyes of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, have published an edition of "The Marrow of Modern Divinity," for sale and circulation throughout that branch of the Presbyterian church. Whatever may be the theological theory, and however logically inconsistent or otherwise, provided that the infinite sufficiency of the atonement of Christ, and its availability and applicability for the salvation of sinners of mankind without exception, be preached, and the Saviour of sinners be pressed on their acceptance, and the confident reliance of their hearts on him alone for forgiveness and justification and eternal life be required, therein he does and ever will rejoice.

general atonement, yet it is enough to agree in the faith of the fact that Christ "died for all," and that as a Saviour his blood and merits are applied universally, and are available for all to whom the gospel comes with messages of peace and salvation.

New school Presbyterians believe that the atonement of Christ may be much more satisfactorily explained by regarding it in the light of that sort of justice appropriate to, and required in, a public governor. This is called public justice, having relation to the public interests, the general good. The governing authority, the chief executive, has the special charge of all those great ends and interests of the public weal which are to be secured, not only by the execution of law, but also by measures which emergencies may demand, and which are not provided for by specific legislation. The obligations of public justice require, that right be done in all cases of which law may not have direct cognizance, and that in estimating right, in such circumstances, governmental authority should seek to secure the greatest amount of public good with the least incidental evil. Examples of such justice in human governments are not rare. In a raging fire, to stop its further ravages and prevent the utter destruction of the city, public justice dictates that the ruling authorities take possession of and destroy the property of private persons, the question of compensation not being taken into account, but left for adjustment in the results of the future. So the governing authorities in time of war and peril, may seize the property of private citizens, levy contributions, and require personal service, when necessary for the welfare of the government or the public security. All sanitary regulations and abatement of nuisances and measures for general improvement must be traced for their sanction, to the obligations of public justice. Its exercise has no direct reference to law, and its obligations are those of high, ennobling morality, enforced by the demands of benevolence and the dictates of virtue. In this respect public justice is but a phase of goodness, as the righteous-

ness of God, essentially considered, is but the conformity of his will and actions to the promptings of his nature, which is love. It is by this that God, the great moral and supreme ruler, governs the universe. His moral law bears the inscription of his love, designed and adapted, as it is, to produce the greatest amount of good (Mic. vi. 8; Deut. xii. 28).

The rebellion of the human race against God is an event in the government of the universe, which demanded the exercise of the functions of his supreme authority. To have consented to it, and suffered it to run riot, would have been for God to have abandoned his throne, and proved himself—we speak with reverence—unfit and unable to govern. The law enacted for the human race was armed with the sanction of the penalty of death. “The soul that sinneth it shall die.” All have sinned and become guilty before God. The execution of the penalty upon our guilty race would have vindicated the law, and honored and maintained the government of God. But this result would have been secured by the utter and eternal loss of the entire human race to God and holiness and virtue, and therefore would have afforded occasion of malignant triumph, on the part of the great enemy and avenger, the first rebel apostate and seducer of man. To have withheld the execution of the penalty, and by an act of simple sovereignty overlooked and pardoned human guilt, would have been to have dishonored his law and renounced his moral government. Here, then, was an emergency of the most solemn nature. Shall an entire race of intelligent creatures be destroyed forever by the enforcement of the penalty? or shall God, by a gratuitous pardon, refusing to execute the penalty, subvert the grounds of confidence in his wisdom, justice, and truth on the part of rational creatures, and virtually abandon his throne? These were the alternatives of the dilemma which the rebellion of the human race presented to the great moral Governor of the universe. It was an occasion befitting and demanding the exercise of public justice. What shall the

mighty ruler of heaven and earth do? It was a mystery beyond the solution of the loftiest created intelligence.

This "mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ," has been solved by the scheme of redemption revealed to us in the glorious gospel of the grace of God. If the rights of God's throne can be maintained, his law be honored, rebellion be suppressed and overcome, and all the great interests of good and righteous government be secured, which had been provided for by the penalty of the law to be executed on the transgressor, and at the same time clemency be shown in the forgiveness and salvation of the penitent laying down the weapons of rebellion and returning to allegiance; then the dictate of public justice, according to the promptings of that benevolence which renders God the fittest being in the universe to exercise dominion, would be: let such an expedient be substituted for the execution of the penalty by the eternal perdition of the human race.

Such an expedient New school Presbyterians see in the divine plan of redemption, by means of the sufferings and death of Christ. It reconciles things that differ, and those that were opposed, so making peace between God and man, hence called the at-one-ment (*καταλαγή*), the reconciliation. It is not necessary to enter into minute details here of "the unsearchable riches of Christ," in order to unfold the marvellous adaptation of this expedient, the sufferings and death of Christ, for securing, through the salvation of men, all the great interests of good government, even more effectually than by the eternal perdition of the human race. It may suffice to state that the incarnation of the Son of God; his voluntary devotion to the work of recovering rebellious, ruined man; his perfect obedience to the moral law; his absolute subjection to the will of God commanding him to lay down his life and take it up again (John x. 17, 18); his suffering even unto death in perfecting that obedience; his uniting himself to our fallen nature, and dwelling among

men in this revolted and accursed world; his thus meeting and enduring, in common with the race, the consequences of man's rebellion against God, as really as if he himself also had been a transgressor; and his whole mediatorial work, so honorable to God,—are in his sight an ample compensation and satisfaction for the dishonor done to his law and government by the sin of man. It more than meets all the ends of good government that might have been secured by the infliction of the penalty on the persons of the guilty, while it thus renders it practicable for God to forgive and save, and provides a subduing power of love to make the rebel return, in faith, repentance, and new obedience, to entire submission to God and friendly intercourse with him through a mediator. This atonement or reconciliation, secured by the sufferings and death of the Lord Jesus Christ, must ever thence be regarded by an intelligent universe as a sufficient reason with God, an expedient, abundantly satisfactory to his public justice as moral governor, so that the exercise of his pardoning prerogative may be freely indulged, and without injury to the interests of his government. So far from encouragement being given to rebellion by forgiveness under such circumstances, the motives and obligations to obedience are greatly and eternally enhanced.

It is obvious, therefore, that although Old and New school Presbyterians differ in their views of the justice of God more particularly concerned in the maintenance of his divine moral government, and in their illustrations of the nature of the same, yet are they both agreed in the belief of the following facts, viz. the necessity and reality of the atonement made by Christ; the full satisfaction rendered to the divine justice, so that God “might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus”; the substitution of the sacrifice of Christ for the infliction of the penalty on the persons of guilty sinners; and the expiatory virtue of his vicarious offering up of himself to God. They are both equally far from believing, that the sufferings and death of Christ were merely educational or scenical displays, sym-

bolical exhibitions for illustrating the love of God for fallen man. But while the Old school Presbyterian, with his views of a limited atonement, designedly restricted upon principles of commutative justice to the elect only, is embarrassed in preaching the free and universal offers of salvation by God to sinners of mankind without exception, although his faith may overpower his philosophy, the New school Presbyterian, according to his view of the nature and rationale of the atonement, finds no difficulty whatever in proclaiming to sinners universally of the human race the infinite sincerity of God in his offers of mercy and salvation, but can take his word and oath without the shadow of a doubt, as reliable assurance that he "hath no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but rather that he would turn [unto him] and live."

THE DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

Neither the high supralapsarian scheme of ultra-Calvinists of a former age, nor the conditional election of Arminians, can be charged on either Old or New school Presbyterians, as an item of distinctive belief. Both believe, according to the doctrine of the divine decrees, as set forth in the Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms, that God has a plan predetermined in his own mind from all eternity, which he is prosecuting in his providence, according to which all things eventuating are so rendered certain to him as to be the objects of his foreknowledge. Their differences on these subjects relate to the methods, metaphysical and philosophical, employed by them in attempting to reconcile the predestination of God with the free-will of man and the contingency of second causes. The Old school have charged the New with believing that God could have prevented the existence of sin in the world, but not without destroying the freedom of the human will, and that sin is incidental to any moral system. To this the latter reply, that God permitted the entrance of sin, but not because he was unable to prevent it; but for wise and benevolent reasons which he

hath not revealed. As to the disputations, whether sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, or whether God permitted it in order to give greater intensity to his glory, the New school Presbyterian prefers to remain ignorant, because it is not a matter revealed to us in the sacred scriptures. If a brother should say, that as friction is incident to matter so is sin to a moral system, and that therefore while God would not absolutely prevent it altogether, he seeks, like a skilful machinist, to limit and restrain it, and overrule it for the greatest good, the New school Presbyterian will be contented to reply: "prove it if you can." Should he in rejoinder be challenged to prove the contrary, he deems it sufficient to say: "when we so aver, then may you demand of us the proof." He prefers neither to assert nor deny, but lets it rest where God has left it, among the secret things that belong not to us.

That God foresaw that man, when tried, would act as he did and sin, neither Old nor New school Presbyterians will deny. If asked *how* God foresaw it, he prefers to be ignorant rather than wise above what is written. If the Old school Presbyterian affirms that God's foreknowledge is founded on his purpose, the New school Presbyterian replies that the absolutely certain futurition of any event is not essential to its being apprehended by Omniscience; for God has spoken of contingencies as possible, and under supposable cases certain, to arise, which never actually did occur, as when by oracle he replied to David (1 Sam. xxiii. 11, 12). He will not circumscribe the mind of Omniscience by reducing it within the limits of God's conscious intention. His foreknowledge is part of his Omniscience, the result of his predestination or of the adoption of his plan. In so saying he reverently assumes that there may be predicated an analogy between the divine and the human mind; but he prefers to let such themes pass, *sub silentio*, and to take off his shoes in deep humility when adventuring so near to God. The Confession of Faith is plain enough for him

when it affirms that "God knows whatever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions."¹

New school Presbyterians do not affirm that God exercises his sovereignty arbitrarily, i. e. willing for mere will's sake, but believes with the Confession that the decrees of God, his plan, or predestination are "according to the *counsel* of his will," for reasons known to himself, and in all respects wise and good, like himself.

In the decree of election they believe that the sin and ruin of the human race are presupposed. If, after having in various respects so misstated the difference between Old and New school Presbyterians, Dr. Rice will be admitted as authority, there is here in reality no difference. "Our doctrine," says he, "concerning the first sin committed by man, and in which the human race was involved, is simply that God *for wise and good reasons* decreed or purposed, first to permit sin, and secondly to overrule it for his glory."² The same position is applicable to the decrees of election and reprobation: they are for good and sufficient reasons known to God himself. New school Presbyterians do not affirm that faith foreseen is the condition with God for his decree of election, much less any good works. The objects of his election are to be made holy by the redemption of Christ; and the work of the Spirit is designed for this purpose. On this subject, according to the admonition of the Confession of Faith, cautious speech becometh us. Believing that God foreknew all of the human race who, in the progressive development of his plan of redemption through Christ, could be led to faith and repentance by the Holy Spirit, the New school Presbyterian avers that he affirms nothing at variance with the sacred scriptures and the standards of his church, when he says, that the divine decree of election embraces all whom God foresaw that he could, by the blood and spirit of Christ, in the providential development of his plan, bring to faith and repentance. The apostle Peter affirms

¹ Confession of Faith, Chap. III. sec. 2.

² Rice on Divine Sovereignty, p. 4.

believers to be "elect according to the foreknowledge of the Father."¹ Elect, says the New school Presbyterian, expanding this thought, not because God foreknew that this one and the other, left to themselves would believe; but because, according to the mystery of the divine Omniscience, he foreknew whom he could, by the truth and Spirit of Christ, bring to faith and repentance, as the plan of redemption should be developed and prosecuted by him throughout all the generations of men. Hence he affirms with the Confession of Faith, that the number of the elect is "so certain and definite (in God's view) that it cannot be either increased or diminished." This relieves the whole subject in his opinion from the harsh aspect of absolute, unqualified, arbitrary will, or a decree of election or reprobation without "*counsel*" or good and wise reason.

Old school Presbyterians are apt to adopt a more summary process by which to explain the mystery of election, affirming the choice of God to be wholly arbitrary, a simple, absolute exercise of sovereign will, without any reason whatever, except its designed arbitrariness. Rom ix. 15, where Paul quotes God as saying to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," etc., is adduced in proof of the absolute, unqualified arbitrariness of the decree of election. It is however worthy of critical attention, that the original Greek expressions, by which Paul has translated the Hebrew in Exod. xxxiii. 19, admit not of such a rigid interpretation. Ἐλεήσω ὃν ἂν ἐλεῶ, καὶ οἰκτερήσω ὃν ἂν οἰκτείρω are his words. He employs the Greek particle ἂν in connection with the subjunctive mode, as though the exercise of the sovereign will, asserted in the first part of the sentence, was dependent or conditioned on some circumstances apprehended in the divine mind. "I will have mercy on whom I *may* or *can* have mercy." The differences on the subject of the divine sovereignty are not radical; but like all already noticed on other topics, relate more to theological explanations of facts

¹ 1 Pet. i. 2.

than to the facts themselves, as reported to and received by the Christian's faith.

CONCLUSION.

The reader will draw his own inferences from the statements made in this Article. We think that in most instances he will agree with us in saying that the differences are not such as should separate brethren whose hearts and efforts might be much better united, ecclesiastically and socially, in advancing the great interests of Christ's truth and cause against the common enemy. Even Dr. R. Breckenridge, who contributed as much, if not more, than any other man, to the dismemberment of the Presbyterian church, five years afterward was constrained, in his discourse preached at the opening of the Old school general Assembly in 1842, to bear his testimony (though by no means in a kind spirit) to the radical soundness and superior orthodoxy of the New school branch of the Presbyterian church. Referring to the protest already noticed, which embodied a statement of the views of New school Presbyterians, as the reader has seen, in opposition to the false charges of error alleged against them, he says: "This extraordinary party could not lay aside its moral characteristics; and after doing so much to destroy the church and corrupt its faith, they drew up and recorded a confession, not only at direct variance with their own published declarations, but more orthodox than many who dreaded and opposed them ever held."¹ That protest contributed greatly to neutralize the reproach of heresy which, for a few years previously, had been so industriously circulated. His insinuations against the honesty and sincerity of those who adopted the confession it embodied, call not for our animadversion. The day, we trust, draws nigh when, instead of unkindly magnifying differences and making them pretexts for separation and angry contention, it will be found much better to study the things which make for peace, whereby we may edify one another. The want of

¹ The Calling of the Church of Christ, p. 15.

this spirit was, we doubt not, the prime cause of the measures which resulted in separation. Truth requires us to state our conviction that both sectional and sectarian jealousies exerted their influence to separate us, long before the division took place. That prolific source of incalculable evil in our country, the slavery cherished in the Southern States, had inflamed the minds and alienated the hearts of many; and although it was not publicly made a pretext for the division, yet the sectional relations and unmistakable sympathies which became apparent immediately thereafter, afforded undeniable proof, that differing views and dissonant moral sensibilities on this subject so inflamed and irritated as to render separation a desirable means of peace. The *coup d'Eglise*, if we may so call it, by which the separation was attempted in 1837, would have been lately imitated by a *coup d'Etat* in the state, for overriding the Constitution and establishing a new basis for the administration of the Federal government, had all the circumstances necessary for it as favorably concurred. Sectional strifes and jealousies, sustained by differing views and conflicting moral sensibilities on a great question of morality and religion, have convulsed the nation and shaken the government to its very centre and foundations. Ecclesiastically, the Old school branch of the Presbyterian church has suffered more deeply from it than the New. What Providence may have in store for the future, it is not for man to predict. But as to the great interests both of church and state, now so rent and perilled, our hope rests in the love and wisdom, the grace and care, of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the great administrator of divine providence, and "head over all things to his church," "God, blessed for evermore." Haste the day when a united country and united church, delivered from self-destroying measures and hostilities, shall have occasion to say: "Lo this [Lord Jesus] is our God; we have waited for him and he will save us: this is the Lord; we have waited for him, we will be glad and rejoice in his salvation!"

ARTICLE IV.

THE FATHERS AND FOUNDERS OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH.¹

BY REV. B. SEARS, PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

THE author of these interesting biographies gave ample evidence of his fitness for the task in his admirable *Life of Flacius Illyricus*, noticed in a former Number of this Journal. The present volume is a collection of gems, abounding in the rarest knowledge, drawn freshly from original sources. To the theologian of historical tastes, to the pastor and to the scholar, we can scarcely conceive of more delightful reading than is furnished by this volume. To make good this assertion, we cannot do better than to select a few of these lives and endeavor to give the spirit of them as far as our brief space will allow.

THE LIFE OF JUSTUS JONAS, FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES. By Theodore Pressel.²

It is a welcome sight to see such a pleasing personage as Justus Jonas moving about with the two great Reformers, Luther and Melancthon. His bright, clear intellect, his genial temper and spirit, his pure and untarnished character, his legal knowledge and great skill in practical affairs, his firmness united with a spirit of toleration, his flowing eloquence in the pulpit, and his easy and clear style as a writer and translator of Luther's works, combine to render him an attractive figure in the group of Reformers. He is a sort of Mercury by the side of Jupiter and Apollo, and other lesser divinities. While at Erfurt, a few years after Luther had gone to Wittenberg, first as student, and afterwards as professor of law, and as rector, he was an active and influential member of the society of poets or humorists, of which Mucianus was the head, and the poet Eoban Hess the chief ornament. Rarely, if ever, had a young man risen so rapidly to distinction in the university. When Göde, the last professor of the canonical law at Wittenberg, who resisted Luther and the Reformation, died, the Elector applied to Mucianus to recommend an eminent scholar as his successor. The latter had an interview with Jonas on the subject with a satisfactory result, and replied: "We have secured Jonas. He is just such a person as ought to be the successor of Göde. He is so at home in theology, so skilled in the law, so faultless in character, that

¹ Die Väter und Begründer der Lutherischen Kirche. VIII (Supplement) Theil. J. Jonas, C. Cruciger, P. Speratus, L. Spengler, N. v. Amsdorf, P. Eber, M. Chemnitz, D. Chytraeus. Von Dr. Theodor Pressel. Elberfeld. 1862.

² Justus Jonas nach gleichzeitigen Quellen. Von Dr. Theodor Pressel. 1862.

he cannot be sufficiently praised. His preaching is so attractive that the churches are crowded with hearers; his lectures are so prized that the students throng to listen to them. He is well known to the venerable Stautpitz, and is highly esteemed by Luther. . . . I thought of Erasmus; but he can only write; Jonas has the gift of speech. I recommend him as the best man for the place." During these negotiations, Luther arrived at Erfurt, April 6, 1521, on his way to the celebrated Diet of Worms, and Jonas joined him, and remained with him all the time he was at Worms. Notwithstanding the attempt of Erasmus, who had been his particular friend and correspondent, to dissuade him from going to Wittenberg, where "Luther's bold course was producing a tumult and drawing the attention of scholars away from classical studies to controversial theology," Jonas, who had, by daily intercourse, become warmly attached to Luther during those memorable days at Worms, accompanied him back to Eisenach where he parted with him, he himself going to Wittenberg, while the hero of the day went around by Mora, to be captured in a friendly way and conveyed to Wartburg. Jonas was pleased with everything at Wittenburg except that his professorship required him to teach the canon law. Melancthon, to aid him in his difficulty, wrote to Spalatin, the Elector's minister: "Yesterday our Jonas was installed. There is, however, one obstacle remaining, and it is our business in every possible way to retain this pious and learned man. But this will be impossible, if he must teach the papal law. You must see that we do not lose such a man for so trivial a cause. If for any reason we allow him to be drawn away from us, we shall act as if we had neither our reason nor our eyes. The university could not obtain an abler man." Two days after, Luther showed how highly he valued him by writing to him and dedicating to him his reply to Latomus. He exhorted Jonas, in teaching the canon law, to help the students "to unlearn what it taught." The new professor was allowed to teach theology, and was honored with the degrees of Licenciatus and Doctor of Divinity the same year, to the great gratification of Luther and his old friend Mucianus, of Gotha.

Jonas remained at Wittenberg twenty years, as an efficient laborer and faithful associate of Luther and Melancthon, himself holding the third rank among the Reformers in that place. He was then sent to Halle, the residence of Albert, Archbishop of Mainz, to conduct the Reformation which had appeared there in spite of the Archbishop's authority, and remained there eight years, till after the victory of Charles V. over the Protestants. The last few years of his life he was somewhat of a wanderer. Instead of giving any account of his life and labors at Wittenberg, we will give Melancthon's summary of the talents characteristic of the different men then prominent in that university. "Pomeranus is a *grammaticus*, who lays himself out on the words of the text; I am a *dialectic*, looking at the connection of the text, and seeing what Christian truth may be drawn out of it and inferred from it; Jonas is an *orator*, who can clearly and splendidly pronounce and unfold the text; Luther is *omnia in omnibus*."

Jonas was not less distinguished as a writer than as a speaker. He wrote the Latin and German with equal ease and elegance. Melancthon acknowledged that he was far surpassed by Jonas in the graces of German style. Luther alone excelled him in the vernacular tongue. This talent he employed more in translating the writings of the two great Reformers, from the Latin into the German or from the German into Latin, than in original composition. The translations of Luther's Theses, of his treatise of the Free Will against Erasmus, of Melancthon's *Loci*, and the Augsburg Confession are from his pen.

Of his call to Halle, in 1541, he says, in a letter to his friend Myconius, informing him of the change: "A wonderful providence of God! Three days before my departure from Wittenberg, I had no thought of such a thing." No other man, that could be spared from the University even temporarily, was deemed competent by Luther to undertake the management of the Reformation in the city where the primate of Germany resided. On his unexpected arrival, the people were overjoyed, the City Council alarmed, and the Cardinal enraged. The people, under his wise and skilful control, prevailed; the Council yielded; and the first ecclesiastic of Germany found it more agreeable to leave the town and take up his residence in Mainz, the proper seat of his power.

The heroic courage of Jonas excited universal admiration in the Evangelical party. Among the many letters of encouragement which he received, must be mentioned that of his intimate friend Myconius, written upon a bed of severe illness, in which he said: "I shall not die, but live to proclaim the works of the Lord, and among others, that you, my learned and very dear Doctor Jonas, have been sent into the very midst of the camp of our fiercest enemies, to drive off the plunderer and to restore to Christ his captives. . . . Go on, Lord Jesus, triumphing over the proud old foe; and you, my dear Jonas, go on fighting the battles of the Lord." The latter replied: "After I had, by invitation of the whole Council and the people of Halle, preached the gospel two weeks in that place, the Coadjutor, John Albert, sent me a message, commanding me to leave the city in all haste. I replied, with due respect, that I and the people of Halle would be obedient in all civil matters; but in matters of conscience, affecting so many thousand souls; "we must obey God rather than man."

At first, Jonas was sent to Halle to perform a temporary service; but it soon became apparent to him and to the people, that the state of affairs there was so complicated and delicate that it would be unsafe to leave them in any less skilful hands. He, therefore, obtained permission of the Elector to remain there three years, retaining his place in Wittenberg. He acted as preacher and superintendent at Halle, supported by his friends Poach, from Wittenberg, as arch-deacon, and Schumann, of Naumburg, as deacon. His first work was to introduce the Reformation into the principal churches of Halle, which was affected not without much opposition; his

next task was to reform and elevate the schools, which had sunk very low. He succeeded in placing over them E. Sylvius, a man of decided ability and learning. Meanwhile the three years' leave of absence expired, and in 1544 his return to Wittenberg was desired. But the city of Halle was very desirous of retaining permanently the man to whom it owed so much, and Jonas himself was reluctant to leave a field of action in which he had been so highly blessed. And yet, so attached was he to his friends and old home in Wittenberg that it was hard for him to entertain the thought of separating himself entirely from them. At the instance of Luther, the Elector granted him permission to remain at Halle without giving up his connection with Wittenberg. With what pleasure Luther contemplated the course of events is evident from a letter addressed to the people of Halle, May 7, 1545: "I have conferred with my dear friend, Dr. Jonas, very freely, especially on the state of the church among you. I learned that it prospers under the blessing of God, that its members live in a Christian manner, and that its teachers are of one heart and of one mind, and that the City Council also favors the gospel."

Cardinal Albert, archbishop of Mainz, died in 1545. His Coadjutor, John Albert, was elected as his successor in the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. But the city of Halle would not acknowledge his authority. After a long controversy, the parties agreed to refer the matter in dispute to the Elector of Saxony for decision, and the decision was given in favor of the city. Before the full benefits of this decision were realized, however, Halle for a time fell into the hands of the Catholics, by the defeat of the Protestants at Mühlberg.

It was with Jonas that Luther and his three sons remained as guests the three days of his last visit to Halle, on his way to Eisleben, where he died three weeks after his arrival. Jonas was his companion all this time, not leaving him for an hour, and receiving the last word (*ja*, yes) from his dying lips, in reply to the question whether he died in the faith which he had preached. He delivered the funeral discourse the next day in Eisleben, and was appointed by the Elector to follow the body to Wittenberg. In the troubles that were afterwards experienced by all the Protestants, Jonas was twice driven from Halle, and twice restored, and finally left it for good in the year 1551, and accepted a call as superintendent and court preacher to Coburg. Here he remained in honor and usefulness for two years, when, on the death of his friend, the old Duke, he resigned, spent a short time in Jena, and then settled as superintendent at Eisfeld, where he continued to his death, in 1555.

CASPAR CRUCIGER, FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES. By Theodore Pressel, 1862.

NICHOLAUS VON AMSDORF, FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES. By Theodore Pressel. 1862.¹

Next after Luther, Melanchthon, and Jonas, may be mentioned Cruciger and Amsdorf, as the most important of the circle of Reformers at Wittenberg. These two men were as unlike each other as the two chief reformers were. Cruciger represented Melanchthon as Amsdorf did Luther. While they all lived in harmony at Wittenberg, the closest attachment of Cruciger was to Melanchthon, and of Amsdorf to Luther.

Cruciger, of Bohemian descent, was born and educated at Leipsic. He studied Greek under the celebrated Richard Crocus, of England, then professor in Leipsic, and the scarcely less celebrated Mosellanus, who died so young and so much lamented. The latter was warmly attached to his young pupil, and "commended his abilities and diligence to the whole university." The earliest of Cruciger's letters preserved, speaks highly of the learning and zeal of his teacher and friend Mosellanus. Camerarius, speaking of Cruciger as his fellow-student at Leipsic, says: "As a boy, he showed such powers of mind that he acquired easily what we learned with great labor." He was present at the Leipsic Disputation in 1519. During the pestilence in Leipsic, in 1521, Cruciger's parents, whose sympathies were with the Reformers, seized the favorable opportunity to remove to Wittenberg, where the son was matriculated with Ratzenberger, the biographer of Luther, Medler, Veit Dieterich, and Spengler, all special friends of Luther. In Wittenberg Cruciger prosecuted the study of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, with a view to theology, and was the first man at the university who studied those languages with exclusive reference to theology. Others were classical scholars or jurists at first, and afterwards became theologians on espousing the doctrines of the Reformation. Of the other studies pursued in the university, he excelled in mathematics and botany. Even when at his meals, his Euclid lay upon the table before him, in order that he might lose no time. So mature was he in his studies, that, though he was but twenty years of age, Luther and Melanchthon desired that he might be a teacher in the university; but he was called to Magdeburg as a teacher, where his services were more needed by Amsdorf, now the reforming preacher in this place. Nothing will better show the estimation in which he was held than the letter of Melanchthon to him in 1525, after his return from Magdeburg, whither he had gone to aid him in organizing his school: "As I have, my dear Caspar, lived with you in the most confidential manner, ever since I first knew you, I cannot but give you a token of my love and attachment, now that you are

¹ Caspar Cruciger nach gleichzeitigen Quellen. Nicolaus von Amsdorf nach gleichzeitigen Quellen.

absent. . . . Nothing would please me more than to live with you, that we might share our studies, our conversations, our walks, and our recreations with one another." Cruciger remained three years in Magdeburg, instructing in the gymnasium and preaching every Sabbath. His school increased to such a degree that he was obliged to remove to a larger building; and his clear, and warm-hearted preaching was so attractive that the large church was crowded. At length, in 1528, Luther and his other friends felt the need of his aid at Wittenberg, on account of the swelling numbers of the students, and the frequent absence of Luther, Melanchthon, and Jonas, to attend public colloquies or imperial diets. He was appointed preacher in place of Pomeranus who was temporarily absent in Holstein, and, at the same time, supplied the place of Melanchthon as teacher in the university, who was then engaged in making the ecclesiastical Visitation in Thuringia. In 1530, he was dean of the philosophical faculty; in 1533, he was made Licentiate, and soon after Doctor of Divinity, and Rector of the university, an office which he repeatedly filled, especially in the stormy period of 1546-1548, signalized by the death of Luther, the capture of Wittenberg and of the Elector. There were times when Cruciger was nearly the only active teacher of theology in Wittenberg. Said Luther, in a letter to Melanchthon, in 1539: "Theology is now almost without a teacher. You are absent; Pomeranus and I are sick; Jonas is on a journey, and Cruciger is now the only teacher of theology." From the specimens of his lectures on interpretation, theology, and the history of Christian doctrines, it appears that his learning was very extensive, that his judgment was excellent, and his manner clear and attractive. Indeed, he resembled Melanchthon in all these respects, except that he was not so perfect a classical scholar, but was a much better Hebraist.

On the death of George, Duke of Saxony, in 1539, Cruciger and Myconius were selected to introduce the Reformation into the city and university of Leipsic. All the eminent men of Wittenberg took part in this great undertaking. Cruciger performed his work so well that the city of Leipsic insisted on his being permanently settled there, and nothing but the protest of Luther, who could not spare him, prevailed on the Elector to resist the application. He continued through his whole life a noble, firm but pure and amiable friend of reform, respected and beloved by all. His learning, candor, and judgment gave weight to his opinions, while his pure style and lucid order gave a charm to his writings. His life and character furnish a beautiful example of the value of the union of learning and religion in a public servant of the church. His death was as peaceful as his life was pure.

Amsdorf is almost the exact opposite of Cruciger. Though fully equal to him in ability, if not in learning, he resembled Luther in his faults rather than in his virtues, while Cruciger resembled Melanchthon rather in his strength than in his weaknesses. Amsdorf was straightforward and sincere in his character, powerful in his logic, undaunted, unflinching, unaccommo-

dating, unamiable in his opposition to what he received as truth. He was gloomy and morose ; and was as belligerent and crabbed, though not so hot-headed and waspish, as Flacius Illyricus. Luther could differ materially with Melancthon, and yet prize him highly. If at times he became impatient and severe, his generous nature would come over him again, and there was nobody like his dear Philip. Not so Amsdorf. When dark suspicions came over him, no generous sentiment mitigated them, no elevation of mind that could recognize merit different from his own. In his adhesion to the letter of all Luther's teachings, he lost the broad scriptural views of truth, which stretch far beyond the narrow enclosures of Luther's theology. Amsdorf was of the same age with Luther, being born in 1483. When the university of Wittenberg was founded, in 1502, he was one of the first students, owing, perhaps to the fact that he was a relation of Staupitz. In 1504, he was made master of arts, and became a teacher in the philosophical faculty. In 1507 and 1508 he took the degrees of baccalaurist, sententarius, and formatus, and was dean of the philosophical faculty. In 1511 he was made Licentiate and Doctor of Divinity. In 1513 and after, he was rector of the university. Soon after Luther's call to Wittenberg, in 1508, they appear to have been friends. He warmly espoused Luther's cause on the publication of the Thesis and the strifes that grew out of it, and accompanied Luther to the Leipsic Disputation in 1519. "Eck," he remarks in a letter to Spalatin, Aug. 1, 1519, "says everything that comes into his mind, without distinction, judgment, or sense ; and pronounces the words which he has learned by heart with great pomp and show." "He is not to be compared with Luther in doctrine or in art, in speech or in memory, any more than gravel or mud is with fine gold, though he excels in one thing—in bawling louder." Scheurl, who was the friend both of Eck and Amsdorf and the other Wittenberg theologians, said, in a letter to the first: "I follow with most others, the views of my friend Amsdorf, who holds firmly, honestly, and invariably to Luther's doctrine."

In 1521, Amsdorf, Schurf, and Jonas accompanied Luther to Worms, returned with him ; but Amsdorf was the only one of them who was with him when he was captured by two noblemen near Waltershausen and taken to Wartburg. Amsdorf knew what was to take place, though he did not know where it was to be done. When, in November of the same year, Luther, in the garb of a nobleman, left his Patmos, and came to Wittenberg to quell the religious tumult there created by the Zwickau prophets, he went directly to Amsdorf's house, with whom he had corresponded ever since their adventure at Waltershausen. From this time on, Amsdorf appears as an active promoter of the Reformation, writing with much vigor and preaching with great power. A broad theatre of action was open before him, when, in 1524, at Luther's recommendation, he was called to Magdeburg by the City Council, where he became superintendent, and labored with great energy and success for seventeen years.

During the whole of this period, Amsdorf was in constant communica-

tion with Luther, and exerted a great influence over him. No other person had such power over the latter, and Amsdorf was not the man to suppress anything that was in his heart, or to avoid a collision because great names supported what he deemed error. Few men ventured to say so plainly to Luther what they thought of some of his questionable views. But as Amsdorf complained, not of his severity but of his indulgence, perhaps he was not unwilling to listen to complaints with which he felt a secret sympathy. Erasmus imputed to Amsdorf's influence Luther's attack upon his doctrine of the free will.

It is to be regretted that on a subject where Luther was so sensitive and self-willed (or conscientious) as on the doctrine of the real presence in the Lord's Supper, his intolerance, and even cruelty, should have been spurred on by the still more ardent and intolerant zeal of Amsdorf. He was the man to stand by Luther in public conventions, or to take his place when the latter was absent.

Amsdorf was finally called from Magdeburg to be bishop of Naumburg, in 1542. As Julius Pflug, the Catholic bishop, irregularly elected by the Catholic party, was set aside by the Elector of Saxony to make room for Amsdorf, not only the Catholics, as such, but the nobility of Misnia, who felt themselves insulted in the person of Pflug, one of their number, opposed Amsdorf and all his measures in every possible way. This imprudent step, against which Melancthon warned the Elector, but to which Luther urged him, was one of the causes of the fatal Schmalcald war. Amsdorf's position was an unhappy one; but instead of yielding to opposition he threw himself into it with all his power. Meanwhile Luther, who kept up a lively correspondence with the new bishop, endeavored to comfort him in his perpetual troubles, while Amsdorf in turn imparted his own irritation to Luther, and was thus the means of increasing the asperity of his intercourse with the Papists and Zuinglians. "Amsdorf," says his biographers "belongs to that class of persons who do not yield to adversity, but are hardened by it to steel. The conflicts through which he passed in Naumburg embittered his spirit and increased his suspicious temper, which was already sufficiently strong. His mind became more and more gloomy. Every instance of gentleness towards the Catholics or the Swiss Reformers, was interpreted as apostasy from the truth and a denial of Christ. He was especially suspicious of Melancthon and his school, and was the cause, in part, of the bitterness of Luther's 'Short Confession of the Supper,' published near the end of his life, in 1544. He censured severely the articles on the free will and on the Supper, in the Confession of Cologne, drawn up by Bucer and approved by Melancthon." The differences between the disciples of Luther and Melancthon broke out openly after Luther's death. Hence Amsdorf and Flacius assailed Melancthon and his followers as apostates, because they did not regard all Luther's peculiar opinions as pure gospel. A more wretched period of bitter and unchristian controversy can scarcely be found than that which now followed. So unhappy are the effects when

theologians contend for human authority instead of the authority of Christ. We abstain purposely from giving any account of the wrangling and endless recriminations that grew out of the controversies about the Leipsic Interim, the *Adiaphora*, *Majorism*, and *Synergism*. We prefer to draw a veil over the weaknesses and miseries which beclouded the last days of a man otherwise upright and true, though somewhat rough and hard in his nature.

PAUL EBER, FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES. By Theodore Pressel.
1862.

Of the remaining lives comprehended in this volume we single out one as especially worthy of notice. In Paul Eber we have a good specimen of the disciples and immediate successors of the Reformers, whose history carries us forward beyond the times of Luther and Melanchthon. Although he was the particular friend of the latter, he was always true to the former, and is remarkable for his attachment to the doctrines in which both agreed, rather than for holding exclusively to the peculiar views of either. While his friendship made him inclined to sympathize with Melanchthon at first, his candor and independent thought restored the equilibrium in the end, and made him one of the most judicious, if not of the most profound, of the Lutheran theologians.

There is an old picture by Cranach, formerly in the Parochial Church at Wittenberg, representing the vineyard of Christ. On the left are the Papists laying waste the vineyard. On the right are the Reformers and their associates working in the vineyard. Luther is swinging the mattock and breaking up the soil; Melanchthon is bringing water from the fountain; Pomeranus and Cruciger are driving props into the ground for the vines; another is cutting off clusters of grapes, and a third is carrying them in a basket to the wine-press. Through the open gate are seen the pope, cardinals, bishops, and abbots proudly demanding their pay. Kneeling near the gate, is a man with his family, humbly asking for admission. In his person he is small, feeble, and hump-backed, but has eyes full of fire. This is Paul Eber near his own monument.

He was born in Kitzengen, near Wuresburg on the Mayn in 1511, and was the son of a tailor. He was sent to school in his native place, where he made such rapid progress that, at the age of twelve, he was sent to Ansbach to enjoy the advantages of superior instruction. Returning from this school he met with the accident which made him a cripple for life. He was thrown from a horse and dragged, with his foot in the stirrup, for a mile. This delayed his studies for a full year. Too weak for labor, and too poor to support himself at school, he, by a fortunate accident, was admitted, in 1525, into the newly opened Protestant school at Nürenberg, where, for six years, he received a careful classical training under such

¹ Paul Eber nach gleichzeitigen Quellen

teachers as Camerarius and Eoban Hess. He was placed upon one of the foundations by the liberality of the City Council, and was, furthermore, aided by the principal of the school and by others. It is not strange, therefore, that he called Nürenberg his "second native city."

When he had finished his preparatory studies, he was again in trouble. He says: "I had an incredible desire to fly to Wittenberg as soon as possible; and yet my father could not furnish me a single penny." His passion for study overcame his timidity, and he applied to the authorities of Kitzengen for a scholarship which was in their gift, and to one of the Council of Nürenberg for some little aid. Supported by the best of testimonials, he was successful in both applications, and was liberally provided for. He entered the university in the spring of 1532, when it was in its most flourishing condition. The fire of the first love burned in the hearts of both teachers and pupils; and of all who sat at the feet of the great masters of wisdom, few had a more receptive mind and heart, or brought with them a better preparation than Eber, now a little over twenty years of age. Camerarius, no doubt, recommended him warmly to his friend Melanchthon. Certainly he was at once received into the friendship of the latter, which grew more and more cordial to the end, and in the breast of the pupil survived the death of the teacher.

After four years' study at Wittenberg, Eber received his degree in 1536, and was admitted as tutor or repetent, whose office it was, not to give independent instructions, but to conduct the reviews of the professors' lectures and to aid students who needed private instructions. In this capacity, aided and directed by Melanchthon, he went through nearly all the studies taught by the philosophical faculty, that is, all but the professional studies. How admirably this intermediate position, between student and professor, for five years, prepared him for his future work, can easily be understood by those who know the value of mature scholarship for a teacher. In a letter to Baumgarten, Melanchthon said: "Eber has been of great use to us, not only in the instruction of the youth, but in other affairs which are imposed upon us much more than is customary in other universities. I was, therefore, very anxious to retain him here." July 15, 1541, five years before Luther's death, Eber could say, in a letter: "Yesterday, I learned from the rector that the academic senate had appointed me to a vacant professorship, and that the Elector had confirmed the nomination. As I did not seek this place so could I not decline it without exposing myself to the suspicion of refusing it because the salary was smaller than that of the other professorships. And yet I must hear that others took it hard that I (on account of being Melanchthon's favorite) should be preferred to them, though I would gladly give place to them, as I do not consider myself suitably qualified to conduct the declamations." Meanwhile Melanchthon looked out a wife, Helen Küffner of Leipsic, for his young friend, and the choice proved to be excellent. To meet the increased expense of house-keeping, Eber took private pupils, boarding and

lodging them in his own house, with all the joys and sorrows usually attending such a course. He could not accommodate all the applicants. He sometimes waited long for his pay. Two died in his house; the one in 1545, the other in 1568. His care over the young men under his tuition was so tender, and his influence so good that they often treated him as a father ever after. At first he was only professor extraordinary in 1544 he was made a regular, or ordinary professor. Luther prized him very highly. On one occasion, when the Leipsic theological faculty invited the Wittenberg theologians to be present at the ceremony of conferring of a doctor's degree, Luther replied that it would be impossible for him to attend, but that Cruciger and Eber would represent the Wittenberg faculty; "two men who will be welcome to you on account of their ability and talents for business as well as on account of old acquaintanceship." Warning his friends Melanchthon, Pomeranus, Cruciger, Major, and Eber against the dangers that should arise after his death, he turned to Eber at the close, and said: "Your name is Paul; see that you be a Paul; and after his example manfully teach and defend his doctrine." How deeply he felt Luther's death appears from the fact that he observed the day on which it occurred every year afterwards.

Luther had scarcely gone to his rest when Witttemberg was threatened by the emperor and finally overwhelmed with troubles. "In the midst of great waters," said Eber, in a letter to Sabinus, "we are struggling to perform our duties to the church and the school." But for a whole year, from November, 1546 to November, 1547, the university was suspended. Melanchthon fled to Zerbst, and most of his associates followed his example. Only Cruciger, Pomeranus, and Eber remained. Soon the thunderbolt of war fell upon them. In a letter of Eber to Melanchthon, dated April 25, 1547, he said: "Yesterday between four and five o'clock P.M., our cavalry were put to flight at Mühlberg. In the early part of the evening they reached our city. The two young princes and Otto of Brunswick have returned, but we have not yet received our pious and broken-hearted Elector. Many give out that he is taken prisoner. I congratulate you and your colleagues that you are removed from these scenes of danger. It was unwise in me not to escape when I could." Eber took his family to Kitzen-gen that they might be among his friends in case anything should befall him. Finally the university was re-opened, and Eber gave notice, Oct. 23, 1547, that he should resume his instruction. He now taught mathematics, astronomy, and natural history. In botany he said he should notice all the plants that grew in the vicinity of Wittenberg. He visited the mountains of Misnia in order to "observe in the mines the wonderful works of nature." He also gave lectures in mental philosophy and history.

In December, 1556, John Forster, Cruciger's successor, died, and the university nominated Eber in his place, in the following words: "For the professorship of Dr. Forster, who succeeded Cruciger as teacher of theology and of Hebrew, and as preacher in the Electoral church on Sundays and Wednesdays, we propose Master Paul Eber, who has been in the univer-

sity more than twenty years, and is favorably known, both at home and abroad, for his piety, learning, and intelligence." He commenced as professor of theology, with lectures on the original text of Isaiah. "You know," said he at the opening of the course, "that I have hitherto been occupied, with no little diligence, in teaching the languages and the elements of the sciences. I would prefer, on account of my weakness both of body and mind, to continue in the same studies; but there are reasons why I should yield to the will of the Prince and the Senate." As a theologian, he took his ground in the following solemn manner: "I declare myself to be a member of the true church, of which this our church is certainly a part. Therefore I will not depart from our confession of faith, nor introduce new doctrines, nor sow dissensions, but, with God's assistance, I will maintain the pure doctrines according to the writings of the prophets and apostles." All his future life showed the sincerity of these words. A few months afterwards, Pomeranus died, having been pastor in Wittenberg thirty-six years, and Eber was appointed his successor, as preacher in the city church, and superintendent of the electorate of Saxony. As there was, at this time, only one Doctor of Divinity, George Major, the others having been removed by death, Melancthon prevailed (though not without difficulty) on Eber to receive that degree, which, at the same time, was given to Crell, Major's son-in-law. It was only six months after this, in January, 1560, that Eber was called to stand at the death-bed of Melancthon, his dearest earthly friend. Ever after this event, he seems to have longed to follow his friend to his final rest.

We have Eber before us, henceforth, in the three capacities of preacher, professor, and superintendent. Now, for the first time, are all his talents put in requisition. From this time forth we find him acting a leading part as a teacher and as an ecclesiastic. Besides preaching in the city church, he for a time took upon himself the Latin service, which Melancthon had held on Sunday mornings for the benefit of foreigners. He prepared his discourses carefully. In the specimens given us by two of his hearers, who acted as reporters, we observe perfect clearness and transparency of thought, pure and terse popular language, and a direct practical aim. His office as pastor was very laborious in the years of the plague, especially in 1566. "It is a miserable sight," he observes, "to see a strong man cut down at once, or go through the slow tortures of a poison coming gradually to the surface and bloating the whole body. Still more terrible is the contagion which makes separation from the diseased a stern necessity. The ties of blood and friendship make it necessary to attend to the sufferer, but the public safety makes it necessary for those who do so to avoid the company of all others." He could not visit his sick parishioners without shutting himself out from all the rest. One of the preachers was obliged to attend exclusively to the sick, and confine himself with them. The epidemic raged most in the huts of the poor, requiring all Eber's energy to see that they were provided with the means of subsistence. We may mention, before

leaving this general topic, that he is the author of several beautiful Lutheran hymns, which have been much used in the church.

Notwithstanding his parochial duties, Eber entered, as professor of theology, upon the task of giving exegetical lectures upon the Old Testament and the historical books of the New, with the same ardor which he had formerly shown in the ancient languages and the sciences. He was accustomed to give a grammatical and historical interpretation of the scriptures as the only sure foundation of Christian doctrines. This, he maintained, was the only way of weeding out the errors of the scholastic theology. He speaks of the concord that existed among the professors of theology as adding much to their strength and comfort; but there was a drawback in their small numbers, being only three, and in the advancing age and declining health of two of them. He says in a letter, Nov. 10, 1564: "Dr. Major, with whom I am now connected by family ties, my son Paul having married his daughter Mary, is in the sixty-third year of his age and suffers from catarrh and from giddiness. I entered upon my fifty-fourth year last Wednesday. Dr. Paul Crell, the third, is but little over thirty. He studied fifteen years under Melancthon and other professors, and is well versed, not only in theology, but in *tota philosophia, lingua Latina, Graeca, et Hebraica*." Under these three professors, the number of theological students had not declined since Melancthon's death. In general, law students were becoming far more numerous than theological students in all Germany. The latter belonged to the poorer classes. Therefore Eber applied to the cities to furnish higher stipends for them, saying that ten or twelve guilders should be added to the forty, on account of the increased expense of living. He commended the majority of the beneficiaries of the Margrave George Frederic, but appended to his account some amusing comments upon others. "Some enter the university too young, before they are well grounded in the grammar of the languages; some, from their youth and from the influence of companions, lead too gay a life. Still it is hoped that they will yield to good counsels." One, John Seranus, is too fond of music and neglects his studies, but having been remonstrated with, has promised reform. Of one it is said that he has an overweening opinion of his knowledge. A third is not very diligent; he spends much time in fencing, and is in debt. A fourth is too attentive to a very good young lady, to whom he is prematurely engaged.

As superintendent of a large district, Eber was fully aware of his great responsibilities. With unremitting diligence and fidelity did he, as inspector and visitor of the churches and schools, provide churches with pastors, and watch over the faithful application of church funds to their legitimate objects. He complained bitterly, in a letter to a secretary in Anspach, in 1563, of the plunder of church property, "as though the devout of former times had established a fund for the recreation and amusement of the churches." "In stripping the servants of the church of their stipends, the people will in the end see how little blessing

would ensue." With great respect and gratitude did those who were under him submit to his wise measures, well knowing that none of their just interests would suffer in his hands. To prevent troubles and dissensions, and to maintain sound doctrine in a loving, peaceful way, was his constant aim, and he was so successful that, while divisions and strifes were rife all around, his province was preserved in a happy state of union. From his register it appears that from 1558 to 1567, he ordained 925 persons, some of whom had studied not less than eighteen years at the university.

Application was made to him from all quarters for pastors and school teachers. He writes to a friend, August 22, 1565: "Among the difficulties of my office, this is not the least, that I am beset with requests to recommend preachers for the greatest variety of places. While I do a service to one church, I am blamed by others who do not wish to part with their pastors. Sometimes a man is not pleased with his new position, or he does not make good the place of his predecessor. In either case I come in for a share of the blame. But as destitute churches ought to be provided with able and good preachers, I cannot refuse to aid them in getting a supply." As early as 1560, he writes thus: "With the small number of the students of theology, who are almost universally poor, we are often obliged to avail ourselves of the services of those who would be benefitted by a more protracted course of study, not only in respect to knowledge, but in respect to maturity and experience. But the same poverty which drives them to the study of theology, not having the means of studying the other professions, forces them to close their studies prematurely." Again he writes in 1566: "Within a few years, many excellent, experienced, and learned preachers have been called away by death. It has been estimated that the plague has, within a circuit of fifty miles from Halle, including the territories of Magdeburg, the Hartz, Thuringia, Misnia, Mansfeld, Anhalt, and the Mark Brandenburg, carried off not less than three hundred and fifty preachers and pastors. This university and the universities of Leipsic and Jena have been decimated in the same way; and, moreover, many of the theological students are called to supply the places of the deceased. Thus the remaining students are very young, or are bound to various services on account of the stipends which they receive. It is therefore necessary to educate more men for the ministry, and to encourage those of fine promise by a more liberal patronage."

We do not propose to follow Eber in the controversies into which he was drawn, against his will, with theologians abroad on the Eucharist. He was a Lutheran of moderate views and of a most tolerant spirit; and all that he wrote tended to charity and peace. It is truly refreshing to find such "a rose among the thorns," such "a Daniel among the lions."

ARTICLE V.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRAVEL.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D D., NEW YORK.

MR. FORSTER pursues his theory of the Sinaitic inscriptions with a confidence and enthusiasm worthy of better success. His "Voice of Israel from the Rocks of Sinai," though it passed to a second edition in 1852, found little favor with oriental and biblical scholars ; — curiosity was soon satisfied from an inspection of its plates, and it was left to slumber upon the shelves of libraries. The ambition to prove too much, and the confident boast of great philological and historical discoveries, prejudiced the reader against even the moderate claims to original merit that might be conceded to Mr. Forster in his specialty. Not content with ascribing the Sinaitic inscriptions to the Israelites in their wanderings, he claimed to have discovered in those inscriptions, and upon sundry monuments of Egypt, vestiges of patriarchal tradition, conveyed in alphabetic characters of "the one primeval language," whose long-lost powers were now happily restored. This pretension was met with a scepticism little short of ridicule ; and after a brief controversy with his reviewers, Mr. Forster seemed to have subsided into the oblivion of the primeval chaos. But with the ardor of thorough conviction, he resolved to lay before the scholars of Europe the means of testing his interpretations and theories in detail, by *fac similes* of the inscriptions upon which they are based. The British government, ever ready to second the explorations of scholars and scientific men, sanctioned a mission of two gentlemen, Rev. Pierce Butler, and his brother, the late Captain Henry T. Butler, to make further researches, and to collect fresh materials in the peninsula of Sinai. These commissioners took moulded casts of numerous inscriptions, — a process adopted also by M. Lottin de Laval, under the patronage of the Imperial government of France, — and from these, photographs and glyphotographs were taken for the work before us.¹ "The hieroglyphic tablets and the cursive inscriptions, accordingly, are all given as they stand upon the living rocks ; on a greatly diminished scale indeed, but line for line, letter for letter, point for point. The fidelity of our materials, therefore," adds Mr. Forster, "is beyond the reach of scepticism. This is one grand step towards the discovery of their contents."

Since Niebuhr first brought to the knowledge of European scholars the

¹ Sinai Photographed ; or, Contemporary Records of Israel in the Wilderness ; with an Appendix. By Rev. Charles Forster, B.D., Six-preacher of Canterbury Cathedral, and Rector of Stisted, Essex. London : Richard Bentley. Imperial quarto. pp. 352. With many illustrations.

existence of the hieroglyphic tablets and other monuments upon the summit of Sarbut-el-Khadem, the theories of their origin have been almost as numerous as the archaeologists who have gone thither to inspect them. There is scarcely anything in Egypt itself more impressive than these sepulchral monuments, on the table-top of a steep and rugged mountain seven hundred feet high, in the rocky wilderness of the Sinaitic peninsula, pointing by their hieroglyphics to an Egyptian origin, yet remote from any known settlement, post, or garrison of ancient Egypt, and suggesting the presence of capital, of labor, and of skill in their immediate vicinity. Though the monuments are not numerous nor large, — being chiefly rows of upright slabs, eight or ten feet high, and the fallen walls and columns of a small temple, the whole covering an area of one hundred and sixty feet by seventy, — yet the isolation of these remains, the elevation at which they are found, the evidences of skill in the handling of materials and the execution of the sculptures, show that either some deep religious motive or some weighty social or official reason, prompted this difficult and costly memorial. Niebuhr suggested that Sarbut-el-Khadem was a cemetery, and associated it conjecturally with the graves of lust described in Numbers xi. 34.¹ Laborde, following the clue furnished by traces of copper mines in the vicinity, conjectured that this was a central mining station, and that the official miner set apart this almost inaccessible cemetery in imitation of the mountain tombs of the upper Nile.² Others have suggested an Egyptian colony, and yet others pilgrimages to this as a sacred mountain, to account for these anomalous remains. But all conjecture will be at random until the reading of the hieroglyphics shall furnish some definite data. Hence the great importance of the inscriptions reproduced in Mr. Forster's volume as a contribution to "experimental philology."

His own theory of the Sarbut cemetery is that it was the burial-place of the magnates of the Israelites, "the heads of tribes, the princes of the people, the elders of Israel, who perished in the awful plague of Kibroth-Hattaavah" which he labors to identify with Sarbut-el-Khadem. Upon this identification our author reasons in a circle — first arguing the identity of Sarbut-el-Khadem with Kibroth-Hattaavah from the Israelitish character of the cemetery and its inscriptions, and then arguing that these are Israelitish because found near the memorable encampment of Kibroth-Hattaavah. Still he adduces some few doubtful geographical and philological proofs of the identity here claimed. Following the maps of Ortelius and Goldschmidt, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he infers that the traditional geography of the Middle Ages had located the *Sepulchra Concupiscentiæ* in juxtaposition to Sarbut-el-Khadem. Kibroth-Hattaavah lay midway between Taberah and Hazeroth. The latter is proximately identified by Rob-

¹ Voyage en Arabie, Tom. I. p. 189. "Ne seroient-ce pas ici les sépulchres de la convoitise."

² Journey through Arabia Petraea, Eng. ed., p. 88.

inson, Burckhardt, Stanley, and others, with *Ain-el-Hüdhera* at the eastern extremity of the great sandy tract Debbet-et-Ramleh. Mr. Forster attempts also to identify Taberah with the Wadi Bêrah, which he interprets "The valley of the wrath of God." This Taberah was "a remote outskirt" of the great encampment at Kibroth-Hattaavah, which "lay along the plain for twelve miles, or a day's journey in length," — for so Mr. Forster interprets Numbers xi. 31. So far the geographical proofs, which are far from conclusive. They proceed, moreover, upon the assumption that mount Serbal was the true Sinai — an assumption necessary in order to bring the Israelites by the route of El-Khadem, and within the time specified in Numbers for the march from Sinai to Kibroth-Hattaavah. Upon this point Mr. Forster adds little to the well-known arguments of Lepsius,¹ Stewart,² and others in behalf of Serbal.

Mr. Forster's philological proofs of the identity of Sarbut-el-Khadem with Kibroth-Hattaavah rest upon his alleged interpretation of the inscriptions. These are of two kinds — hieroglyphic and cursive. With regard to the former he observes that, though they wear a general resemblance to the hieroglyphic tablets of Egypt, they are nevertheless marked by "the absence of the usual Egyptian symbols of Apis, and of most if not of all the Egyptian deities," and also by "the presence of symbols altogether unknown to the native monuments of Egypt"; and hence he infers that they were the works of a people so far under Egyptian influence as to adopt the monumental style of that country, yet not imbued with the spirit of Egyptian life and worship. "A crane-like bird, resembling a goose, with slender body and long legs, is the *leading* hieroglyphic symbol in the tablets of Sarbut-el-Khadem"; and this Mr. Forster claims to have identified with "the *salus*, or long-winged and long-legged fowl of the miracle," — the red-legged crane frequently seen on the upper Nile and in the desert. Taking this symbol as the key to the hieroglyphics, he makes a crude translation into such phrases as the following:

"Casts to the ground, propelling, the rapid-blowing wind the *nuhams*" (Arabic for the Heb. *salus* 'quails,' of our version). "The bow arrests the birds on the wing congregated; a sudden death; greedily lusting after flesh, die the gluttons"; and so on through a detailed description of the effects of this sudden greediness of flesh upon the stomachs and the marrow of the gluttons.

With respect to the cursive inscriptions, Mr. Forster maintains that "while the letters are mostly our present Hebrew, the language is the old Arabic or Egyptian"; that this was "the primeval language, an idiom indisputably coeval with the primitive division of tongues at Babel, always preserved buried in the Arabic lexicons, but from the rise of Mahomet lost to the Arabic writers;" and that this archaic idiom now "proves itself the master-key to the hitherto undecipherable Sinaitic inscriptions which,

¹ Letters from Egypt.

² Tent and Khan.

to the Arabic lexicon, uniformly yield senses simple, serious, and scriptural; senses tallying throughout with the Mosaic history, and elucidative of the events and miracles of the Exode." Following out this theory, Mr. Forster gives page after page of these rude cursive inscriptions, reduces them to Arabic equivalents, and finds in them the narrative of the crossing of the Red Sea, of the plague of Kibroth Hattaavah, of the water procured from the rock, — in a word, a record of all the salient points in the history of Israel in the desert.

Concerning Mr. Forster's reading of these mysterious writings we may observe that, while it carries with it a certain air of plausibility, the interpretation seems to be forced into accordance with a preconceived theory, rather than the theory deduced from the deciphering of the signs. Some of the characters at once suggest letters of the Hebrew alphabet; but Mr. Forster tortures others into Hebrew signs to which they bear hardly a remote resemblance. We have not found it possible, even with the aid of a powerful lens, to bring out in his photographs certain outlines which he professes to have deciphered and which he restores in full upon the printed page. Much of this deciphering is the merest guess work. In the sentences which he constructs from his arbitrary alphabet, Mr. Forster supplies the connections with the same facility. He bends everything to his theory with an enthusiasm which borders upon the ludicrous. Thus seizing upon the conjecture of Rev. Moses Margoliouth,¹ that the phrase "they were of them that were written" (Num. xi. 27) should be read, "they were among the inscriptions," Mr. Forster exclaims, with exultation: "The case is simply one of *alibi*. They [Eldad and Medad] went not out unto the tabernacle because they were elsewhere occupied in executing or directing the execution of those records of the Exode, graven with an iron pen, and lead, in the rocks forever"! Then leaping to his conclusion, he adds: "*This mention of the Sinaitic inscription by Moses himself*, in the book of Numbers, may continue to be questioned, but never can be refuted. The text is so simple, and the meaning so clear, when once elucidated from the phenomena to which it so plainly refers, that no hypercriticism can eventually succeed in replunging the question into that obscurity in which it was so long inevitably involved, solely from the absence of the only lights that could clear it." It is worse than useless to criticise an author who is capable of setting forth such reasoning in such verbiage.

As yet no palaeographer of eminence has accepted Mr. Forster's enchorial alphabet of these Sinaitic inscriptions, or followed his interpretation. Prof. Beer regarded the alphabet as unique, though having marked affinities with the Cufic; the language he believed to be that of the Nabathaeans, and the inscriptions memorials of religious pilgrims, in about the fourth century of our era. Prof. Tuch regards the dialect of the inscriptions as Arabic, — which corresponds with Forster's view — and he attrib-

¹ Pilgrimage to the Land of my Fathers.

utes them to the ancient Tawarah of the peninsula. He attaches no Christian meaning to the sign of the cross, so frequent in the inscriptions, and which Forster makes the Hebrew *Tau*. Upon the whole, then, we may still say with Dr. Robinson, that the origin of these monuments, "is a point wrapped in the darkness of time, which the hand of modern science has not yet unveiled."¹ It is well, for the further investigation of this curious topic, that Mr. Forster has laid before the scientific world the ample and exact transcripts of Sinaitic inscriptions which illustrate his elegant volume.

M. W. Pleyte of Utrecht, in a recent brochure, attempts to carry us back of the Exode to Egyptian sources of the religious belief of the Israelites.² From Phenician and Grecian traditions he derives the early founding of Phenician colonies in the Delta of Egypt, — traces of which he thinks exist in the monumental mythology of Egypt itself. The statement of Herodotus that the Phenician *Astarté* was worshipped at Memphis as a foreign Venus, is fully confirmed by recent discoveries. [See *Bib. Sac.*, Vol. xix. p. 840.] The invaders of Egypt known as the Shepherds or the Hyksôs, he regards as Palestino-Phenicians, descendants of whom M. Mariette announces that he has discovered upon the borders of Lake Menzaleh. [See below, upon the Suez canal.] With these invaders he associates, upon the authority of Arabic traditions the Pharanite Arabs or Amalekites, and from a comparison of traditions he derives "the historical fact that an Asiatic tribe once dwelt in the valley of Lower Egypt, and that it was composed of a *mélange* of Phenico-Palestino-Arabs, among whom, in all probability, were the Israelites."

The chief divinity of the Hyksôs was *Set*, who was worshipped originally as the good god. This divinity M. Pleyte seeks to identify with the *Seth* of the Hebrew genealogies; and he makes the religion of the Jews a *mélange* of the religions of Phenicia, Arabia, and Egypt, with which successively they came in contact: "Originating in Chaldea, they worshipped El or *El-Schedej*, the god of fertile fields, the god of nomades. In Phenicia they adopted the god Melech, and rendered homage to Baal. In Egypt they found the Egypto-Asiatic worship of Set or Sutech." Then after a severe conflict with the sensuous element in these various religions, Jehovism was established as the national religion of the Jews. In all this there was simply "a natural and regular development of intelligence, the fruit of a progressive civilization."

M. Pleyte's pamphlet is another indication of the tendency of modern scepticism to eliminate the supernatural element of the Pentateuch by discrediting its historical individuality, and reducing it to the level of oriental traditions. It is to this point, therefore, — the substantial truth of the

¹ *Researches*, I. 79. Forster styles "Dr. Robinson the American rationalist." But Dr. Robinson had dismissed his former book, as "too visionary to require notice."

² *La Religion des pre-Israelites. Recherches sur le Dieu Seth.* Par W. Pleyte. Avec X planches d'après les monuments. Utrecht: T. De Bruyn.

Pentateuch as a record,—that its defenders must turn their attention, if they would vindicate its claims as a revelation. In this course of investigation biblical scholars are not idle.

Professor Rawlinson of Oxford, to whom we are already indebted for the elucidation both of Herodotus and of the Old Testament from the monumental records of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon, has issued the first volume of his long-promised history of Chaldea, Assyria, Babylon, Media, and Persia.¹ This volume treats in full of the first monarchy, Chaldea, and in part of the second, or Assyrian. The author's plan embraces under each a general view of the country, its climate and productions, its people, their language and writing, arts and sciences, manners, customs, and religion, with a concluding sketch of the history and chronology of the nation, in a consecutive form. The author attempts to accomplish for the five ancient monarchies of middle western Asia, "what Movers and Kenrick have accomplished for Phenicia, and Wilkinson for ancient Egypt." Assuming that the cuneiform inscriptions have been successfully deciphered, and that the various ancient remains are assigned on sufficient grounds to certain peoples and epochs, he seeks "to unite with our previous knowledge of the five nations, whether derived from biblical or classical sources, the new information obtained from modern discovery."

Some of the conclusions at which Professor Rawlinson arrives are of special interest to biblical scholars. In his third chapter he argues in reply to Niebuhr, Bunsen, Max Müller, and others, that the Chaldeans were not an Aramaic or Semitic race, but *Hamites*. In the first place he combines the traditions of the Greeks and the Armenians to the effect that there were Ethiopians in Asia, along the coast of the Southern ocean, and adds to these certain affinities between the mythology of Chaldea and that of Egypt. But to this he adds a new and weighty argument from language.

"The conclusions thus recommended to us by the consentient primitive traditions of so many races, have lately received most important and unexpected confirmation from the results of linguistic research. After the most remarkable of the Mesopotamian mounds had yielded their treasures and supplied the historical student with numerous and copious documents bearing upon the history of the great Assyrian and Babylonian empires, it was determined to explore Chaldea Proper, where mounds of less pretension, but still of considerable height, marked the sites of a number of ancient cities. The excavations conducted at these places, especially at Niffer, Senkereh, Warka, and Mugheir, were eminently successful. Among their other unexpected results was the discovery, in the most ancient remains, of a new form of speech, differing greatly from the later Babylonian language, and presenting analogies with the early language of Susiana, as well

¹ The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World. By George Rawlinson, M. A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. London: John Murray.

as with that of the second column of the Achaemenian inscriptions. In grammatical structure this ancient tongue resembles dialects of the Turanian family, but its vocabulary is pronounced to be 'decidedly Cushite or Ethiopian;' and the modern languages to which it approaches the nearest are the Mahra of Southern Arabia and the Galla of Abyssinia. Thus comparative philology is found to confirm the old traditions. An eastern Ethiopian, instead of being the invention of bewildered ignorance, is proved to be a reality which henceforth it will be the extreme of scepticism to question, and the primitive race which bore sway in Chaldea Proper is demonstrated to have belonged to this ethnic type." (pp. 64, 65.)

From this conclusion Professor Rawlinson proceeds to the question of primitive origin, which he determines as follows :

"When the early inhabitants of Chaldea are pronounced to have belonged to the same race with the dwellers upon the upper Nile, the question naturally arises: Which were the primitive people, and which the colonists? Is the country at the head of the Persian gulf to be regarded as the original abode of the Cushite race, whence it spread eastward and westward, on the one hand, to Susiana, Persia Proper, Carmania, Gedrosia, and India itself; on the other, to Arabia and the east coast of Africa? or are we to suppose that the migration proceeded in one direction only; that the Cushites, having occupied the country immediately to the south of Egypt, sent their colonies along the south coast of Arabia, whence they crept on into the Persian gulf, occupying Chaldea and Susiana, and thence spreading into Mekran, Kerman, and the regions bordering upon the Indus? Plausible reasons may be adduced in support of either hypothesis. The situation of Babylonia, and its proximity to that mountain region where man must have first 'increased and multiplied' after the flood, are in favor of its being the original centre from which the other Cushite races were derived. The biblical genealogy of the sons of Ham points, however, the other way; for it derives Nimrod from Cush, not Cush from Nimrod. Indeed this document seems to follow the Hamites from Africa — emphatically 'the land of Ham' — in one line along southern Arabia to Shinar or Babylonia, in another from Egypt through Canaan into Syria. The antiquity of civilization in the valley of the Nile, which preceded by many centuries that even of primitive Chaldaea, is another argument in favor of the migration having been from west to east; and the monuments and traditions of the Chaldaeans themselves are thought to present some curious indications of an East African origin. On the whole, therefore, it is most probable that the race designated in scripture by the hero-founder Nimrod, and among the Greeks by the eponym of Belus, passed from East Africa, by way of Arabia, to the valley of the Euphrates, shortly before the opening of the historical period." (pp. 67, 68.)

The data derived from monuments and from the archaic cuneiform inscriptions, are not yet sufficiently numerous or determined to be accepted as a final authority. But there is much in these discoveries to stimulate inquiry,

and to awaken the expectation that the ethnological chart given in the tenth chapter of Genesis will be substantially confirmed from contemporary sources. Prof. Rawlinson expresses his own conviction that "the Mosaical narration conveys the exact truth—a truth alike in accordance with the earliest classical traditions, and with the latest results of modern comparative philology." He assigns to the establishment of a Cushite kingdom in Lower Babylonia a date of at least 2300 B. C. The great men of this empire were *Nimrod*, its founder (afterward worshipped as *Bil-Nipru*), *Uruk* the builder, whose reign was the era of the great temples, and *Kudur-Lagamer*, the Elamitic conqueror, who marched an army from the Persian gulf to Palestine.

With regard, however, to this latter monarch, Sir Henry Rawlinson now recedes from the identification of the *Kudur-mapula* of the monuments with the Chedor-laomer of Abraham's expedition, and proposes an entirely different reading. Such varying conjectures, while creditable to the candor of cuneiform scholars, do not inspire confidence in their accuracy; and until the interpretation of these monuments is reduced to a science, we must receive even the most plausible conjectures *cum grano salis*.

The ethnic character of the ancient Assyrians is less in doubt than that of the Chaldeans. The documentary records of their language are copious, and both Bunsen and Max Müller agree with Rawlinson that this was Semitic. But Ernest Renan regards it as a mixture of Semitic and Hamitic elements not yet definitely determined.¹ Our author regards Chaldea as "the great parent and original inventress of Asiatic civilization;" and since the settlement of Chaldea is traced to Egypt, we have in the early monuments of these kindred nations a striking witness for the genius and power of "the seed of Ham," which the politico-theological criticism of our times has pronounced "accursed." We shall await with interest the completion of Professor Rawlinson's valuable work. The Messrs. Appleton have announced their intention to republish it, in a style uniform with their edition of the author's Herodotus.

The sojourn of the Israelites in Judea, and the crossing of the Red sea, may possibly receive some fresh illustration from the explorations of the engineers of the Suez canal. That stupendous project already appears feasible, and the work steadily advances. Indeed, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps estimates that a little more than one year's labor will open the canal to commerce. The alimentary canal is now opened from the Nile to lake Timsah the interior port of the grand canal. This feeder, while connecting Egypt with the commerce of the East, is designed also to convey sweet water to Suez by a separate branch, and to irrigate and fructify the desert through which it passes. Its bed lies mainly in what M. Lesseps regards as the Goshen of the Scriptures. M. Lebeau, in his *Historie du Bas Empire*, following the Arabic geographer Abulfeda, says:

¹ Renan; *Histoire Générale des Langues Semitiques*, p. 214. 3d ed.

"The coast at Faramah (a town a little to the east of Pelusium on the Mediterranean) was only seventy miles distant from the Red sea. This space was a very smooth plain, slightly elevated above the level of the two seas. Amrou formed the design of uniting them by a canal, which he would have filled with the waters of the Nile; but Omar having opposed it, from fear of opening an entrance into Arabia for the ships of the Christians, Amrou turned his thoughts in another direction. There was an ancient canal, called Trajanus Amnis, which Adrian caused to be brought from the Nile near Babylon in Egypt, as far as Pharbaethus, now Belbeis. He met at this place with another canal, commenced by Nechos and continued by Darius Hystaspes, and the two together discharged themselves into a lagoon of salt water, at the outlet of which Ptolemy Philadelphus caused a large trench to be made, which conducted the waters as far as the town of Arsinoë, or Cleopatris, at that part of the gulf where Suez now is.

"The whole of this canal, being filled up with sand, had become useless at the time of the famous Cleopatra. Amrou was not deterred by the ancient prejudice, which, supposing the waters of the Red sea to be higher than the soil of Egypt, created a fear of opening a passage for them; and he made it navigable for the transport of the corn of Egypt into Arabia. It is that which is now called Khalig, which passes through Cairo, but it only goes as far as the lagoon called the Lake of Sheib. The remainder, as far as the Red sea, is entirely filled up, although some traces of it are still distinguishable."

This ancient route is re-opened, and the Wadi Tomilat promises again to become a Goshen. The analogy of the great plains of Chaldea, once teeming with fertility and with population, now an arid waste, simply for want of the old system of irrigating canals, will serve to illustrate the decline of that large eastern section of the delta of Egypt, once famous as the best of the land. Lesseps conjectures from topographical and geological surveys, in connection with early traditions, that the Red sea formerly extended to the lakes Amers (Bitter Lakes), and even to Timsah. He assumes as well identified, Rameses, Suecoth (now called by the natives "the sea of tents"), Etam (from neighboring tribes called *Etames*), and Pi-hairoth (now called "the bay of reeds"). Ras El Wady, "the head of the valley" Tomilat, he regards as the Pithom of the Bible. This valley debouches into Timsah; and Lesseps conjectures that Moses crossed, at low tide, between the extremities of lakes Timsah and Amers.

On the shores of lake Menzaleh is a population of some fifteen thousand fishermen, in a degraded servile condition, who are of a widely different type from the inhabitants of the valley of the Nile. Mons. de Lesseps supposes them to be of Assyrian origin. In the vicinity of *Tsane*, near the western shore of the lake, — the reputed site of the ancient Tanis or Avaris, — Mons. Mariette has discovered a line of sphinxes,¹ having a marked

¹ For a description of these sphinxes see *Revue Archéologique* for 1861.

Semitic physiognomy, whose features resemble those of the neighboring fishermen. It is conjectured that the Semitic invaders of Egypt who erected the monuments, still survive in this degraded caste. An inscription on Karnak records that *Seti*, a predecessor of Sesostris the Great, coming from Canaan to Egypt, halted at Zin (Gr. *Pelusium*, Ar. *Tineh*, so-called from the ooze or slime of the Nile); thence he advanced to Magdol (*Magdolum*, the *Migdol* of the Bible (?)) whose ruins lie between Pelusium and Kantara); next, he came to a city, traces of which are found not far from Kantara, and at last halted at Hereopolis (which some identify with Rameses, but Brugsch with Pithom). The inscription further states that there was here a canal from west to east, which was filled with crocodiles — a tradition preserved to this day in the name *Timsah*. Thus the re-opening of the eastern portion of the Nile delta to commerce and fertility, may bring us new illustrations of Goshen and the Exode.

The topography of Jerusalem is still the topic of essays, reviews, and even of volumes. Just as Dr. Robinson had closed his labors, we received the work of Berggren (pp. 444) with the title, *Bibel und Josephus über Jerusalem und das Heilige Grab wider Robinson und neuere Sionspilger* — a work written with elaborate research expressly to controvert the leading positions of our distinguished and lamented countryman. Part I. treats of the topography of Jerusalem, its walls, gates, towers, hills, valleys, pools, etc., as derived from Josephus and the holy scriptures. Part II. discusses at length the genuineness of the present sites of Calvary and the sepulchre upon topographical, historical, traditional, and archaeological grounds. Part III. is a systematic arrangement of extracts from the “Antiquities” and the “Wars” of Josephus relating to Jerusalem. This will be found very convenient for reference. Part IV. classifies the references in the Old and New Testaments to localities in ancient Jerusalem.

The strength of the book lies in its first part — the determination of disputed localities by the authority of Josephus and the Hebrew scriptures. The author resolutely denies that the substructions of the present citadel can be a portion of the tower of Hippicus — as held by Schultz, Robinson, and indeed by most modern topographers; yet he too maintains that Hippicus stood somewhere near the Jaffa gate.

“Indeed, as it is certain that no part of the disputed northwestern tower in the present citadel is or can be an antique remnant of the old tower of Hippicus, — provided that Josephus did not deceive himself as regards his description of the enormous dimensions of the stones in the substructure and the foundation of the three towers, — so it is certain, and sooner or later it will be settled forever, that if the old tower of Hippicus did not stand in the very place where the citadel stands to-day, yet it must unquestionably and incontrovertably have stood in the immediate neighborhood of the citadel, though perhaps somewhat to the north of it.”

Robinson argues that as Josephus wrote from memory, his dimensions of

Hippicus cannot be taken as exact; but the solidity of its foundation was its marked feature. Yet Josephus describes other towers with this same feature, having different dimensions. Berggren argues that the ell of Josephus was the medium ell of six handbreadths, of which four hundred make a stadium; and, applying this measure to the several walls and towers, he reaches the following conclusion.

"If Josephus, in what relates to the number of the towers and their distance from each other on each of the three walls, is to be understood as I have pointed out above, and by careful analysis have shown to be probable, then must we allow to the wall of Agrippa a considerably greater circuit and northerly direction than hitherto, and even make it include the traditional sepulchres of the kings, whilst the pyramidal tombs of queen Helena and her son must be placed three stadia north of the king's graves. Accordingly we must allow the lower city or Akra to stretch across the Tyropeon, having on the other side of the valley an eastern and northeastern section, which includes Antonia; and therefore a very differently shaped and constituted lower city from the Akra of Dr. Robinson."

That Zion stretched further north than the Jaffa gate, and that Akra lay wholly or in part to the east of the Damascus gate valley, are conclusions that are becoming more and more pronounced both in Germany and in England. Perhaps nothing but a thorough excavation of the modern city from the debris of centuries will settle the question.

ARTICLE VI.

COLENSO ON THE PENTATEUCH.¹

[In our April Number we inserted an Article from Professor Bartlett on the Historic Character of the Pentateuch. In our next Number we shall publish an Article from the same author on the Authorship of the Pentateuch. The following is Professor Bartlett's Notice of the work which has occasioned this discussion.]

DR. COLENSO has issued two parts of his discussion, and a third is promised.

Part I. has attracted much attention, for several reasons. It comes from a bishop of the church of England. It is bold in its statements. The positions are all palpable. Some of the points, moreover, are adroitly put, at least for immediate effect. The volume would have been more effective for the purpose in view, had a considerable portion of it been sup-

¹ The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined. By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part. I. 239 pp.; Part II. 303 pp. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1863.

pressed inasmuch as many of its objections are too manifestly invalid or unfair. Christian readers also, however unlettered, would be placed on their guard by the final result which the writer reaches in his relations to Christianity. Men who cannot solve a historic difficulty, can yet know certainly the work and influence of a present Saviour and the unspeakable value of his religion. Christ and Christianity are living facts. Still this volume will be and is welcomed by a large class of persons, as a new accession to the popularized forms of cavil.

The proper method of dealing with such difficulties as are here raised, is to view them in connection with a broad discussion of the general subject. For it is always part of the logical legerdemain of such treatises to fix our attention on the pennyweight of difficulty which they place with much ado in one scale, and to hide the hundredweight of evidence which reposes quietly in the other.

If we were briefly to characterize the effective qualities of the volume we should specify : first, great boldness of unfounded assertion and assumption ; second, a deliberate refusal to understand the *Pentateuch* from its own points of view, — more particularly a determined refusal to recognize (1) common idioms of speech ; (2) the writer's own mode of conception ; (3) explanations found in the volume ; (4) explanations too obvious to require mentioning ; (5) explanations possible and plausible.

I. Among the unfounded assertions and assumptions which are made the basis of cavils are several statements in regard to tents. It is said (p. 97) that they must have been "made of skins," although various passages of the *Pentateuch* imply the art of weaving both linen and hair cloth (Ex. xxxv. 25, 26 ; xxvi. 7, etc.), and any collection of Egyptian antiquities will exhibit cloth older than the time of Moses. It is said (p. 96) that the Israelites "were not living in tents in Egypt," implying that they had no tents at all ; notwithstanding the shepherd life which a large portion of them certainly entered upon in Egypt (Gen. xlv. 34 ; xlvii. 1 – 7), a mode of life from earliest times associated with tent life (Gen. iv. 20 ; xiii. 5 ; xxv. 27). It is assumed from one passing allusion (Ex. xvi. 16) that the narrative declares *all* the people to be well provided with tents, notwithstanding the "dwelling in booths" mentioned Lev. xxxiii. 52 ; and that these tents were in readiness at their departure, though they are not mentioned for a month afterwards. It is assumed in this and other connections, that the Israelites at their departure looked forward only to a three day's journey into the wilderness (p. 96), contrary to the tenor of ancient prophecy (Gen. xv. 14), of Moses's commission from God (Ex. xii. 16), of his explanation to the people (iv. 31), and of the well-understood issue of the whole struggle (vi. 1 – 8), which was a struggle for deliverance from Egypt. It is asserted (p. 113) that "this vast body of all ages [was] summoned to start, according to the narrative, at a moment's notice, and actually started, not one being left behind, together with all their multitudinous flocks and herds," and (p. 114) "the order to start was communicated suddenly at midnight" ; that "in

one single day the whole immense population of Israel was instructed to keep the passover, and actually did keep it" (p. 105); that "when suddenly summoned to depart, they hastened, at a moment's notice, to borrow in all directions, and collected such an amount of treasure in a very short time that they spoiled the Egyptians" (p. 108). Now it would seem sufficiently captious to interpret a historian's record of the final order to march, as a denial of all preliminary arrangements. But the allegations here made are rendered unpardonable by the distinct previous statements that Moses had from the beginning expressly informed the people of the coming result (Ex. iv. 30, 31; vi. 5-9); that the order to keep the passover on the fourteenth day was given at some time previous to the tenth day (Ex. xii. 3); that the direction about "borrowing" [asking], which was communicated to Moses at the burning bush (Ex. iii. 20-22), was also communicated by him to the people (according to the order of the narrative, xi. 2) prior to the directions for the passover, and that on the same occasion the people were also informed of the hurried departure at hand (Ex. xi. 4, 8). No doubt the final notice was very short, since the people, or a large portion of them, occupied probably with other preparations, "had not prepared for themselves any victuals"; but it clearly was not so short as to create any absurdity in the narrative. Very likely the expulsion from the royal cities was quite abrupt. Again the writer insists (p. 98) that the doubtful word *חַמְשִׁים* (Ex. xiii. 18) must mean "armed," though a word to which Gesenius, Ewald, Rosenmüller, Knobel, and the Septuagint each assigns a different meaning; and he further assumes that the whole six hundred thousand men over twenty years of age were armed, and apparently fully armed, in order to raise the question how they procured the arms. Whereas each of these three points is an open, if not doubtful, question. The fundamental word may mean (with Gesenius) "fierce, active, eager, brave in battle," or quite as likely (with Knobel) "in united ranks, or orderly bands," in opposition to a disorderly dispersion. Fürst gives the fourfold meaning "accincti, parati, instructi, armati," and De Wette the equally ambiguous translation, "gerüstet." The whole matter is of no great moment, as the principal armor of the age and region was exceedingly simple: bows and arrows the most common of all, a bull's-hide shield, a quilted helmet, a sling, a mace which was often nothing but a heavy club, a smaller curved club (*lissar*) which was carried alike by light and heavy armed troops and archers; a metal-pointed spear, short metal swords and daggers, battle-axes with metal blades, maces loaded with bronze, and rarely metal helmets and coats of mail. (See Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*.) The more simple and common armor was easily procured. In much later days we trace the scantiness of the arming. The army of Deborah and Barak seem (Jud. v. 8) to have had neither shields nor spears. Saul and Jonathan only, at the opening of the Philistine war, had swords and spears. Colenso assumes (pp. 116, 117) that all the Israelites marched in a body from Rameses to the Red sea; that they proceeded without any interval of

resting ; and that they accomplished the march of sixty miles in three days ; — all of them, particularly the last, gratuitous suppositions. He assumes that the distance “ without the camp ” where the ashes and offal of the sacrifices were to be carried, was probably “ six miles,” “ through the midst of a crowded mass of people ” ; whereas the Pentateuch (Num. ii. 17) informs us that the Tabernacle was surrounded by the single tribe of Levi, and calls that body “ the camp of the Levites ; ” besides which there was the “ camp of Judah ” east, “ the camp of Reuben ” south, the “ camp of Ephraim ” west, and “ the camp of Dan ” north, each of the last four containing three tribes. Without the camp of Levi will answer all the requirements of the narrative, and save the distant travel. The bishop even assumes that the direction found in Deut. xxiii. 12–14 required “ half a million men to go out daily — the twenty-two thousand Levites for a distance of six miles — to the suburbs for the common necessities of nature ” ; although any respectable commentator as Rosenmüller (after Le Clerc), Gerlach, Knobel, or even Scott less clearly, would have pointed him to vs. 10, and informed him that this is “ not to be understood of the Israelitish camps in the desert, but of the *military* camps ” when on warlike expeditions. He assumes (p. 195) that the three priests were obliged *personally* to sprinkle the blood of one hundred and fifty thousand lambs at the second passover, though he is constrained to admit (on p. 202) that nothing in the Pentateuch requires or “ implies it ” ; only in the time of Hezekiah, when the number of priests was greatly increased, they seem to have done so. He boldly asserts (p. 189) that around Sinai and in the wilderness “ it would have been equally impossible for rich or poor to procure ” turtle-doves or young pigeons according in the law (Lev. xii. 68). On what authority, he does not inform us, though naturalists declare that species of the great pigeon-family “ are found in every part of the world except the frigid zones,” and we know certainly that turtle-doves are abundant on both sides of this region, in Egypt, Asia Minor, and Palestine, where their natural home is in the wilderness (Ps. iv. 5, 7) and in the clefts of the rocks (Jer. xlviii. 28. See also Thompson’s Land and Book I. 415.) The volume is full of such assumptions and assertions.

II. On the other hand, the writer utterly refuses to understand the statements of the book from its own point of view :

1. He deliberately misconstrues common idioms of speech. The direction (Lev. iv. 11, 12) that the priest remove the offal of certain sacrifices without the camp, furnishes to his luxuriant imagination the picture (p. 87) of “ the priest having himself to carry on his back, on foot, the skin, and flesh, and head, and legs, and inwards, and dung, even the whole bullock.” The slightest consideration of the wide usage of the verb הֵצִיא, *to remove*, to say nothing of the fact that the Levites generally were appointed for the burdensome work of the tabernacle, to be at the disposal of Aaron and his sons “ in all their burdens and in all their service ” (Num. iii. 6–8 ; iv. 27), might have relieved his mind of this load of offal. In his corrections (in

part II), the bishop, while giving the priest "the help of others," still insists on his personal labor in the case. Perhaps we are to understand the ashes of the morning and evening sacrifice as being removed to a clean place by the priest himself (Lev. vi. 10, 11). Knobel, however, sensibly remarks, that this would "take place only from time to time"; and we find in Num. xix. 9, that some other person than the priest, in the case of the red heifer, gathered up the ashes. When a right understanding exists in regard to the camp no difficulty arises. In like manner the bishop insists that, when Moses or Joshua is said to have spoken to all Israel, the writer is thoughtless enough to state that his single voice was audible to two or three millions of people at once. Can it be necessary to say that as the Israelites were thoroughly organized and officered, not only by tribes and fathers' houses, with captains of tribes (Num. ii.), but also with rulers or captains of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, of tens (Ex. xxiii. 18; Deut. i. 15), Moses had only to proceed as the commander of an army communicating his orders now—through his subordinates? Still more ridiculous are the three pages of figuring (p. 78) to show that two and a half millions of people could not have been brought into the court of the tabernacle, an area of one thousand six hundred and ninety-two yards. A writer who could have repeatedly told so stupid a story surely would not be worth answering; his idiocy would be only the less astounding than that of a whole nation who for hundreds of years reverently received such a tale. Why should a man stumble over such assemblies of the congregation, any more than over the conventions of the Republican party of the United States, held representatively, even if such passages as Ex. xii. 3, 21, 28, and others did not distinctly in some instances identify the "elders" with the "congregation" and "the children of Israel"?

2. Dr. Colenso constantly refuses to enter into the writer's mode of conception. This is eminently the case in regard to the family of Judah (p. 60), and the points connected with it. He rigidly presses the phrase "came with Jacob into Egypt," notwithstanding the evident popular latitude with which the writer speaks, since, for example, he includes Jacob himself in the sum total among those which came out of his loins,¹ and even includes the sons of Joseph who, *as he informs us*, were "born in Egypt." Ewald, Kalisch, and others are undoubtedly right in understanding, from the intimations of vs. 12 compared with Num. xxvi. 19, 21, that Hezron and Hamul are reckoned as taking the place of Er and Onan, heads of families, and are here introduced, just as are Ephraim and Manasseh, heads of tribes, though born in Egypt. The whole statement is therefore a popular and inartificial mode of expressing an idea, which though obvious is not easy to state technically nor, when so stated, in keeping with the style of the composition. The writer contemplating the great nation which left Egypt, is moved to specify its insignificant number at its origin in Egypt. His explanation shows that the expression "which were with Jacob in Egypt" would

¹ "The fairest of her daughters, Eve."

have been more precise, though still inexact, as excluding Jacob himself. He would set forth *the nation's Israelitish ancestry in Egypt*, viz. the pure stock of Jacob, contemporary with him, and constituting the foundation of the nation, that is, its central head, the heads of its tribes, and the heads of its families (מִשְׁפָּחָה). These persons were most of them, though not all, in existence at the coming into Egypt. The plan of the list therefore excludes from the reckoning, (1) the sons' wives, vs. 26; (2) servants, if any, as is probable, Gen. xxxii. 5; (3) descendants of Jacob born after his death, except perhaps the children of Ephraim and Manasseh. It includes, (1) Jacob the head; (2) the second generation, actual or virtual, (a) his sons, heads of tribes, (b) the two grandsons born in Egypt, but adopted as sons and made heads of tribes, (c) the daughter of Dinah, who as a matter of fact, was in the company; (3) the third generation contemporary with Jacob, viz. (a) his actual grandsons, heads of families, (b) other grandchildren (Ohal, Gera, Rosh, and the sister Sarah), who either died without issue or were absorbed in other families, (c) certain numbers of the fourth generation made heads of families for special reasons, as Hezron and Hamul in place of their uncles, and Heber and Malchiel, grandsons of Ashu, perhaps because born in Canaan. The heads of families in the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh are not included in the list, probably because born after Jacob's death, though they became heads of families by virtue of standing in the place of grandsons. By simply recognizing some such underlying principle — whether we have correctly defined its *exact* limits or not — the statement of the writer is cleared of the alleged absurdity, and without resorting to the supposition of a special attempt to make out the number seventy.

The truth is that such a genealogico-historical table must always be looked at from the author's point of view, since its limits vary with his intention. Some of the facts in this case are well illustrated by Bradford's list "of those who came over first in ye year 1620, and were by the blessing of God the first beginners and (in a sort) the foundation of all the plantations and colonies in New England; and their families." Prince had numbered them as one hundred and one; Young, exactly one hundred; and Bradford calls them "about one hundred," while his list foots up one hundred and four; but the editor shows that it should be one hundred and two, two persons being deducted. Now Bradford twice speaks of them as those "that came over"; whereas one of the persons named died on the passage, one was born on mid-ocean, and one was born in Cape Cod harbor. The footing of one hundred and two was reached by the editor by dropping the last mentioned (Peregrine White) and counting the second (Oceanus Hopkins) *instead of the first*, William Butler. The editor, however, notwithstanding the verbal inaccuracy, still reckons the four who died on the coast before landing at Plymouth, among the "beginners" of that plantation. In later days (according to Young's *Chronicles of the Pilgrims*, p. 353) it has been customary to extend the list, and reckon all those who came over in the *Fortune* and the *Anne*, as well as the *Mayflower*, among "the old-comers or

forefathers"; much as this list in Genesis is brought down to a period seven-teen years subsequent to the entrance into Egypt.¹

3. This writer refuses to accept explanations afforded by the volume itself. Thus he insists (p. 154) that the coming out of Egypt "in the fourth generation" (Gen. xv. 16) must signify the fourth stage of genealogical descent, notwithstanding that the third verse previous (vs. 13) expressly fixes it as "four hundred years." Gesenius, Rosenmüller, Tuch, Delitzsch, Kalisch, and Knobel agree that a generation here is, in the words of the last-mentioned writer, "clearly a century"; while Rosenmüller explains that it is the sum total of the lives of contemporary men (e. g. Ex. i. 6). And when Dr. Colenso encounters the positive tracing of ten or (if Resheph be understood as the son rather than the brother of Rephab) eleven generations from Joseph to Joshua (1 Chron. vii. 23-27), for which interpretation such authorities as Knobel stand vouchers, he feels "justified in dismissing the whole account in the book of Chronicles about the genealogy as most probably erroneous" (p. 159). Meanwhile, however, Knobel still being witness, we find supplied six generations from Judah to Nabshon, six from Joseph to Zelophehad, and seven from Judah to Bezaleel, the builder of the ark. The genealogies, however, are commonly abridged so as to give only the landmarks of descent,—the tribe, family, immediate parentage, and a link or two between. Such abridgements cannot invalidate the positive statements of the fuller genealogy.

Here is also a full biblical solution of the difficulty concerning "the number of the Israelites at the departure," p. 162. The period of sojourn in Egypt—whether, with the Septuagint, Josephus, the rabbins, and many modern commentators, two hundred and fifteen years, or with Gen. xv. xiii. in round numbers, and with Ex. xii. 40 more exactly four hundred and thirty years, as firmly maintained by nearly all respectable late commentators on the Old Testament, except Baumgarten—actually contained *ten whole generations* from Joseph to Joshua, the latter being the eleventh in the line of descent from Jacob's youngest son but one. That fact is settled. If we then take Colenso's own data in other respects, viz. fifty-four males for the generation after Joseph, and four and a half as the ratio of increase, we shall reach a number far too large. But suppose we take only the forty-one grandsons of Jacob who are actually mentioned in Numbers as heads of families (exclusive of the sons of Levi), adopt four as the ratio of increase and even reject one generation on the ground that the generations in Joseph's line may be beyond the average, and we should still find a population of $41 \times 4^8 = 2,686,976$ souls at the Exodus, without reckoning "the mixed

¹ Professor Green, however, understands the list to be confined, in theory, to those who actually came into Egypt, exceptions being made in the case of Herzon and Hamul, who took the place of the dead, and Joseph's sons, whom Jacob adopted as his own. The lack of minute dates renders it difficult to determine the principle of reckoning in all its details, while it is very clear that there is an underlying principle.

multitude " who accompanied the people (Ex. xii. 38), and the remainder of the former generation still living, there ceases to be any difficulty on the score of increase. The only remaining difficulties on this point are : (1) the allusion by Paul (Gal. iii. 17), which speaks of four hundred and thirty years from the promise to the law, but which may be explained as a use of the Septuagint translation, not corrected (as also in Heb. x. 5), because the correction would make no difference in the argument, while the expression as it stands conveys no untruth. It was four hundred and thirty years — and more ; (2) the genealogy of Aaron, seemingly implying that his mother Jochebed was Levi's own sister, which has induced Ellicott, Alford, and some others to insist on the shorter period. The last difficulty, however, presses also on the theory of two hundred and fifteen years ; for as Levi was (see Ellicott on Gal. iii. 7) about forty-three years old at the coming into Egypt, and Moses was eighty at the departure, if Moses were actually the grandson of Levi, then, on the average, his mother must have been at least eighty-nine years old at his birth, and her father eighty-nine at her birth ! Some solution must be sought in any case. We can only say here that it is found in the supposition of omitted links of genealogy, either between Kohath and Amram (with Kalisch), or (with others) between Amram and Moses. Even Dr. Davidson declares in his latest work (Introduction, vol. I. p. 224) that " this solution is exposed to no serious objection." The former mode of supplying omitted links would hold that Jochebed, the mother of Moses, was another Jochebed than Levi's daughter, and one of her descendants — names being not seldom repeated even in biblical lines, and when so repeated always causing perplexity ; the latter would hold that Jochebed was the ancestor, but not the mother, of Moses, finding scripture authority to explain the mode of speech.

Dr. Colenso raises a difficulty on Ex. xxiii. 27 – 30, hinging on the small size of the promised land, which he declares to be but eleven thousand square miles, or twice the size of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex counties in England. Yet the very next verse (31st) defines the boundaries " from the Red Sea even unto the Sea of the Philistines, and from the desert to the river [Euphrates] " ; and a similar extent of dominion is promised in Gen. xv. 18 ; Josh. i. 4, and elsewhere. Rosenmüller would have informed the bishop that " these were in truth the boundaries " of the Israelites, a region five times as large ; Tuch and Knobel would have told him that " in its best days the Hebrew power had this specified extension " ; and Keith, that but for positive disobedience this dominion would have been both sooner and longer held.

4. This writer refuses to recognize explanations too obvious to require special suggestion in the text. As several cases have been involved in our previous remarks, and as other instances are obvious, we refrain from further specification.

5. He refuses to admit other explanations perfectly possible and admissible. The difficulty about the censers and the atonement money (p. 89) is in point. The *exact* correspondence of the two amounts points to the un-

avoidable supposition that both were the result of the same reckoning. The supposition is strengthened by the previous direction (Ex. xxx. 11-13), which connects the taxing with the numbering, by the evidence (Ex. xxxviii. 25, 26) that a numbering took place when the tax was collected, and by the fact that the actual payment of the tax and the returns of the military census were clearly within a very short time of each other, not more than six months apart. The only difficulty lies in the fact that the formal census-taking is mentioned as a new thing after the taxation. We answer, it is not only possible but probable that when the tax was collected it was done with the Egyptian accuracy of a registry of names. No classification was made, however. But the materials were now in existence for an accurate military classification by tribes and families. The direction for such a military census was accordingly given, and on the same day on which the direction was given the thing was done, (Num. i. 1, 18). This certainly looks more like an inspection of records by "the congregation" (vs. 18, i. e. their representatives) than an assemblage of people personally, on each short notice, to be numbered. In truth why should not a fresh record, careful enough for tabernacle taxation, be sufficiently accurate for military registration? Would not a further census be superfluous?

In this entirely illogical mode does this writer pass through the *Pentateuch*, confounding simple incompleteness of statement with inconsistencies and absurdities. It is idle to attempt to fasten such charges on any narrative, so long as some wanting brick can be supplied which would form a perfect coherence. All that is necessary in such a case is, not that we *know* the wanting fact, for the loss of the fact constitutes the difficulty, but that we can suggest a supposable fact. It is a principle of constant use in judicial investigations.

In many other instances, likewise, had the narrative given us but one additional remark the cavil never could have been raised. Suppose that in connection with the relative small number of the first born (p. 141), it had been simply stated in the scriptures that this number includes only those born after the enactment of the law; suppose that in reference to the Danites, though only the family of Hushim is mentioned as belonging to the tribe (p. 169), it has been added that Dan had daughters whose offspring were reckoned in the family of their brother, or that Hushim himself had three more children than his grandfather had, or simply that he had a large number of children and grandchildren, and the alleged difficulties vanish. Yet these explanations are perfectly possible.

The assertion of the impossibility of maintaining the cattle of the Hebrews in the wilderness, rests solely on our lack of knowledge, and not at all on any counter showing from contemporary facts. The difficulty is not a new one. We suggest the following heads of solution: (1.) The present desolation of the region is in effect somewhat exaggerated. Neither its degree nor its universality is so great as is implied in Colenso's entire statement. Let one fact suffice. Caravans of five thousand pilgrims from Africa to Mecca now pass directly through the desert of El Tih, "a region,"

says Stanley, "far less available for the resources of life than the mountains of Sinai," where the Hebrews tarried a long time. (2.) There is positive proof, given by Ritter and by Stanley, of a great deterioration in the character of portions of the wilderness within historic and even modern times. For example, the acacia (shittim) trees in the whole Sinaitic peninsula have been for years disappearing and even ruthlessly destroyed; so that while still abundant on the eastern and western clusters of mountains, yet on the central one, where the tabernacle and the ark must have been built of this very wood, not an acacia is now to be seen. Any person who knows what an effect the denuding of a mountain range of its trees will produce on the brooks and vegetation around and below in a very few years, will appreciate the significance of this single fact. Any New England farmer can understand it. We may boldly pronounce it impossible to say from the present nakedness and barrenness of such a mountain region that it could not have been vastly different two hundred, much more three thousand, years ago. Stanley and Ritter call attention to the numerous rock-inscriptions scattered through that region, on Sinai and Serbal, in Wady Mokatteb, and in a hundred other ravines, and on the tops of rocks and mountains; to the numerous remains of a former population in that region, and to the fact that before the passage of the Israelites four different nationalities, the children of Amalek, Midian, Ishmael, and on the east the Edomites, had their abodes in the desert; and Ritter concludes that "from the small number of its present population no certain conclusion can be formed as to its former condition." The theme admits of great enlargement. (3.) It is probable that the flocks and herds were widely dispersed from the central camp, like those of the Bedouins. J. L. Porter in the Syrian desert "rode for two consecutive days in a straight line through the flocks of a section of the Avazeh tribe of Arabs, and the encampment of the chief was then at a noted fountain thirty miles distant, at right angles to my course; yet the country was swarming with men and women, boys and girls, looking after their cattle." The camp would be but the central nucleus for the flocks. (4.) It is not necessary to suppose that they retained their herds undiminished. We find the tribes of Reuben and Gad specially mentioned at last as seeking a home east of the Jordan on account of "the multitude of their cattle." This too was after the capture of a great number of cattle and sheep from the Midianites (Num. xxxi). (5.) It is manifest from the narrative that great hardships were experienced. It was "a great and terrible wilderness," where they suffered at times both from hunger and thirst. Once at least God interposed by miracle to sweeten the bitter water, and once to bring water out of the rocks, "whereof the congregation drank and their beasts" (Num. xx. 11). (6.) It is therefore not to be forgotten that the narrative declares the people to be under the special guidance of God; and though Colenso may regard all such statements as "unhistorical," we hold that he who could in the last resort bring miraculous supplies, could also shape the action of natural

causes themselves to yield unwonted supplies. The special guidance and guardianship of Israel by God throughout is the burden of the story.

On the whole there is nothing of which this book so much reminds us as the persistent efforts of a wily advocate to mislead a jury by impudent assertion and deliberate misconstruction of the testimony. And there is no process before which it would so shrink into nothing as the searching examination of a legal mind fully informed on those subjects.

Part II is devoted to a consideration of the age and authorship of the Pentateuch. It deals more with questions of scholarship and criticism, and is much less popular in its cast. As a discussion of the subject from that point of view, it bears no comparison with those of German scholars, or with that of Dr. Davidson in his Introduction (1862). As the whole subject is undergoing a discussion in this periodical; and the objections will be probably met more at large than can be done in this place, we refrain from further comment.

ARTICLE VII.

THE TERCENTENARY JUBILEE OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.

[This Article was prepared by Dr. Philip Schaff, and forms a fit appendix to Dr. Gerhart's Article, published in our January number, on the German Reformed Church].

THE Heidelberg Catechism is the most generally received doctrinal symbol of the Reformed Confession, as distinct from the Roman Catholic, and the Lutheran. It is more particularly the creed of the German Reformed and Dutch Reformed churches in Europe and in this country. It was prepared at the request of Frederic III., justly surnamed the Pious, Elector or the Palatinate, Zacharias Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus, the former a pupil and intimate friend of Melancthon, the latter a pupil of Calvin. After being examined and approved by a synod of the Palatinate convened for that purpose at Heidelberg in December 1562, it was first published January 19, 1563, at Heidelberg, the seat of the oldest German University, and at that time the capital of the Palatinate on the Rhine. Hence it is called generally the Heidelberg Catechism, after the city of its birth, or also the Palatinate Catechism, from the electorate of that name for which it was originally intended. It soon found extraordinary favor, and threw all the older Reformed Catechisms, even that of the great Calvin, into the shade. It was introduced as a guide of catechetical instruction and as a confession of faith into the various Reformed churches of Germany, into several Swiss cantons, into Hol-

land, Hungary, and Poland. It was also approved by the Reformed church of Poland, and published among its doctrinal standards. It was translated into Latin, ancient and modern Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, all the leading languages of Europe, and several dialects of Asia. Innumerable commentaries and sermons were written on it, especially in Holland. For in several countries it was made the basis of catechetical discourses on Sunday afternoon. It is supposed that the Heidelberg Catechism was more frequently printed, translated, assailed, defended, analyzed, explained, and written about than any other catechism of the Christian religion.

The theology of the Heidelberg Catechism grew out of the combined influences of Zuinglianism, Calvinism, and Melancthonian Lutheranism, which met in the Palatinate, and especially in the University of Heidelberg, about the middle of the sixteenth century. It represents the mildest form of Calvinism modified by the influence of the gentle and peaceful Melancthon, who was himself a native of the Palatinate, who controlled the Reformation in that country, and who in his latter years decidedly leaned towards the Reformed Confession, especially in regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. The catechism occupies thus an intermediate and conciliatory position between the Lutheran Confession in Germany and the strict Calvinistic churches of France, Holland, England, and Scotland, and extends the hand of fellowship to both. Hence it was acceptable to the Melancthonians, or Philippists, and Crypto-Calvinists, as they were called in Germany, and was endorsed at the same time in the strongest terms by the strictly Calvinistic Synod of Dort.

One of the chief excellences of the Heidelberg Catechism is its devotional character. It is not simply the product of profound theological study, but also of fervent prayer and meditation. It is full of unction, and baptized by the fire of the Holy Ghost. It speaks the language of Christian experience, and addresses itself to the heart as well as the mind and memory of the pupil. It regards the catechumen not as an outsider, but as standing already in covenant relation with God by virtue of his baptism and connection with Christian parents, and thus bound to serve him, and to grow up more and more in the nurture of the Lord. By its practical character, its theological depth, and spiritual richness it has become a book of devotion to the adult as well as a guide in the instruction of Christian youth.

The first question which has always been admired as a real gem in catechetical literature, is characteristic of the whole spirit and tone of the work. It contains the theme, and answers the first and last question of man's only comfort in life and in death, making it consist in his vital union with the Saviour for time and eternity. "What is thine only comfort in life and in death? That I am not my own, but both in body and soul, in life and in death, belong unto my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ, who by his precious blood fully satisfied for all my sins and delivered me from the power of the devil, and so preserves me that without the will of my Heavenly Father not so much as a hair can fall from my head; yea all things must work to-

gether for my salvation. Wherefore by his Holy Spirit he also assures me of everlasting life, and makes me ready and willing henceforth to live unto him." The second question contains the division, stating, that in order to enjoy this comfort, man must know three things: first his own sin and misery in a state of nature, secondly the redemption of Christ, and thirdly his debt of gratitude to God. This threefold order is taken from the Epistle to the Romans, where Paul first treats of man's sin and need of redemption (i. – iii. 20), then of the Christian redemption and justification by faith (iii. 21 – xii.), and last of man's gratitude for so great a salvation (xii. to the close). It corresponds also to the practical experience of the Christian who passes from the state of sin and misery to the state of redeeming grace, and thereby is enabled to serve God and to do his holy will. In the second part the catechism gives a most skilful popular exposition of the Apostles' Creed, and the third part an equally able and impressive exposition of the ten commandments and the Lord's prayer. The whole contains one hundred and twenty-nine questions and answers, divided into fifty-two Sundays with reference to the old Reformed custom of preaching catechetical sermons. Each question is amply fortified by scripture proofs, which upon the whole are very judiciously selected, although several might be replaced by more convincing passages.

This catechism was transplanted to America by the Dutch Reformed church after its settlement on the banks of the Hudson, 1609, or rather 1618, when the first congregation was organized on Manhattan Island, and by the German Reformed church since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The German Reformed church owns no other symbolical book besides the Heidelberg catechism, and thus reserves to itself considerable freedom for theological progress. The Dutch Reformed church recognizes in addition the articles of the Synod of Dort, and is thus like the Old school Presbyterian church, more decidedly committed to the strict Calvinistic scheme of theology on the subject of a double predestination, original sin, and the loss of free will by the fall.

It was in honor of this venerable Catechism, which is now three hundred years old, and thus has outlived the time generally allowed by Roman Catholic controversialists to the duration of heresy, that the synod of the German Reformed church in the United States held a memorial convention in the city of Philadelphia from the 17th to the 23d of January last. This jubilee, the first of the kind held in the churches of this country, has a more than denominational significance, and claims the respectful attention of all the branches of the old reformed family. It is important that the original reformed family feeling which has given way of late to sectional and sectarian names and interests, should be revived again. Calvin, the strongest, and Melancthon, the gentlest, of the Reformers, agree, among other things, in their fervent desire and prayers for more unity and harmony among the evangelical churches and Christians of their age. Let us remember their prayer, and labor for the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace, and thus

counteract the centrifugal tendency towards excessive sectionalism and individualism so strong in our age and country. One of the most effectual means to this end is to go back to primitive foundations and the common starting-point of the various evangelical denominations, and a careful study of their genius and history, by which they will learn to know and appreciate each other more and more.

The object of the tercentenary celebration of the formation and publication of the Heidelberg catechism was to revive the ever memorable history of the Reformation under its reformed aspect, yet with perfect respect for the Lutheran section; to connect the church of the present with the church of the past, and to invigorate and urge it to renewed energy, and by all the impulses to be derived from the heroic period and the pentecostal days of Protestantism. It is also contemplated to make this movement practically useful during the remainder of the present year by way of general contributions for the more complete endowment of the literary and theological institutions and the increase of the missionary activity of the German Reformed church.

It was a special favor of Providence that this branch of the old Reformed communion was permitted to celebrate this festival of peace in spite of the clamor and distraction of civil war. The convention, though held in the midst of winter, was very largely attended from all parts of the German Reformed church, and by distinguished ministers of the leading evangelical denominations, especially Presbyterians and Lutherans. The Presbyterian Historical Society sent official greetings from Westminster to Heidelberg, which were properly responded to by Dr. Nevin, the venerable President of the convention. It lasted a whole week. Several sessions were held simultaneously in English and in German at two churches, without however breaking the unity of the convention. The spirit which prevailed was free from denominational and sectarian bigotry, and truly Melancthonian, catholic, and Christian. Nothing occurred to mar the harmony and good feeling, and all parted with a deep sense of gratitude to God for the rich spiritual feast they were permitted to enjoy.

The principal and most interesting part of the convention consisted in the reading and discussion of about twenty essays, which were especially prepared for the occasion by distinguished divines of the German Reformed church in Europe and in this country. This was the first time in history that German professors addressed an American audience, and they did it with great credit to themselves, and to the full satisfaction of the hearers. Drs. Ullmann, Hundesbagen, Ebrard, and Herzog treated their subject with learning, talent, tact, and excellent spirit. Their productions were read both in the German original and in an English translation prepared from the manuscript. These various essays brought out successively the leading events and characters of the Reformation — this most stirring and important period of the church history next to that of the Apostles. In the language of the closing address of the convention, "Luther, the Elijah of

Protestantism, the humble monk who from his quiet study at Wittenberg shook the world by the simple power of faith; Melancthon, the meek and gentle, the mild and lovely, friend both of Luther and Calvin, whose last care and prayer was for the unity of the evangelical churches; Zuingli the honest and hardy son of the Swiss mountains, those symbols of power and freedom, whose chief object was to insert the pure Christ from the fountain of the scriptures into the hearts of men; Calvin, the exile from the land of his birth for his faith, the great theologian, legislator and disciplinarian, whose master mind and holy zeal for the glory of sovereign free grace still controls the most earnest and active portions of Protestant Christendom; Frederick III., confessedly the most pious and one of the wisest and best of all princes of that period; Ursinus, who expressed his inmost life in the inimitable first question of his and our catechism, and who declared that he would not take ten thousand worlds for his conviction that he belonged to Christ for time and for eternity; Olevianus who sealed his faith by a pious death, his last word being a triumphant *certissimus* to the question whether he was still assured of his salvation: these and other heroes of faith, together with the stirring thoughts and facts of that most eventful age arose from the grave of history, and spoke burning words of wisdom and counsel to this convention and the church it represents. But the Reformation itself strikes its roots in the Middle Ages, and Mediaeval Christianity rests on the ancient Christianity, and the fathers echo the voice of the apostles, and the apostles point us to Christ, the great Captain of our salvation and the ever-living head of the church, which is his body, the fulness of him who filleth all in all."

All these essays together with the opening sermons, free addresses, and a history of the Tercentenary Movement will shortly appear in an English and German Memorial Volume, also a triglott edition of the Heidelberg Catechism in German, Latin, and a new English version. Free copies of these works will be sent by order of the Convention to the leading theological seminaries of the country. We can here only give in conclusion a list of the subjects of the Essays with their respective authors:

- I. The Swiss Reformers. By Prof. Dr. Herzog, of Erlangen, Germany.
- II. Melancthon and the Melancthonian Tendency. By Dr. Ebrard, of Erlangen, Germany.
- III. The City and University of Heidelberg at the Time of the Reformation. By Prof. Dr. Hundeshagen, of Heidelberg.
- IV. The Heidelberg Catechism and its Fortunes in Germany, especially in the Palatinate. By Prelate Dr. Ullmann, of Carlsruh, Germany.
- V. The Heidelberg Catechism in Scotland. By Dr. Schotel, of Leyden, Holland.
- VI. Critical Introduction to the proposed Tercentenary Triglott edition of the Heidelberg Catechism. By Dr. S. N. Nevin, of Lancaster, Pa.
- VII. The Elector Frederick III., or the Pious, of the Palatinate. By Dr. B. S. Schneek, of Chambersburg, Pa.
- VIII. Ursinus and Olevianus. By Prof. Thomas C. Porter, Lancaster, Pa.

IX. The Confessional Relations of the Heidelberg Catechism. By Dr. E. V. Gerhart, Lancaster, Pa.

X. The Theological System of the Heidelberg Catechism. By Dr. M. Kieffer, Tiffin, Ohio.

XI. The Genius of the Reformed Church as compared with the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran Confession. By Prof. T. Appel, Lancaster, Pa.

XII. The Organism of the Heidelberg Catechism. By Rev. Thomas Appel, Greencastle, Pa.

XIII. The Theoretical and Practical Mission of the German Reformed Church in America. By Dr. Philip Schaff, Andover, Mass.

XIV. The Theological Seminary at Mercersburg. By Dr. B. C. Wolff, Mercersburg, Pa.

XV. The Necessity and Use of Creeds. By Rev. J. B. Russell, Pittsburg, Pa.

XVI. The Heidelberg Catechism in the Dutch Reformed Church of America. By Dr. De Witt, New York.

XVII. The Fortunes of the Heidelberg Catechism in the German Reformed Church in America. By Dr. Bomberger, Philadelphia.

XVIII. The Educational System of Religion. By Rev. D. Gaus, Harrisburg, Pa.

XIX. Creed and Cultus. By Dr. H. Harbaugh, Lebanon, Pa.

XX. Catechetics and Catechetical Instruction. By Rev. B. Bausman, Chambersburg, Pa.

ARTICLE VIII.

LATEST GERMAN THEOLOGICAL WORKS.

BY PROF. W. F. WARREN, OF BREMEN.

(1.) *Die Psalmem Uebersetzt und Ausgelegt*, von Dr. Ferdinand Hitzig, Professor der Theologie in Heidelberg. (Vol. I. 8vo. pp. xxxi and 312. Price, 2 Thaler). This is the title of a new commentary upon the Psalms, the first volume of which, reaching to the 55th, has just been issued. A former work of Dr. Hitzig's (*Die Psalmen, Historischer und kritischer Commentar nebst Uebersetzung*, 2 Bde.) appeared in 1835-36, and created no small sensation by the boldness of its "positive" criticism. De Wette having endeavored in his Commentary (1811) to throw doubt and suspicion upon most of the results of contemporary and former biblical scholars without substituting anything reliable in their place, Hitzig seems to have felt himself called upon to complement his predecessor's negative and destructive work by setting forth the positive results to which the new and "only truly scientific" principles of biblical criticism must necessarily lead. Accordingly he set himself to the determination of the real authorship, age, etc., of each Psalm from internal, philological, and rhetorical characteristics.

The result was a denial of Davidic origin to all but *twelve* (to wit, 3, 4, 7⁸, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19), the attributing of a score or more to Jeremiah (5, 6, 14, 22-41), and the assignment of more than half of the entire Psalter (all beyond the seventy-third) to the age of the Maccabees! This was pretty resolute criticism, but seems to have only prepared the way for von Lengerke, who in 1847 quite distanced his Heidelberg predecessor, by refusing to the "sweet singer of Israel" the authorship of a solitary Psalm in the whole collection. This however was so manifestly overdoing the thing that it failed even to endanger Hitzig's position as the main representative of the extreme school of what Delitzsch calls "omniscient, positive criticism," in the department of Psalm interpretation. During the thirty years which have elapsed since this position was accorded him, the scholarly works of Hengstenberg (1842-47), Vaihinger (1845), Tholuck (1843), Ewald (1839), J. Olshausen (1853), Hupfeld (1855-62), have appeared, and in them the pretended results of the Heidelberg critic have been abundantly discussed. Accordingly he now reappears to retract, as he tells us, whatever the continued study of the subject since his *debut* in 1835 has led him to abandon or modify, and to expose the weakness of that which has been urged against such of his positions as he still maintains. The work proves far less controversial, however, than one would expect from the author's peculiar position, and indeed from his brief preface. We have not found time to compare all his new results with the old; but from a somewhat extensive examination we are led to believe that his retractions are by no means numerous or important. The first and second Psalms are still attributed to Alexander Jannacus, twelve only allowed to David, and the latter half of the whole book again relentlessly assigned to the Maccabean age. The author's is the simple old-fashioned plan; first a general introduction to each Psalm, then an original poetic version of it, and, under this, brief philological, critical, and explanatory notes, nearly as compressed and dense as De Wette's. Its typographical outfit is remarkably neat and comfortable to wearied eyes. Vol. II. will complete the work, and is already in press.

(2). *Die gegenwärtigen Parteien in Staat und Kirche. Neunundzwanzig akademische Vorlesungen*, von Stahl (Berlin: 1863. pp. viii and 393. 8vo.). These lectures of the late Dr. Stahl of Berlin constitute probably the most popular course he ever delivered. Their theme is: "the Parties of the Present, in State and in Church." They were prepared and for the first time read 1850-57, and were repeated four times, the last being in 1856-57, when the writer had the pleasure of hearing them. At that time so great was the enthusiasm of students, and even of the public, that the most spacious auditorium could not contain the crowd which struggled for admission. Often have we waited nearly an hour in the midst of a patient throng before the door, that we might be sure of a chance when once the hall should be opened. Men of almost every rank and station were there: generals, parliament members, artists, cadets, actors, merchants; every class was represented. What Sir William Hamilton says of the enthusiasm

with which Cousin's Lectures on the History of Philosophy were greeted in Paris might be applied to Stahl's course on the Parties of the Present, year after year. He was often requested before his death to publish them, but he desired to reserve them for his disciples in the University. His political position is well known. He believed in kings by divine right, denied every form of popular sovereignty, maintained the inviolable sanctity of all rights based upon historical developments or inheritance, abhorred all written constitutions, and only desired that the absolute power of the sovereign should limit itself (not be limited) by the Christian principles embodied and taught in the church, and by regard to the varied interests of all classes represented in the organically interacting, but in no sense authoritative, institutions and factors of the national organization. In Lectures 2-24 he characterises and criticises the *political* parties of the present; in the remaining the religious and ecclesiastical. Lectures 2-6 are devoted to the parties of the Revolution; 7-9 to the liberal party: 10-12 to the constitutional party; 13 to the constitutional monarchy, as distinguished from the last-named party; 14, 15 to the democratic party and to North American Democracy; 16-20 communism and socialism; 21-24, to the party of legitimacy. His own fraction of this party he denominates "Institutional Legitimist," to distinguish them from the absolutists on the one hand, and on the other from the admirers of parliamentary constitutional monarchy. The section on North American democracy is exceedingly interesting to an American, exhibiting as it does the exact estimate which the great theological and royalistic statesmen of Prussia had formed of our government before the flames of civil war broke out. While he will not allow to European democracy any close affinity with the American, and while he finds in the history of the American colonies much to excuse our form of government, he cannot nevertheless justify the Revolution, or regard our institutions as either theoretically or practically superior to monarchical ones. Of New England, however, and of her influence upon the whole nation, he says not a few handsome things; adding that "if ever a people were called by origin, history, and circumstances to a democratic organization, that people was the population of New England." To her he attributes the *democratizing* of all other colonies, their decision to revolt against England, etc., "New England is the prototype and leader of North America." The portion relating to ecclesiastical parties is less important, especially as the anonymous editor has taken the liberty of omitting the two final lectures. He doubtless did so under the impression that, as his maturest views on the subject had already been given to the public in the enlarged second edition of his work on Church constitution, published soon after his death, these older lectures would prove superfluous. We think it would have been better to have given them as contributions toward the history of the development of the distinguished Doctor's views.

(3). *Babel, das Their, und der Falsche Prophet. Biblisch-symbolische Studie über Offenbarung Johannis 13-19. Nebst eine Einleitung in die Apokalypse,*

von A. Ch. Laemmert. Pfarrer zu Weil in Württemberg. (Gotha : 1863. pp. 130.) — This little essay is a modest contribution to a freer and more spiritual method of interpreting the symbols of the Apocalypse, particularly the three chief of them, Babel, the beast, and the false prophet. Instead of seeking their antitypes in certain definite historical personages, empires, or hierarchies of the post-apostolic or present age, the author finds them in the grand chronic antagonists of the kingdom of God, Satan, and depraved man. He finds the real Babel (Babylon is only the Greek for it) in that rebellious human pride and self-sufficiency which commenced its monument on the plain of Shinar, and has been busy building and building ever since. The beast and false prophet are older than Mohammedanism or French Socialism ; both appear in the primitive temptation in Paradise, and have been active ever since, wherever Satan has seduced the sense or beguiled the reason of men. One of the closing passages may perhaps give the reader some idea of the writer's theory and style : " From the beginning of the world to the end rise up Satan and man in his pride in opposition to that authority of the Eternal King, which he has transferred to the Lamb, the son of man, as King, Prophet, and High Priest. The former, as liar and murderer, avails himself of the grand, beastly, and mendacious powers of the earth, in order, by means of trickery and force, lies and murder, to prevail over the kingdom of God ; the latter, in reliance upon his own spiritual powers, erects his own proud unchristian and antichristian structure. Both labor in company, and are long time associated with each other ; but their covenant is no covenant of love, but only a common antagonism to the Lord and his people. Satan and his associates hate man, even when he is building the Babylonian tower of pride and false worship ; for man would like to rule over all, even over his allies from the deep. But proud, ungodly-minded man shall be brought to nought, when the friendship, as it must necessarily come, shall be dissolved. Long doth the church resist these hostile forces ; but as she, like ancient Israel, absorbs more and more of the bad leaven of human pride, and the satanic agencies of falsehood and sensuality and malice and lovelessness, and becomes on the whole lukewarm and ever more lukewarm, the world and the kingdom of darkness receive so much the more power. and that which was once slain by the word of God revives anew. The evil powers become ever stronger, the sufferings of the genuine spiritual Israel ever greater, with the flow of years. Nevertheless, for the elect's sake, for the sake of the poor worm Jacob, for the sake of his own great name and sacred blood, the Lord has compassion upon all those who have kept their fidelity, the virgins who have remained undefiled by the lusts and vices of the world and of idolatry, as also upon many a wavering soul who is purified and preserved by afflictions, so that its raiment is also washed white in the blood of the Lamb, and plunges the whole kingdom of darkness, after sufficient probation, into destruction, to rear the luminous, eternal city, having the glory of God ; now old things are passed away, behold all things are become new ! The work of the Lamb that was slain is accomplished ; Babel annihilated, the beast, the false prophet, the devil, and

with him death and hell, are delivered over to the lake of fire, the second death." — One finds here and there, scattered through the little book, not a few new and suggestive thoughts, exegetical hints, etc., and not a few felicitous passages verifying his conclusions by squaring them with the general doctrinal systems of the church and with universal Christian life. Some parts, however, strike us as fanciful, and tend to leave the mind in an unsatisfactory state. As to the Apocalyptic chronology, he supports (with Bengel) the view according to which the several seals, trumpets, woes, vials, etc. represent *continuous* history, notwithstanding the dissent of Hengstenberg, Ebrard, and so many others. The part entitled "Introduction to the Apocalypse" contains a very timely essay on the philosophy of prophetic vision.

(4). *Geschichte des Alten Bundes*. (Leipzig; 1863.) — This is a volume of Lectures on the History of the Old Covenant from the pen of the late Professor F. R. Hasse of Bonn, best known as the author of a remarkably thorough and valuable monograph on the *Life and Views of Anselm of Canterbury* (2 Vols. 8vo. 1843, 1852). Dr. Hasse was born in Dresden 1808, became Privat Dozent in Berlin 1835, sometime after Professor of Theology in Greifswald, and since 1842 in Bonn. He died the 14th of October last. Compared with Kurtz's "History of the Old Covenant," the work before us might seem superficial and unimportant, but it should be remembered that a course of academic lectures are not to be compared in these particulars with thoroughly elaborated and exhaustive treatises. And if it lacks some of the excellences of the corresponding portion of even Kurtz's "Sacred History," it is also free from some of the latter's defects. His portrayal is far more objective than Kurtz's. While in the latter you can scarcely read two pages without discovering something to remind you of his peculiar school of Lutheranism, Hasse might almost defy a stranger to detect his personal views of Christianity as a system or as a life. As lectures they must have been superior, as a book they will not live long.

(5). For the benefit of all interested in the study of the slow revolutions going on in the constitutions of the different German evangelical churches, we will here call attention to the most important publications of the past year bearing upon this point. It may be well to premise that the different parties are as follows: 1st, the *Ultra Presbyterians*, contending for complete independence of the state and a thorough organization of the church in each state, in strict accordance with the principle that all ecclesiastical power resides in the people (Drs. Schenkel and Rothe); 2d, the *High Church Episcopalian* party (lost its main pillar in Dr. Stahl; not large or influential); 3d the *Compromisers*, aiming at a combination of the synodal and consistorial organizations, such as shall secure the peaceful co-operation of autonomic and secular authority (embraces the greater part of the theologians of the Union, such as Nitzsch, Lechler, Beyschlag, Sack, the Krummachers, etc.).

The old-fashioned consistorial system still has a few advocates among the High Lutherans, while the only voice that has as yet been heard in favor of *Congregationism* is that of Pastor *Diedrich* and his five or six adherents among the separated Lutherans.

R. ROTHE. *Zur Orientirung über die gegenwärtige Aufgabe der deutsch-evangelische Kirche* (in 1 und 2 Heft of Schenkel's *Allgemeine k. Zeitschrift*).

D. SCHENKEL. *Die Kirchliche Frage und ihre protestantische Lösung im Zusammenhang mit den nationalen Bestrebungen und mit besonderer Beziehung auf die neuesten Schriften*, J. von Döllinger's und Bischof von Ketteler's. Elberfeld : 1862. 8vo. pp. viii and 386. Price, 1½ thaler.

The above have produced a profound sensation in all circles. In the former Rothe goes completely over to the radicals in doctrine as well as in government. Although he had formerly been reckoned among the "*Gläubigen*," he now demands, as a condition of the salvation of the church, the abandonment of all further confessional recognition of the Trinity or Atonement; from Nicaea and Anselm we must finally break. Though in his "*Theologische Ethik*" he had written: "If at the present day the majority of those who belong to our church come to decree the creed, the doctrine and cultus of the same, in a word her whole action, then will this church organized according to their notion, if indeed she can bring such an one into being, have little left her that belongs to the Christian church" (Vol. III. p. 1041), he now hesitates not to demand the re-organization of the church on just this principle. Even Baden does not yet realize his ideal, while all the Prussian and other attempts at church reform are only working the destruction of what remains of Protestantism. Schenkel's work possesses considerable polemical, or better perhaps apologetical, value in those parts which reply to the charges and insinuations of Döllinger and von Ketteler. The name which the party give their system is borrowed from the political world — "*Ecclesiastical Constitutionalism*." Its relation to old-fashioned Presbyterianism is that of a pure democracy to an aristocracy.

STAHL. *Die Kirchenverfassung nach Lehre und Recht der Protestanten* (8vo. pp. x and 484. Price, 2 thalers, 4 groschen).

This is a new and enlarged edition of Stahl's well-known work, and might be entitled "*Plea for Episcopacy*." It received its last corrections from the hand of its author but a few days before his death.

PROF. TH. HARNACK. *Die Kirche, ihr Amt, ihr Regiment*, etc. (Nuremberg. Price, 16 groschen).

DR. ADAM VON HARLESS. *Etliche Gewissensfragen hinsichtlich der Lehre von der Kirche*, etc. (Stuttgart. Price, 10 groschen).

Pamphlets from well-known Lutheran theologians, both distinctly disclaiming Stahl's views.

K. KIRSCH. *Die Aufsicht des Geistlichen über die Volksschule* (Leipsic).

The above list embraces all the important literature of the subject during the past year. One should compare, however, the discussions of the "*Kirchentag*" and the periodical literature.

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ARTICLE I.

THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL.¹

I. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE THEORY OF THE SOUL'S
PRE-EXISTENCE.

1. *Theory of Pythagoras.*

ACCORDING to this philosopher, the body is the substance which is determined, and the soul is the principle which determines the body. The soul is more than mere number or measure; it has an individuality, different from that of the body, and is implanted within the body. Before its union with the corporeal substance, it had a troubled, dreamy life; after its separation from this substance, it will continue to live, and will wander through other bodies, in its process of purification. The human soul is an emanation

¹ This Essay is, in the main, a condensed abstract of an elaborate German volume, entitled: "Die Lehre von der Präexistenz der menschlichen Seelen historisch-kritisch dargestellt, von J. Fr. Bruch, Professor der Theologie und Prediger in Strasburg." 1859. 8vo, pp. 211. An attempt is made in this Essay, not to give the exact translation of the words, nor to follow the precise line of thought, which have been adopted by Professor Bruch, but merely to give the substance of his treatise, in the order most appropriate for American readers.

from the world-soul, and its confinement in the body is a punishment for its previous transgression.

2. *Theory of Plato.*

The notion of the soul's pre-existence stands in intimate connection with Plato's doctrine of "ideas," and it illustrates his theory of the immanence of these ideas in the rational soul. It is well known that he drew a distinction between such thoughts as have for their object the empirical, sensuous, constantly changing, perishable, and such as have for their object the unchangeable, permanent, indivisible, divine. The former class of thoughts are the *phantasies*, and are the result of sensuous impression; the latter are the product of the reason, and are immanent in the soul, although they are first called out into consciousness by the sensuous impressions. They are the forms under which we must apprehend and reduce to oneness the object which, as presented by the senses, appears to be *many* and *various*. They are not *substances* nor *powers*, but yet they have an objective reality, so far forth as they represent the essential, the permanent, the divine, in empirical objects. These ideas are in the divine mind, as well as in the human. They are the unchangeable laws of his working. He has made the world according to them. The world, therefore, is a material realization of the divine ideas. Every nature bears in itself a divine idea, which is developed by means of the sensuous, empirical element. The world is an image of God, and there is a divine element in every object of sense. The sensuous is changing, but the idea is permanent.

Now as the ideas of a man are not of empirical origin, but precede the sensuous perception, Plato was forced to inquire: Whence came they? He was not familiar with the theory that they arise from the laws which regulate the acting of the soul; therefore he said: The soul brought these ideas with it from a previous life into the present one. In that ideal world in which the soul existed before its temporal development, it attained to the clear vision

of the divine ideas. God showed to the soul the nature of everything before the soul was united with the body. Hence all our knowledge of the general and the essential is a remembrance of what we knew before, but of what had been lost in the consciousness.

God created all souls at the same time. Each one is a development of a divine idea, and each was originally in an ideal state. It was essentially a pure intelligence; its entire activity was in thinking. It resided in a heavenly framework. Its present material embodiment was not necessary, but accidental. As the sensible world was created for no other end than to manifest the divine ideas, so the soul was made to develop itself in a body for the purpose of realizing some of these ideas. The design of its embodiment was, that it may, by contemplation of the world, obtain a clear vision of the divine ideas, consequently a clear vision of God himself, who is the original Idea, and at last a likeness to God, who is the original Good. In consequence of its connection with the body, the soul ceases to be a mere thinking principle; it becomes also a feeling and a willing principle; and these were spoken of by Plato as if they were three souls. Only the thinking principle, however, is imperishable.

3. *Theory of Philo.*

Souls are spiritual powers which have emanated from God, but are not entirely separated from him. They are like the rays which beam forth from the sun, and yet remain united with it. They are indeed of an ethereal, fiery nature; yet this ether is something different from matter; it has, as it were, a nature of spiritual light. Souls are a reflection from the divine Essence, and are destined to be inwardly united with God.

As the divine Being is strictly absolute, elevated above all finite existence, beyond all relations to the world, consequently without any predicates, he could not have created the world directly. Between the pre-existent matter and

the supreme God, there is a world of the divine ideas, which are divine powers, and which taken together are the Word of God, the first-born Son of God, the divine Logos. These ideas, coming forth from the divine nature and made objective, and constituting a divine Person, are not merely the archetypes of finite excellence, but also the living powers that form the world.

There is no other existence except the supreme God, the divine ideas, matter, and the world, which is formed by the conjunction of those divine ideas with matter. Souls, then, originally belong to the class of these divine ideas. They are distinguished from other prototype ideas emanating from God, by the fact that they possess a certain independent existence, reason, and free-will. Their proper home is the air or heaven, where they dwell in entire purity and blessedness. Those who have maintained themselves in this state are the angels. But many souls allowed themselves to be attracted by matter, and entered into union with it. These are human souls, who are punished for this fall by an imprisonment in the body which corrupts them. From the first moment of their appearance in the material world, they are morally polluted and laden with guilt. Their great mission is to withdraw themselves, by their own exertion, from the defiling influence of matter, and to raise themselves, by steadfast striving after wisdom, to the pure vision of God, and to a consequent worthiness of being again received to their heavenly home.

4. *Theory of Plotinus.*

This philosopher represents the Neo-Platonists, although some of them, as Jamblichus and Proclus, differ from him in some particulars. He supposed that the individual human soul is a product of the general World-soul, which is an emanation from the original reason, which itself is an emanation from the One. God is the One, the First, elevated above all imperfection, all change, therefore above all conditions. Consequently, while the author of all being,

he has in himself no being, no entity, no nature ; while the source of life, he has in himself no life ; while he originates all thinking powers, he is not himself a thinking substance. The Reason, which is a reflection from God and inferior to him, comprehends all things in an ideal form, and remains in an eternal, changeless vision of itself. The World-soul is related on the one side to the Reason, from which it springs, and on the other side to Matter. It perceives in the Reason the ideas for Matter, and so becomes the principle which forms the world.

By its own internal movement this World-soul produces a multitude of individual souls, which live originally in the supersensuous sphere. Many of them, however, unable to retain this height of pure existence, sink down into the material substance, and become the principles of the formation of the world, and of the order pervading the world. Human souls are those which have descended from their heavenly abode, and have formed for themselves bodies, which are henceforth as their prisons and fetters. Their descent into matter was on the one side an act of necessity, and on the other an act of free will, and therefore of moral guilt. The great office of human souls is to break loose from matter, to free themselves from its stains, and to reach that union with God which will liberate them from all self-consciousness and all separate personal existence.

5. Theory of Origen.

Some of the early Christians believed in the soul's pre-existence. The Alexandrine Fathers were particularly inclined to this doctrine by their reverence for Plato and by the influence of Neo-Platonism on their general theological system. Origen was among the foremost in defending the doctrine, although he was original in the reasons which he assigned for it. He founded it on the great disparity of condition in which men begin their earthly life. Some have rich endowments, physical and mental ; others have meagre gifts. Some are born to outward prosperity ; others, to a

pitiable state. Whence this difference? If it be ascribed to the unconditional will of God, then God is partial. It cannot be reconciled with his righteousness, unless this inequality of condition be ascribed to a difference in the conduct of souls during a pre-existent state. The divine perfections required him to make all souls equal at first. All were created pure, but all did not retain their purity. Many sank into sin; some more, others less deeply; and therefore they were punished according to the degree of their transgression. Those who kept themselves most pure from all contact with evil were assigned to the highest rank, and are called thrones, powers, dominions. Those who stood next in purity are the angels, some of whom have been invested with shining bodies, and run their course as the stars of heaven. Those spirits who sinned most flagrantly are the devils. An intermediate class are the spirits who sank into sin, yet were not altogether lost in it. These were sent to the earth and united with corporeal bodies. Their condition here corresponds with the degree of their guilt. God, the eternal and unchangeable Good, has no other will than that the fallen souls return to their pristine state of purity and blessedness; and he has made the material world as a means of their gradual purification. In the process of purifying themselves by their earthly discipline, they are aided by the souls who remain uncorrupted. Those who succeed in this process go, after death, into the home of etherial bodies, where they receive from higher spirits disclosures of truth which were hidden from them on earth, and where they pass through various stages of purification, until they become worthy of the clear vision of God, and are welcomed into perfect blessedness. The winding up of the whole is, that all souls are brought back to their original state of entire equality.

6. *Ecclesiastical Opposition to the Theory of the Soul's Pre-existence.*

In the Western church the authority of Plato was less than in the Eastern, and accordingly there was more oppo-

sition to the Platonizing theories of the soul's pre-existence. Tertullian was foremost in this opposition. If we had an existence previous to our earthly one, he said, we should have had some remembrance of it. Although he believed the soul to be simple, indivisible, imperishable, yet he did not deny that it is in a sense corporeal; different indeed from the body, but extended through it, diffused through all its members, having a form invisible to the physical eye, yet perceptible to the mind. Our souls, being propagated like our bodies, are derived from one source—the spirit which God breathed into Adam. Hence the moral corruption which entered human nature by the fall of the first man is communicated, as the soul itself and as the corporeal nature are communicated, from parent to child.

It is true that the pre-existence of souls continued to be maintained, as by Nemesius, bishop of Emesa in Syria (380); Synesius, bishop of Ptolemais (410); and the religious poet Prudentius (405); still it continued to encounter opposition, and became more and more disreputable on account of the growing unpopularity of Origen throughout the Western, and at last the Eastern, church. The assertion that God made the world on account of souls that had fallen into sin, and that the body was formed for the mind after the fall, was thought unseemly and unscriptural. Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Jerome, and Augustine opposed the doctrine decidedly. It was definitely condemned by the synod of Constantinople, which Justinian assembled (538) for the purpose of putting an end to the authority of Origen. This council decreed:

“Whoever upholds the fabulous notion of the soul's pre-existence, and of the consequent restitution of things, let him be anathema.

“Whoever maintains that the creating of the whole intelligible world was a producing of spiritual natures, without any bodies, and without any matter, without number and without names, so that they all formed a unit by means of their identity in substance and power, and of their union with God the Word, and their knowledge of him; but that, tired of the vision of God, they corrupted themselves, and according to the degree of their sin received finer or grosser bodies, and also certain names, as among the

higher powers there is a difference of bodies and names, so that some are made and called cherubim, others seraphim, others dominions, thrones, and angels — and so on through all the heavenly orders — let him be anathema.

“Whoever maintains that the sun, moon, and stars belong to the unit of the intelligible world, and by their corruption have been made what they are, let him be anathema.

“Whoever maintains that those spirits in whom the love toward God grew cold were united with gross bodies like ours, and were called men, but that others who sunk to the lowest degree of wickedness, were united with cold and dark bodies, and were made and called demons, spirits of evil, let him be anathema.”

7. *The Jewish Theories of Pre-existence.*

For a long time after the above-cited decrees, the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence found but little favor in the Christian church. It continued, however, to retain its hold on the Jewish mind. On the one hand, the Talmudists believed that the nature of man is twofold, comprising body and soul; that all souls were created at the origin of the world, were kept in a place called “Guph,” and were taken thence at their appointed times to be united with their respective bodies. On the other hand, the Sabbatists believed that the nature of man is fourfold, comprising the body and three souls. The lowest of the souls is the principle of animal life (Nephesch), which begins its existence when the body begins, and ceases to live when the body ceases. Ungodly men have no other soul than this mortal one. But even this becomes immortal if it be united with the two higher souls, both of which are emanations from God, and continue to live in Paradise. The highest, purest of these two is the Neschamah; the soul intermediate between the Neschamah and the Nephesch is the Ruach. Only good men are endued with both these souls, and are so endued at different periods of time.

8. *Theories of Creationism and Traducianism.*

From the sixth century, the contest raged between the notion that human souls are directly created by God and

the notion that they are propagated from parents to children. The former of these notions seemed to be demanded by the simplicity of the soul's nature, and by the tendency of the notion to counteract materialism. The latter seemed to be favored by its fitness to explain the doctrine of original sin. The scholastics decided in favor of Creationism, and this has been the prevailing theory of the Catholic church. Protestantism has been inclined to favor the Traducian theory, as more coincident with profound convictions of human sinfulness. The authors of the Concordat Formula, however, favored the doctrine that God, after the fall, creates the soul, no less than he created it before the fall.

9. *Theory of Kant.*

This philosopher revived the old dogma, although not in its old form, of the soul's having existed before time. His theory was a novel one, and it encountered much opposition. It was a legitimate result of his peculiar system of philosophy. His system rests on the essential distinction between "the thing in itself" (noumenon) and the appearance of the thing (phaenomenon). We do not understand "the thing in itself" (the noumenon), but we understand only the appearance of the thing (the phaenomenon). The soul as a "*thing in itself*" is exempt from the conditions of space and time, and is not subject to external causation; but as *phaenomenon* it is subject to the conditions of space and time, and to external causation. Man thus leads a mysterious twofold life; the one free from, the other involved in, the relations of space and time, of outward causality, and of the consequent necessity. The mind as a "thing in itself" is the necessary condition of its "appearance," of the "phaenomenon"; and this "appearance" is only the reflex of the mind as a "noumenon."

There is a marked difference between the theory of Kant and that of the ancients in regard to our timeless existence. They believed that this existence preceded the present in respect of duration; he believed that it precedes the tem-

poral existence in idea only. They supposed that it was in a duration before the existence of the world; he supposed that it is before time, is without relation to time, is a pure conception of the intellect. They believed that the soul's previous existence is already past; he believed that it is an existence free from all the conditions of time, yet it is itself the condition of our existence in time.

Although Kant admitted the mysteriousness of this timeless existence, yet he supposed that we can derive from our moral nature some positive conclusions about it. The moral law pronounces an unconditioned *shall*; it thus vouches for the existence of an unconditioned power of *will*, which is entirely independent of outward causality, and is therefore itself a power of unconditioned causality. Duty presupposes freedom. Over against the sensuous instincts and inclinations, which have self-gratification for their object, the free-will asserts itself as a power to act independently of all sensuous impulses, and even in opposition to them, purely through the conception of the moral law. Reverence for the moral law is the only motive which consists with freedom, and which therefore has a moral nature. But as the whole world of appearances (phenomena) is under the law of necessity, as freedom does not consist with the sensuous nature of man, so freedom must be ascribed to man only as he "is in himself" not as he "is in appearance." Only as *noumenon* is man free; as *phaenomenon* he comes under the conditions of causality, which is inconsistent with freedom. Therefore every determination of will, when it is passing into action, and becoming a phenomenon, loses the character of a free act, and is interwoven with an outward necessity.

Considering that man, as he "is in himself," has a power of will which is independent of all sensuous inclinations and of all temporal causality, it would be natural to suppose that, as he "is in appearance," he would conform his action to the moral law. He does not, however. He subordinates his moral to his sensuous impulses. Universally he has a

tendency to sin. Whence comes this universal propensity? It must have come from his own free act. But where was this free act performed? Not in time; for as far back as we can trace the moral conduct of man it is sinful. Then the origin of this evil tendency must have been his free act, performed in his existence before time. In this free act he subordinated his moral to his sensuous impulses; he gave himself this propensity to sin. In this free act was his fall. The fall occurred in that mysterious existence which precedes time. In order, then, to account for the early and universal prevalence of our propensity to sin, we must resort to the theory of a timeless existence of the soul. This process of reasoning conforms to the following principles laid down by Kant. "Hitherto men have supposed that all our knowledge must regulate itself according to the objects of knowledge; but on this supposition, all attempts to make out anything concerning these objects *a priori*, by means of our conceptions, whereby our knowledge would be widened, went for nothing. Therefore let us inquire, whether we shall not come out better in metaphysical problems, if we make the supposition that the objects must regulate themselves according to our knowledge; a supposition more accordant with the desired possibility of obtaining concerning them an *a priori* knowledge which is to decide something with regard to objects before they are given to us. It is in this case, as it was with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, since he did not make progress in his explanation of the movements of the stars so long as he supposed them to revolve around the spectator, inquired whether he could not make better progress, if he should suppose the spectator himself to be revolving, and the stars to remain at rest." (Kritik, etc. s. XV. Sieb. Auf.)

10. *Theory of Schelling.*

This philosopher distinctly recognized the fact, that all men have a tendency to sin. The tendency did not result from accident, nor from any free choice put forth in time.

Every man brings into the world with him his moral bias, and thus the acts which he performs in the world are the product of necessity. Every man feels that he has been from all eternity what he is now, and yet he feels that he is responsible for his wickedness. Therefore the wickedness must, somehow or other, have resulted from his own free choice. But this choice was not put forth in time; therefore it must have been put forth in eternity. It *was* put forth; it is not, as Kant supposed, a mere ideal abstraction of freedom from our present acts; but it is a *past* act; it was performed, not indeed as a *personal*, but as an *individual* choice; not indeed under the conditions of time, but it is to be viewed as a pure object of thought. Thus the deed which has determined the moral character of every man was antecedent to his life, not in the order of duration, but in the order of nature; and being out of the temporal sphere it is an eternal deed. Regarded as irrespective of time, the life of every man reaches back to the beginning of creation; it is outside of created things, and is a free and eternal beginning.

The following, perhaps, are the essential elements of the metaphysical system out of which Schelling draws his theory: There is in God an original reason for his being. This original reason has a tendency to develop itself, first, in that nature which is the Real in God, and which forms the eternal One. All things which are, are the self-revelations of the absolute. This original reason has a tendency to develop itself, secondly, in that which is the Ideal in God, the divine light, the divine love, the divine understanding. This Real and this Ideal form the ground of the divine existence. From the same ground springs the finite understanding, the finite love, the finite free-will. In the sphere of nature the Real and the Ideal are not absolutely identified. The Real prevails over the Ideal, and the principle of self-love reigns. The Absolute is completely evolved, first of all in man. In man the full power of self-love is developed, and also the full power of the ideal principle, of

light, of benevolence. If the ideal principle uniformly prevail in him, if he be, as he was destined to be, unconditionally guided by the light, the understanding, the love, then is he Spirit, and God is Spirit within him, and man thus attains his true personality. That which is truly divine in man, and which answers to the divine personality, is permanent, and will merge itself again into the Absolute. That which is not thus divine, will be annihilated at death. The great end for which God reveals himself is that the real and the ideal may be united perfectly, that the self-love may be subordinated to the love of the universe. But it is only in man and by man that this process of divine revelation is consummated. The being of man, therefore, does not commence with his birth in time, but extends back to the beginning of creation. In that being which preceded time, and which is a pure object of thought, was performed the free act by which man fixed his moral bent. As morally good, or as morally evil, he comes into his temporal life. He lives henceforth under the law of necessity. But this necessity does not prevent us from ascribing his wrong moral bias to him as his own fault. He is responsible for it because he originated it freely in his eternal being. He cannot now of his own strength reform himself. All improvement of his character must be the work of divine power, an effect of the divine magic. Whether the man will allow or will not allow this divine operation for his improvement, depends upon that decisive act which he performed in his original state. He, who in that eternal state decided in favor of sin, is naturally incapable of becoming better, because it lies in the very nature of sin to resist and repel the divine working to subdue it.

11. *Theory of Julius Müller.*

In some respects Müller does not, but in other respects he does, coincide with Kant. He founds his theory of Pre-existence on the two truths, that the will is free, and that sin universally prevails in the race. *Formal* freedom con-

sists in the fact that the will is able to act out its own nature, to carry itself through, to realize itself, to act as it chooses, without hindrance. In this freedom of will the man seeks his highest possible self-hood; his greatest possible individuality and independence. This freedom is therefore a conscious self-determination, which involves and implies the possibility of an opposite self-determination. This power of contrary choice does not constitute freedom, but is inseparable from it. The freedom includes a *contingency*, which, however, must not be confounded with *accident*.

The existence of this *formal* freedom is proved by the fact that the will is bound to obey the moral law. It cannot obey the divine commands unless it have the power to disobey them; for without the power of disobedience the obedience would not be free. It is, then, essential to the freedom of the will that the will have the ability to sin; to put itself out of harmony with the moral commands, and thus with itself and with God. This ability to sin is given to man with the design that he should, by his own self-determination, always keep himself from realizing it in act, and also that he should by his own free self-determination, put an end to the ability itself. The created personal agent must begin existence in a state in which his will is not determined; so that he may by his own act bring himself into a state in which his will is determined. The will must have a *formal* freedom; but it could not have this freedom if it were not able, by its own act, to determine itself, so that from this determined state, the moral character of its individual acts would result with infallible necessity. At the starting point of the will, it has a freedom which is not an inward necessity, but involves the power of the contrary choice; at the landing point, it has the freedom which is identical with necessity. In this way the *formal* freedom goes over to the *real* freedom.

All the voluntary acts which man performs during his present life are attributable to himself, and we feel compelled

to praise or blame him for them. This fact necessarily presupposes his *formal* freedom. But an unconditioned freedom is not found in his present acts. There is no unconditioned self-determination in his temporal life; neither is there an undetermined will,—all his acts are affected by his previous disposition; and for this disposition we are compelled to hold him accountable, because it is the result of antecedent acts, which in their turn were occasioned by still previous dispositions, which, as these are blameable, must have resulted from some original choice. That choice, that act of primitive self-determination, as it has certainly been performed, and as it is not performed in the life which we now experience, must have been performed in an existence antecedent to this. In that existence, which is not within the sphere of time, the man must have passed from an undetermined state into the state of moral determination which forms the mysterious back-ground for all his subsequent volitions.

In that pre-existent state the souls were not exalted to the perfect knowledge of God and of all truth, nor to unalloyed blessedness, nor had they mutual relations to each other, nor were they so far distinguished from each other as they are in their material life, nor were they exposed to the influence of sensual appetite. They were under a law requiring them to determine their wills in harmony with the will of God. That they did not obey this law is obvious from the fact that sin is rooted deep in the nature of men, and is chargeable upon them as its guilty authors. They are indeed allured to moral evil by the circumstances of their earthly life; but why do they not resist these allurements? They are led into sin by their dispositions; but these dispositions are sinful, and must therefore have sprung from some predetermining act of the will. When could this act have been performed? As far back as the most feeble glimmering of consciousness can reach, we find the sinful inclination, which is the prolific origin of an innumerable multitude of sinful acts. Then the decisive choice

which resulted in that inclination must have been put forth antecedently to our material life, in that obscure, mysterious existence which is out of the sphere of time. It was not a sensual, but it was a purely spiritual, and a purely selfish choice, and it is this selfishness which controls all the acts of unrenewed men.

It must not be imagined, that Müller's theory pretends to account for the existence of all sin, as mere sin. He does not profess to answer the question: Why did souls in their timeless existence, when they reposed in God, and were lost in the intuition of their infinite author, and were free from all outward solicitations to disobedience,—why did they separate themselves from God and array themselves in opposition to his law? Müller refers this original self-determination to the spiritual self-hood of the human person. A creature who is capable of holy love must also be capable of sin. Inseparable from the nature of a mind which can act freely is that property of the mind by which it can be tempted to act wrongly. As the existence of sin is mysterious, even in our empirical life, so it must be the more mysterious where the pure will becomes impure by its own self-determination, and performs its first act—makes the very beginning of iniquity.

Müller does not suppose that all the souls existing in a timeless state fell into sin; for if they all fell, then their apostasy would not seem to have been their free act. Some of them, by their own self-determination, exalted themselves from their state of created purity to a state of free holiness; while others departed from their Maker so completely as to exclude from their temporal life every inclination to good. Thus there is some real ground for the representation that there are angels and devils. We likewise know of one human will which in its original self-determination retained its union with the will of God. For if original guilt and the power of sin had followed our Saviour into his temporal existence, his uninterrupted and undisturbed harmony with the law of God could not be explained.

12. *Theories of Rückert and Fichte.*

According to Rückert, the *origin* of sin, as a free determination of the will, cannot be accounted for; because in order to account for it, we must ascribe the sin to some cause, and if we ascribe it to a cause, we cannot regard it as a free determination; and if it be not free, it is not sin. Still we may account for the *universal prevalence* of sin in our race, by supposing that only such souls entered into the race as have transgressed the law in a previous state of existence. This ideal state was more exalted and perfect than the present. There is no decisive proof of any such pre-existence of souls; therefore no scientific system can be securely grounded upon it. Still we adopt many theories which do not rest on a strong foundation; and as this theory affords certain advantages for explaining the universal prevalence of sin, it may be adopted until some decisive objections are brought against it.

The theory of Fichte has some resemblances to the theories of Kant, Schelling, Müller, and Rückert. He believes, however, not in the pre-existence of the soul (the *psyche*, *seele*), but in the pre-existence of the spirit (the *pneuma*, *geist*).

II. THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

It is evident that the question of the soul's pre-existence must depend somewhat on the question of its nature. What is the essence of that which is supposed to have existed before the origin of the bodily organism?

1. *The Representations given of it by Hebrews who wrote before the Captivity.*

They regarded the body as so important a part of man that they used the phrase "all flesh" to designate the human race.¹ Still they recognized one, or more than one, living principle distinct from the body, and designated it by

¹ Gen. vi. 13, 17; vii. 15.

the words *nephesch* (נֶפֶשׁ), *ruach* (רוּחַ), and *neschama* (נִשְׁמָה). These three words have originally a physical meaning, and denote *breath, breeze, wind*, as πνεῦμα is derived from πνέω, animus from ἄνεμος, spiritus from spirare, and geist originally denotes *breath, wind*.

The *nephesch* was regarded as the condition of life. While it remained in the man he was a *living soul*.¹ We read: He went to save his *soul*, i. e. his life;² Let us not kill the *soul*, i. e. take the life;³ He destroyed all the *souls* in the city, i. e. took the life of all the persons there.⁴

The breath was regarded as the first thing which gave evidence of the soul or life, and was called *nephesch*; thus, when the breath departed, the soul departed from the body.⁵ As the life goes when the breath goes from the body, so the life leaves the body when the blood leaves it; hence the Hebrews regarded the *nephesch* as existing in the blood, and they spoke of the blood as the life, the soul.⁶ Hence they were forbidden to eat the blood of animals.⁷ It seemed horrible to nourish their own bodies with that which formed the soul of other bodies. Hence the murderous shedding of one man's blood was punished with the shedding of the murderer's blood.⁸ The sin-offering and the trespass-offering involved the same principle: the life which had been forfeited by sin, should have an atonement made for it by the life, i. e. the blood, of the animal offered in sacrifice.⁹

The physical life or soul, the *nephesch*, was presupposed not only in the physical functions, but also in the spiritual activities. Thus we read not only of satisfying the *soul* with food,¹⁰ but also of the soul's knowing, loving, rejoicing, etc.¹¹ Accordingly the word *nephesch* was used to denote the

¹ Gen. ii. 7.

² 1 Kings xix. 3.

³ Gen. xxxvii. 21; see also Deut. xix. 6, 11.

⁴ Josh. x. 28, 35, 37, 39.

⁵ Gen. xxxv. 18; 1 Kings xvii. 21.

⁶ Lev. xvii. 11; Deut. xii. 23.

⁷ Gen. ix. 4; Lev. xvii. 12; Deut. xii. 23.

⁸ Gen. ix. 5, 6.

⁹ Lev. xvii. 11.

¹⁰ Prov. vi. 30.

¹¹ Psalm cxxxix. 14; Prov. xix. 2; Sol. Song i. 7; Deut. vi. 5; 1 Sam. i. 15, etc.; Isa. lxi. 10.

whole person, as "if your soul were in my soul's stead," i. e. if you were I.¹ Hence we read of the dead soul, i. e. body, person,² and even of the soul (*nephesh*), as a corpse.³

The two other words (*ruach* and *neschama*) are evidently synonymous with each other. Thus we read: "my breath (*neschama*) is in me, and the spirit (*ruach*) of God is in my nostrils; and the spirit (*ruach*) of God hath made me, and the breath (*neschama*) of the Almighty hath given me life."⁴ These two words refer to the same principle, which is designated by *nephesh*. They are used in parallelism with *nephesh*, thus: "With my soul (*nephesh*) have I desired thee in the night, yea with my spirit (*ruach*) within me will I seek thee early."⁵ They are used, like *nephesh*, to denote the physical principle in man. We read: "My breath (*ruach*) shall not always remain in man"; "Thou takest away their breath (*ruach*), they die."⁶ They are likewise used to denote the spiritual principle, as: "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration, breath (*ruach*) of the Almighty giveth him understanding";⁷ "The spirit (*neschama*) of man is the candle of the Lord."⁸

But although these three words refer to the same object, they yet refer to it in different relations. *Nephesh* is the principle of life, so far as it is considered immanent in the body; *ruach* is the same principle so far as it is considered a product of the divine spirit, a creature of God; *neschama* is the same principle considered as breathed into man by God, and manifesting itself by the human breath. Therefore *nephesh* is the *life of the flesh*,⁹ the vital principle remaining in the blood, the living soul; but *neschama* is used when the writer alludes to the breath of life;¹⁰ and *ruach* is more commonly used when allusion is made to spiritual operations as such. It is the spirit (*ruach*) of God

¹ Job xvi. 4.² Num. vi. 6.³ Num. v. 2.⁴ Job xxvii. 3; xxxiii. 4.⁵ Isa. xxvi. 9; see also Job xii. 10.⁶ Gen. vi. 3; Psalm civ. 29; see also 1 Sam. xxx. 12; 1 Kings x. 5; Job xxvii. 3; xxxiii. 4; Deut. xx. 16; Josh. x. 40.⁷ Job xxxii. 8.⁸ Prov. xx. 27.⁹ Lev. xvii. 11.¹⁰ Gen. ii. 7.

which moved upon the face of the waters, and breathed into man the breath of life.

It is true that spiritual operations are often referred, in the Old Testament, to the physical organs; and it is remarkable that those parts of the Old Testament which were written before the captivity do not refer these operations to the nerves, or brain, or head; but to the physical heart, and to the lower intestinal system. In the book of Daniel, which was written after the captivity, we find the first allusion to the *head* as an organ of mental operations, but then only in reference to visions.¹ The Hebrews regarded these organs, however, not as actually percipient and volitive, but merely as instruments of the soul which gave them life. Still we suppose that, before the captivity, the larger part of the Hebrews had only confused and dim ideas of the soul's nature, and regarded it as originally breathed into man's nostrils, and as being itself a kind of air. They did not have clear notions of the pure spirituality of God himself, but spoke of him as *having* a spirit, as working by his spirit, employing it as an instrument.² Particular individuals had more refined notions than prevailed among the common people, in regard to the pure spirituality of God and of the human soul;³ but the notions prevalent among the common people were such as threw a veil of obscurity over the state in which the soul existed after death. Doubtless the early Jews believed that the soul was immortal, but their ideas were confused in regard to the kind of life which it would lead. For, in their view, the spirit came from God and went back to God. It was breath which God inspired into man at first, and which he would call back to himself at last. Still the soul was identified with the body, and when the body went down to the grave, there seemed to be danger that the soul would go with it. Thus we read: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in sheol;" "Thou hast de-

¹ Dan. ii. 28; iv. 5, 10; viii. 1, 15.

² Lev. xxvi. 11; Psalm xi. 5; xxxiii. 6; Job iv. 9.

³ Job iv. 15; 1 Kings xix. 12.

livered my soul from the lowest sheol;" "Shall he deliver his soul from the hand of sheol?"¹ The spirits of the dead were often conceived of as shadowy forms, and their life as clouded and dreamy. Sometimes indeed the inhabitants of sheol were represented as enjoying an intense life; but it may be said, in the general, that men are indebted to the New Testament for just and pure ideas of the soul's spiritual nature and distinct personality.

2. *The Representations given of the Soul by Hebrews who wrote after the Captivity.*

The book of Ecclesiastes speaks of man and beast as both going to one place, as having one breath (*ruach*)²; and although it describes the *ruach* of man as going upward, and as returning to God who first breathed this spirit into man,³ yet in one passage it shrouds in obscurity even this distinction between man and brute.⁴ The Son of Sirach represents the spirit as departing from the body at death,⁵ but as retaining only an inactive kind of life.⁶ The Book of Wisdom speaks of the soul as breathed into man by God, and as therefore merely *lent* to him.⁷ On the other hand, it intimates that souls existed before they entered the body, and even then differed from each other in moral characteristics.⁸ It also describes the soul as oppressed and imprisoned by the body.⁹ This description implies that the

¹ Psalm xvi. 10; lxxxvi. 13; lxxxix. 48. [Here, as elsewhere, not only Bruch, but nearly all the German writers on the Jewish theories of the soul, mistake a popular form of representation for a scientific theory, and overlook the fact that both European and American Christians use words which, when literally interpreted, imply that the soul is not purely spiritual. These words, however, are not to be literally interpreted; and while we habitually imagine the soul to have a form, and to occupy space, we know that the imagination is not accordant with reality. We often imagine the corpse to be sentient; we often speak of the body as a soul; but we do not mean to be understood as actually believing that our fancies or words correspond with the scientific truth.]

² Eccl. iii. 19.

³ Eccl. iii. 21; xii. 7.

⁴ Eccl. iii. 21.

⁵ Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 39.

⁶ Ecclesiasticus xiv. 14-16; xxii. 11; xxxviii. 21; xlv. 19.

⁷ Wis. Sol. xv. 11; xii. 1; xv. 8, 16.

⁸ Ecclesiasticus viii. 19.

⁹ Ecclesiasticus ix. 15.

soul has a distinct personal nature. Therefore the righteous soul is represented as "greatly rewarded" after death, in the presence, in the hand, of God,¹ while the unrighteous is "in sorrow."²

Philo describes the soul as a personal monad, proceeding or breathed out from God, a fragment of God, yet abiding in the closest union with God. It bears the impress of the divine form. Although this philosopher defined the soul as a spirit, it is doubtful whether he considered it as perfectly immaterial, for he often portrayed it as an ethereal nature, formed of the same matter which constitutes the substance of the stars and the angels. He even represents God himself as having the nature of light.

The influence of the Alexandrine philosophy was felt by the Pharisees of our Saviour's time. They believed fully that the soul is a personal substance; that the body is not essential to the human being, but that the soul constitutes the man; that after the soul is separated from the body, it will retain its existence, its feeling, its personal nature; that sheol is not peopled by shadowy forms, but by spirits. After all, it may be doubted whether the Pharisees had attained the conception of the soul as a purely immaterial substance.

3. Representations given of the Soul by the Writers of the New Testament.

The teachings of the New Testament in regard to the nature of the soul, may be inferred from the fact that it describes the spirit as the principle of consciousness and personality, and as that peculiar nature of man which is allied to God.³ So far is the body from being a necessary integral part of man, that it stands related to the spirit as an earthen vessel,⁴ as an earthly tabernacle,⁵ in which the spirit dwells. The spirit is essentially different from the body,

¹ Ecclesiasticus iii. 1-6.

² Ecclesiasticus iv. 19.

³ Acts xvii. 28.

⁴ 2 Cor. iv. 7.

⁵ 2 Cor. v. 1.

and is perfectly immaterial.¹ It is therefore not subject, as all material nature is, to the law of decay.² Existing now as an individual person, it will continue after its separation from the body to exist as an individual person.³ Souls which have passed into the blissful immortality are called "the spirits of just men made perfect."⁴ At some time after the departure of the spirit from the body, it is destined to unite itself with a glorified body, adapted to the higher sphere on which it will then have entered.⁵ Thus the New Testament excels the Old in making the fact clear to the common people that the spirit is, in its own essence, a person, and that it is perfectly immaterial.

In order to designate this higher nature of man, the New Testament employs two words, *psyche* and *pneuma*. Some have inferred that it here agrees with Philo and the Platonic school in ascribing to man three elements, the body (*σῶμα*), the principle of animal life (*ψυχὴ*), and the principle of the higher life (*πνεῦμα*), on which principle of thinking, feeling, and willing depends our relationship with God and our susceptibility for spiritual influences. But on a more accurate examination of the passages⁶ which appear to favor this supposition, and of other passages relating to the theme, this appearance of trichotomy vanishes, and the principle of animal life seems to be essentially the same with the principle of spiritual life. There is only one substance, which in its relation to the body has one name, and in its relation to the highest processes of thought has a different name.

As the word *nephesch* in the Old Testament, so the word *psyche* in the New, is chiefly used to designate the vivifying principle of the body, the source of sensuous desire, that which turns the *σῶμα* into *σάρξ*.⁷ Therefore the adjec-

¹ Luke xxiv. 37; John iv. 24; Acts xvii. 28; 1 Cor. xv. 50.

² 1 John ii. 17.

³ Luke xxiii. 46; Acts vii. 59; Phil. i. 23.

⁴ Heb. xii. 23.

⁵ 1 Cor. xv. 42, sq.

⁶ 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 44.

⁷ Matt. ii. 20; vi. 25; xx. 28; Luke xiv. 26; John x. 11, 15, 17; xv. 13; Acts xxv. 26; Rom. xi. 3.

tive *ψυχικός* designates a man who is governed by the sensuous, animal principle.¹ As the Hebrew *nephesh* was used to denote the whole man, so was the Greek *psyche*: “and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand *ψυχαι*.²

On the other hand, the Greek *pneuma* corresponds with the Hebrew *ruach*, and denotes the principle from which the spiritual life proceeds.³ It often denotes the principle of holy life, and is then opposed to *σάρξ*, as: “Walk in the spirit (*πνεῦμα-τι*) and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh (*σαρκός*).⁴ If ye, through the spirit (*πνεύματι*) do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live,”⁵ Hence the adjective *πνευματικός* designates a man who is governed by a spirit enlightened, strengthened, and sanctified by the Holy Ghost, with whom the man is inwardly united.⁶ As the word *pneuma* denotes the principle of the whole moral and religious life, so it comes to denote the inclinations of man, whether they conform to or resist the divine will. Therefore the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) of bondage is opposed to the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) of adoption; the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) of fear to that of love.⁷ When the soul is considered as the thinking principle, it is sometimes called *νοῦς*, and *ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*.⁸

That the two words *psyche* and *pneuma* refer to one, and only one, substance in man, is evident from the fact that they are used interchangeably with each other. Thus the word *psyche* sometimes denotes the principle of the higher spiritual life, as, “For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul” (*ψυχὴν*).⁹ “Seeing ye have purified your souls” (*ψυχάς*), etc.¹⁰ “Fear not them which kill the body and are not able to kill the soul” (*ψυχὴν*).¹¹ Thus also, the word *pneuma* sometimes denotes the principle of inward life, as, “The body without

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 45; James iii. 15; Jude 19.

² Acts ii. 41.

³ Matt. v. 3; xxvi. 41; Luke ii. 40; John iv. 23; 2 Cor. vii. 13.

⁴ Gal. vi. 16.

⁵ Rom. viii. 13.

⁶ 1 Cor. ii. 13, 15; iii. 1.

⁷ Rom. viii. 15; 2 Tim. i. 7.

⁸ Rom. vii. 22, 23, 25.

⁹ Matt. xvi. 26.

¹⁰ 1 Pet. i. 22.

¹¹ Matt. x. 28, 35; xvi. 25; xxvi. 38; Rom. ii. 9.

the spirit (πνεῦμα) is dead.”¹ Thus again, deceased persons are sometimes called ψυχαι, and sometimes πνεύματα.²

4. *Representations given of the Soul by Pantheists.*

Pantheism represents the soul either as a mere attribute of the universal substance and a correlate of extension, or as a vanishing point in the eternal process of the evolution of the Absolute. It opposes our consciousness, because, first, it denies our individual personality. Every man knows that he is not a universal existence, but a concrete, individual being. This knowledge is involved in the idea of the ego, and this idea is the fundamental condition of all thinking, feeling, willing. When a man says ego, he distinguishes himself from all outward realities. Although we constantly feel the influences of the objective world, we are conscious that we are essentially different from that world, and have the power of making it in some degree serviceable to us, in promoting our own ends. The great distinction between a man and a brute is this: a man chooses his end, and acts for this rather than for another which he might have chosen; a brute is necessitated to act for a definite end, and has no choice in regard to it. As we know that we are different from the outward world, so we know that we are different from God; that we can oppose him, transgress his laws, work against his purposes. Even our love to him implies our difference from him; for love can arise only between two natures congenial with each other, and drawn to each other, but each of them enjoying his own individual being.

Pantheism opposes our consciousness, secondly, by denying the freedom of the will. A person is one who thinks, wills, and acts for an end. But no being can act for an end unless he is free. Now the freedom of the will is a fact guaranteed in our very consciousness; it cannot be, as it

¹ James ii. 26; Luke viii. 55.

² Compare Acts ii. 27, 31; Rev. vi. 9; xx. 4 with Luke xxiv. 37, 39; Acts xxiii. 8, 9; Heb. xii. 9, 23; 1 Pet. iv. 6.

need not be, theoretically proved ; nor can it be made uncertain by any process of reasoning.

But, thirdly, Pantheism opposes our *moral* consciousness in denying the moral distinctions ; or if it recognize the difference between good and evil, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, it must ascribe to God himself all the error, sin, and crime under which man suffers, and here it opposes our *religious* consciousness. But all truth has its ultimate ground in consciousness. Pantheism then must be groundless, for it does not agree with our consciousness, and indeed in its fundamental principles denies the possibility of personal consciousness.

5. *Representations given of the Soul by Materialists.*

Materialism regards the soul as a power dwelling in the very essence of matter, or as a power springing from the intermixture of material substances in the human organization, or, as the last result, the highest potency of the process in which organic nature makes itself subjective. The materialism of the present day regards all phenomena as reducible to matter and force ; it regards the processes of thinking, feeling, willing, as the workings of the material force ; it recognizes no distinction between matter and substance, but regards all substance as material.

It is a clear and fundamental principle that out of all combinations of matter, however fine and complicated, there cannot rise a development which surpasses the force dwelling in the matter itself. Now what we call spiritual developments do surpass this force. First, the consciousness of the ego as a *concrete unity*, cannot be explained as a result of physical force. This force is either mechanical or physical or chemical. How can any such power account for the mysterious doubling of the soul, its looking in upon itself, its dividing of itself into subject and object, and its unceasing comprehension of both subject and object into a perfect unit, the ego ? The consciousness of self is a real wonder. It cannot be freed from mystery ; for we cannot

go behind it, for it is the ultimate fact, the last foundation of all our knowledge. We do not have it when we enter life; we have only the faculty for it then, and we gradually attain the knowledge of ourselves, after we have received certain impressions from the external world. Even the processes of vegetable life cannot be accounted for on the theory of mechanical or physical or chemical forces alone. These forces do not manifest themselves until the life ceases, and then they produce the decomposition of the plant. Therefore, the processes of vegetable life cannot be explained, except by supposing a peculiar power, superior to the powers of mere matter, and this peculiar power resides in a peculiar substratum. Far less can we explain, on any even the most refined theory of materialism, the wonderful fact that the soul divides itself into subject and object, voluntarily looks in upon itself, and remains the one ego, the perceiving and the perceived principle.

Secondly, the *continued identity* of the ego cannot be accounted for as the result of mechanical, physical, or chemical forces. These forces are perpetually changing. The material particles which compose the body are continually disappearing; yet the youth looks back upon his childhood, and the old man looks back upon his youth, and perceives that the ego has retained its identity, amid all the fluctuations of that material substance and those material forces with which it has been connected.

Thirdly, the higher operations of the mind cannot be accounted for on the supposition that they result, however remotely, from material forces. In these operations the mind shows itself to be independent of matter, and to have control over it. The mind penetrates the world, rises to principles which include the solution of the problems of the world and of life. In its process of generalization, the mind shows itself to be independent of space and time. It derives conclusions from premises, and then follows the guidance of these conclusions in detecting material phenomena previously unobserved. The mind forms ideas of truth, of

beauty, of moral goodness; and these ideas are not derived from the outward world. They spring from that idea of God, which is immanent in the soul, and in which man finds the highest unity of his knowledge, the final solution of all problems of life and of the world, the highest principles for determining his own voluntary action, the light, the inward firmness, and repose for which he has so deep a longing. Is it possible that this idea of God, and all the ideas involved in it, can be a result of material organism or of material life?

In exact parallelism with thought is the voluntary act of man. The will of a brute proceeds from blind impulse; the will of man rises in successive gradations from its dependence on sense until it subjects to itself all animal desires. Man has wants superior to those of his physical nature. They correspond with the pure ideas which spring from the ego, and have no relation to matter. Man longs after the true, the beautiful, the morally good; and as God is the substantial truth, the beauty, the moral goodness in absolute perfection, man longs after God. He finds in himself the power to determine his voluntary action by these pure ideas. This is the free-will, by which man, instead of being subject to nature, makes nature subject to himself. Is it possible that a will thus exempting itself from the laws of necessity can be the result of matter, which is always bound by those laws?

Mediating between thought and volition are the feelings. It is through the feelings that intellect acts upon will, and will upon intellect. They give to our life its highest power, fervor, and richness. Some of them are in the sphere of sensation, and are governed by our physical being; others, such as joy in the possession of wealth, of fame, of dominion, etc., rise higher, and are influenced by reflection; others rise higher still, and are independent of our physical being; they attach themselves to our loftiest ideas, and to the volitions determined by those ideas; they are the feelings of joy in view of truth, the aesthetic feelings, the moral,

the religious. When man, thinking and willing, has raised himself up to these exalted ideas, and has entered into inner, harmonious connection with his Maker, he has found the union of all his faculties and sensibilities in God; he has found that peace of God which the world cannot give, and that true godliness which no change of outward relations can take away. This godliness is the product of inward freedom. How is it possible to derive from the forces and laws of material substance those pure, sweet, holy feelings which are elevated above our sensuous nature, which unfold themselves out of the loftiest ideas, and out of the volitions determined by these ideas, and which continue until the dark hour of death?

6. *The true Representation of the Soul.*

Materialism and Pantheism agree with each other in denying the personal nature, the separate, individual substance of the soul. But what they deny is the real truth. The processes of thought, willing, feeling, result from a concrete, individual substance which is essentially different from unorganized matter, and which remains the same amid all the fluctuations of the sensuous organism, and which hereby gives a pledge that it will continue to live after the dissolution of the body. This substance, this distinct peculiar monad, develops itself in the animal life, in all the functions of animal life, in the origin, the development, and the preservation of the material organism. We are conscious of but *one* life in us; the spirit is the soul; the ego which manifests itself in thought, feeling, willing, announces itself as one and the same principle with that which by the nerves of sensation informs us of the outward world and of our corporeal states, which also by the nerves of motion sways the physical members, and uses them for accomplishing its own designs. It is only by supposing our spiritual and animal life to be developments of one and the same substance, that we can account for the influence of the body on the mind, and of the mind on

the body; all the disturbances of our organic life causing disturbances in our spiritual life, and the spiritual functions re-acting on the organic, so that sometimes by the spiritual energy alone the organic disturbances are quelled, and the animal life brought back from its abnormal to its normal state. The soul, then, develops its activity in two spheres: it works in the darkness of unconsciousness as a natural power, forming and animating the material organism; and also, having been awakened from its original slumber by the outward world, it works, in the light of consciousness, and in the permanent feeling of its own oneness and identity, as the principle of thinking, feeling, willing. In the unconscious sphere it constructs for itself a body, by assimilating certain materials derived from unorganized nature, and it preserves the play of the life which animates that body. In the conscious sphere it lives in an immeasurable fulness of thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which form, as it were, its spiritual body, and the methods of its self-revelation. Working in the animal sphere it is the *ψυχή* of the New Testament. Working in its ideas, feelings, volitions, it is the *πνεῦμα* of the New Testament. Thus do philosophy and revelation agree.

III. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF THE SOUL'S PRE-EXISTENCE.

1. *The Ideal Pre-existence of the Soul.*

God is the author of the world, and accordingly the world is a revelation of himself.¹ As the human mind mirrors itself forth in its own thoughts, realizing themselves in acts, so God mirrors himself forth in his ideas, which are realized in the world. As his ideas have a unity, so has the organism of the world. As his ideas are infinite, so are his acts eternal.² Not only does he know the creatures which now exist, but also those which will exist. The idea of the human race was in his mind before the idea was made objective on the earth.³ Every individual of the race is

¹ Rom. i. 19, 20.

² John v. 17.

³ Gen. i. 26.

represented by inspired men as having existed from eternity in the mind of God¹; even the moral and religious condition of every man, his eternal destiny also, are included in the divine foreknowledge.² This foreknown life is the ideal pre-existence of the soul, and is taught in the Bible.

2. *The Real Pre-existence of the Soul.*

§ 1. THIS REAL PRE-EXISTENCE NOT TAUGHT IN THE BIBLE.

By the real, as distinct from the ideal, pre-existence of the soul, we mean the existence of it in the created world, and not in the uncreated Mind. Origen interprets the parable of the householder who "saw others standing idle in the market-place,"³ as referring to souls who had not yet been sent into the world. It is not wonderful that an allegorizing interpreter like Origen should find a proof of pre-existence in such assertions as that Jacob and Esau were objects of the divine love or hatred before they were born.⁴ The Cabbalists derive an argument in favor of this doctrine from the statement that the "spirit returns unto God who gave it."⁵ In the song of Hannah we read: "The Lord killeth and the Lord maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave (sheol) and bringeth up."⁶ But it is evident from other passages, that this verse refers to deliverance from the gates, the borders of the grave, from the danger of death, not from sheol itself.⁷ There is an utterance in the Apocrypha which does declare the soul's pre-existence; where Solomon says: "I was a witty child and had a good spirit, yea rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled."⁸ This idea, however, is foreign from the purely Jewish method of thought, and sprang from the Alexandrine-Jewish philosophy, the incipient traces of which are found in the Book of Wisdom.

¹ Acts xv. 18; Rom. iv. 17; Psalm cxxxix. 16; Jer. i. 5.

² Rom. viii. 28-30; Eph. i. 4; 2 Tim. i. 9; 1 Pet. i. 1, 2.

³ Matt. xx. 3.

⁴ Rom. ix. 11.

⁵ Eccl. xii. 7.

⁶ 1 Sam. ii. 6.

⁷ Psalm xlix. 16; lxxxvi. 13; ix. 14.

⁸ Wis. Sol. viii. 19, 20.

But that not even one trace of this theory is found in the inspired scriptures, has been admitted by even Julius Müller. He attempts to explain the biblical silence on his favorite doctrine, by saying that the Bible does not teach philosophy. But this silence ought to be explained on the ground that his favorite doctrine is contrary to the general teachings of the Bible. In the Mosaic record of man's creation, there is not the slightest hint of man's soul having existed before the body was formed. The creation is absolute. As God forms the corporeal nature, so he forms the principle which animates that nature. The breath of life comes from him. It is the same divine breath (*ruach*) which the Old Testament describes as the universal principle of life in the world. The New Testament agrees with the Old in always describing the act of creation as the one act of absolutely creating both the body and the soul at the same time.¹

§ 2. THE REAL AND TIMELESS PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IS
CONTRARY TO REASON.

We ought to inquire first of all, whether the ante-temporal or ante-mundane existence of the soul be conceivable or not. If it be conceivable, then we may inquire whether the facts of our moral life can be explained on no other supposition than that of such pre-existence. If they cannot, then we may regard the supposition as needed for completing the biblical account of the soul's history. We must distinguish between the theory that the soul exists before time, has a timeless pre-existence, and the theory that the soul did exist before it entered on its temporal state before the world was formed. The present section is devoted to the theory of the soul's timeless pre-existence, which is a pre-existence only in a figurative sense. This is the theory of Kant. It is founded on his great principle, that time and space have no objective reality, and are only subjective forms of our sensuous perception. Consequently we perceive the world without us and the world within us only as they are pre-

¹ Matt. xix. 4; 1 Cor. xi. 9; xv. 45; 1 Tim. ii. 13.

sented to us under these forms, and we have absolutely no knowledge of material or mental substances as they are in themselves. Man as a Phenomenon appears to exist in space and time. As a Noumenon, as he is in himself, he does not exist in space and time. Now his freedom belongs to him only as a Noumenon. In the sphere independent of space and time he performs that decisive act which causes his inclination to sin, and this inclination brings upon him a guilt which he cannot shake off.

Now we agree with Kant in affirming that our ideas of space and time are forms of sensuous perception. If they are not so, then they must be generalizations formed from experience; empirical notions formed by abstracting from our sensuous perceptions. But that these ideas are not derived from experience, is evident from the facts that they are presupposed in every possible perception; that we cannot divest our minds of them; that we cannot imagine any bounds of time or space, nor any limit of their divisibility; that we know *a priori*, or can *demonstrate*, the truths relating to time and space, whereas we know the truths of experience only *a posteriori*, and cannot have *demonstrative* evidence of them.

Still we differ from Kant when he teaches that space and time are nothing but subjective forms of sensuous perception, and have no objective reality. We cannot conceive of any necessary form of thought which has not some object corresponding with it. If there were nothing objective, answering to our ideas of space and time, we should never have these ideas. The eye alone would not give us vision; there must be light. The ear alone would not give us sound; there must be the vibration of the air. The idea of beauty is not the product of experience; it is of subjective origin; still we should not be conscious of the idea if there were no object corresponding with it. Neither should we be conscious of our subjective idea of moral goodness, if the idea had not an objective correlate in the act which is called good.

It is an error to suppose that thought and real existence are identical. Existence is real because it is independent of thought. On the other hand, we can think of objects which are not real. Still, thought and reality are in most intimate correspondence with each other. All real existence can be apprehended by the mind. Whatever so contradicts the laws of thought that it cannot be apprehended by the mind, does not really exist. The ideas which we form *a priori* are afterwards justified by experience. They have led sometimes to empirical discoveries which were confirmed by experiment. Thus our conviction is strengthened that our ideas of space and time have their correlate in a real existence.

What this real existence is to which our ideas of space and time correspond, we cannot easily say. Everything finite is under the relations of time. There cannot then be a timeless existence of the soul. Such an existence cannot be conceived of. Even Kant himself contradicts his own theory, by affirming that in its ante-temporal being the soul is free, and it then puts forth the moral choice which decides its temporal destiny. But freedom cannot realize itself except in a succession of acts, and that moral choice which decides the temporal destiny of the soul was put forth. This *succession* and this *putting forth* of a choice involve the idea of change, and thus of time. Schelling also speaks sometimes of an existence and of an act which preceded the temporal existence of man, which belong not to time but to eternity, and which yet go through time. Now such an existence and such an act cannot be timeless. It is a contradiction to say that a thing belongs to eternity and not to time, and yet comes forth in time. Julius Müller also contradicts himself in some of his remarks concerning this theme. He speaks of men in their timeless existence as recognizing their own individual nature by looking into the nature of God, and seeing their humanity reflected from it. But is not this an act which presupposes change, and therefore time? He teaches that in this mysterious pre-existence,

the soul performed an act which has shaped its temporal destiny. But this act, by which the soul came out of an undetermined into a determined state, implies great changes, and all changes are inconceivable unless there be time. Thus is the idea of the soul's timeless existence self-contradictory.

§ 3 THE REAL AND ANTE-MUNDANE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASON.

The majority of believers in the soul's pre-existence agree in advocating, not the timeless, but the ante-mundane being of the soul; not its existence *out of* the relations of time, but before the changes and successions of time. They differ among themselves, however, in various particulars. Some, as Plato, Philo, and others, believe that the soul in its ante-mundane state was far superior in excellence and blessedness to the soul in its mundane state; while others, as Fichte, Julius Müller, and others, adopt the theory, which is far more consonant with modern science, that the soul in its previous condition had not attained its full personality, and had only a potential life. Some believe that the spirit is the highest potency of the soul, and is one principle with it, and of course that both had an ante-mundane being, while others, like Fichte and Julius Müller, believe that the soul and spirit are distinct principles, and that the spirit did, but the soul did not, exist before the body.

But we need not now spend any time in proving that the soul and spirit form one ego, nor that the spirit's consciousness is first awakened by its relations to the external world. If the spirit did exist before its union with the body, it must have existed in an unconscious state. The only theory, then, which we need to controvert now, is the theory that the soul had an ante-mundane existence which was unconscious, merely potential—a germ life, in which were all the faculties, but not the full reality of the human person. It must be confessed that this potential pre-existence of the soul is not in itself inconceivable. It contradicts no law of thought. As the plastic principle of the seed-corn can slumber thou-

sands of years, until the outward conditions of its development appear; as there is reason to conjecture that the earth conceals within itself innumerable germs of organic natures which will gradually, as circumstances evolve them, shoot forth into visible life, so the soul-monads may have existed potentially for a duration surpassing our thought, and may commence their development as soon as they are connected with bodies, the relation of the soul to the body being essential to the awakening of consciousness. We are willing to confess that there is something magnificent in the thought that, before the first conceivable moment of time, God so created and endowed all souls, and placed them in such relations to each other as to fashion the future history of mankind, and that he then so constituted and disposed all things, so arranged all their laws and forces that plants and animals should appear at the proper time and place, and that there should unfold itself a vegetable and animal kingdom diversified in the highest degree, yet having an inward connection and just proportion of all its parts, and forming one great completed whole.

It is no objection to this theory of a potential pre-existence, that we have no remembrance of it; for memory begins with consciousness. We cannot remember the scenes of our earliest childhood. Still this unconscious pre-existence is only an hypothesis, to which we should not have recourse unless there be irresistible reasons compelling us to sanction it. We will proceed to examine the alleged reasons:

a. The variety of conditions in which men are placed at their entrance into the world is no reason for the hypothesis of their pre-existence.

We confess that when we look at the infant who was born a cripple, or an heir of poverty and wretchedness, we are prompted to inquire: What great sin has this child committed, to occasion its being introduced into such a life of misery? and wherein have other infants been less guilty, to occasion their being introduced into life with sounder

bodies and in the bosom of happier families? But these are superficial questions. A deeper examination answers them thus: If the outward relations of life depend on the degree of guilt incurred before birth, the men who were born into the state of the direst penury must have had the most sinful dispositions, and the men who were born into the state of greatest physical comfort must have had the most innocent characters. But our observation proves that such is not the fact. The Bible represents our earthly lot as depending on an ordination of God; but it never represents that ordination as depending on our ante-mundane guilt. Thinking of the old Jewish theory, that all individual suffering proceeds from individual guilt, and of the Alexandrine theory, that the calamities to which men are born proceed from the guilt which they contracted before birth, the disciples of Christ asked him whether the unfortunate man was born blind because he had sinned before birth, or because his parents had sinned. Jesus replied: "Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents, but [the man was born blind] that the works of God should be made manifest in him."¹ He was born blind so that Jesus might exhibit his divine power of working miracles; then, so that Jesus might, through the aid of these miracles, secure a faith in his redemptive mission; finally, so that the kingdom of God might be established on earth. This special case, then, teaches the general principle, that the variety of conditions into which men are born springs, not from the greater or smaller degrees of sin committed before birth, but from the plan of God to develop his own kingdom.

This biblical teaching corresponds with the sound lessons of reason. If all men were born to the same state and relations, physical and mental, there would be a bar to all excitement, effort, striving, contest, and conflict; to all progress from the lower to the higher, to all development of resources, to all human history. Out of the unequal conditions into which men are introduced at birth, spring their

¹ John ix. 3.

wants, their living interchange of thought and feeling, the gradations of society, the diversities of trade and office, the reciprocities of help, the pressing forward in improvement, the uninterrupted progress in unfolding the human character, the ever increasing development of the kingdom of God on earth. Therefore has Jehovah ordained this stimulating inequality in the original states of men. History teaches that minds come forward as they are required by circumstances, and at extraordinary periods extraordinary minds present themselves, who not only concentrate in themselves the power of the race as it has been already developed, but who have the force to press the development still further onward. History also teaches that these minds are formed, and their resources are brought out, by the external relations into which they are called at birth, and through which they pass in subsequent life. Minds are fashioned *for* circumstances and *by* circumstances.

But the question presses yet: Why is one man appointed to serve his race through adversity, and another through prosperity? How have those who are depressed from their very birth merited their depression, and how have those who are exalted from their very birth deserved their exaltation? Another key to unlock this difficulty is found in the doctrine that there is a future life, in which all the crookednesses of the present life will be straightened out. That God will make all needed adjustments, is evident from various scriptures, and particularly from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, and from some of the Beatitudes.¹ Our moral feelings require that all which is oppressive here be rectified hereafter. The Bible also assures us that God will recompense men according to their various degrees of virtue, and with all due allowance for the differing degrees of power originally given to different individuals, for their differing opportunities to improve themselves, for their deprivations, pains, conflicts, and for all the circumstances which hindered the unfolding of their natures. There is no other doctrine

¹ Luke xvi. 19, sq.; Matt. v. 4, 10, 11.

than this which can relieve us when we reflect not only on the *natural* inequalities of condition into which men are born, but also on the *moral* inequalities; on the fact that one person is, from his earliest childhood, encompassed with influences which tempt him to vice, while another person is exempted, as far as possible, from these temptations, and is blessed with multiplied advantages for progress in virtue. Jesus has solved this enigma by the significant words: "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more."¹ The future life will be one of unending progress; and the soul which has pursued a course of improvement here, and been retarded in this course by the obstacles of its earthly lot, will have an opportunity for increasing improvement in the life to come.²

b. The rise of our *a priori* ideas affords no reason for the hypothesis of our pre-existence.

The Platonists believed in two principles of things: the one being particular, manifold, mutable, and perishing — an object of empirical knowledge; the other being universal, characterized by strict unity, unchangeable, unperishing — an object of the *a priori* ideas. These ideas are necessary for recognizing this principle; and they must have been brought by the soul into the present from an antecedent life.

At the present day, every judicious philosopher agrees with Plato, so far as to recognize the *a priori* ideas, and thus to deny that the mind of the infant is a *tabula rasa*. The mind is controlled by certain laws or forms of thinking immanent in it. Logic is the science of these laws or forms of thinking. Ethics is the science of the laws or forms of moral feeling. Every object in nature has its own laws, immanent in that object. Thus there is a law by which bodies attract each other; there are laws of cohesion and of

¹ Luke xii. 48.

² Professor Bruch makes various remarks on this theme, which indicate his leaning toward some such theory of restoration as that adopted by Origen.

repulsion ; there is a law by which a plant builds itself up according to a type lying in it. Why should not the soul have its laws ? In the darkness of unconsciousness it does form its own body according to a type given it by its Creator. All its sensuous perceptions and its intellectual operations are conformed to fixed laws. There is no purely empirical knowledge. All knowledge which we obtain *a posteriori* is the combined product, on the one hand, of the working of the outer world, and on the other hand, of those forms of sensuous perception which are immanent in the spirit. Then, our *a priori* ideas, although not derived from experience, are yet unfolded on condition of our past experience and are applied to matters of experience. Thus our ideas of truth, of beauty, of virtue, are applied to the world without us, although they originate from the world within us. The idea of God comprehends under it all natural objects, and all the phenomena of life. There must, then, be a close correspondence between the laws of the spirit and the laws of the outer world. Thinking and being answer to each other with the most wonderful exactness. They are both revelations of God. Hence *a priori* thought often anticipates the phenomena of existence, and afterwards is confirmed by those phenomena.

But Plato and after him DesCartes fell into a grievous error when they represented our *a priori* ideas as *inborn cognitions*. There are no inborn cognitions slumbering in the mind, and first awakened by outward experience. What man brings with him into life is nothing else than indwelling powers, and laws binding their activity. All the knowledge which we have is acquired in our earthly life, and is the product of these powers regulated by these laws. What are called our *ideas*, as distinct from our generalizations, do not at first lie ready formed in our souls. They are as really acquired as are the notions derived from sensuous perception and abstraction. The soul develops them from its own activity ; which corresponds with the laws which are immanent in it. They are not developed until the soul has

matured its powers to a degree sufficient for unfolding them. It is deceptive, then, to represent our learning and knowing as a mere remembering of what we had learned and known in a previous state. It does indeed appear sometimes as if the ideas which rise in our minds were the mere waking up of dark, slumbering reminiscences. This appearance results from the fact that the ideas had previously floated before our minds, and been forgotten, and now present themselves with a brightness of evidence which surprises us. There is not the slightest evidence that the ideas had ever presented themselves before our entrance into this world. Therefore there is not the slightest evidence from these ideas that we ever existed in a previous state.

c. The moral condition in which men are born, and in which they continue, is no reason for believing in their pre-existence.

There are two divisions of this argument in favor of our pre-existence. One is derived from the mere *fact* of our sinning. But it is now admitted even by such men as Julius Müller and Rückert, that it is impossible to account for the existence of sin as a mere fact. To account for it is to assign a cause which produces it. Now if any cause produces it, then sin comes under the law of cause and effect, and that is the law of necessity. But if sin be necessity, it ceases to be sin. The very idea of guilt presupposes freedom.

The second division of the argument is derived, not from the mere fact, but from the universal prevalence of sin. How happens it that all men sin, when every man is free to be holy? Rückert and others have answered this question by asserting, that only those spirits became men, who had sinned in a previous state. Their character in the present world is traced up to their sin in an antecedent sphere, thus: every wrong act must have sprung from a wrong inclination; but this inclination must have sprung from a preceding wrong act. Thus we pursue our history backward, until we find that we have the sinful inclination at the earliest

period of our earthly existence. It must then have sprung from a sinful act preceding our earthly existence. This inclination is called sin, because it is, first, the result of sin, and secondly, is the inward motive to sin.

We have been surprised at the fact that, while men have accounted for sin by tracing it back to a pre-existent state, they have not accounted for theoretical error by the same process. The mind has an instinctive love of the truth; it was designed, constituted for the truth; still it has a prevailing inclination to credit what is false. It costs man earnest labor to ascertain the truth, his progress in it is dilatory; but he learns error with ease, and he advances in it with great rapidity. He not merely fails to believe the right, but he positively believes the wrong propositions. Positive error has dominion over men. Not only the uneducated populace, but the most learned scholars adopt a mass of prejudices and positive blunders. Now, why does man thus give himself up to the sway of error, when his destination is to receive the truth? Is it said that at his very entrance into the world he finds himself encompassed with a multitude of wrong motives, which in the lapse of ages have made themselves popular? But how happens it that so many errors have been accumulated in past time by men who were created with such strong instincts for the truth? Why does every man, though endowed with magnificent powers for learning the right principles, fail to exercise these powers; and why does he cherish faith in so many wrong principles, and cling to them with so great tenacity? Is it said that theoretical error results from sin? It does often, but not always. There are many sins which do not spring from wrong belief, and there are many wrong beliefs which have no influence on practical life? We cannot, then, account in these ways for men's inclinations to believe in what is false. Yet we have never heard that any philosopher has resorted to the theory that man's first act of believing an untruth gave a wrong direction to his mental powers, and as they have this wrong direction when he first

enters the world, therefore this first act of believing an untruth must have been performed in a pre-existent state!

Is the present moral state of man explained by Kant's theory of a timeless pre-existence? We have already shown that this theory involves a self-contradiction. But even if it were not so, we cannot believe that the origin of human sinfulness could have been in that timeless state. For in that state men were free from the influence of sense, and of associates infected with sin. How, then, could they have been led into sin? and into such a sin as has produced our deep-rooted inclination to evil? It is unreasonable to account for the wrong which we now commit under the influence of sense and of evil companions, by supposing that it sprung from a wrong which we committed when there was no such corrupting moral influence! This is to explain the easier by the harder.

Is the present moral state of man explained by the theory that we apostatized, not in a timeless state of being, but in a state which was under the conditions of time, and yet previous to the existence of man on earth? This theory, also, branches out into two divisions. One is, that in this previous existence we were blessed with clear views of duty and of God. But here we ask: How could we have been tempted to break up our intelligent, rational, joyous communion with our Maker? We could not have been tempted by sense, for there was none; nor by evil companions, for there were none. If men say, with Origen, that we were tempted by Satan, then we ask: How was Satan himself drawn into sin? If it be difficult to account for the apostasy of *men*, how much more difficult must it be to account for the apostasy of a higher order of beings? Why did not perfectly virtuous and blessed spirits resist his temptations? Why did God allow him to tempt us? Thus are our difficulties increased rather than diminished by this endeavor to explain our sinfulness in our present circumstances, which peculiarly tend to encourage it, by supposing that our sinfulness began in far different circumstances, which peculiarly tended to discourage it.

Admitting that countless minds did apostatize in that ante-mundane existence, how can we suppose that their first departure from God produced at once a deep-rooted sinful disposition? Would not the wretchedness occasioned by the first sin; would not such allurements to goodness as had been operating on those blessed spirits, have brought them back from their first wandering, and restored them to their former harmony with God?

The theory that men apostatized in an ante-mundane existence generally winds up with the supposition that they were transferred to this world, and invested with a corporeal nature, in order that they may recover from their apostasy and enter upon a course of purification. But the influences of their present sensuous nature, and of their present evil companionship, are exactly fitted to *prevent* their restoration from their apostasy. If they were to be purified from sin, they would have been retained in a sphere where the influences favored that purification, and not removed to a sphere where the influences opposed it.

A second division of this theory is, that the sinful act which decided our moral character was committed in a previous state, not of conscious activity, but in one of unconscious and merely potential life. To this we reply, that all moral action presupposes a knowledge of the divine law and the freedom of the human will. In an unconscious state there can be no such knowledge, no such freedom; therefore no moral act can be performed; least of all, a moral act which determines the whole moral character of men during their entire existence on earth.

Again, the moral argument for our pre-existence would lead us to believe in an infinite series of sinful acts performed by man. He puts forth a wrong volition; this must have resulted from a wrong bias; this wrong bias, being culpable, must have resulted from wrong volition preceding it; but man was born with this wrong bias; then the preceding volition was put forth in a previous state of being. This is the argument. Now, on the same principles of reasoning, the wrong volition put forth in a previous state

of being must have resulted from a wrong bias; and that from an antecedent volition, and so on in an infinite chain of biases and volitions. At the end of the argument we are just where we were at the beginning of it; the same difficulty remains, and is only pushed back from the present to an antecedent sphere of being.

The argument derived from our moral condition at birth, in favor of our pre-existence is thought to be confirmed by the Bible. We accede to the statement of Julius Müller that the inspired word represents human wickedness as consisting, not merely in the individual sinful acts which we perform, but also in that moral corruption which dwells in us permanently, and which is the origin of our sinful volitions. But does the Bible teach that this corruption does not originate in our temporal existence. Müller appeals to the words¹: "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth;" but these words do not imply that the evil imagination is grounded in a moral corruption which at man's entrance into life on earth has already taken up its abode in him. He quotes the verse,² "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;" but certainly this verse asserts nothing more than that the Psalmist's parents were sinners like himself. Müller places the chief weight upon the passage,³ "and were by nature (*φύσει*) the children of wrath, even as others." But if we examine this passage in its connection we shall find that the word *φύσει* is explained by the words immediately preceding it in the second and third verses, and also by the eleventh and twelfth; and it must refer to the sinful state which is described in those four verses, and in which both Jews and Gentiles *actively* place themselves before their conversion to Christianity, and before their entrance into the state of grace which is conditioned upon that conversion.

Thus far we have reasoned against the theory of pre-

¹ Gen. viii. 21.

² Psalm li. 5.

³ Eph. ii. 3. [For a further development of the biblical argument, see pp. 697-705 above.]

existence, on the assumption that the facts of our moral life cannot be accounted for on any other theory. But is this assumption just? Let us examine it. We admit the universal sinfulness of man. The holy scriptures prove it. Experience confirms it. Whenever we first come in contact with a man, we believe *a priori* that he is sinful. There has been on earth only one exception to this general law of depravity. We admit also the natural inclination of all men to sin. Paul, in the seventh of Romans, refers to this inclination, which is awakened and excited by the law. Who has not recognized it in his own experience? It manifests itself in tender childhood. It originates the difficulty of performing a good act, the facility of performing a wicked one. It is the reason why we follow a wrong more easily than a right example. When we reflect on the wealth of the moral powers with which we are endued, and on those tendencies to virtue which result from such powers, we are amazed at our inclination to sin; and it would be disgraceful to science did we not inquire for the origin of this inclination. This is the great problem.

We may solve the problem by supposing that our first evil inclinations arise in the natural process of human development. While the soul is under the law of 'unconscious necessity,' it is neither to be praised nor blamed for anything moral. But as soon as it has come out from under that law, and entered the sphere of consciousness and free-will, the soul is to be blamed for its evil inclinations. It is to be blamed for that want of energy in the free will, which want is the occasion of the soul's not struggling as it should struggle against the evil inclination. It is to be blamed for those wrong volitions which give new power to the inclination. Still this involuntary inclination is not blameworthy in its first principle; it is not in itself, and in the distinctive meaning of the term, sinful. In order to be sinful it must result from a free act. But if such an act had been performed, it must have been performed in a pre-existent state, and we have shown this theory to be a pure fiction. We

must, then, distinguish between the first uprising of this inward inclination to evil, and the form which the inclination receives in consequence of the action of the free-will. It is metamorphosed from a power of nature to a sinful feeling, by the entrance of conscious choice. At its first uprising the inclination is a result of a natural necessity, and therefore cannot, in and of itself, be sinful, in the strict sense of that word. It becomes guilty when we enter into conscious, personal life, and because we passively allow ourselves to be governed by it, instead of contending against it with the requisite energy, and holding it within its due bounds by the legitimate use of the free-will, which has gradually ripened out of the state of a faculty which could not be exercised into the state of a power which is actually exercised.

The following is the natural process of development in which sin has its origin. The spirit is not a foreign substance added to the soul, but is identically the same substance with it. The soul becomes spirit when it rises out of the dark sphere of animal life, where it acts as the plastic principle of the body, and comes into the domain of conscious thought and free-will. Ascending into this rational domain, the immaterial substance does not cease to be the organizing principle of the body, but it superadds new functions to those which it previously exercised, and it develops itself more and more until the principle of animal life is controlled, permeated, and glorified by the principle of rational life.

Considered as belonging to the sphere of nature, man does not differ from other creatures belonging to the same sphere. He has many impulses which together take root in one permanent, fundamental impulse, which is the love of life, of corporeal life. As every satisfaction of a physical want is immediately followed by a sensation of physical pleasure, so all man's impulses, while he continues in the sphere of nature alone, go out after that which is agreeable to sense. In that sphere, too, all his impulses are concentrated upon

himself. He knows himself alone; therefore he is the central point of the whole world. The strict law of his life is to withdraw himself exclusively into himself, and make all his movements converge in himself, the whole animated but irrational nature stands under the power of blind egoism. So long as the child is in this first stage of his earthly being, and all his powers are under the dominion of necessity, he lives for himself alone. But we do not blame him for this egoism more than we blame a mere animal, which, because it cannot become spirit, and therefore cannot develop itself into a free agent, does not come forth from this egoism, and cannot withdraw itself from the power of the impulses after sensual gratification. But by degrees the soul of the child begins to raise itself above its mere plastic activity. It experiences a wonderful, though a gradual change; awakened by influences of the outer world, it begins to think and to will. Its thought and volition are connected together by feeling. These three operations are illumined by self-consciousness. Thus the soul begins a new life. In some individuals the soul develops itself into a spirit more easily and more rapidly than in other individuals. But we can discover no limit to the child's progress in this unfolding of his spiritual powers. They are capable of an endless perfectibility.

Now at the moment when he rises from the sphere of the soul into the sphere of the spirit, from his unconscious to his conscious state, from his condition as an individual to his condition as a person, he disentangles himself from the law of necessity and becomes a free agent.¹ His sensuous impulses are no longer the only ones which stir him. The

¹ Professor Bruch does not attempt, but regards it as impossible, to answer the question: "When does moral agency commence?" and also the question: "When does the child begin to sin?" He is satisfied, however, that the child is not an actual sinner till some time after birth. He even goes so far as to query whether the first acts which the child commits, during the earliest glimmerings of personal consciousness, are sins; for at the first dawning of personality the moral convictions and the freedom of the will are not strong enough, he thinks, to resist the forces of our psychical life.

spirit as well as the soul is penetrated with a strong desire for various forms of good. This general desire of the spirit is divided into many particular desires, and the good to which they tend is adapted to the dignity of the spirit, and has nothing in common with the mere sensual delight of the soul. This higher nature of man has impulses which direct it to God. It is under laws which do not, like the laws of nature, operate by constraint, but they appeal to free-will, prompt the person to strive after those forms of good which have an absolute worth, to become free from egoism, to love his fellow men, and to love God.

But when the person has emerged from his merely psychical into his higher state, he has not thereby ceased to be a soul as well as a spirit. His natural being lies at the basis of his spiritual. His sensuous impulses remain in full force when the rational impulses begin to stir him. Hence we need not wonder that a sharp conflict breaks out between his lower and his higher principles of action. His psychical being has great force, and it continues to crave sensual pleasure and to concentrate its interest in itself. It must, then, oppose those impulses which prompt him in his spiritual being to love his fellow men and to love God. Man yields to his lower nature. He follows the sensuous rather than the spiritual desires. Here is the origin of sin. The sensuous impulses *themselves* are not sin, because they are necessary. The natural inclination which tempts the will to choose wrong is not blameable in and of itself, for it first rises in the soul without any permission of the will that it should rise. It becomes blameable when the person has reached that stage in which he might resist it, and does not; in which he might confine it within fit bounds, but does not; in which by voluntary sinful acts he strengthens it. This voluntarily omitting to control and to transform his inclination is a moral act, and is imputed to him as sinful. This it is which lets the inclination itself appear sinful, notwithstanding the origin of that inclination is in the dark domain of natural life. Thus we may account for the first

act of the child's sin, by supposing it to be occasioned in the natural process of the soul's development, and therefore we need not resort to any theory of the child's pre-existence.

But a new difficulty presents itself. How can we account for the fact that all men, save one, have yielded to their evil inclination? We cannot explain the universality of human sinfulness on the ground that the will is free; for the freedom of the will would give as much reason to anticipate the universal purity as the universal impurity of men. We may in some degree explain this prevalence of sin in the following method. When the powers of man's spirit are first developed, the impulses of his lower nature are in full sway; and in order that the spiritual powers may prevail over the psychical impulses, it is needful that all the external influences should be in favor of virtue, or at least not opposed to it. But the external influences are unfavorable to the predominance of the spiritual powers over the lower impulses. The very best education is imperfect. The highest wisdom of man indicates no method of avoiding the temptations with which every child is surrounded at the beginning of his moral life. These inducements to iniquity, which are inwrought into the very spirit of the times, may be traced from one generation to another, until we come to the earliest age, and of that age we read: "By one man sin entered into the world." The disobedience of our first parents, then, laid the foundation for the evil influences which have pervaded society in all times.

But how did the first sin originate? *Mere philosophy* cannot answer this question. It can indeed refer us to the fact, that before the spiritual powers had been strengthened by exercise they were too weak for preserving the due balance between themselves and the natural impulses. *Theology* favors the supposition that in the primitive state of our first parents they had some peculiarly powerful temptation, which was for them what the corrupting influences of society are for us. This supposition is confirmed by the

Mosaic record. The serpent there described is a symbol of this powerful temptation; but the full meaning of the symbol we cannot explain. We must then leave as a mysterious fact the moral disobedience of our first parents. Nor is it necessary to account for this fact, in order to refute the theory of human pre-existence. We do not claim that all the difficulties attending the origin or the prevalence of sin can be cleared up by our explanation of the process of the soul's development, but we think that this explanation may be more successful than any other in removing the difficulties of the subject.

d. There are no anthropological grounds for believing in the pre-existence of human souls.

We might here close this treatise, if Fichte had not drawn our attention to the individual personality, the peculiar spiritual endowment, which he calls the *genius*, dwelling in every human being. He thinks that the origin of new individual spirits is like a process of spiritual "generatio equivoca"; that, while a man derives from his parents his intermediate, sentient nature, manifesting itself in temperament, in peculiarities of disposition, and in all those characteristics which originate from the fancy (in the generic sense of that term), yet he does not derive his *spirit* from his progenitors. This spirit must have a transcendental ground. It must originate from a principle which is not the effect of earthly causes, but which introduces a new spiritual nature into the visible sphere. This spiritual nature, this *genius*, comes from the eternal world of real causes or grounds. Its entrance into this sphere of being is like the first introduction of an organic structure into the visible world. This *genius* is an existence as really *sui generis* as is any new species of animals which appears for the first time in the kingdom of created nature. But there is this difference: the animal species imprints itself upon innumerable single specimens, and can therefore be reckoned as only a part of nature, while the very essence of the *genius* is such that it appears only once, and works, and thus helps directly to

produce history, instead of being merely introduced into the history of the creation, as is the animal species.

This theory of Fichte rests on the assumption that the soul and the spirit are two distinct substances ; but we have already proved that the spirit is only a higher development of the soul, and is the same substance with it. Fichte says that there are peculiarities of the spirit, the *genius* ; so there are peculiarities of the soul, the natural disposition, the temperament. There is a classification of the temperaments, and there are innumerable degrees in which those of one class approximate to, or recede from, those of another class. The difference of men's temperaments occasions a like difference in their styles of thinking. A person of sanguine temperament has a different order of spirit from a person of phlegmatic or melancholic temperament. His spiritual processes are dissimilar. Fichte remarks that the differences of genius among men affect the course of history ; so do the differences of humor and disposition. He says that the peculiarities of temperament which appear in parents appear also in their children, and seem to be inherited. The same may be said of spiritual peculiarities. The children have the same which the parents have, and there is as much reason to believe that the higher as that the lower faculties are transmitted from one generation to another.

Fichte's doctrine of pre-existence rests on his theory of the original positions of the parts of the universe. If we understand his theory, it implies that all these parts were complete at the very origin of the universe, that no new substance comes into being, and that all the changes which occur in the universe are changes in the position and relation of its pre-existing parts. He supposes that material organizations are a theatre for the manifestation of souls ; that these souls are the counterparts to those organizations, and are presupposed in them. He supposes that the gradations of souls are numberless, and that the human soul is only to be viewed as the apex of them all. Now it appears to us that, in order to be consistent with his theory, Fichte

ought to have believed in the pre-existence of the human soul as well as of the human spirit. Still his theory need not have led him into a belief that the soul had a *conscious* existence. He believed in the original *germinal* being of the parts of the universe. But we have already seen that we can derive no moral explanation of our early sinfulness from the supposition that the soul pre-existed in this undeveloped and merely potential state.

To the question whether the immortal part of man be transmitted from parents to children, we are unable to give a confident answer. We can only affirm, on grounds which have been previously stated, that the theory of transmission is more probable than any other. It has been generally maintained in the church that every soul is directly created by God. But this is a highly improbable supposition. It implies that certain creative acts of God are dependent on the will of man, and is thus inconsistent with the absoluteness of the divine dominion. The origin of that principle which forms the life of human bodies, is analogous to the origin of those principles which form the life of other organized bodies. If we suppose that the soul of man must be directly created by God, we are bound, in consistency, to suppose that the vital powers of other organized beings are directly created by God. For the main distinction between the soul of man, which forms his animal life, and the principles which form the life of other organized bodies is this: the human soul is a plastic substance which has the power of developing itself into a spirit; but those other principles have no such power.

ARTICLE II.

STODDARD'S THEOLOGICAL LECTURES.

BY REV. CHARLES M. MEAD, THEOLOGICAL LICENTIATE, HALLE, GERMANY.

MOST of our readers may remember that Mr. Stoddard after his return to Persia in 1851, prepared a course of theological lectures for use with his classes in the seminary at Seir. No one who has learned to admire the man can have failed to feel a curiosity to know somewhat more respecting these lectures. But as they were written in English only for his own convenience, then translated into Syriac, and published only in that form (after Mr. Stoddard's death, under the supervision of Dr. Perkins), of course that curiosity has not been gratified. It gives us pleasure to state that we have been permitted to see the English manuscript, and to give some account of it to the public. It is only a sketch, not a critical analysis, that we attempt. He who is most willing to have his defects pointed out is the one in whom we most dislike to find them. No theologian, probably, would have more heartily invited a severe judgment on his work than Mr. Stoddard; but on no one would we be less inclined to bestow it. There was that in his unaffected modesty, in his thorough honesty, in the unselfish and elevated character of his aims, which disarms criticism. He may have had faults as a man, as a Christian, as a missionary, as a teacher; but, as not in the case of some men, we can learn less from his faults than from his excellences. In regard to him then, at least, we are disposed to do all we can to falsify Mark Antony's dolorous complaint: "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones."

Theological lectures on missionary ground are so rare that many may be prepared to expect in them something very different from the theology of Christian lands. We must disappoint such expectations. These lectures have

their peculiarities, growing out of the fact that they were designed for, and specially adapted to, Nestorian youth; but in the staple of the thought, in the order and mode of discussion, and in the general impression left by them on the mind, there is nothing strikingly novel. Had they been written for Chinamen or Esquimaux they would doubtless have borne different features. The Nestorians believe in the authority of the Bible. They discard alike the absurd theologies of the heathen and the idolatrous practices of Roman Catholics. They are called by Dr. Perkins the Protestants of Asia. In theory, even before conversion, they are not very far from orthodoxy, according to our own standard. What they chiefly need is to be vitalized. Mr. Stoddard was eminently fitted for this work. Naturally ardent, supernaturally quickened, he was well able, both by precept and by example, to exhibit the value of Christian truth working in the heart, as distinct from a blind adherence to Christian doctrines and a dull observance of Christian forms. Much as we see evidence of this in the work before us, it cannot be supposed that the fervor of his oral instructions has been transferred to the written page; nor can we hope, in the following sketch, to do justice in this respect even to what is written, especially as in him, more than in many men, what he says depends for its force very much upon how he says it.

The order of the topics discussed is not very different from that adopted by Dr. Dwight, whose system is one of those to which Mr. Stoddard often refers. Natural theology is first taken up, and the *a posteriori* argument for the being of God is stated in almost precisely the same form as by Dr. Paley. He has nothing to do with *a priori* arguments, nor does he introduce the more subtle of the skeptical objections to the other. The divine attributes are treated in a similar manner. The subject of God's benevolence is argued at considerable length. Bringing up the objection derived from the existence of sin, he says in a note: "Here present the old dilemma: 'He can and will, or he cannot

and will not, or he will and cannot, or he can and will not, keep out sin from the creation.' But (1) if he can do a thing and will do it, he *does* it. But he has not done it. Therefore this assertion is a lie. (2) He cannot and will not. Then he is neither omnipotent nor benevolent. (3) He will and cannot. Then he is benevolent, but not omnipotent. (4) He can and will not. Then he is omnipotent, but not benevolent. This is, after all, probably the true alternative. He *could* keep it out, but by destroying the moral system, by taking away our free agency, by making us brutes. I am not ready to say he could in any *other* sense, though many eminent theologians of the Tyler school think so." Having given, as one reply to the objection that perhaps God will in the end bring good out of evil, he says in another note: "Then,' say some, 'sin is a necessary means of the greatest good.' I like Dr. Taylor's statement better: 'sin is necessarily *incidental* to the best moral system.'" The moral argument, which to a cultivated mind is likely to seem the most conclusive, he gives in the following form: "He knows that we cannot love our Creator, if he is wicked. He has given us a conscience. That teaches us to hate what is evil. If, then, God is wicked, he has made us so that it is impossible for us to love and obey him. We cannot, then, believe that he is wicked." But although it is stated thus clearly and forcibly, he remarks: "This *a priori* reasoning of Dwight has little force to the common mind."

The discussion of the doctrines of immortality and of future retribution presents nothing of special interest. The genuineness and authenticity of the scriptures are proved in the ordinary way and with great fulness. Having established the inspiration of the Bible, he begins anew with the doctrines, and gives us his system of revealed theology. On the divine attributes he has little but proof-texts. On the decrees of God he has nothing specially noteworthy, which cannot be better considered in another connection. Passing this by, therefore, together with the next subject in order, that of holy and evil angels, we will arrange what we have

further to say under a few general heads, according to our own convenience.

The subject of the Trinity is not introduced at all until after that of human depravity. Having shown that there is no justification by the law, the author asks: "Who, then, justifies us? *Ans.* Christ. This leads us to a great subject: Who is Christ?" Christ's humanity is first proved, then his divinity, and the conclusion is thus stated: "We are, then, to understand that Christ had two *natures*; that he was real man and real God. But he had only one *person*. These two natures were united in one person. So the Bible teaches; but we cannot understand just how." Similarly, the Holy Ghost is not spoken of until the subject of regeneration is taken up, and the question arises: "Who is the regenerator?" Having answered this, he brings up the general subject of the Trinity, but disposes of it in a few lines: "the Father is God; the Son is God; the Holy Ghost is God. These three are one divine being, equal in power and glory. *How* they are united, we cannot understand, and perhaps never shall. There are three persons, but not three Gods; three *persons* and one God, three *persons* and one *being*; three trees and one root."

We pass to consider what is said on the character of man. From his creation "in the image of God," Mr. Stoddard infers in Adam a resemblance to God, (1) "in mind, reason, etc.;" (2) in his "power and dominion over the world"; (3) "in his conscience"; (4) "in moral disposition"; (5) "in his blessedness"; (6) "in his immortality." Under the fourth specification he remarks in a note: "It would be unprofitable in my classes to discuss the question whether holiness is *created*, any more than under 'total depravity' to discuss the question whether sin is. My opinion is that *neither* is created in any proper sense, but that man was originally endowed with such powers as *uniformly led to right action*, and has now such a nature as *uniformly leads to wrong action*. But I would neither predicate *holiness* in the proper sense, nor *sin*, of the nature, previous to moral

acts. Dr. Woods says of man's fallen nature that before moral action it is sinful '*relatively to its effects.*' So we may say that Adam's nature, when he was first created, was holy '*relatively to its effects.*' It is difficult to feel that holiness and sin do not both involve the *will*, the voluntary choice of the mind and heart." On the question why God suffered Adam to fall, he says: "This is a difficult question, but we can say some things about it." Three considerations are presented: (1) that it was better that Adam should be a free agent than a machine; (2) that, except for the fall, men might have remained forever on the earth; (3) that "in no other way could God so well have shown his mercy and his justice blended together." In a note he adds: "Is not sin then a *good thing*, if so much good comes out of it, and more good than would out of holiness? And the more sin there is, is there not greater resulting good? Shall we not sin that grace may abound? All that I can say in reply is that which Paul said: 'God forbid.' Dr. Taylor thinks he has found a solution. He thinks that God perhaps *could not* prevent sin consistently with free agency, and he chose therefore not the highest *conceivable* system, but the best *practicable* system. One is tempted to adopt this view as relieving the difficulty in a measure. 'But,' says Dr. Tyler, 'you thus limit the *power* of God and tarnish his ineffable lustre.' 'But,' replies the other, 'you, by your system, limit the *goodness* of God, and throw a reproach on him still greater. If he *could* prevent sin, why did not he?' For my part, I do not expect a full solution till I get to heaven, and may be thankful if the subject is not above my comprehension even there." In reference to the sentence pronounced on Adam, he says: "We understand by the words 'thou shalt die,' not only the death of the *body*, but, first, *spiritual* death secondly, *eternal* death." In a note under this, we read: "Dr. Taylor argues, and perhaps justly, that spiritual death is not a *part* of the penalty, though it is a *consequence* of *sin*. Sin is the act of a free moral agent, and not a thing suffered." On our connection

with the sin of Adam, we find the following: "(1) We ourselves did not eat the fruit. We were not there. We were not born. (2) We are not guilty because Adam ate it; (3) But yet we must admit that Adam was the public head of his posterity; (4) Also, that by trying Adam God tried the *race*. (5) It is evident from Rom. v. 15, etc., that we *are* connected with the sin of Adam." This leads to the subject of human depravity.

As we have said, on full definition of sin is attempted in the text. Under the head of "total depravity," the proposition is simply: "All men, if the grace of God does not renew them, are at *heart* entirely sinful. We cannot say that everything in man, e. g. his *intellect*, his *desire* for food, etc., is sinful, but only his *heart*." But from the quotations already given it is evident that Mr. Stoddard reckoned *voluntary action* essential to the idea of sin. The following passage illustrates the point still further: "But do not wicked men love each other, and is not *love* a good thing? *Ans.* It is well, but it is not always holiness. Men may love each other just as a dog loves his master (*instinct*, not *principle*). So of compassion. In passing over a battle-field, many wicked men will weep, but a good man may not. This is *nature*, and not *holiness*. The 'amiable young man' lacked *one* thing, and so lacked everything. 'These things are good.' Good! So is a grindstone good, and calomel and rhubarb." By the light of these expressions we are aided in determining what was his belief on the subject of *native depravity*. Under this head he says: "All men by birth have a sinful and corrupt nature." What he means by the phrase *sinful nature* is evident from the quotations already given. In developing this proposition he uses such illustrations as the following: "We say, a tiger is fierce by nature. A man is noble by nature. A rose has a pleasant smell by nature." And he concludes by saying: "Sin, then, comes from a corrupt nature and nothing else." In a note he adds: "How is it *just* in God to bring us into the world with such a nature?" A great question. *Ans.*

This nature does not *compel* us to sin. And we are not punished for our *nature*, but for our *sin*. The *nature* we cannot help, but the *sin* we are responsible for. I cannot go into this subject here, and do not need to in my classes; but I must record my conviction that we are not *guilty* of *original* sin. It is enough that we are guilty for that which is *voluntary*."

What Mr. Stoddard says on the subject of the will, ability, etc., is only incidental; but his views are sufficiently indicated. We have already seen that he makes moral character consist in voluntary *choice*. And he does not make this a mere Hobson's choice. "God," he says, "so created man that he is free to do good or to do evil. . . . If we then choose evil, it is *our* fault and not the fault of God." "This, then, is our answer to a man who says 'God has decreed all my actions, whether good or evil, and I cannot help myself, and I am not guilty if I do wrong.' We answer, 'you *know* that you are *free*; you can do *right* or *wrong*, just as you please.' And that there is no catch in these last words, is evident from this: "Every man *knows* that he is *free*, not only in his external actions, but also in his *will*." To the question: "Can a man thwart the purposes of God?" he answers: "Perhaps they have this *natural* power." In explaining the doctrine of final perseverance, he remarks: "We do not say that it is *impossible* for them to *destroy themselves*. They are free; God does not force." Speaking of the influence of the Spirit, he says: "Can man resist this converter? *Ans.* In one respect he can, and often does. . . . We have *power* to resist and drive away from our hearts the Holy Spirit. But when he comes as our *renewer*, we *do not* resist."

Of the atonement, no formal definition is given. The doctrine is argued mostly from the scriptures. There was no occasion for entering into a minute discussion of the general principles underlying the work of redemption. The Nestorians were not inclined to that perversion of the doctrine which the New England theologians of the last

century encountered, and which obliged them to restate the doctrine more carefully. We find little that is more explicit than such general expressions as these: "Christ, who was perfectly holy, and who did not deserve to suffer, died for our sins." "His sufferings were in place of ours." "The meaning [of the passages 'he bare the sins of many,' etc.] is, that Christ bears the *punishment*." "Paul says it was by the *obedience* of Christ that we are made righteous. . . . The meaning is, '*his obedient life and his obedient death*.' The perfect obedience of Christ, separately considered, i. e. disconnected with his *death*, is never mentioned as *meritorious*." In a note under the subject of Christ's intercession, he has some remarks which give some clue to his dogmatic view of the atonement, though he expresses himself hesitatingly. "What is the meaning of '*plead*,' as we use it in English in reference to Christ? Is it to plead as an *advocate* and *claim* forgiveness as a right, or to plead as a *suppliant* and beg it as a *favor*? Dwight says: 'Intercession in its very nature involves petition.' This may be doubted. The Nestorians have strongly the idea that Christ *prays* for us in heaven. Perhaps John xvii. would incline us to think that he *entreats* for us in heaven."

With regard to the *extent* of the atonement, he says that it is evident that God holds out salvation to all." "God sincerely invites all. God has given the sun for all; but if any man wish to live in a dungeon, the sun is not for him." "Salvation is spoken of as for those who are lost, or who perhaps will be lost."

Regeneration is thus defined: "It is not a physical change; not a change of *habits*, e. g. from intemperance to temperance, from lying to honesty, etc. It is a true relish for spiritual things, put in the heart by the Holy Spirit." Respecting man's relation to the Holy Spirit's agency in regeneration, after giving first, as he usually does, the biblical argument, he says: "the Holy Spirit is necessary because the heart of man is *so wicked*. We have so long loved sin, we are so hard-hearted, that without the Spirit we

shall never repent. In this respect we are crippled, and cannot run in the way to heaven. But it is our fault and not God's. When God commands us to be holy, we *dare* not answer, 'I cannot.' We know God will not accept such an answer. We understand, then, that the Holy Spirit is necessary, not because God has not given us *power* to repent, but because we have by sin plucked our own wings." "God renews the heart by his Spirit. It is *his* work. Are we not, then, free when we repent? Yes, *yes*. . . . From some passages of scripture, it is true, it seems as if *God* did all, but from others, as if *we* did all." "This change takes place by the word of God; i. e. the Holy Spirit *uses* the word of God for our awakening and conversion. In this work *three* things are necessary: (1) the Holy Spirit; (2) the truth of God, i. e. the word of God; (3) the effort of the sinner."

We have alluded to the comparatively large space devoted to the evidences of regeneration. It is easy to see that much might be brought into this discussion and made practical, which others would be more likely to put under other heads and treat more purely as matters of science. Mr. Stoddard, at the conclusion, remarks: "As I have gone so extensively into the subject of regeneration, and especially the *evidences* of it, I do not think it necessary in a *distinct form* to discuss the 'nature of holiness,' 'faith,' 'repentance,' 'adoption,' 'peace of conscience,' 'joy in the Holy Ghost,' and 'justification.' Perhaps, however, the latter ought to be discussed." But it need not be inferred from this last remark that the cardinal doctrine of Protestantism is slighted in these lectures. It is everywhere involved, though nowhere evolved.

The subjects of final perseverance, prayer, fasting, death, the intermediate state, the resurrection, the judgment, and the final condition of the wicked and the righteous, are next treated of, and with the author's usual good sense and fulness of biblical illustration. On positive institutions we find nothing.

Such, in brief, is Mr. Stoddard's theology, so far as it is brought out in these lectures. Having promised not to criticise them, we might here pause. But as the subject is somewhat novel, may it not be "improved" by a few reflections suggested by it?

First. It suggests the importance, to every one holding the position of religious teacher, of *having* a system of theology. Doubtless the author of these lectures will be known to posterity as Stoddard the missionary, not Stoddard the theologian. Did he err, then, in becoming a theological lecturer? It might almost as well be asked, since President Edwards is more commonly spoken of as a theologian than as a Christian, whether he did not err in becoming a Christian. He could not have been so great as a theologian if he had been less a Christian; so Stoddard could not have been so great as a missionary had he been less a theologian. In other words, he could not have been so successful a teacher of Christian doctrine unless he had himself so well apprehended the thing to be taught, that is, unless he had had a theological system of his own. Even on the most cultivated minds we cannot make a strong impression unless we have positive opinions. When the pupils are comparatively unenlightened, it is still more important, if possible, that the teacher have definite and strong convictions. The lectures of Mr. Stoddard show that his love of science was not a love of astronomy merely, nor of any other natural science. He was not a controversialist, and his discussions, therefore, do not have a polemic form; but it can easily be seen that he had definite views on the controverted as well as on the established doctrines of Christianity. And in the main those views are here disclosed. If the form of his propositions does not always suggest the school to which he belonged, it is because there was no occasion for his obtruding on the Nestorian mind distinctions which in other places need to be discussed only because they cannot be overlooked. At the same time, though he addressed those who could not appreciate the nicest metaphysical exactness, he did not find it necessary

to use language inconsistent with his own metaphysical belief. If he did not give them his system in all its bearings, he yet gave them *his* system. May we not here suggest that, if he found it desirable to be so careful and thorough in his instruction of Nestorians, it can be no less important for pastors of churches in Christian lands to know enough of theology at least to know *what* they believe.

But, in the next place, we are led to remark that it is of still higher importance that a theological teacher have a *practical* system of theology. Without any radical difference of belief, men may differ widely in the impression which they make on others. Some can see a truth clearly and grasp it boldly; but they see it so clearly that, for the time being, they see nothing else; they forget that there are other truths to which it bears relations, and to which it must be adjusted. When one of these other truths does come before them, it takes its turn in being the sum and center of all theology. Explanations and reconciliations they "cannot away with." The doctrine of such men may possibly be light from heaven, but it is too often light that leads astray. Others fail in just the opposite way. Nothing ever stands out before them with sufficient prominence to rivet their attention. They get so high above the ocean of truth that at every glance they "grasp in all the shore." But of course they see everything through a glass darkly. Their system is, even to themselves, a rigid and unimpressive thing; to others, who look with different eyes and from a different point of view, it may seem not only unimpressive, but false. More truthful as well as more useful theologians are those who love truth with such ardor that any doctrine, when it comes to be examined, is fresh and stimulating, but is not allowed to exclude others; who can distinguish between their own idiosyncrasies of temperament and the character of men in general, and who in the communication of their ideas have in mind something besides the ideas themselves. Among the latter we may safely class Mr. Stoddard. There is a business-like air

about his lectures. He says nothing for the sake of saying it — nothing for the sake of rounding out his discussions. He knows where to begin and when to stop. What he says he seems to be saying for something and for somebody. He knew enough to keep much of his knowledge to himself. He had both a warm heart and a clear head.

This leads us to observe, further, that these lectures illustrate the importance, to a religious instructor, of consulting the needs of his pupils rather than any abstract logical standard. Symmetry is a good thing, but the gospel is better than symmetry. Paul made himself "all things to all men." He was the prince of theologians as well as the chief of the apostles, and no one need be afraid to follow his example. Mr. Stoddard was too Pauline to imitate the first Moravian missionaries, who began their labors with the heathen by inflicting on them complete bodies of divinity in the old-fashioned form and proportions. We find on every page evidence that the lectures were prepared for Nestorians, not for an exhibition to the world of his more abstruse speculations, nor, as the prolix congressman said of his tiresome speech, for posterity. Accordingly he omits entirely some topics which we might otherwise expect to find discussed, and others he treats only in notes not belonging to the body of the work. In some cases there are observations not intended to be used at all with his class; in others, they are memoranda designed as hints to be followed out in extemporaneous remarks, or as guides to assist in further investigation. It is interesting to notice, in these instances, how he thought it necessary to caution himself against saying anything that could be misunderstood. Thus, having alluded to the doctrine of verbal inspiration and to the objections against inspiration drawn from improprieties in the private conduct of the sacred writers, he says: "If I introduce this, be VERY CAREFUL to be explicit." On the subject of immortality he remarks: "To a thinking mind, the law of continuance, as applied to this subject, has much force; but I doubt whether it is worth while to bring

it before the class." For the same reason, we suppose, he passes by, without even an allusion, all *a priori* arguments for the divine existence. The doctrine of eternal punishment, as not being questioned by Nestorians, he barely states without argument; but the *nature* of future punishment, as liable to be misunderstood by a superstitious people, he carefully considers. More space is occupied in disproving the claim of the Koran to divine inspiration than in elucidating the doctrine of the Trinity. Less is said about the justice of God than about evil angels. Three pages are devoted to the subject of fasting; none to a formal discussion of the doctrine of the will. In regard to regeneration, the space devoted to a statement of its *evidences* is much greater than is given to all the other questions connected with it. The subject of prayer is treated at considerable length; the philosophy of the atonement not at all. The fact of universal, total, and native depravity is strongly insisted on; but no scientific definition of depravity or of sin is given. In all this we see how much more careful the missionary was to adapt his lectures to the practical wants of the Nestorians than to satisfy his own mind by a full investigation and solution of the knotty questions of theology. It was more important to guard his scholars against superstitious notions respecting demoniacal possessions than against heretical notions respecting original sin. It was of more consequence to expose the unimportance of forms, of which they were likely to make a bad use, than to introduce speculations of which they would probably make no use at all. To a people having the form of godliness, but denying the power thereof, it was more needful to distinguish the true from the fallacious signs of a regenerated heart, than to be ever so explicit about the mode and the instruments of the regenerating process.

Another thing suggested by reading these lectures is the beauty of *simplicity* in stating, discussing, and illustrating religious truth. This can be fully appreciated only by one who reads the whole work. Its character in this respect

cannot well be considered apart from the character of the author. Dr. Perkins, in the sermon (still in manuscript) preached at Mr. Stoddard's funeral, says of him: "How strikingly does the Saviour's brief commendation of Nathanael describe our departed brother! What a mirror of openness, sincerity, and ingenuousness was that noble face! We never knew him pen an ambiguous, much less a guileful, sentence. We never knew him utter an ambiguous, much less a guileful, word. We never knew him perform an unmanly or disingenuous act. It has well been said of him by one of our number, that his heart was a transparent crystal; and his entire character and conduct were but the visible impersonation of such a heart." Carlini, while he was convulsing Paris with laughter by his comic talent, was advised by a physician, personally unacquainted with him, to hear Carlini to be relieved from mental depression. Cowper was in the lowest depths of despondency when he wrote John Gilpin. Profligate men have written some of our best hymns. Stage actors at their option can exhibit almost any phase of emotion. Such apparent inconsistencies do not always imply deception; but the most genuine simplicity, the most healthful state of mind and of body, will hardly find room for them. Mr. Stoddard's simplicity was not a painful fear of paradoxes or strong statements; it was not an obstinate partiality for favorite notions; it was not feebleness or narrowness of mind. A simple man may have many *sides*, but no *folds*. He may exhibit the most various, and even the most opposite traits of character, if that opposition does not imply duplicity. Satisfaction will not be expressed by the lip, when indignation is felt in the heart. Certainty will not be attested by the pen, when doubt prevails in the mind. No effort will be made to excite emotions for which no just ground is seen. But there may be conjoined in the same man, as there were in Mr. Stoddard, intellectual force with childlike artlessness; keenness of observation with an all-embracing charity; deep piety with habitual cheerfulness; enthusiasm with practical

wisdom ; zeal for scientific pursuits with equal zeal for the salvation of souls. He could talk of himself without egotism, of others without envy or resentment. He was humorous without lacking Christian sobriety. He mourned over the wickedness of men without losing his buoyancy of spirits or his faith in God. The charm of his character consisted in this versatility, and the ease with which he could give play to each emotion in its proper time. All this is daguerreotyped in these lectures. He wrote as he thought and felt. He himself says: "As to the style, there is no style to it. I have generally thought in Syriac, and very often expressed myself, half-unconsciously, in the Syriac idiom. Sometimes I have done this intentionally." There is certainly no stiffness in the style, nor is there any confusion in the thought. He is not brilliant, but he is transparent. His disquisitions do not dazzle, but the truth shines through them with uncommon clearness. They were designed for comparatively uncultivated minds, but the most cultivated cannot fail to be stimulated by them. Stories written for children often convey lessons of the highest wisdom to men. When Mr. Stoddard remarks, "Faith and unbelief, love and enmity, seem sometimes mixed," it neither obscures nor belittles the subject to jot down as a memorandum: "e.g. if my beloved son is taken away." In some circumstances, he would not thus introduce himself; but, considering his relations to the Nestorians, we discover not only no breach of good taste, but a delightful evidence of his piety, when he illustrates the power of prayer by an allusion to the prayers of his mother and grandmother for him. He never dwells long on a subject which he cannot make clear and practical. He deals in no fanciful speculations respecting the nature and occupations of angels, no metaphysical jugglery in explaining the nature of Christ's sonship, no elaborate guesses at a solution of the problem of the origin of evil. "To all such questions the Bible gives no answer, and how can I?" he says in respect to the rationale of the resurrection. "It is not profitable,"

he observes, when speaking of the first sin in Paradise, "for me to discuss here, or indeed *anywhere* with Nestorians, the question how a holy being can become sinful. When I *find out*, I shall be glad to inform the world." This language well illustrates the spirit with which he treats every other topic. But what he does profess to understand, he aims to elucidate and enforce. We cannot otherwise so well convey an idea of his style in the illustration of doctrines as by giving a few miscellaneous quotations. "The evidences [of regeneration] are good, but piety in his heart is so *faint* that it is with difficulty seen. He needs a microscope to find it. A dove looks like a raven when *first hatched*." "There are many monks who have given up the wealth and pleasures and honors of the world. But do they abase themselves? No. They are quite filled with pride and self-righteousness. They have driven out one *black* devil, and brought in seven *white* ones." "Why is it [the judgment] appointed? To show before all the universe that God is *just*, and that sinners are *unjust*. Each one will of course be judged at death, but it is necessary that there be a *great divan* of the universe." Passing from natural to revealed religion, he remarks: "Up to this time we have pretended that we were heathen, but it has been *mere pretence*. Just as if we should shut our eyes and imagine how it would seem if it had always been dark and we never had seen the light of the sun. Of course we could not imagine correctly. So we have gained light from the Bible, and this enables us to study nature as no heathen ever can or will." To illustrate the need of revelation, he says: "The king does not say: 'Of course my subjects will learn from this thing and that, my will'; but he gives a *firman* and puts on it his own seal. It is then fitting that God should give us a book in which he has perfectly made known his will. If he has *not* given it, alas for us! Did not God make man? And shall he not *reveal* himself to him? Shall not a father speak to his own child? If absent, will he not *write* him?" To show that God's purposes must extend to the minutest

events, he uses the following illustration: "If God had designed me as a preacher to the Nestorians, had made me the child of pious parents, and instructed me, etc., inclined my heart to come, guided the vessel over the ocean, so that I had reached Trebizond in safety; yet if I had then mounted a vicious horse, which God had not paid attention to, and been thrown off and killed, God's whole plan would have been frustrated by this horse, and the maker of heaven and earth would have been confounded." "A miracle is *God's great seal*. It shows that the firman is genuine and authoritative." "If God without punishment should pardon sin, his kingdom would perish. He would show that he was not a wise king. He would, by such a course, injure all the universe. A human soul is exceedingly valuable; but it is better that every soul should be *blotted out of existence* than that there should be any stain on the purity and lustre of the King of kings. Why? In one moment, by *one word*, he could create a better and more numerous race than that of Adam, but a blot on him could never be wiped out."

Mr. Stoddard's lectures are peculiarly interesting, we remark finally, because of the aid which they render in answering the question: What kind of theology can be used to the best advantage the world over? As Christianity is the religion destined to prevail over all others, there should be, in possibility at least, a scientific statement of Christian truth suited to all classes of men. The several doctrines need not always be put in the same rhetorical form, nor be made to assume the same relative proportions. This must depend on the habits and capacities of the learners. But the substance should be everywhere the same. The best test of the truthfulness of a theological creed is: Can it be preached safely and successfully at all times and in all places?

Mr. Stoddard is the only missionary, so far as we know, who has prepared for his people so elaborate and systematic a treatise on theology. We therefore cannot be certain that another type of theological instruction might not be a better

auxiliary in the work of Christian missions. It is true, too, that Mr. Stoddard was prevented by his death from giving to his work the revision which he thought it needed before being published. Nevertheless, until some one proves himself a more successful missionary than Mr. Stoddard, and that by a course widely different from his, the presumption will be that these lectures are of the stamp required on missionary ground. In one respect they certainly are: they abound in well-chosen biblical quotations and references. Mr. Stoddard himself once wrote to a theological student: "If you were to read what I have prepared, I do not believe that, in *general*, you could tell whether I was Old school or New school, but I think you would admit that I had got in a good deal of the Bible." We can testify that this is so. And it is gratifying to know that the lectures were the means of greatly aiding and stimulating the Nestorian students in their study of the Bible. More than this, they are still used with marked success as a text-book, not only at the male seminary, but at the female also. Mr. Stoddard's works follow him. This might not have been so, had his theology been less a biblical theology, and more a display of himself as a theological athlete. If this fails to satisfy one who examines it for the sake of gratifying a curiosity respecting the author's views on unimportant minutiae of doctrine, it is eminently satisfactory to one who looks at it with reference to its own object. One cannot read it without gaining a new conception of the richness and fulness of the Christian scheme of doctrine. It affords a proof that the loftiest truths can be made subservient to the spiritual growth of the humblest believer; it shows how the religion of Christ is fitted to the wants of every race; it brings us into closer sympathy with the great work of saving the heathen world, and it encourages us to hope for the speedy coming of the day when mount Zion shall be the joy of the whole earth.

ARTICLE III.

BIBLICAL COSMOLOGY AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FALL OF THE WORLD.¹

BY REV. W. F. WARREN, D.D., MISSIONS ANSTALT, BREMEN, GERMANY.

SCIENCE has robbed us of the old heaven up among the stars — the heaven of the Bible and of childhood. She has unroofed the imposing temple under whose dome of span-gled azure David sang, and the whole procession of primitive saints reverently trod. She has left us no firmament to support God's throne, and "his footstool" has become a flying, whirling ball. She has taken us down to the ancient Sheol, and lo! instead of souls, there is nothing there but seething chemicals and centres of gravitational and magnetic attraction. The goings forth of morning and evening no more rejoice; it is only an optical illusion, produced by the diurnal revolution of the earth. To ascend into heaven now and twelve hours hence, is to go in diametrically opposite directions. The deeper you descend into hell, the higher you go into the heaven of your antipodes. The world has no longer top or bottom. Up and down are become provincialisms, meaningless to all who take comprehensive views of things. We ourselves are but microscopic animalculæ, clinging to a grain of sand, which eddies its little round in the obscurest corner of the great cosmos of nature. Our heaven is gone, our old hell, our biblical picture of creation, the significance of natural evil, our own central position and importance in the universe of being. Science has robbed us of all these things. Science must bring them back.

Can she do it? Is there to come a time when the rain-

¹ Die Schöpfungsgeschichte und die Lehre vom Paradies. Ein urgeschichtlicher Versuch von Philipp Friedrich Keerl. Also under the title: Der Mensch das Ebenbild Gottes; sein Verhältniss zu Christo und zur Welt. Erster Band. Basel Balumeiers Buchhandlung (C. Detloff) 1861. 8vo. pp. xiii and 804.

bow shall again be the seal of a divine covenant, and not an illustration of the laws of optics? Is there to come a time when we shall be able, without scientific compunction, to call the peopled sky *heaven*, and, with the simple souls of old time, joy to descry in its remotest spaces the hearth-fires of the holy, the never-darkened tabernacles of the angels — “the faire folk of God”? Can science re-hallow the vast temple she has so ruthlessly, so utterly desecrated? Can she again fill it with the hush of awful presences, the sanctity of a divine habitation? Will she ever be able to cast out the buyers and sellers, the whole herd of scientific speculators which she has introduced, and re-invest the dismantled altars with their original sacredness?

The question is no idle one. A sadness steals over us when we identify ourselves with the childlike believer of old time, who lived all his days with a real heaven right over his head, and a real under-world beneath his feet; to whom the ocean was not a big pond, but a circumambient infinity; to whom all evil and deformity was from sin and the devil, and all beauty and joy from God and his angels. The contrast between his religious consciousness and our own is a painful one, and we cannot but feel it so. So the contrast between our present mature, scientific, world-view and that of our childish years. The latter was infinitely more religious and — let us out with it — more Biblical. To our young, wondering, reverent eyes, the whole world was a grand, starred, and curtained sanctuary, the worthy dwelling-place of God and all his varied families. Now it has become to us a vast out-door infinity, in which dead masses of material swing under the impulses of mechanical force. We used to *believe* in heaven, and in the possibility of some time *going* there, until the astronomers taught us that none was to be found inside the offing of the fixed stars, and that to pass that boundary line would require, even at the velocity of a cannon-ball, the best part of one’s expected immortality! We have all known the painful experience of seeing our child-heaven fade out into thin air and emp-

tininess, and we can all join with Hood in that rythmed sigh in which he so pathetically voices his disappointment on learning that the tall fir-tree tops of his childhood home were *not* close against the sky.

"It was a childish ignorance,
But now 'tis little joy
To know I'm farther off from heaven
Than when I was a boy."

But the question: Can science re-hallow nature? has more than this mere poetic interest. It has a high practical importance. Who can find any comfort in pursuing investigations into the wonderful works of God, when every discovery only seems to remove him further from us? Who is not painfully conscious, as he reads the word of God, of a great discrepancy between his scientific world-view and that of revelation? Whose sensibilities are not more or less jarred by this consciousness? How often does our school-wisdom bring us to a dead stand in our religious meditations! We read: "He descended into the lower parts of the earth;" but the picture of the molten, seething centre rises before us, and our shocked sensibilities revolting, check all further thought. We can accompany our blessed Lord through all the scenes of his earthly career; but the moment we leave Olivet to follow him heavenward, imagination, instead of nearing, with ever intenser emotion, "the tall, white portals of eternity," and, with the transfigured King of Glory sweeping through to join the rising acclamations of the heavenly host, falters, finds herself in "the upper regions of the atmosphere," with millions of weary leagues of emptiness between her and any reasonable place for heaven. She can no more soar than a bird in a vacuum. Then we speculate: if heaven be beyond all these shining worlds, whose light, travelling with inconceivable velocity, requires such myriads of years to reach us, it cannot be the heaven which, in the days of Jacob, was within ladder-reach of Syria's hill-tops. It is not the "Paradise" which was within at least a day's journey of the crosses of Golgotha.

Is heaven, then, *illocal*, and are we wrong to speak of here or there? Do we thereby only betray our own "gross materialistic conceptions"? Must we think of the spirit-land as the metaphysicians instruct us, as "*nowhere*"? Must we adopt Dr. Good's dismal doctrine of the soul, and say with him, "the mind or thinking principle can have no PLACE of existence; it can exist no WHERE, for where or place is an idea that cannot be separated from the idea of extension." Must we be content with this metaphysical heaven, absolutely nowhere, and containing nothing but extensionless, positionless, motionless "monads," once known as souls? Or, revolting from this, shall we, with Sears ("Foregleams of Immortality"), conceive of the natural and spiritual spheres as concentric and conterminous; a world within a world; the invisible infolding the visible, earth bosomed in heaven? Why then an ascension at all? The whole scene was illusive. It was a spectral phenomenon in condescension to the prejudices of the disciples, a theatric show. So run our busy thoughts, and meanwhile nature remains as meaningless as the spiritual world is intangible and visionary.

But the reconciliation of natural and revealed knowledge must come. We do not believe in it and labor for it half so heartily and hopefully as we ought to do. It MUST come. If this universe is God's universe; if man bears, in a peculiar sense, the image of his Maker; if this earth is the theatre of that divine drama whereinto the angels desire to look; if nature experienced the curse of the fall, whelmed a guilty world in waters, shuddered at the crime of the crucifixion and hid its perpetrators in a pall; if the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now, waiting for the adoption; if human history is of such central significance that at its completion a grand cosmical revolution is to ensue, heaven and earth pass away with a great noise, the elements melt with fervent heat, a new heaven and a new earth to rise from the universal ruin; in a word, if the grand fundamental doctrines of Christianity respecting the origin, history, and destiny of our globe are true, then MUST the

Bible and natural science come to terms — a place must be formed for nature in the plans of God; a place for God's plans in nature.

Believing as heartily in the possibility, and feeling so intensely the necessity of such a reconciliation, we are prepared to welcome every attempt at mediation, however wild and visionary it may at first seem. Unfortunately in our cosmological speculations in England and America, one-sided tendencies, either materialistic or spiritualistic, have generally prevailed to such an extent as to prevent any perceptible advance toward a satisfactory solution of our problem. We suppose it is generally known that in Germany these speculations are pursued in a broader and more comprehensive spirit. We should antecedently expect it to be so. The whole genius of Lutheranism as a metaphysical, theological, and ecclesiastical system, tends to guard it from that ultra-spiritualism which has often prevailed in the speculations of Reformed theologians and philosophers respecting such subjects as the disembodied state, the resurrection-body, etc.; while, on the other hand, it betrays little tendency to run into coarse materialism. Add to this the healthy realistic tendency of the latest schools of philosophy and natural science, and we are fully justified in expecting from contemporary German thinkers profound and valuable contributions to that edifice which shall ultimately combine the final results of astronomic and geologic science, and the plain, immutable teachings and assumptions of the word of God, in one harmonious, comprehensive whole.

Of all the German works in this department of investigation, perhaps none possesses for our Anglo-Saxon readers a greater intrinsic or representative interest than that from the pen of Keerl, published last year. We have placed its title at the head of this Article with the design of reproducing its contents and mode of argumentation, so far as may be necessary to give the reader a correct idea of the general style of cosmological speculations in the father-land, and of the general results to which many have come.

The work of which we speak is an octavo of eight hundred and four pages, without counting preface, contents, etc. It is published both as an independent work under the title : the History of Creation and Doctrine of Paradise, and as the first volume of a larger one entitled : Man the Image of God ; his Relation to Christ and to the World. The body of the work is divided into three parts, each subdivided as follows :

I. The Realm of Creation. pp. 10 – 123. 1. The Sun. 2. The Planets. 3. Meteors. 4. Comets. 5. The Fixed Stars. 6. The Central Sun. 7. The Changeableness of the Stars. 8. The Binary and Multiple Stars. 9. Nebulae. 10. Dark Bodies in the Region of the Fixed Stars. 11. The Distance of the Fixed Stars. 12. Nature and Condition of the Fixed Stars. 13. Inferences and Conclusions.

II. The History of Creation. pp. 124 – 686. 1. The Scripture Record. 2. The Creation of the Heavens and the Earth. 3. Tohu va Bohu. 4. The Relation of Satan to the Earth. 5. The Relation of Satan to the Planets. 6. The Angels and the Fixed Stars. 7. The Judgment [final burning up] of the Heavens. 8. The Spirit of God over the Waters. 9. The Evolution of Light. 10. The Superior and Inferior Waters. 11. Creation of Sun, Moon, and Stars. 12. Origination of the Planetary System according to La Place's Hypothesis. 13. The Formation of the Earth out of Water. 14. Formation of the Mountains. 15. The Mountains of the Earth. 16. Continuation. 17. Continuation (the Deluge). 18. Continuation and Conclusion. 19. Character of the primordial Earth. 20. The Creation of the Vegetable World. 21. Creation of Animals. 22. Animals of the pre-Adamic and of the Present World. 23. Continuation. 24. Dividing Line between the Primordial and the pre-Adamic World (Urwelt und Vorwelt). 25. Climatic Relations of the Ur-Vor-und Jetztwelt. 26. Duration of the Days of Creation.

III. The Doctrine of Paradise. pp. 687 – 804. 1. Relation of Genesis i. to Genesis ii. 2. Continuation. 3. Second

Creation of Plants. 4. Second Creation of Animals. 5. The Site and History of Paradise.

In style the author is remarkably clear, forcible, animated, often rising almost to the poetic. In argument he is acute, searching, thorough. He seems equally at home in theology, astronomy, and geology. His continual reference to important works in each of these departments, especially to the latest productions in each, give his book a peculiar literary value, which all students will know how to prize. As a whole the book must be pronounced a well-studied, well-constructed, and well-written performance.

Now as to his views: What does he advance, which bears upon the solution of the great problem to which we have alluded — the re-habitation of nature in its lost religious significance? We will endeavor to reproduce his whole theory in few words:

The fixed stars are realms of light and purity — the many mansions of God's house. The elements of which our solar system is composed, originally constituted a similar self-luminous and holy world (the "earth" of Gen. i. 1), and was the "estate" or "principality" which Satan and his angels "kept not," the "habitation" which they "left" (Jude 6). By their fall this glorious constituent orb of heaven was precipitated into a dark, formless, chaotic state, and became the Tohu va Bohu of Gen. i. 2. Its light went out in darkness, its elements dissolved, a world of heavenly life and glory was transformed into a Stygian pool of murky waters, the haunt of devils. Over these dark and deadly waters, the Spirit of God swept, at the commencement of the Mosaic creation. Light was brought forth. Then the waters were separated from the waters; i. e. the liquid material of which the sun and planets were afterwards formed, was separated from that which remained as material for the earth. The formation of the solid earth and the mountains is maintained to have taken place according to the Plutonian theory; Paradise was not a mere garden, "an English park," but a superinduction of heavenly life

upon the already deranged and depraved earth, identical with that which shall be in the "new earth." The destination of man was the complete subjugation, redemption, and occupation of the re-erected Satanic world, embracing the whole solar system. Failing to realize this destination, he is driven out of Paradise, the evil physical potencies regain the upper hand, and though the earth still remains comparatively an Eden, and nature possesses all that fulness of vital energy indicated by the astonishing longevity of the antediluvians, the growing corruption of men brings on another world-catastrophe, and a new discovery of the divine resources commences. The heavens to be purified by the final judgment of fire at the end of the world, are the planetary heavens. Composed of the same depraved primordial Tohu va Bohu with our earth, they need the same purification. By this baptism of fire, the drama of redemption being complete, the principle of cosmical evil which has so long poisoned earth and the nearer heavens, will be completely destroyed, the devils will be cast out of their mundane retreats, and plunged into the fiery lake prepared for them, the new heaven and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, rise to view, the New Jerusalem descends from God out of heaven, the city which shall have no need of the sun nor of the moon to shine in it, for the glory of God shall lighten it, and the Lamb be the light thereof. Thenceforth shall there be no more night in this restored light-world, and no more sea to remind of the chaotic waters over which, in the beginning, the Spirit of God moved.

Such, in imperfect outline, is the view advanced. It would be interesting to trace the main steps by which the author seeks to establish one point after the other, from beginning to end, but it would expand our Article beyond the bounds of propriety. It would also afford no little instruction to take up particular points which have been discussed in our literature with much zeal, as for instance, the questions respecting the length of the days of creation,

the plurality of inhabited worlds, the *Bene Elohim* in Gen. vi. 2, etc., and compare our author's method and results with those of Anglo-Saxon writers. This, however, would only afford a few desultory glimpses into the work before us, and throw no light upon its relation, as a whole, to the grand and only practically important end of all present cosmological philosophising, to wit, the above-mentioned reconciliation of natural science and revealed truth. As, on the other hand, one of the chief difficulties in the way of the Christian philosopher, is found in the presence of physical disorder and death in the world's history anterior to the fall of man, and as with the solution of this difficulty a very long step is taken toward the harmonizing of natural and sacred history, we prefer to select for closer examination that portion of our author's theory which explains all physical disorder and evil, both in the earth and in her sister planets, as resulting from the fall, NOT OF ADAM, BUT OF SATAN.

In the first place, we scarcely need remark that this hypothesis is by no means a novel one. Indeed traces of it can be found in the mythologies of all primitive races.¹ Origenes, as is well known, understood the New Testament phrase, *καταβολή τοῦ κόσμου*, which we invariably translate, "foundation of the world," literally, i.e. as "the casting down of the world," and regarded the material world as the ruins ("precipitate") of a higher angelic one. The adherents to this opinion seem to have soon become sufficiently numerous to call for the express rejection of it as an error, by the fifth Oecumenical Council. Tholuck quotes in one of his essays a saying of the old English king Edgar, in the tenth century, in which we find the same view. It was held and stoutly inculcated by Boehmen, and all his theo-

¹ In a very elaborate appendix, of ten closely printed pages, at the close of the third chapter of Part Second, Keerl has adduced, in confutation of an unqualified statement of Delitzsch, to the effect that no extra-Israelitish myth can be found which points to a primitive chaos brought about by an angelic rebellion, extracts from authentic myths of the Chinese, Japanese, East Indians, ancient Persians, Egyptians, Grecians, Northmen, Mexicans, and other ancient people in support of his position.

sophic successors. It is mentioned by Episcopius, Malabranche and Leibnitz, and more or less approved and accepted by many of the latest and best natural philosophers of Germany. Our author claims for it (p. 217) the sanction of the following, among the philosophers: Fr. von Schlegel, Fr. von Baader, Fr. Hoffman, F. Schaden, Kreuzhage, and Molitor; among naturalists: Buckland, von Schubert, K. von Raumer, A. Wagner, and to a certain extent, H. Steffens; among literary men, F. von Meyer, Rougement, Hamberger, Dillmar, and others; among theologians: Kanne, Stier, Drecheler, Rudelbach, Guericke, Tholuck, Schnieder, Kurz, Ebrard, Baumgarten, Hengstenberg, Richers, Delitzsch, Engelhardt, Ranke, Reichel, Kniewel, Wichart, Lebeau, F. W. Krug, Rocholl, Hotho, Werner, L. Schmid. Several of these, as the writer knows, hold to the opinion, and Keerl affirms that all of them do. If true, (and Kurz has before claimed the most of them),¹ our author stands in no danger of "lone conspicuity," or of acquiring the reputation of a fantastic innovator. Right or wrong, he certainly has no reason to be ashamed of his company.

We do not find in the work before us any summary of the evidence in favor of this theory, but it will perhaps serve a good purpose to state some of the considerations which may be, and are, urged by its advocates as proof of its correctness. It will be impossible to do justice to our author's logic in a statement so brief and condensed; since in such matters the full force of the argument can only be seen from the full development and connection of the various considerations. If, however, the main points on which the hypothesis must depend for support are distinctly intimated, the grouping of them will have an independent value for such as wish to reflect upon the subject more at leisure for themselves.

1. The first consideration which occurs to us is, that as a theory it is not intrinsically absurd or incredible. *As a*

¹ See his work, *Bibel und Astronomie*, and J. P. Lange's *Christliche Dogmatik*. Vol. II. p. 570.

mere theory it need not be ashamed to challenge comparison with the prevailing ones. The theory which attributes the entrance of physical disorder and death into the world, to the fall of Adam, is well enough as a theory, but unfortunately falsified by every fact of the pre-Adamic period. The theory of "*anticipative consequences*," advocated by Dr. Bushnell and others,¹ needs no other conviction of logical confusion and self-contradiction than that contained in its own name. The supposition that God created chaos with all its horrors, and gradually advanced to the production of the present relatively perfect flora and fauna of the world through those stages of malformed, noxious, hideous, and malign creation, which preceeded merely because to Infinite Wisdom this seemed the best way of creating and furnishing an Eden world,² is a little hard to believe, and open to many a plausible objection. The resolution of the whole thing into a matter of divine caprice,³ or of divine sportiveness,⁴ is plainly undeserving of sober consideration. As a mere hypothesis then, this Origenistic one would seem at

¹ Nature and the Supernatural, Chapters VI. and VII.

² Meth. Quarterly Review, April, 1862, Art. vi.

³ See, for instance, Dr. A. Clarke on Gen. i. 24, when speaking of the mastodon he remarks: "This animal, an astonishing effect of God's power, he seems to have produced *merely to show what he could do* (!), and after suffering a few of them to propagate, he extinguished the race *by a merciful providence*, that they might not destroy both man and beast." What an illustration of divine wisdom!

⁴ Poets, in the exercise of their legitimate license, have pronounced flowers "God's smiles." Poetic naturalists, going yet further, have discovered, as they fancy, traces of playfulness and humor in the works of the Creator. Hence a theory, oftener hinted than openly maintained, that all the incoherent and fantastic creatures of the pre-Adamic period were only the sportings of God's exuberant fancy — play-creations, burlesques of things about to be. That in a certain sense God *amuses* himself, i. e. finds pleasure in the wisdom and cunning handiwork of his creations, may perhaps be allowed, especially if we translate Prov. viii. 30 with Luther: "*Ich spielete vor ihm alle zeit, und spielete auf seinem Erdboden*," etc. But when we look at the real monstrosity, ugliness, and noxiousness of these supposed *play-creations*, the preposterousness of such a theory is at once apparent. What should we think and say of a heathen's deity whose ghastly *pastime* was the creation and destruction of such horrid dragons as those of the primitive earth?

least as good as any that have been advanced. Abstractly viewed it certainly has advantages over all except the one which attributes derangement and mortality and ugliness in nature to the sin of man.

2. The advocates of this theory claim that every presupposition possible to the human mind, every consideration drawn from the perfections of God, lies directly against the common scientific notion. We should not antecedently expect from the hand of a perfect and holy God a chaos. On the contrary, every *a priori* consideration would cause us to deny the possibility of such a creation. So, for instance, Keerl (p. 167), after describing the earth when in its *Tohu va Bohu* condition, continues: "And is this the earth, we may fairly ask, which comes forth directly from the hand of that God of whom the scriptures testify that he is the Father of Lights, from whom every good and perfect gift cometh (James i. 17); who dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto (1 Tim. vi. 16); who covereth himself with light as with a garment (Ps. civ. 2)? Shall we call this desolate, insensate, lifeless mass the work of him who is a lover of life, who has no pleasure in death, who will and must everywhere and always reveal himself as the God and Father of the glory and good order of life in his creation as well as elsewhere? Is not creation a mode of divine manifestation, and will not his being reflect itself in his work? But how shall the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and Godhead, be seen in a *Tohu va Bohu* which absolutely contradicts the light and life-glory of God? The God who himself dwells in light, whose very essence is light (1 John i. 5) can will no other than a world of light. To that God who is the original source of life, everything dead and lifeless must be an abomination. One might perhaps say that the *Tohu va Bohu* is only the beginning and foundation on which God afterwards manifests his being — a dark foil, as it were, that the light may beam the more brightly. Doth the light then need the darkness in order that its glory may be perceived? Then must also the light-life of

God repose upon a dark back-ground. Is death the pre-supposition of life; and can life come to know itself as life only in antithesis to death? But are not in this way the antitheses which sin brought into the world carried over in to God's original creation, yea, made absolute?"

3. The first positive argument is sought in the words *Tohu va Bohu*. These, it is claimed, signify more than a mere negative condition of *unorder* and *formlessness* and *lifelessness*. They denote a state of positive *disorder*, *disturbed life*, *derangement of what was once in order*. Our author devotes ten pages of acute philological and critical investigation (pp. 170-180) to the discussion of this point, and arrives at the conclusion that "these words designate a condition brought about by the penal judgment of God." This interpretation has the countenance of Stier, Kurz, Baumgarten, Richers, and many others. Its bearing upon the argument is then of course duly developed and enforced.

4. Another argument is drawn from the Hebrew expression *והָאֲרֶץ הָיְתָה תוֹהוּ וָבֹהוּ*, which Keerl, Stier, and others translate, not "the earth *was*," but "the earth *BECAME* formless and void." In the work before us the reasons for and against this version seem to be given with much fairness, and we confess that to our own mind they are so nearly balanced that we can find little force in the argument derived from this source.

Another argument is found in the existence of "*darkness*," which cannot be regarded as a direct production of the Creator. The position that darkness, even as a physical phenomenon, is according to scripture language and views "a manifestation of the wrath of God, is maintained with remarkable skill in a discussion of considerable length (pp. 185-195). The doctrine (represented by Nägelsbach) that darkness is just as normal and beneficent as light, is met on scientific ground, and to the author's mind satisfactorily disposed of (p. 188).

6. A sixth consideration is drawn from the word *תְּהוֹם*, "*the deep*," which it is claimed designates the elements as

- heaving, restless, full of *hostile, unsubdued, irregular* life and force.

7. Another argument of more decisive character is derived from the remarkably close relation which, according to the scriptures, seems to subsist between our world and the fallen angels, Satan in particular. Keerl, after calling attention to the fact that MEN seem the sole object of Satanic hate, their assured destruction and the frustration of all efforts for their redemption the sole aim of Satanic activity, proceeds as follows:

“Not less striking is the relation in which, according to the scriptures, Satan stands to the world. He is called the “prince” of this world (ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου), John xii. 31; xiv. 30; the “god” of this world (ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου), 2 Cor. iv. 4; the power and magistracy of darkness ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους), Col. i. 13. In a like relation stand also his angels, which with him are styled world-rulers of this darkness (κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου) Eph. vi. 12. It is true that the phrase τοῦ σκότους τούτου limits his domain, for his activity extends only as far as the darkness reaches. But this darkness extends over the whole (planetary) world, for he is the ruler of the world because it has fallen into the hands of darkness, or because darkness is the essence of this world. The same thought lies in the expressions: “the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not” (John i. 5; iii. 15); for it is “the world lying in the wicked one,” into which the light has come (1 John v. 19). It is in truth no assumption, no “mendacious appearance of truth,” as Kurz has it, when Satan promises Christ the kingdoms of the world, in case he will worship him (Matt. iv. 9); on the contrary he had this power, which had been delivered unto him (Luke iv. 6), to give these kingdoms, whose prince and ruler he in fact was, to whom he would. Such a right of possession is also evident from the fact that he cannot be deprived of his dominion over it until deprived by a *legitimate judicial decision* (pp. 245–246).

As additional proofs of the intimacy of the relation subsisting between Satan and our world, may be noticed the fact, that it still seems to be the main residence of the fallen spirits (Eph. vi. 12 and ii. 2); that it is impossible to trace the imperfections, disorder, and mortality which everywhere prevailed in the primeval world, Eden alone excepted, to the sin of man; and finally, that the ultimate doom of the wicked stands in the closest relation to that of Satan. On this last point our author expresses himself thus: "the holy scriptures everywhere place the final doom of the wicked in the closest relation to the final doom of Satan. The same judgment, the same punishment, is dealt out to both (Matt. xxv. 41; Rev. xx. 10; 12-15; xxi. 8). The prince of this world shall be cast out (John xii. 31) but at the same time with him the children of unbelief, in whom he had his work. This utterance of our Lord, "he shall be cast out" (on which Grotius happily remarks, ἐξω ex voce ἀρχων interpretandum ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς), presupposes that this world is his dominion, and will remain so, until the judgment, which commenced in the victory of Christ, is completed; until the kingdoms of this world shall have become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ (Rev. xi. 15; xix. 6). The ungodly, however, are engulfed in the same place of perdition and torment with Satan and his angels, in the lake which burns with fire and brimstone. Where is this fiery lake? Again, the scriptures know no other locality for this place of horror than the lower parts of THE EARTH. Furthermore, those who are under the earth shall one day bow the knee at the name of Jesus (Phil. ii. 10). Wiesinger understands by those dwelling under the earth, the fallen angels. Comp. 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. The apostle is speaking, however, of what is yet hereafter and *finally* to take place. Even the devils will one day be forced to acknowledge the dignity and power of Christ, experienced in the judgment. The lower parts of the earth can therefore be nothing else than the lake of fire into which they will be driven after the judgment. That the identical doom overtakes both Satan

and the ungodly might be explained from the fact, that the latter have assimilated themselves to him; but that the lower parts of the earth should be the place where the judicial sentence is executed upon the former, that can be for no other reason than because the earth was the realm of his activity and rule. Had it not been the earth, but some other heavenly body, which was ruined by his insurrection, this latter would be the place where his sentence would be executed"¹ (pp. 251, 252).

8. The advantages of the theory over the prevalent one, as a theodicy, is nowhere broached, except in a brief footnote (p. 564). Instead of developing the full force of the consideration, our author merely remarks: "It is evident from our representation of primeval history, a satisfactory theodicy is attainable, whereas from the point of ecclesiastical doctrine it is not possible. He maintains with the naturalist, that from the beginning death has reigned upon our earth, nay more — we show what he is not able to do — *why* death has penetrated the world as universal natural law. K. Vogts triumphant shout: "Death existed before man appeared upon the earth. No stride of faith, no pious *Salto Mortales*, can help you over this stone which lies in your garden," etc. (compare similar expressions in Oerstedt, "Spirit in Nature," and G. Combe, "Science in Relation to Religion," from the English; Leipsic, 1857, p. 121) needs from our point of view no refutation."

9. In conclusion, had we the theory to advocate, we should rely not a little upon its superiority to all others as an explanation of the facts in question. However slight the *positive* evidence of a theory may seem when viewed by itself, it may still command an almost universal acceptance, provided only that it explains all the facts and harmonizes all the beliefs concerned in the case better than any other

¹ In locating the fire prepared for the devil and his angels in the lower parts of the earth, Keerl seems directly to contradict what he says further on (pp. 309 – 313), where he gives it an altogether different location; viz. in the comets. We cannot account for so glaring an inconsistency.

theory. The case before us is one which from the nature of things does not admit of demonstration ; indeed, the positive evidence for the hypothesis may be very meagre ; but if the evidence in its favor only exceed that in favor of all known theories, the mind will necessarily incline to adopt it. And as a matter of fact, it must be confessed that the theory before us is not only as reasonable and self-consistent *as a theory* as any other known (see remarks above), but also that it finds no small confirmation the moment it is applied. Yield to it heartily and willingly, and how readily the isolated and apparently conflicting facts of science and history, the intimations and presuppositions of the word of God, the whole motley, straggling multitude of our beliefs begin to organize around it as the facts and phenomena of nature gather and range themselves under a newly discovered law. Nature is at once brought back into a closer relation to spirit, the physical world regains its long-lost moral significance. The heavens are no longer a meaningless immensity of space ; cosmical history no longer a series of blind or capricious or "pantheistic developments." The theologian has no more to complain that angelology has no place in the system of Christian doctrine ; that it introduces "a foreign and disturbing element," which can only be attended to in supplements or excursions. The personal existence and powerful influence of Satan and his angels seems to acquire new reasonableness. The whole history of redemption has a higher scope and unity, and its final culmination in a renovated heavens and earth a sublime ideal fitness. Most of those who have adopted the theory, have done so, we doubt not, far more under the influence of these considerations, than because they believed it clearly taught or implied in the word of God. It seems to them to systematize and scientifically adjust their cosmological and theological beliefs more satisfactorily than any other.

But has not the theory its own peculiar difficulties? What is gained, if in disposing of one set of difficulties

we raise another equally, perhaps more, formidable? This hypothesis may account for natural evil and disorder, animal rapacity, and death antecedent to the fall, or even creation, of man; but what if valid objections lie against the hypothesis itself, and forbid our adoption of it?

We think the theory *has* its difficulties. Of those occurring to us, we have space for the notice of but two, but these are perhaps the most important. It may be asked in the first place, for instance, what relief is afforded us by this theory as regards the creation of the monsters of the primeval world? The disfigurement and derangement of a world, indeed its complete reduction to chaotic ruin as a judicial consequence of the fall of its occupants, is conceivable enough; it is only an extension of the current conception of the consequences of Adam's fall; but here is more than the *destructive* agency of justice, here is *productive* agency of omnipotence. The annihilation of beauty and order seems a natural enough effect of the wrath of God; but after the work of restoration has been undertaken, light evolved, the firmament fixed, the mountains established, the seas shut up, dry land prepared, why and whence these hideous monsters? Why and whence this animal blood-thirstiness and death? Are not these new creations fresh from the hands of God, and do not all the arguments of the advocates of the theory before us, against the supposition that so imperfect a creation as chaos could proceed immediately from the hand of God, recoil upon the heads of their own originators?

In our author's discussion of "the character of the primeval world" (p. 530 – 566), this point is taken up, and it must be allowed, that no disposition is shown to reject or minimize the difficulty. It is, on the contrary, stated in all its strength. The writer takes pains to show the inadequacy of the solutions of Wagner, von Schubert, and others, who maintain that the perished flora and fauna were necessary preliminaries to our living flora and fauna. In so doing he calls special attention to the monstrosity of many of the

primeval creatures, their murderous instincts, etc., and denies the notion that these abortions were necessary antecedents to those peaceable and faultless beings which Adam named and ruled over; denies it even more emphatically than he does the naturalistic maxim, that death is the condition of organic life, decay the mother of bloom. He earnestly and eloquently affirms that God could have, by one creative word, called into being a world perfect in beauty, perfect in its inward harmony. "If he did not do it in the case of the earth," he says, in italics, "the reason cannot lie in his power or goodness, but in the earth itself, in a nature which it had not received from God." This sentence contains the key to his explanation. Terrestrial matter possesses a depraved nature. The action of God upon it and through it is like the action of a holy soul through and in a thoroughly depraved body. It was not passive and receptive; it resisted and modified the creative impulse. The forces and qualities of nature were all hostile, perverted, disturbed; hence when subordinated and utilized by the great Artificer, they marred his work, prevented the perfect divine idea from coming to perfect reality. He illustrates his conceptions of the matter by referring to the analogous case of the Holy Spirit's operation upon a sinful heart. What counteraction, rebellion, intensified hostility does it call forth so long as the sinful principle is unsubdued! Sin takes occasion thereby to work in such a heart all manner of concupiscence; so that that which was ordained unto life, that which was designed, adapted, and exercised to bring forth life, we find to be unto death. Our author finds an express authorization to the employment of this analogy in 2 Cor. iv. 6 ("but God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts," etc.). Just, therefore, as the sinner's illumination," which is the first step towards his sanctification, only stimulates the sinful nature to new spasms of resistance, and to new developments of perversity, so we are to conceive of the results of the primeval illumination of the depraved and perverted earth. The first step towards the

regeneration of the evil world, called forth the same monstrous and abnormal action as the first step toward the sanctification of an evil heart.

This is the first part of his explanation. The elaboration of it is exceedingly skilful and interesting. As an answer to the objection under consideration, it will be differently estimated by different minds. To those who cherish the mechanical view of nature, to whom matter is absolutely inert, and the universe a machine, the whole thing will seem no better than a fantastic, Gnostic dream. To those, however, who cherish the dynamic view of nature, to whom the material atoms are not mere isolated, infinitesimal incomprehensibilities, but at the same time centres of native force, cohesive, magnetic, gravitational, vital; to whom the universe is not a piece of clock-work, but a grand natural organism, it will appear at least allowable, if not entirely satisfactory.¹ As most Anglo-Saxons belong to the first class, the solution will not be very likely to prove among them an additional recommendation of the original theory.

The second part of the explanation is, that Satan was present in all stages of the work, and exerted his powers to their utmost extent, in resistance and counteraction. He sought as eagerly to frustrate the divine scheme for the redemption of nature, as he afterwards did to frustrate the divine scheme for the redemption of man. The fallen earth was his possession, and it was but natural he should resist the effort to take it from him, and to fit it up with all the decorations which divine ingenuity and skill could produce, and transfer it to a new and holy creature. Our author does not refer to it, but the healing of the lunatic, as related Mark ix. seems a good illustration of his idea. The devil could not resist the omnipotent word which rebuked him and charged him to come out of the world which he "possessed," but in obeying, he was permitted to exhibit his

¹ Dr. Taylor Lewis, if we rightly understand him, finds no difficulty in such a view of natural co-operation in the work of creation. See his "Six Days of Creation; or the Scripture Cosmology," pp. 197-232.

malice and hate, by "throwing" and "rending sore" the nature from which he was expelled. The malformations, abortions, and monstrosities of the primeval world, were the results. In theory Keerl is supported by not a few philosophers and theologians, not only of former, but of the most recent times. He quotes with especial approbation from Boehmen, J. A. Kanne, Dauf, Steffens and F. von Baader. Kurz advocates the same views, and Delitzsch, who in the earlier editions of his Commentary on Genesis combats, has since adopted it. For ourselves we must confess the hypothesis, when properly limited, strikes us more favorably than the previous one of malign *natur-potenzen*? Why may not Satan have commenced the manifestation of his hostility to God before, just as well as after, the completed creation? Is it replied: It is unreasonable to suppose God would permit his interference in such a work? How much more incredible that he should permit him to ruin it after its completion! If he is permitted to interfere in the erection of God's spiritual kingdom to introduce error and strifes, to deceive the nations, to lead almost the whole redeemed race of man captive at his will, why may he not have had the same liberty of interference in the erection of God's natural kingdom?

The second difficulty which we proposed to mention is the supposed incompatibility of the theory with those representations of scripture which seem to attribute all natural evil to the fall of Adam. The discussion of this point (in second appendix to the last chapter) is perhaps the least satisfactory in the book before us. Here, however, we apprehend, all theorists stand upon an equality. The old theory found in Josephus, Basil, Luther, and most of the Fathers, according to which the poison of the serpent and thorn of the rose were *dona superaddita*, created and superinduced upon poisonless and thornless organisms in consequence of the fall of Adam, has no longer a defendant. The advocates of the theory of "anticipative consequences," can no more deduce the origin of thorns and thistles from

the primeval curse (Gen. iii. 18), than can the holders of the theory under discussion. When therefore the latter is asked: how his view can be reconciled with the almost universal understanding of those scriptures which touch upon the entrance of evil into the world? he can at least silence his questioner by retorting the inquiry. The holder of the current theory is in the same predicament with himself.

Such, then, is the Origenistic theory of the origin of natural evil. Such are some of the considerations on both sides. We think the whole subject deserves a more thorough and intelligent discussion than it has yet received. In the works of Keerl, Kurtz, and other recent advocates, it is only incidentally treated. In the work before us, as the reader of the above will have seen, it is only a subordinate point, one element of cosmological theory, which is itself only so far elaborated as was deemed necessary to the anthropological work to which the volume is introductory. Such being the case, the only wonder is that the discussion is as full and thorough as it is. We should rejoice, however, to see from a competent hand a special treatise on *the origin of natural evil*. We can scarcely expect a cosmology, satisfactory alike to the naturalist and to the theologian, until this subordinate question has been subjected to a more searching investigation.

As to the broader question with which we set out, the reconciliation of the cosmological teachings of science and the Bible, we must not expect so speedy a solution. The question respecting the origin of natural evil is clear and explicit. We know the terms of the problem; they can be distinctly defined and intelligibly stated. We know what is required in a solution. Not so with this problem. We neither know exactly what the physical assumptions and implications of the Bible are, nor what the ultimate and confirmed results of science will be. Certain data may be regarded as settled on both sides, others approximately

so ; but still there is much to be done before the testimony of the rocks and stars can be proved to agree or to disagree with the testimony of God's word. Meantime we should be in no haste to abandon biblical thought-idioms, that general framework of ideas which inspiration everywhere presupposes and implicitly approves. The levity with which many sincere friends and interpreters of the Bible treat the inspired record of creation is truly astonishing. They seem willing to truncate, lop off, interpolate, or allegorize the whole, to suit the demands of each new geological or cosmological theory which comes in fashion. A notion first broached, if we mistake not, by one of the older German rationalists, has recently been brought before the Anglo-Saxon public by a Rev. Mr. Rorison of England, and recommended as the long-sought key to the interpretation of the Mosaic record. According to this notion, the first chapter of Genesis is a grand "symbolical hymn"! We cannot accept the new discovery. It is not a solution, but an elusion, of the difficulty. It does not solve the problem, it only arbitrarily erases one of its terms. The satisfactory resolution of the first chapter of Genesis into a hymn or a myth, or a dream, or a forgery, or into nonentity itself, would relieve the real question but very little, for the fundamental cosmological ideas of that chapter, in their grand characteristic features, underlie the whole Bible, and crop out on every occasion. It is not in the first of Genesis alone that we read that in six days God created the heavens and earth, and all that in them is. "God spake" the same words from the top of Sinai (Exod. xx. 1, 11). It is not from Gen. i. alone that we learn that God commanded the light to shine out of darkness; inspired Paul affirms the same thing (2 Cor. iv. 6). Moses is not the only one who tells us that the original earth was covered with waters until the omnific word caused dry land to appear. Read also Ps. xxiv. 2; cxxxvi. 6; 2 Pet. iii. 5. The fourth day's work is as explicitly described in Ps. cxxxvi. 7-9; viii. 3; Jer. xxxi. 35, and in many other passages, as in Gen. 14-18. The

literalness of the account of the creation of man out of the dust of the ground, and of the taking of Eve from Adam's side, is at least as well vouched as that of the history of the fall (Gen. iii. 19; ix. 6; Job x. 9; xxxiii. 4; xvii. 13-16; Ps. cxxiv. 29; Eccl. xii. 7; 1 Tim. ii. 13; 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9). The question with which we have to deal is a broader one than the mere reconciliation of an isolated passage of scripture with the results of scientific research; it is the reconciliation of the cosmology of the Bible, as a grand whole, with that of modern science.

We know it is iterated and reiterated in our ears: "the Bible was not given to teach natural science." We reply: neither was it given us to teach us profane history, and yet if the historian of the Roman empire can learn only from it the name of the Roman governor who succeeded Felix in the administration of Palestine, is the information, on that account, necessarily unreliable? It was not given us to teach chronology, and yet if by means of it we can fix the date of the reign of the Phenician Hiram, shall we refuse to do so merely because the Bible was not designed for a handbook of dates? It was not given to teach us ancient geography, but if it incidentally tells us of Jordan and Carmel and Hermon and Genesareth and Jerusalem and Joppa, shall we conclude that all these mountains and waters and cities are figures of speech, in accommodation to the current superstitions of the Hebrews? For ourselves, while confessing our inability to reconcile our scientific convictions with what seem to be the cosmological implications and assumptions of scripture, we must also profess a profound respect for every assumed or implied truth of God's word. What do we know of the existence, nature, and occupation of angelic beings except that which the Bible thus indirectly teaches us? And yet the Bible was not given us to teach the natural history of the angels. Indeed the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul are but presuppositions and implications of the Bible, not revelations. Are we then to suppose that the implicit teachings of the Bible on these

points are mere "reflections of the current" theistic and psychological "beliefs of the Hebrews"? Have they no higher authority? We are old-fashioned enough to believe that these wonderfully self-consistent, peculiar, hallowed, old world-views of Moses and the prophets, Christ and the apostles, answer to the truth, *in some way*, more perfectly than any theory of our late-born schools; *how*, we believe science will itself one day show. We do not herewith imply that every writer of holy scripture possessed a clear, astronomically and geologically correct knowledge of the extent and nature, origin and history, of the material and spiritual cosmos of God; such a supposition is unnecessary. Just as Luke could know and record the historical fact that an imperial census was ordered and taken "when Cyrenius was governor of Syria," without possessing Niebuhr's or Tacitus's knowledge of the whole field of Roman history, so might he and the other biblical writers record such cosmological facts as were incidentally revealed to them without anything like a clear or complete comprehension of the great system to which these facts belong. We simply mean that, as the isolated facts of ancient history, geography, and ethnography, incidentally revealed in the scriptures, are found to fit into the general system of our knowledge on these subjects derived from other sources, as true though meager parts of that system; so the cosmological facts and implications of the word of God will be found to fit into the true system of God's cosmos as integral parts of the same, whenever we shall come to know it. Meanwhile let us hold fast to the great biblical conceptions of the world as a creation of God, of heaven as a locality, of matter as susceptible of inconceivable glorification, of man as the especial object of divine care and effort, of earth as central in the moral universe of God.

We do not ask science to belie herself, to stifle clear convictions, to stay her investigations. Much rather do we desire the most rapid advances, that her discoveries may the quicker interpret the obscurities of the divine record, and

confirm its eternal truth. Thank God, the latest developments in her fields are auspicious. Plutonism, but a few years ago so undisputed in its sway, is now dethroned, and the leading minds in the scientific world are coming back to the defence of biblical Neptunism. Some still hesitate to go to the extent of Bischof, J. D. Dana, James Hall, T. Sterry Hunt, and others, and maintain in the face of every noted geologist of the last generation, the formation of all the rocks, except the modern volcanic ones, by precipitation from solvent fluids, but even the most hesitant make exception only in favor of the granitic, and possibly of the metamorphic formations. The utter discrepancy of the wild guesses which have been made as to the age of the earth, on the part of those who, with Lyell, would trace all its structural and revolutionary changes to the operation of known natural forces acting with their present intensities and under their present laws, has shamed the scientific dogmatism of their authors and destroyed confidence in their fundamental principle. Science is far humbler than twenty years ago; she has just learned how little she has learned, what infinities remain unmastered. The Bible recommends a higher reverence. New discoveries in comparative philology, in ethnography, in ancient history, in chronology, in geography and topography, in almost every department of human investigation, are continually adding new testimonies to its truth. Self-sufficient science has reached the crisis foretold by Tennyson; has been forced to humble herself and cry —

“Make me a cottage in the vale,
Where I may mourn and pray.”

Ere long we may expect the time to come in view of which she prayed the sparing of her “lordly pleasure-house,” —

“Yet pull not down my palace towers, that are
So lightly, beautifully built;
Perchance I may return with others there
When I have purged my guilt.”

She is returning already, and when she shall re-enter her cold marble palace-pile this time, guiltless, humble, hand in hand with sweet-faced faith, and convoyed by the angels of God's revelation, she shall discover to her unutterable joy that the glistening structure, which in the days of her proud self-sufficiency was so empty and magnificently desolate, has been suddenly transformed into the real, eternal house of God — the house not made with hands, — the same old temple of David and the saintly fathers, infinitely enlarged and beautified.

ARTICLE IV.

CONSTANTINE THE GREAT, AND THE DOWNFALL OF PAGANISM IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.¹

BY DR. PHILIP SCHAFF.

It is agreed on all hands that Constantine the Great, the first Christian emperor, the founder of Constantinople and the Byzantine empire, marks one of the most important epochs in the history of Christianity and the world. He was the chief instrument, in the hands of Providence, by which the church was delivered from oppression and persecution, and elevated to a position of honor and power in the proud empire of Rome; from him dates the union of church and state; his reign sealed the doom of Graeco-Roman paganism, and secured the triumph of Christianity. But opinions are not yet quite harmonized as to his personal character and the motives which induced him to favor the Christian religion

¹ Die Zeit Constantins des Grossen, von J. Jacob Burkhardt. Basel. 1853.
Der Uebertritt Constantins des Grossen zum Christenthum. Akademischer Vortrag, gehalten am 12 Dec., 1861, im Grossrathsaae in Zürich, nebst geschichtlichem Nachweis von Dr. Theodor Keim. Zurich. 1862.

Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church. By E. P. Stanley. New York: 1862. Lect. VI.

above the religion of his fathers and predecessors on the throne of the Caesars. The Greek church has gone so far as to enroll him among her saints, and, in strange perversion of the term, to honor him with the title of the "equal of the apostles" (*Isapostolos*). The Latin and the Protestant church are contented to call him the *Great*, and to assign him a similar position in history as that occupied by Charlemagne. Some modern writers, especially those of the rationalistic school, represent him as a political and military genius, without moral principle and without sincere interest in the Christian or any other religion. He was great undoubtedly, though not in the first, but in the second order; and more by what he *did* than by what he *was*; more by the favor of circumstances and position than by personal character and merit. He was one of the most gifted, energetic, and successful among the Roman emperors, and the first friend and patron of Christianity. He had a naturally strong, clear, and shrewd mind, a tolerable, though by no means thorough, cultivation, a good knowledge of human nature, administrative energy and tact, and military and political genius. His prominent trait as a ruler was practical good sense. He had the sagacity and policy of a genuine statesman in discerning the signs of the times and placing himself at the head of true progress; while his equally gifted and more learned, but far less practical, nephew Julian mistook the true character of the age, vainly endeavored to stem or divert the current of history, and incurred the fate of a fruitless reactionist and the disgrace of an apostate. As to his moral character, he was neither as bad as the later heathen historian Zosimus, nor as pure as his Christian friend and eulogist Eusebius, the famous church historian, endeavored to represent him: the one by direct and malignant perversions; the other, from pious motives, by exaggerating his virtues and holding him up as the pattern of a truly Christian prince, and ignorantly or wilfully passing by his vices. They represent the extremes of partiality for and against Constantine. A just estimate of his character must

be formed from the facts admitted by both, and from the effects of his political and ecclesiastical policy and legislation. He had indeed noble traits, among which a chastity rare for the time, and especially at a court just emerging from heathenism, and a liberality and beneficence bordering on wastefulness, are especially prominent. Many of his laws and regulations breathed the humane spirit of Christianity, elevated the condition of woman, of the slave, and the unfortunate, and gave free play to the efficiency of the church throughout the whole empire. Altogether, if he had not professed Christianity, he would without controversy be numbered among the best as well as the greatest of Roman emperors. But the execution of Licinius, his conquered rival and brother-in-law, and of Crispus his own son, on suspicion of political conspiracy, while they are not sufficient to destroy his title to greatness (remember the double crime of David, and similar crimes in the life of Charlemagne and Peter the Great), show conclusively that Christianity did not produce in him a thorough moral transformation, and that his character is by no means, in all respects, a model for imitation. He stood on the transition of two ages and two religions, and clearly bore the marks of both. He himself acknowledged the duplicity of his position in his dying moments in Nicomedia, when, after a long delay which can be easily explained from the combined influence of policy and superstition, he took the final step and was baptized in the name of Christ, whom he had revered for nearly thirty years as the God of victory.

In judging of this remarkable man and his reign, many writers have lost sight of the great historical principle, that all representative characters act, consciously or unconsciously, as the free and responsible organs of the spirit of their age, which moulds them first before they can mould it in turn; and that the spirit of the age, whether good or bad or mixed, is itself but an instrument in the hands of divine Providence which rules and overrules all the actions and motives of men. It is unhistorical and absurd to suppose,

that the Christian church was indebted to the personal favor of Constantine for her social position and victory in the Roman empire. Through a history of three centuries Christianity had already inwardly overcome the world, and thus rendered such an outward revolution as has attached itself to the name of this prince, both possible and unavoidable. The intellectual and moral victory preceded the political and military triumph, and was necessarily followed by it. The Christian religion, after outliving so many persecutions and literary assaults of Judaism and heathenism, and sending so many thousand martyrs to the scaffold and the stake, could not for ever remain a church of the desert and a proscribed sect. It deserved to be reorganized by the government as a legitimate religion, and to have a fair chance to show its power in the world on a larger and more comprehensive scale. The crucifixion was to be followed once more by the resurrection, and the state of humiliation had to give way to the state of exaltation.

Constantine possessed that genuine political wisdom which, from a high and comprehensive view of the general condition and tendency of the age, clearly saw that idolatry had outlived itself in the Roman empire, and that Christianity alone could breathe new vigor into it and furnish its moral support. He understood the tendency of the age and the signs of the time, and acted accordingly. Christianity appeared to him, as it was in fact, the only hopeful religion and the only efficient power for a political reformation of the empire, from which the ancient spirit of Rome was fast departing, while internal civil and religious dissensions and the outward pressure of the barbarians threatened a gradual dissolution of society. His personal interest as a ruler, in this case, coincided with the true interests of the state, But he had by no means a purely political interest in Christianity. His whole family was swayed by religious sentiment, which manifested itself in very different forms: in the devout pilgrimages of Helena, his mother, the fanatical Arianism of Constantia, his sister, and Constantius, his

son, and the fanatical paganism of Julian, his nephew. Constantine was perfectly sincere in his course towards Christianity, as far as he understood it. He adopted it first as a superstition, in the spirit of the New-Platonic syncretism of the more earnest thinkers of the age, till finally, in his conviction, the Christian God vanquished the heathen gods; yet he never rose to a pure and enlightened faith and a corresponding purity of moral character, and delayed even a formal profession of the religion he had uniformly protected, till a few days before his death.

The latest biographer of Constantine, Professor Burkhart of Basel, has done him great injustice in denying the sincerity of his religious profession and ecclesiastical acts. He represents him as a purely military and political character of the Napoleonic order, whose only possible religion is fatalism and a belief in his own star; and he does not hesitate to treat the famous vision of a cross as a deliberate fabrication of the emperor or of Eusebius, or of both. But since that time Theodor Keim, in the essay mentioned at the head of this Article, on Constantine's conversion, and Stanley in the sixth of his able and interesting lectures on Greek Christianity, which contains a graphic picture of the first Christian emperor, have done him more justice under this view, and strike a middle course between the older over-estimate and the modern depreciation of his religious character.

The famous vision of the cross as related by Eusebius (not in his church history, but in his eulogistic biography of Constantine) will hardly be received by any critical historian at the present day without a considerable deduction. It certainly cannot be regarded any longer in the light of a sudden and thorough conversion which produced a corresponding wonderful change in the whole age by raising Christianity to the throne of the Caesars. Yet the general fact of some extraordinary phenomenon or experience preceding the decisive victory over Maxentius in October, 312, is well supported by contemporaneous testimonies of the

author of the work *De Mortibus persecutorum*, written A. D. 314, and the heathen panegyrists of Constantine, especially Nazarius, in 321. We resolve the facts in the case into a prophetic dream, which may be traced to a special providence without resorting to a proper miracle.

All other hypotheses are surrounded by insurmountable difficulties. The old orthodox view of a personal appearance of Christ to Constantine and his army, is hardly justified even by the great significance of the victory which followed; and, besides the critical objections to the Eusebian narrative, it assumes such a union of the Prince of Peace with the god of war, and the holy symbol of redemption with the bloody ensign of conquest, as is incompatible with the dignity of the Saviour and the genius of his religion, and would require us to stretch the theory of accommodation far beyond the limits of strict propriety and truthfulness. We should suppose, moreover, that Christ, if he had actually appeared to the young captain, either in person (according to Eusebius and Theodoretus) or through angels (as Rufinus and Sozomenus modify the story), would have exhorted him to repent and be baptized, rather than to construct a military ensign for a bloody battle. But it is a fact that he was not baptized till twenty-five years later. The opposite view of an intentional falsehood of Constantine or Eusebius, or both, is in itself too unworthy to be resorted to without absolute necessity; it ill agrees with the general character of the prince and his biographer, and it is overthrown by the three independent and contemporary testimonies of Lactantius, or whoever wrote the work on the death of persecutors, and two heathen panegyrists, which agree as to some extraordinary vision or dream at this remarkable turning point of history. Finally, the rationalistic hypothesis of a peculiar cross-like formation in the clouds, resorted to by Gieseler and adopted by Stanley, derives some show of evidence from similar cross-like clouds which appeared in Germany in December, 1517 and 1552, and were mistaken by contemporary Lutherans for supernatural signs. The

parhelion, likewise, is said to assume not unfrequently, in an afternoon sky, almost the form of a cross. Stanley even refers to the aurora borealis which appeared in November, 1848, and was interpreted in France as forming the letters "L. N." in view of the approaching election of Louis Napoleon. But this hypothesis leaves the inscription "Hoc vince" and the figure of Christ unexplained; derives one of the most important events in history from a mere accidental mistake, and substitutes a natural for a supernatural miracle, thus reminding us of the exploded exegesis of Paulus in his commentary on the Gospels and his Life of Jesus.

The theory of a prophetic dream, on the other hand, is free from any reasonable objection. It leaves a sufficient foundation of fact to save the character of Constantine and Eusebius from unnecessary reproach, and to account for the unquestionable results and the great change in the prospects of Christianity which followed the victory over Maxentius. It constitutes the main point, and the only point, of agreement between the different accounts of the famous event, and assumes additional support from the universal Christian and pagan belief of that age in the supernatural character of visions and dreams. Constantine and his friends referred the most important facts of his life, as the knowledge of the approach of hostile armies, the discovery of the Holy Sepulchre, the founding of Constantinople, to divine revelation through visions and dreams. Julian the Apostate was even more superstitious in this respect than his Christian uncle, and fully addicted to the whole neo-Platonic theory and superstition of omens, presages, prodigies, spectres, dreams, visions, auguries, and oracles. On his expedition against the Persians, he was supposed by Libanius to have been surrounded by a whole army of gods, which, however, in the view of Gregory of Nazianzen, was a host of demons. Licinius, Constantine's brother-in-law and rival, before the battle with Maximin, had a vision of an angel, who taught him a prayer for victory. Tertullian, Origen, and other Nicene and ante-Nicene Fathers attributed many conversions to nocturnal dreams

and visions. Nor was this mere superstition. The Bible itself sanctions the general theory of providential or prophetic dreams, through which divine revelations and admonitions are communicated to men. "I the Lord will make myself known in a vision, and will speak in a dream." Num. xii. 6. "In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed, then he openeth the ears of men and sealeth their instruction." Job xxxiii. 15, 16. Compare, for actual facts, Gen. xxxi. 10, 24; xxxvii. 5; 1 Kings iii. 5; Dan. ii. 4, 36; vii. 1; Matt. i. 20; ii. 12, 13, 19, 22; Acts x. 17; xxii. 17, 18. We may also refer to a modern, somewhat similar, though far less important, vision in the life of the pious English Col. James Gardiner, as related by his distinguished friend Dr. Doddridge, who learned the facts from Gardiner himself, as Eusebius derived his account from the mouth of Constantine. When engaged, we are told, in serious meditation, on a Sabbath night in July, 1719, Gardiner "suddenly thought he saw an unusual blaze of light fall on the book while he was reading, which he at first imagined might have happened by some accident in the candle. But lifting up his eyes he apprehended, to his exteme amazement, that there was before him, as it were suspended in the air, a visible representation of the Lord Jesus Christ upon the cross, surrounded with a glory; and was impressed as if a voice, or something equivalent to a voice, had come to him, to the effect: 'O sinner, did I suffer this for thee, and are these the returns?'" After this event he became, from a dissolute worldling, an earnest and godly man. But the whole apparition was probably, after all, merely an inward one. For the report adds, as to the voice: "Whether this was an audible voice, or *only a strong impression on his mind*, equally striking, he did not seem confident, though he judged it to be the former." He thought he was awake; but every body knows how easy it is towards midnight to fall into a doze over a dull or even a good book. It is very probable, then, that this apparition resolves itself into a significant dream, which marked an epoch in his life. No

reflecting person will, on that account, doubt the seriousness of Gardiner's conversion, which was amply proved by his whole subsequent life, even far more so than Constantine proved his.

To return to Constantine. The causes and antecedents of the victory over Maxentius in October, 312, may be resolved into the following facts. Before the battle the young captain, leaning already towards Christianity, according to his father's example, as being probably the best and most hopeful of the various religions of the empire, seriously sought in prayer, as he related to Eusebius, the assistance of the God of the Christians, while his heathen antagonist Maxentius, according to Zosimus, was consulting the sibylline books and offering sacrifice to the old idols. Filled with mingled fears and hopes about the issue of the conflict, he fell asleep, and saw in a dream the sign of the cross of Christ, with the significant inscription and promise of victory. Being already familiar with the general use of this sign among the numerous Christians of the empire, many of whom no doubt were in his own army, he ordered the sign of the cross to be put upon the shields of the soldiers (according to Lactantius), and also (according to Eusebius) the construction of the *labarum*, afterwards so called, that is, the sacred standard of the Christian cross, with the Greek monogram of Christ, or the letter χ and P so written upon one another as to make the form of the cross, with or without the Alpha and Omega = *Christos* — the beginning and the end. The cross and the monogram had been in use long before, and the only thing new in this case was the application and the union of this Christian symbol with the Roman military standard in the place of the Roman eagles.

To this cross-standard Constantine attributed the decisive victory over his heathen rival. Accordingly, after his triumphal entrance into Rome, he ordered the erection of his statue upon the forum with the *labarum* in his right hand, and the inscription beneath: "By this saving sign, the true

token of bravery (τούτω τῷ σωτηριώδει — *salutari*, not *singulari*, as Rufinus has it — σημεῖον, τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἐλέγχῳ τῆς ἀνδρίας), I have delivered your city from the yoke of the tyrant." Three years afterwards the senate erected to him a triumphal arch of marble, which to this day, within sight of the sublime ruins of the pagan Colosseum, indicates to every visitor of the "urbs aeterna" at once the downfall of heathenism and the decline of ancient art; as the neighboring arch of Titus commemorates the downfall of Judaism and the destruction of the temple of Jerusalem. The inscription on this arch of Constantine, however, ascribes his victory, naturally enough, to his master mind and to the impulse of the Deity, "instinctui Divinitatis" — an ambiguous term, like "Providence," which veils Constantine's passage from paganism to Christianity; the Christian referring it to the true God, while a heathen, like the eulogist Nazarius, took it for the celestial guardian power of ancient Rome.

At all events the victory at the Milvian bridge was a military and political triumph of Christianity, but no more; the intellectual and moral victory having been already accomplished by the literature, life, and martyrdom of the Church during the three preceding centuries. The emblem of ignominy and oppression, of which Cicero once said (pro Raberio, c. s.): "Nomen ipsum *crucis* absit non modo a corpore civium Romanorum, sed etiam a cogitatione, oculis, auribus": now became the badge of honor and dominion, and was invested in the emperor's view, according to the spirit of the Church of his age, with a magic virtue. It now took the place of the eagle and other field-badges, under which the heathen Romans had conquered the world. It was stamped on the imperial coins, and on the standards, helmets, and shields of the soldiers. Above all military representations of the cross the original imperial *labarum* shone in the richest decorations of gold and gems; was intrusted to the truest and bravest fifty of the body guard, filled the Christians with the spirit of victory, and spread fear and terror among their enemies, until, under the weak

successors of Theodosius II. it fell out of use, and was lodged as a venerable relic in the imperial palace of Constantinople.

This rising significance of the cross was a faithful symbol of the extraordinary change in the empire. The Graeco-Roman heathenism surrendered, after a three-hundred-years' struggle, to Christianity, and died of incurable consumption. The ruler of the civilized world laid his crown at the feet of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. The successor of Nero, Domitian, and Diocletian, who had done their best to exterminate the pestilential sect, appeared a few years after the last and most bloody persecution in the imperial purple at the council of Nice as protector of this very sect; and took his golden throne at the nod of bishops, many of whom still bore the scars of persecution. The despised religion, which for three centuries, like its Founder in the days of his humiliation, had not where to lay its head, was raised to sovereign authority in the state; entered into the prerogatives of the pagan priesthood; grew rich and powerful; built countless churches and altars out of the stones of idol temples to the honor of Christ and his martyrs; employed the wisdom of Greece and Rome to vindicate the foolishness of the cross; exerted a moulding influence upon civil legislation; ruled the life of the people, and began to control the general course of civilization.

At first Constantine did not contemplate a full union of church and state. He pursued the policy of a wise and timely toleration, to which he substantially adhered to the close of his reign. Soon after the final victory over Maxentius, by which he became the sole ruler of the West, he issued from Milan, in January, 313, in connection with Licinius, his brother-in-law and co-ruler in the East, the famous edict of toleration still extant in Latin and Greek, which granted full liberty to all existing forms of worship, and removed the restrictions which the two previous edicts of toleration (of 311 and 312) had still put upon the Christian religion. He allowed every heathen subject to adopt

it with impunity. At the same time the church buildings and property confiscated in the Dioclesian persecution were ordered to be restored, and private-property owners to be indemnified from the imperial treasury.¹

In this notable edict we must not look, indeed, for the modern Protestant and Anglo-American theory of religious liberty, as one of the universal and inalienable rights of man, like the liberty of thought and speech or the right to pursue happiness and to do good. Sundry voices, it is true, in the Christian church itself, at that time and before, in the period of persecution, declared clearly and firmly against all compulsion in matters of religion, and some passages of Tertullian and Lactantius on this subject sound as if they had been written by Vinet or Bunsen, or by an American divine of the nineteenth century. But the spirit of the Roman empire was too absolutistic to abandon the prerogative of a supervision of public worship altogether. The Constantinian toleration was simply a temporary measure of state

¹ *Haec ordinanda esse credidimus, ut daremus et Christianis et omnibus liberam potestatem sequendi religionem, quam quisque voluisset ut nulli omnino facultatem obnegandam putaremus, qui vel observationi Christianorum, vel ei religioni mentem suam dederet, quam ipse sibi aptissimam esse sentiret ut amotis omnibus omnino conditionibus [by which are meant, no doubt, the restrictions of toleration in the two former edicts], nunc libere ac simpliciter unusquisque eorum qui eandem observandae religioni Christianorum gerunt voluntatem, citra ullam inquietudinem et molestiam sui id ipsum observare contendant* — Lact. *De mort. persec.* c. 48 (*Opera Lact.* Vol. II. p. 282, ed. Fritzsche). Eusebius gives the edict in a stiff and obscure Greek translation, with some variations, *H. E.* X. 5. Comp. Nicephorus, *H. E.* VII. 41. Also a special essay on the three edicts of toleration by Theod. Keim in the *Tübingen Theolog. Jahrbücher* for 1852. This edict does not go so far as some remarkable passages of Tertullian, Lactantius, and other ante-Nicene Fathers, who first, in midst of persecution, proclaimed the true principles of religious liberty. Compare the passages of Tertullian quoted in the writer's *General Church History*, Vol. I. § 51. Lactantius likewise, in the beginning of the fourth century, says, *Instit. div.* l. v. c. 19 (*I.* p. 267 sq., ed. Lips.): *Non est opus vi et injuria, quia religio cogi non potest; verbis potius, quam verberibus res agenda est, ut sit voluntas. . . . Defendenda religio est, non occidendo, sed moriendo; non servitia, sed patientia; non scelere, sed fide Nam si sanguine, si tormentis, si malo religionem defendere velis, jam non defendetur illa, polluetur atque violabitur. Nihil est enim tam voluntarium, quam religio, in qua si animus sacrificantis aversus est, jam sublata, jam nulla est.* Comp. c. 20.

policy, which, as indeed the edict of 313 expressly states the motive, promised the greatest security to the public peace and the protection of all divine and heavenly powers, for the emperor and his subjects. It was, as the result teaches, the easy and necessary transition to a new order of things. It opened the door for the elevation of Christianity to the same position which the old Roman idolatry had hitherto enjoyed in the empire. It was the first step towards the union of church and state.

Constantine thus was the first imperial representative of religious toleration, but at the same time also the first representative of state-church Christianity, or of that system which assumes all subjects to be Christians, connects civil and religious rights, and regards church and state as the two arms of one and the same divine government on earth. He did, indeed, not carry it out in full; he adhered upon the whole, as already observed, to the wise toleration policy proclaimed in the edict of 313, and abstained, with a few exceptions, from violent proceedings against idolatry. But he openly protected and favored Christianity after that time in his legislation and various public acts, and professed it at last in form by submitting to baptism on his death-bed. The system inaugurated by him was matured and carried out by his successors in the Byzantine empire. It then, under various modifications, prevailed during the whole mediaeval period of Christianity; it was re-enacted in the Calvinistic republic of Geneva and the various Protestant church establishments of the sixteenth century; it still reigns, nominally at least, all over Europe, and it flourished even in Puritan New England and in Episcopal Virginia down to the period of the American Revolution, or still later.

In judging of this system we should guard against those extreme and unjust views which men are apt to take in making their own individual or national point of view and preferences the measure and rule of all ages and stations.

The union of church and state as inaugurated by Constantine the Great was neither an unmixed blessing, nor a source of all evil and corruption of Christianity. It presents two aspects, which must be kept in view.

It was on the one hand an unavoidable political and social result of the preceding intellectual and moral triumph of Christianity over heathenism, and a just and well-deserved tribute of the secular power to the spiritual. The deadly hostility of these two powers was not natural; and had sooner or later to come to an end. For God ordained the state as well as the church; the one for the temporal, the other for the eternal, welfare of man. Nor was the Christian religion ever hostile to the state as such; it was only opposed to idolatry which controlled the heathen government, and with the overthrow of which the government itself assumed its natural and normal position towards the church, by granting to it not only toleration, but all the necessary rights of a legal corporation.

And this is a point on which our American separation of church and state essentially differs from the ante-Nicene separation. The latter implied a deadly opposition and bloody persecution of the state against the church; the former rests on a friendly recognition and peaceful co-operation. Our churches owe to Constantine and his age a large debt of gratitude in the enjoyment of rights which they justly claim as essential and inalienable.

The greatest American divine, Jonathan Edwards, acknowledged this in his *History of Redemption*, which was written, it is true, long before the separation of church and state in New England (A. D. 1739), but which gives nevertheless a more just estimate of that great event, than many modern popular writers, who ignorantly derive all corruptions of Christianity from the age of Constantine, as if there had been no corruptions before him, or in our American churches, and as if there was nothing but unmixed evil in the state-churches of Europe. Edwards ascribes to the rise and influence of Constantine the following salutary effects:

1. The Christian church was thereby wholly delivered from persecution ; 2. God now appeared to execute terrible judgments on his enemies ; 3. Heathenism now was in a great measure abolished throughout the Roman empire ; 4. the Christian church was brought into a state of great peace and prosperity. But he entirely overestimates that revolution when he calls it " the greatest which occurred since the flood," and adds, " Satan, the prince of darkness, that king and god of the heathen world, was cast out. The roaring lion was conquered by the Lamb of God in the strongest dominion he ever had. This was a remarkable accomplishment of Jerem. x. ii : ' The gods that have not made the heaven and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth and from under the heavens.' "

The union of church and state, moreover, freed the clergy from many onerous public burdens and military duties, from which the heathen priests, and even the Jewish elders, also, in part at least, physicians and rhetoricians, were exempt. It facilitated the support of a regular ministry. It gave the church the right to hold property and to receive legacies, and thus greatly enlarged her capacity for usefulness. It legalized the episcopal jurisdiction, and conferred on the clergy the right of intercession in behalf of prisoners, fugitives, and criminals. It gave to all sanctuaries the right of asylum, which the heathen temples and altars had always enjoyed. It recognized the sacred seasons of the Christians, and secured to them the undisturbed exercise of public worship. It made the Christian Sunday a civil institution, and thus facilitated its observance by the pious, and prevented, at least in great part, its public desecration by the wicked. It enabled Christianity to influence civil legislation, to infuse into it the spirit of justice and humanity, to elevate the condition of woman and the character of the family, to benefit the unfortunate, to ameliorate and finally to abolish slavery, to urge the prohibition of gladiatorial shows, and the reform or abolition of innumerable social evils. Thus the church's opportunity of usefulness was immeas-

urably enlarged. It now became a church of the people, and its field was the world and the history of the race.

But with these very advantages, which date in their beginnings from the age of Constantine, were closely connected certain dangers and temptations, which showed themselves simultaneously. The greatest and most general danger was the secularization of the church, which now took in the whole population of the empire, from the crowned Caesar to the meanest slave, and became mixed up with the world to an extent it never had been before. Discipline formerly so severe, now necessarily relaxed, although there still remained bishops like Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Synesius to exercise it in its primitive vigor, even against emperors and courtiers. The clergy with increasing wealth and power became indolent, arrogant, and hierarchical, especially the occupants of the metropolitan and patriarchal sees. Hypocrisy and vice crept into the rank of nominal Christians. The state intermeddled with all the affairs of the church, and the intrigues and caprices of the Byzantine court exerted an unhallowed influence even upon the most important controversies on Christian doctrine and duty. From that age date all the evils of Caesaropapism or Erastianism, which may be traced to the famous remark of Constantine at a convivial feast of bishops, that he too was a divinely constituted bishop, namely of the external affairs of the church (*ἐπίσκοπος τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐκκλησίας*), while they were the bishops of the internal affairs (*ἐπίσκοποι τῶν ἐν ὧν τῆς ἐκκλησίας*). Finally the union of church and state, being the union of the government to a particular ecclesiastical organization, the catholic hierarchy, was necessarily also a restriction of religious liberty, and a recognition of the right of persecution against all dissenting sects. A crime against the established church became a crime against the state and social order, and hence subject to civil as well as spiritual punishment. So early as the fourth century the dominant party, the orthodox as well as the heterodox, with help of the imperial authority, practised deposition, confiscation,

and banishment upon its opponents. It was but one step thence to the penalties of torture and death, which were ordained in the Middle Ages, and practised even down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not only in Roman Catholic but even in Protestant countries, as Geneva, Sweden, England, and New England, against religious dissenters of every kind, as enemies of the established order of things. Augustine, in his controversy with the Donatists, sanctioned the principle of forcible coercion and compulsion in matters of conscience, although his heart revolted against it and prompted him to say: *Non vincit nisi veritas; victoria veritatis est caritas*. Under Theodosius I. the theory of heretical persecution was incorporated in the legislation of the empire, and the first victims to it, who suffered death, were the Priscillianists, who were executed at Treves, A. D. 385, for their Manichean opinions and practices. Absolute freedom of religion and public worship is in fact logically impossible on the state-church system. It requires the separation of the spiritual and temporal power, or at least the relinquishment of the claim to exclusive catholicity on the side of the ruling ecclesiastical organization. Yet from the very beginning of ecclesiastico-political persecution, loud voices were raised against it, and in behalf of the rights of conscience, though the plea always came from the oppressed parties, so that the blood of martyrs became the seed of religious freedom.

All these dangers and evils of the union of church and state could, of course, not destroy, or even seriously impede, the vital force and influence of Christianity, which acted and reacted against them, and made them the occasion for solving new problems, producing new remedies, and opening new avenues of thought and action, and controlling the destinies of nations in the interest of truth, justice, and humanity.

The conquest of Christianity over paganism was seriously disputed during the short reign of Julian the Apostate, the

nephew of Constantine. Never was there a more systematic and vigorous effort made by any monarch to undo the results of a former reign. Whatever political and military power, wit, zeal, and untiring energy could accomplish, was done by Julian for the destruction of Christianity and for the restoration of heathenism. Constantine's work and policy were submitted to the severest test, but only to be crowned with the most complete vindication. If there ever was a complete failure in history, it was the reign of Julian. His attempt to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem, thrice repeated and thrice frustrated, is characteristic of the whole reign. It was truly "the baseless fabric of a vision, which left no wreck behind." It proved beyond the possibility of doubt that Constantine, with his plain, strong common sense, which was worth much more than the uncommon but perverted sense of his nephew, had rightly understood the signs of the times, and had acted in the interest of genuine progress. It is useless and impossible to swim against the mighty current of history. Failure and disgrace is the inevitable fate of a reactionist, who sins, not only against his age, but also against that almighty wisdom which rules the world, and rules it in the interest of Christianity. Paganism was gone, irretrievably gone, and all attempts to galvanize it into an artificial existence only brought out this fact more clearly and strongly. When Julian, after many preparations, appeared in great pomp and solemnity at the rededication of a temple of Apollo, near Antioch, the only representatives of old heathenism, to his great and just mortification, were a priest and an old woman, offering — a goose !

After the death of Julian, the line of Christian emperors was no more interrupted. His first successor, Jovian, restored to the Christians their rights, and proclaimed anew Constantine's policy of toleration. Under Theodosius severe laws were issued against sacrifices, but not vigorously executed. Occasionally emperors, bishops, and monks disgraced the cause of Christianity they professed, by acts of violence and injustice against the remains of idolatry. But

these instances were comparatively rare, and not to be compared for a moment with the fierce and bloody persecution to which the Christian religion had been subjected for three hundred years. Idolatry approached, with slow but sure strides, towards the grave, and would have perished in the Roman empire, if no law had been issued against it. It died of hopeless consumption, and was ingloriously buried in the confusion of the migration of nations and the ruins of the Western Roman empire. Already, before the close of the fourth century, it was officially called "paganismus," i. e. country or peasant religion, because it had nearly died out in the cities and civilized towns. Theodosius II. caused the last temple to be destroyed in 435. Justinian I., in 529, abolished the last intellectual nursery of heathenism, the Athenian school of seven philosophers, — the shades of the seven sages of ancient Greece! A significant coincidence and poetic fitness, like the diminutive resemblance of the last Western Roman emperor, Romulus Augustulus, to the founder of the empire. In the West a few lingering remains of idolatry continued towards the middle of the sixth century, but only in remote mountain districts, or in cruel habits and customs, as the gladiatorial shows. The northern barbarians labored as zealously for the destruction of idolatry as of the empire, and generally embraced Christianity with great promptness, from an instinctive sense that it would prove to them the mother of civilization and a source of countless blessings. Thus the conquered Romans gave laws to the conquering barbarians, as the conquered Greeks and Jews had given laws to the victorious Romans. Christianity conquered them all, and fell heir to the inheritance of the past.

The downfall of Graeco-Roman heathenism, the noblest and most powerful form of heathenism known in history, is a sublime tragedy which, with all abhorrence of idolatry, we cannot behold without a certain sad sympathy. When Christianity first appeared on earth, the Roman gods and eagles commanded the political and military power, wisdom, letters and arts of the entire civilized world, and led them into

battle against the defenceless religion of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. After an unequal conflict of four or five hundred years, heathenism, with all its power and beauty, lay prostrate in the dust, without the hope of a resurrection. With the temporal support of the civil arm, it lost all vitality and energy, and had not even the courage of martyrdom, while the Christian church had furnished a countless army of martyrs and confessors, and Judaism, in spite of all persecution, continues to this day. Pagan Hellenism and Romanism died of internal self-dissolution, which no human power could arrest. Its last sign of life was the pitiful pleas for toleration in remembrance of ancient glories, raised by Libanius, Symmachus, and the New-Platonists, and their doleful complaint of the decay and approaching downfall of the empire. Its best elements took refuge in the church, or propagated themselves under new Christian names. The gods were dethroned; the oracles and prodigies were dumb; the sibylline books consigned to the flames; the smoke of sacrifices disappeared; the temples and altars were destroyed, or their ruins still stand as trophies of Christianity. Augustine could thus address the heathen of his day:¹ “*Videtis simulacrorum templa partim sine reparatione collapsa, partim diruta, partim clausa, partim in usus alienos commutata; ipsaque simulacra, vel confringi, vel incendi, vel includi, vel destrui, atque ipsas hujus saeculi potestates, quae aliquando pro simulacris populum Christianum persequerantur, victas et domitas, non a repugnantibus, sed a morientibus Christianis, et contra eadem simulacra, pro quibus Christianos occidebant, impetus suos legesque vertisse, et imperii nobilissimi eminentissimum culmen ad sepulcrum piscatoris Petri submisso diademate supplicare.*”

Yet, although ancient Greece and Rome have perished for ever, the genius and spirit of classical culture and literature still remain.

It lives, first, in the natural heart of man, which is as much

¹ Epist. 232.

in need of a regeneration by the grace of God now as it was in ages past.

Then, the spirit of ancient heathenism lives in many idolatrous and superstitious rites of the Greek and Roman church, against which the genuine spirit of Christianity always protested, especially at the time of the Reformation, and will continue to protest, until every vestige of gross and refined idolatry shall be swept away, or be baptized not only with water, but with fire and the Holy Ghost.

Finally, the genius of Greece and Rome still lives in the immortal works of their poets, philosophers, historians, and orators, yet no more as an enemy, but as an ally of Christian theology and science. What is truly beautiful, true, and good can never perish. Classical literature once prepared the way for the introduction of Christianity in the order of intellectual culture and general civilization, and the Greek language became the most appropriate organ for the expression and propagation of the everlasting truths of the gospel. Henceforward the same literature was to serve as a weapon in the defence of the truth, and to prepare Christian scholars for a scientific comprehension of the Christian religion and all the higher branches of a Christian education. It became the rightful property of the church, like the Old Testament scriptures. The word of the apostle was here fulfilled: "All is yours." The ancient classics, relieved of the demoniac pressure of idolatry, have become servants of the only true God, once unknown to them, but now gloriously revealed. They now fulfil their highest mission as handmaids of religion and virtue. This is the noblest and most complete victory of Christianity, which converted its former foe into its permanent friend and ally.

ARTICLE V.

AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH.

BY REV. S. C. BARTLETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

IT is the object of the present Article to set forth some of the reasons which justify intelligent men in holding the firm belief that Moses, the great leader of Israel, was the author of the Pentateuch.

In maintaining this proposition, it is not asserted, (1) that the present text is free from all errors of transcription; nor (2) that the volume has never received any minor modification, made by inspired, and therefore competent, men; nor (3) that Moses incorporated into his work no pre-existing materials, handed down by valid tradition or written record; nor (4) that the account of Moses's own death and character (Deut. xxxiv.) was written by himself.

There are reasons, both general and special, for admitting that the text of the Pentateuch, though preserved with extraordinary care, yet contains some minor blemishes. It is, moreover, so far from being intrinsically probable that the oldest portion of the scriptures should have passed, for a thousand years through the hands of inspired men without any explanatory modification, whatever, that a few surface-marks of revision would not offer the slightest objection to evidence, otherwise conclusive, of the early origin of the volume as a whole. It does not require a tradition that the prophet Ezra revised the earlier scriptures, to render plausible a procedure which now yearly takes place in some form in the editing of old books. That Moses may have used, with or without change, other oral or written narratives, at the same time endorsing them, is no more incompatible with his proper authorship, than a similar course invariably pursued by modern historians is inconsistent with their claims as authors. We may, in due time, have occa-

sion to allude to the indications that such was the fact. And furthermore, the annexation of a sketch of his death and character directly to the end of his narrative, is only the simplest mode of doing what is constantly practised now in the prefixing of a biographical notice of an author to his works. Thus the closing portion of Macaulay's fifth volume of history (in the American edition), is a sketch of his life and writings; and that of Hugh Miller's last work (also in the American edition) is a memorial of his death and character, although in each of these instances the modern art of printing has transposed the order of composition, and placed first that which in a manuscript must have stood last.¹ The appended sketch of Moses's death and character, therefore, so far from impairing the proof of his authorship, is rather the testimony of early antiquity in its favor.

We need not add that we shall not concern ourselves with trivial questions as to the mode of composition, but hold ourselves to the fundamental position that Moses was the responsible author of the volume.

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to the theme. The question is a question of evidence. It concerns a document, and is to be settled on such kinds of evidence as pertain to documents. And here it is important to bear in mind wherein that evidence must consist. Of course no living witness can be summoned to testify to his personal knowledge of a fact that took place three thousand years ago. A contemporary deposition, made under oath and

¹ A good illustration of this whole subject in several respects, especially of the simplicity of such procedures in an age destitute of the paraphernalia of printing, is seen in Bradford's sketch of the first settlers of Plymouth, appended to the manuscript of his History, discovered in 1855. It contains a complete list of the original passengers of the Mayflower, with a sketch of their fortunes, written thirty years later, in Bradford's handwriting. The manuscript contains one note in a different handwriting, without signature; also a note recording the date of *Bradford's own death*, with the name of Prince appended; also four short supplements, of as many sentences, bringing the sketch by successive stages to a period thirty years later than Bradford's death. These supplements are of course by a different hand.

cross-examination (were such a thing supposable), would be now but another ancient document, itself requiring to be vouched for. The evidence therefore that an ancient document was written by a specified individual, must be found in such particulars as the following: The statements of the document itself, especially if uncontradicted; the reception of it and action upon it by those who had the means of knowing, especially those whose interests and expectations were at stake upon it; universal consent, so far as ascertainable, from the date of its origin, and particularly its undisputed recognition by the chain of subsequent writers; its preservation and production by the natural and proper custodians, as the work of the alleged author; the judgment of *genuine* experts; the absence of all rival claimants, much more if there is even no plausible counter-hypothesis; traces of the time and circumstances of the alleged author; together with the appearance of manifest motives, qualifications, and opportunities, on his part, to compose such a treatise.

When such evidences all meet around a document, and no counter *testimony* is produced, and no objections raised of which the known circumstances do not afford an admissible solution, the case is as strong as it well can be. It will be our endeavor to show, though not in this precise order or phraseology, that all these indications actually meet to prove that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. The evidence we believe to be remarkably conclusive.

We shall show that, I. The fact is rendered entirely admissible by the nature and circumstances of the case; II. It is sustained by positive evidence, varied, abundant, and uncontradicted; III. It is corroborated by various collateral indications and circumstantial evidence; IV. It is exposed to no decisive or even formidable objections.

I. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is rendered entirely admissible by the nature and circumstances of the case. All the requisite conditions were in existence:

1. The art of writing already existed, and was largely in

use before the time of Moses. The objection was once boldly raised by von Bohlen and Vatke, was for a time received by Gesenius and De Wette, and was reiterated by Professor Norton in 1848, that there is no evidence that alphabetic writing existed in the time of Moses; or at least that it could have been known to the Hebrews¹ This objection has long been exploded. Sir H. Rawlinson regards the oldest inscribed bricks found at Babylon as dating back probably to about B.C. 2200.² And so far from there being any doubt as to the existence of writing then in Egypt, the present tendency is to assign it even an extravagant antiquity. Bunsen declares that the art of writing "was invented ages before the time of Moses."³ Lepsius affirms that "we see on the monuments, between three and four thousand years before Christ, a perfectly-formed system of writing [the hieroglyphic] and a universal habit of writing, of which the signs, when rapidly used, sometimes approached the hieratical short-hand";⁴ and he declares that there can be "no doubt concerning the remarkable statement of Diodorus (I. 49) on good authority, that king Osmandyas (i. e. Ramses Miamun) built a library in his temple at Thebes, as early as the fourteenth century before Christ."⁵ A soberer authority, Seyffarth, who has handled more than ten thousand Egyptian papyrus-rolls, affirms that at least two thousand years before Christ, that is in patriarchal times, writing was done on papyrus in Egypt.⁶ And the cautious Wilkinson regards the hieratic character as having come into use as early as about B. C. 2240.⁷ We are at liberty to regard any or all of these figures as but rude approximations to the actual dates; still they all concur in referring the use

¹ Norton's *Genuineness of the Gospels*, Vol. II., App. Note D, p. 100 seq.

² Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. pp. 349, 351.

³ Bunsen's *Egypt*, Vol. IV. p. 384.

⁴ Lepsius's *Letters from Egypt* (Bohn), p. 357.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁶ Delitzsch, *Die Genesis*, p. 26.

⁷ Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. pp. 256, 293.

of writing to a period long anterior to Moses, earlier even than the date commonly assigned to Abraham.

This art was practised, and most abundantly, in the very nation among whom the Hebrews dwelt for some hundreds of years. The ancient Egyptians were a race of indefatigable writers. They inscribed or marked everything that admitted of it, from a temple, an obelisk, a pyramid, or a tomb, to a brick, a sarcophagus, a bracelet, or a seal-ring. Everything was done in writing. In all pictorial representations the scribe was ubiquitous. In levying soldiers, scribes write down the names; they count, in the king's presence, the severed hands of the slain; they present to him the amount of weapons, horses, and other booty.¹ The scribe notes down weights, in the markets and the jeweller's shop alike;² he records, for the steward, all the products of the farm, — sheep, goats, asses, oxen, cows, geese, goslings, and even eggs.³ No bargain of consequence, says Wilkinson, was made without a written voucher.⁴ If we may trust such Egyptologers as Birch, Cottrell, and Bunsen, the "Book of the Dead" was already becoming antiquated in style two thousand years before Christ. There is a collection of Egyptian proverbs dating back to 2200 B. C., and a tale, "the Two Brothers," written as early as B. C. 1308.⁵

In the midst of this universal habit of writing, extending from the public monuments of the empire down to the very bricks of which the government monopolized the manufacture, had the Hebrews lived.⁶ That they thoroughly imbibed the influence, appears alike in the formal registers and records, which certainly abound in the sacred volume, and more clearly, because still more unconsciously, in the language itself. Thus the earliest "officers" of the Hebrews in Egypt, in the desert, and in the conquest and government

¹ Hengstenberg's *Egypt and the Books of Moses*, p. 93.

² Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, Vol. II. pp. 137, 148.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 174–179.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 176.

⁵ Bunsen's *Egypt*, Vol. IV. pp. 660, 666, 691.

⁶ Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, Vol. II. p. 195.

of Canaan, bear in Hebrew the significant name of שִׁכְרִים (*writers*).¹ And it is an equally significant circumstance, indicative of fresh contact with Egypt, that this term occurs more than twice as many times in the Pentateuch and Joshua as in all the rest of the Old Testament.²

2. The occasion and urgent motive for such a composition, were also in existence.

The exodus of Israel and the journey to Canaan under the guidance and control of Moses, must, as we have shown, on the very lowest historic platform be accepted as a fact. In that fact a nation had sprung into independent life. They had found a great leader, had wrought a great national achievement, had received laws and institutions. The nation had, as it were, been born and grown to manhood in a day. Here was quite as powerful an impulse as that which stimulated Thotmes III. to depict the scenes of his conquest on the great temple at Karnac and elsewhere in Egypt, B. C. 1460;³ or Sardanapalus to carve his achievements in the north-west palace at Nimroud, B. C. 950;⁴ or Xerxes to engrave his exploits on the rocks at Wan; or Xenophon to write the *Anabasis*; or, to speak of something more kindred in character, an occasion and impulse as powerful as that which, for the last fifty years, has in this country multiplied histories of the United States, lives of Washington, and histories of New England.

To all this, however, in the case of the Israelites, was added the sense of religious duty and gratitude. Not only had a nation sprung into life, and found its independence and its institutions; it had also found its God. Jehovah had taken that nation, as they verily believed, into his covenant and care. Here was a grand epoch that solemnly called for memorials and records, and for an historic review of the way

¹ Ex. v. 6-9; Num. xi. 16; Deut. xx. 5, 8, 9; xxix. 9; xxxi. 28; Josh. i. 10; iii. 2, etc.

² Seventeen times in the first six books; seven elsewhere.

³ So Sir G. W. Wilkinson, *Rawlinson's Herodotus*, Vol. II. p. 299.

⁴ So Rawlinson. Layard substantially concurs: "*Babylon and Nineveh*," p. 614.

in which their God had led them. The highest of all motives combined to elicit such a document. And the actual influence of such motives is stamped on the whole volume.

3. The aim and method of the Pentateuch spring from, and are in perfect harmony with, the occasion. The book is the legitimate outgrowth of that occasion, and of the views which the nation can be shown to have entertained concerning it, from the earliest glimpses of their national life. Whoever wrote it, the volume has a unity of plan and method, and bears strictly upon its appropriate end. It is the history of the theocracy, from the inception to the full establishment. The central fact was the giving of the fundamental law by Moses on Sinai, in the first year after the exodus. This is followed by the further legislation which prescribed the religious observances of the people in their covenant relation to Jehovah, and regulated their entire ecclesiastical and civil polity, both during their sojourn in the wilderness and their permanent home in the land of promise. It is combined with a record of the events and difficulties amidst which this arrangement was established, extending through the life-time of the lawgiver; of the judgments of God on foes within and without, whereby its ascendancy was maintained, and of the solemn reiteration of the law before the legislator's death. Prefixed to this central fact, inseparably connected with it, and indispensable to its right appreciation, is the narrative of the previous exigencies and preliminary measures through which the Creator of the world proceeded to establish this intimate relation with the chosen people. The whole narrative of Genesis is as strictly related to the four subsequent books of the Pentateuch, as those introductions which modern historians invariably prefix to their narratives of some given period, are integral portions of the treatises. In the admirable words of Delitzsch, "Genesis describes not only the beginning of the world, but also the beginning of God's manifestation as Jehovah, the beginning of redemption, the beginning of the

law, the beginning of the people of God, and the beginning of the possession of the promised land. To fix upon one only of the many lines of this beginning, Genesis indicates the earlier divine or consecrated institutions, which the later lawgiving took up and further developed: the origin of the Sabbath, sacrifices, the distinction of clean and unclean in the animal world, the prohibition of blood-eating, the death-penalty for murder, circumcision. To the people of God have reference alike the genealogies and the patriarchal history."¹ The narrative closely follows its fixed law through the narrowing lines of Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to the goal in view.² The definite purpose appears as clearly in what is omitted as in what is retained; in the dropping of

¹ Commentar über die Genesis, p. 18.

² We cannot refrain from quoting Kalisch's admirable statement of the case: "The grand economy in the arrangement of the vast materials of the book of Genesis, the comprehensiveness of the conception, and the consistent unity of the composition deserve, indeed, the highest admiration, and stamp the book with all the characteristics of a work of art. After the account of the creation, the fall, the deluge, begins the history of the nations which people the earth, and whose descent and relative abodes are recorded in a systematic table unparalleled in historical literature. But as the author has but the one aim of describing the election of Israel, he more and more contracts that gigantic circle: from the three chief groups of nations he segregates the Shemites; from the Shemites, the descendants of Arphaxad; and from the latter, the family of Terah. Among Terah's sons he devotes his care to Abraham alone, with the exclusion of his brother Nahor, and thenceforth imparts to his narrative a coloring more specifically religious; Abraham's elder son gives way to the younger, Isaac, the heir of the spiritual hopes; and Isaac's elder son, Esau, yields to the younger, Jacob, who first acquires by his own shrewdness, and then by the divine sanction, the precious privileges. But as Nahor, Ishmael, and Esau yet belong to the chosen family of Terah, and as they come later into frequent contact with the more favored branch, they are not quite neglected, but their genealogies are introduced, disclosing in the briefest form possible their social and political relations. Nor is the place assigned to these collateral or secondary lists less significant. Nahor's descendants are mentioned when on the point of being interwoven with the domestic history of Abraham (xxii. 20-24); the ramifications of Ishmael's line, and of the later sons of Abraham, are stated when Isaac is to come forward as the only or chief object of the Biblical narrative (xxv. 1-18), and precisely after this analogy the propagation and growth of Esau's house are (in chap. xxvi.) embodied in ethnographic notices in order to leave forever this branch of Isaac's family, and hereafter to pursue in an unbroken progress the destinies and development of Jacob." — Kalisch on Genesis xxxvi.

Jacob's family in Canaan to follow Joseph into Egypt, in the passing over of those hundreds of torpid years in Egypt, in the entire silence concerning thirty-seven of the years passed in the wilderness. The transactions and the legislation of the last four books are at every point interwoven with the statements of the previous narrative, and constantly presuppose them. And, as Kurtz truly says, while the giving of the law is the real heart of the Pentateuch, the narratives which precede and accompany, furnish its necessary historical basis and explanation.¹ Delitzsch affirms that the composition has "a systematic unity which, be it the work of one author or of many, is undeniable."² Tuch also admits this general unity, and draws out in detail the "manifest object of Genesis in its relation to the other books of the Pentateuch."³ Knobel says that "Genesis is the portico to the temple of the theocracy, the erection of which is exhibited in the succeeding books"; and he proceeds minutely to trace the plan and relation.⁴ Dr. Davidson is obliged to admit this actual unity of the Pentateuch, though protesting that it is not a valid proof of an original unity.⁵ Such being the fact, it cannot be denied that the Pentateuch as a whole is the legitimate offspring of the occasion.

4. It is not an incredible supposition that Moses himself should have met the demands of the occasion and composed the work. Quite the contrary. He had motive, opportunity, qualifications. Estimated by whatever standard and testimony, the man who delivered and organized Israel, and stamped his memory and influence on the nation forever, must have been intellectually and morally a remarkable man. He was pre-eminently the man to appreciate the occasion, to feel the impulse, to use the facilities.

We feel ourselves now at liberty to assume as unques-

¹ History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 502.

² Delitzsch's Genesis, p. 16.

³ Tuch's Genesis, Vorrede, p. 21.

⁴ Knobel's Genesis, Vorbemerkungen, sec. 1 seq.

⁵ Horne's Introduction, Vol II. pp. 607, 612.

tionable the *main* facts, that Moses delivered the nation from Egypt, and on the way to Palestine gave them laws and religious institutions — facts sustained by heathen testimony, overwhelmingly proved by Jewish institutions and history, and unquestioned by really intelligent scholars and investigators of whatever school. "Did the event known as the giving of the law," says Kurtz, "really take place? and if so, did it occur at the time, in the manner, at the place, and through the person mentioned in the Pentateuch? Even the most incredulous critics are obliged to answer the question in the affirmative."¹ Let us take the admissions of one such writer as a specimen. Knobel, who is the latest, is also one of the very ablest and most scholarly, as well as most incredulous of the Rationalists. He deals in the freest manner with the sacred narrative and all its contents. Yet Knobel specifies as things that "must be received," the facts that at the time of the exode great calamities had fallen upon the Egyptians, and that Moses availed himself of them to deliver his people from the Egyptian yoke, and to lead them forth; that he did not take the shortest way to Palestine, but led directly eastward to reach free Arabia; that being checked on the way, he was forced to push, at ebb-tide, through the gulf of Heroopolis, in which their pursuers perished; that he then chose Sinai as the nearest goal, because it was the ancient sacred region, and had water and a growth of vegetation; that he remained there some time, to give his people organization and laws. So also must we accept as certain that he taught the Israelites to know the paternal God as "Jehovah," and as their Lord and King; founded the Jehovah-religion and the theocracy; in accordance with the theocratic idea established a sanctuary in the tabernacle of the covenant; appointed a priesthood in Aaron and his family; introduced a sacrificial service; established religious festivals, and gave other laws (e.g. the Decalogue) wherein he sanctioned much that he found existing, and created other portions anew. And

¹ History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 502.

Knobel sums up by saying, that "Moses must be viewed as the liberator and founder of his nation and as author of the peculiar Israelitish religion, government, and law, at least in their basis and essence."¹

Given, then, a man of the commanding character here described by Knobel, brought up in a land where writing was so constant and so universal that the very bricks which his countrymen were compelled to make, must have been stamped with the government mark and registered in written accounts; and which is the incredible thing, that he should, or that he should not, have committed his laws and institutions to writing? Aside from all testimony, which is the violent supposition, — that such a man, so trained, when he came to give perpetual laws and perma-

² Knobel on Exodus, p. 22. It might be instructive to cavillers of narrow range, to know how extensively the most scholarly of German rationalists, — men who talk freely of myths and sagas, are *obliged* to admit at last an underlying historic basis in the whole; while it is for the latter to show how they can go so far and not go farther. Thus Knobel (on Genesis, p. 23) while designating the earlier history as mythical, yet remarks that many things here narrated, e. g. of the dwelling-place of the first pair, of the Semitic line of descent leading to Abraham, of the separation of the Noachidae, have a geographical substratum; the genealogy of Cain has an ethnological significance; the history of the flood an actual basis; and the table of the nations, its accuracy. He says that "in general the ground-writing [the Elohistic] narrates according to true national traditions. This is less the case with the much later Jehovist. Yet he also, from his ancient sources, gives us valuable information, e. g. of Abraham's heroic spirit and valor, of his steward Eliezer, of his and Isaac's abode in Gerar, of Jacob's adventures in Mesopotamia, of Joseph and the Egyptians," etc. Tuch says, (Genesis, p. 11) "the removal of Jacob's family to Egypt, is subject to no doubt. As little is the historic existence of Joseph, who shrewdly raised himself to the highest honors in Egypt, and induced his relatives to migrate thither. As historical must Jacob's person and his journey to Mesopotamia be received. Historic must be his marriage with Laban's daughter, the birth of his sons in Mesopotamia, the birth of Benjamin and death of Rachel in Canaan — circumstances so easily imprinted deep on the memory, and, like many other individual traits of the patriarchs, holding out no inducement to invent. As historical must we hold the persons of Esau, Isaac, Ishmael, Hagar, Sarah, Abraham, and the journeyings of the latter to Canaan from Mesopotamia." He also adds that when we glance over the circle of their recorded outer experiences in this long period, these national recollections accord with the natural events in the history of a Nomad race, "as a definite remembrance of an actual life-period of a Nomad race would mould the subject in the mouths of the people."

nent institutions to the Jewish people, should have used the familiar and obvious practice of recording them, or in defiance of the commonest usage, should have left everything floating loose, through his long life and at the time of his death? It is a question for rationalism to meet and answer.

Abiding institutions, especially when so complicated as the Jewish, call for written documents. Permanent laws require to be recorded. To suppose that a man wise enough to found such institutions was also foolish enough to dispense with the simplest method of embodying them, is a large draft on human credulity. Had he been but an ambitious secular leader, the reason for a permanent record would have been sufficiently strong. But as a true religious guide, laying the foundations of the nation's spiritual welfare for all time, the motive was imperative. Kurtz well says: "From the nature and design of legislation, it would be so imperatively necessary that the law should be immediately committed to writing, that any postponement of it would only be comprehensible, or even conceivable, on the supposition that the means and necessary conditions were wanting; such, for example, as the requisite acquaintance with the art of writing, the possession of writing materials, or sufficient time and leisure. But no one will venture to maintain that any one of these conditions was wanting when the Israelites were in the desert."¹ But who so competent to secure the record of his own laws as the legislator himself? Who so well fitted to write the memorial of the great deliverance, as the only man who stood at the centre of the whole transaction from the beginning to the end, who shared the sufferings of Egypt, led every movement for deliverance, accompanied every event to the journey's end, and stood faithful in all? Who so well qualified by position, education, character? Who more likely to erect the monument?

And since those laws and that narrative presuppose at

¹ History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 502.

every point the earlier history of God's dealings, when was there a period or who the man in the whole history of the Jewish nation, at which and by whom it is more credible that the whole narrative from Genesis to Deuteronomy should be completed? The time had come; the man was there.

Nor is there anything in the general qualities of the composition incompatible with the Mosaic authorship. It is simply idle to allege, as De Wette has done, the high literary qualities of the Pentateuch as incompatible with the origination by one man; constituting, as he says, "the perfection of the epico-historical, the rhetorical, and the poetic style" in Hebrew literature. Omitting all other replies, it is enough to say that the allegation is untrue in point of fact. There is nothing of elaborate culture and high art about the Pentateuch. Its chief characteristics are directness and simplicity. If the narrative ever becomes pathetic or sublime, it is by means of these qualities alone. The marks of high literary culture are far more evident in the later productions of David, Solomon, Ezekiel, Isaiah, Nahum. The language of the Pentateuch is singularly free from all that is abstract; the phraseology and idioms of speech are of the most popular kind, the allusions often such as belong only to the most inartificial state of society, and the narratives not free from those anticipations¹ and repetitions² which high art excludes.

There is, then, nothing in the nature and circumstances of the case to break the force of the positive evidence of Mosaic authorship; but, on the contrary, much to make it easy of belief.

II. The position that Moses was the responsible author of the Pentateuch, is sustained by positive evidence, varied, abundant, uncontradicted. The nature and amount of this evidence is studiously disregarded and disparaged by oppo-

¹ Thus Gen. xi. 32; xxv. 7-10; xxxv. 28, 29; Ex. xii. 41, 51, etc.

² E.g. in the narrative of the deluge; Ex. vi. 28-30, and elsewhere. This trait is less noticeable.

nents. Some of them argue precisely as though no such testimony were in existence.

1. The Pentateuch expressly declares of Moses, and of Moses only, that he was engaged in its composition. In this respect it affords us a peculiar vantage-ground. Few ancient books expressly declare their authorship. Even when the fact is indisputable, we usually learn it by common fame. This is the case with the principal writings of Virgil, Caesar, Tacitus, Plato, Aristotle. Now whatever declarations of authorship are found in the Pentateuch, are of great weight, not only on the ground that any such witness is to be believed till proved worthless, and that the record itself is professedly historic, but especially in view of the fact that the declarations were made and continued in the presence of the nation, under circumstances which would seem to render imposition out of the question.

(1) That Moses composed certain considerable portions of the Pentateuch is the *admitted* testimony of the volume itself.

The book of Deuteronomy as a whole (as far as ch. xxxi. 24) is certainly declared to have been written by Moses, and "this book of the law" solemnly committed by him to the charge of the Levites (Deut. xxxi. 9, 10, 24 – 26).¹ The song of Moses, contained in ch. xxxii, is also declared to have been written by him (xxxi. 19, 22). That these statements include so much at least is admitted, we believe, on all hands. Rosenmüller, Hengstenberg, Keil, Hävernicks, and others hold that they comprise more; while Delitzsch, Kurtz, and even Davidson, De Wette, and Knobel, admit that they include Deuteronomy as a whole.² Thus De Wette writes: "the author of Deuteronomy, as it appears,

¹ Compare Deut. iv. 44; v. 1, 24; viii. 1; xi. 18, 23; xii. 28; xv. 5; xvi. 8; xxix. 1; xxxi. 1.

² Delitzsch, Genesis, p. 24. Kurtz, History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 511. Davidson, in Horne's Introduction, 10th ed., Vol. II. p. 616, A.D. 1856. (Dr. Davidson's last work was received too late for use). De Wette, Introduction, Parker's, Trans., Vol. II. p. 189. Knobel, Deuteronomy, pp. 319, 322. Knobel apparently excludes the beginning of Deuteronomy, to chap. iv. 44.

would have us regard his whole book as the work of Moses;" though he dismisses the subject with the dictatorial remark: "but the obscurity and unfitness of these claims deprive them of all value as proofs." It cannot be denied that testimony is given, even though it be ruled out.

Portions of Exodus and Numbers also, it is not denied, expressly claim to have been committed to writing by Moses. It is asserted (Ex. xxiv. 7) that "Moses wrote all the words of the Lord" which he had just heard on Sinai and communicated to the people. The communications thus alleged to have been written, include, by admission of the same writers,¹ the four chapters extending from the twentieth through the twenty-third. The declaration is made (Ex. xxxiv. 27, 28) that, by God's command, Moses wrote down the legal section contained in the same chapter. It is also stated (Ex. xvii. 14) that, after the extermination of Amalek, Moses was directed by Jehovah to "write this for a memorial in the book"; not *a* book, as it reads in the English version. We are also told in Num. xxxiii. 1-3, that "these are the journeys of the children of Israel," and "Moses wrote their goings out according to their journeys by the commandment of the Lord"; a statement which includes the list of stations occupying most of the chapter.

The Pentateuch then, even when its testimony is cut down to the minimum, certainly ascribes to the pen of Moses portions of three of its books, comprising a fifth part of the whole. So much is settled.

(2) The testimony of the volume to the agency of Moses in its production, cannot be fairly restricted to those portions thus indicated.

a. It is a weighty fact that the books of the Pentateuch nowhere contain the slightest allusion to any other authorship than that of Moses. He is repeatedly mentioned as a writer engaged in the composition, and there is absolute silence concerning any other writer.

¹ De Wette simply calls it "an older writing that has been inserted." The others speak distinctly.

b. It is entirely unwarrantable to infer that the definite ascription of certain portions of the narrative to him, is or implies a denial in regard to the remainder. When the evangelist John relates, in regard to two special incidents (John xix. 35; xxi. 20-24), that being a personal witness of them, he also made the record, no man presumes, for that reason, to deny or question either his personal knowledge of other events recorded, or his authorship of that whole gospel. For special reasons he mentioned his personal relation to those transactions, without disparagement of the remainder.

In like manner the mention of Moses's writing, in the passages where it occurs, seems to be elicited by special reasons. The first instance (Ex. xvii. 14) occurred in the second month after leaving Egypt, on the first great deliverance in battle; and is mentioned as done, upon God's command, "for a memorial." The second and third instances, in the order of time (Ex. xxiv. 4; xxxiv. 27), took place immediately after, and in connection with the giving of the law on Sinai. A manifest reason for these special statements at that time, was to show that from the beginning of God's revelations to his covenant people, it was his choice to make both his wonderful doings and his sacred law matters of permanent record. The remaining statements (Num. xxxiii. 2; Deut. xxxi. 9, 10, 19-22, 24-26) are made concerning what was done at the end of the wanderings and of Moses's life. It was in the fortieth year that by God's command he wrote the journeyings of the Israelites; and it was in the eleventh month of that year, just before his death, that he "made an end of writing" the law, and solemnly delivered the book to the Levites, and wrote a "song the same day, and taught it the children of Israel." Thus the first and the last events, as well as the earliest and the latest promulgations of the law — so reads the record — were written down by Moses, and it was done by command of God. The legitimate inferences, were we left to inferences, would be, not that nothing else, but that all

between was, in like manner, recorded for a memorial. The statement is, that the record was begun and that it was completed by Moses.

c. The reasons for making a record in these instances was equally operative throughout. The conflict with the Amalekites was no more remarkable than that with the Moabites; and neither of these more striking than many other divine interpositions on the way. The reasons for writing the first four chapters of laws were just as imperative for recording the subsequent thirty or more chapters, civil, ritual, and religious; indeed, the ordinances for the tabernacle, the priesthood, and the sacrificial service, which, as Knobel admits, came from Moses, are contained in those subsequent chapters. That such a man, having actually begun to write his laws, should have suspended the process, and left the more minute and complicated unwritten, would seem to require a special declaration to make it credible. And again, what was the conceivable value of a mere register of halting-places, in comparison with the events which took place at those stations? Would this author (whoever he may have been) gravely inform us that of all the incidents attending the journey from Egypt to Palestine, the great leader wrote down only a barren list of encampments, and an account, in six sentences, of one battle? Does a construction that brings us to this result carry an air of probability?

d. Accordingly we find very distinct indications that the passages under consideration were but parts of a larger whole, composed by Moses.

(i.) This is true of the very first mention of writing found in the Pentateuch, Ex. xvii. 14: "And the Lord said unto Moses, Write this for a memorial in *the book* (בַּסֵּפֶר, not *a book*). Here is a manifest reference to a well-known book, in which the event was to be recorded.

To escape the force of this troublesome passage, two principal methods have been adopted: Dr. Davidson assumes that the book referred to was "a monograph on the wars of

the Amalekites," in which was to be written simply the prophecy of Amalek's utter overthrow, contained in the latter part of verse 14th.¹ The supposition of such a monograph is, of course, baseless; there is no hint of it here or elsewhere. It is the more inexcusable in a critic who is insisting on the most rigid restriction of biblical statements, thus to advance a groundless and needless hypothesis to escape the force of testimony. "The book" must be some well-known book, either in process of writing, or to be written.

Knobel, on the other hand, would practically disregard the article, and understand the direction as only equivalent to "commit to writing" (*schriftlich machen*). But neither he nor De Wette nor Gesenius ventures to *translate* otherwise than "the book." He disregards, in interpretation, the distinction between the definite and indefinite article.² But this course (1) repudiates a distinction which the Hebrew of the Pentateuch well knew how to make, and which it did make in this very phrase. It could say "write in a book" (אֶל-סֵפֶר Deut. xxxi. 24; עַל-סֵפֶר Deut. xvii. 18); or it could say "in the book" (בַּסֵּפֶר Deut. xxviii. 58; xxix. 26).³ In various other passages of the Old Testament the latter phrase occurs, clearly meaning "the book"; e. g. Jer. xxxvi. 8, 10, 13; Dan. xii. 1; Neh. viii. 8. An instructive case is found 2 Sam. xi. 14, 15, where the difference between the expressions is exhibited in two successive verses: in the first sentence we have the general statement, "David wrote a letter, or writing (סֵפֶר); in the second sentence, "and David wrote in *the* letter (בַּסֵּפֶר) saying." Hebrew prose maintains the force of the definite article as decidedly as Greek prose, and much in the same way.⁴ (2) This attempt fails to sustain itself by any exceptional cases in the

¹ Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 613. In his later work Dr. Davidson ventures to change the pointing of the Hebrew.

² So Vater and Bleck substantially, as we understand Hengstenberg, Genuineness of the Pentateuch, Vol. II. p. 123.

³ Here with הַזֶּה, and strengthened to "this."

⁴ Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar, § 107.

use of this phrase. Knobel cites five instances to justify his interpretation: Esther ix. 25; Jer. xxxii. 10; Job xix. 23; 1 Sam. x. 25; Num. x. 23. The expression *בְּסֵפֶר* or *הַסֵּפֶר* occurs in each of these passages, but in none of them can it be shown to have any other meaning than "the book," or the document. In the first instance it means, not "letters" in general (as in our version), but "*the* letters" or written official documents (Esther viii. 8, 9), which had previously been written in the king's name, sealed with the royal seal, and sent through all the provinces. In Jer. xxxii. 10 it is still *the* writing ("evidence," Eng. version), namely the necessary, or customary, or well-known writing, employed in such bargains; as we speak of buying land and taking "the deed." In Job xix. 23 it is also "the book," namely the book implied in the first member of the same verse, in the word "written"; the speaker wishes for a lasting record of his words—that they were now written, and not only written, but that they were "deeply cut (*יִתְקַיֵּם*) in the book" alluded to; and the wish succeeding is for a rock-record even. In 1 Sam. x. 25, the case is equally clear: Samuel wrote "in the book," that is, the sacred record, for it is added "and laid it up before the Lord." The remaining instance (Num. x. 23) equally fails to sustain the interpretation. There is no necessity in that case for forcing the language out of its legitimate meaning, "the book," i. e. the requisite or customary document, or possibly even the book kept for record in such cases, especially as the offering prescribed for the occasion is termed a "memorial offering" (vs. 15, 18). De Wette translates, as in duty bound, "the book."

These attempts to evade the legitimate meaning of Ex. xvii. 14, are more worthy of a partisan than a scholar. We may conclude, in the words of Kalisch, that "it is clear almost to a certainty, that here 'the book of Moses' is understood."¹

(ii.) Again, in Deut. xvii. 18, 19, it is commanded in

¹ Kalisch on Exodus, *in loco*.

reference to the future king, that "he shall write him a copy of this in a book out of that which is before the priests, the Levites; and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this law and these statutes to do them." Here a copy of the law is spoken of as being "before the priests." And further, in Deut. xxxi. 9–11, mention is made of the completion "of this law"; it is stated, "Moses wrote this law and delivered it unto the priests," commanding that it be publicly read, every seven years, at the feast of tabernacles; and (vs. 24) "when he had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book till they were ended, that Moses commanded the Levites which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord saying, Take this book of the law and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord, that it may be for a witness against thee." In various intermediate passages, also, mention is made of a written book of the law, as something already existing. Moses declares to the people (Deut. xxviii.) that if they did not observe "to do all the words of this law that are written in this book (vs. 58), God would bring upon them, besides other specified diseases, "every sickness and every plague which is not written in the book of this law" (vs. 61). He announces (xxix. 20) that the defiant sinner shall experience "all the curses that are written in this book." Similar expressions occur in verses 21st and 27th of the same chapter, and in chapter xxx. 10.

Of these passages in Deuteronomy, the following are some of the obvious considerations which indicate that the reference is not to Deuteronomy alone, but to a larger composition of which it formed a part: (1) These expressions were all *oral* communications; yet they all speak of what is "written in this book." There was then a book written, or partly written, when these utterances were made; and these declarations—the repetitions of the law in Deuteronomy—were but part of a larger whole. To reply, as

does Davidson,¹ that these expressions were not in the oral utterance, but were added when the declarations were afterwards put in writing, is simply to cut the knot by an arbitrary assertion. (2) The supposition that these utterances involve the recognition of a larger whole, already committed in part to writing, is confirmed by manifest references in Deuteronomy to the preceding laws of the Pentateuch. Thus the direction in Deut. xviii. 2 clearly and directly refers to Num. xviii. 20; and Deut. xxiv. 8, 9 as clearly to Lev. xiii. 14. The passing allusion to the various offerings, ch. xii. 6, 11, presupposes the fuller directions of the earlier books to make it intelligible. The laws of the feasts in ch. xvi. are not given completely; the festivals are but briefly mentioned in order to specify the place where they are to be observed, viz. "in the place which the Lord shall choose, to put his name there." A reference to the promises of Gen. xv. 5 and of Ex. iii. 8, 17 occurs in ch. vi. 3; and to Num. xxxiii. 52, 53, in ch. vi. 19. It will be shown, in another connection, how indeed the book of Deuteronomy is filled with brief references to transactions fully described in previous books. Now to reply to this and similar considerations, with Dr. Davidson,² "that they must be dismissed with the single remark of their *weakness*," is more summary than satisfactory. (3) Thus to limit the statements in Deut. xxxi. concerning the completion and solemn commitment of this book of the law to the Levites, is to destroy all reference to any such deposit of the remainder of Moses's alleged writings, even those communications on Sinai written down by him at the commandment of God (Ex. xxiv. 3, 7). For there is no other record of their being so deposited. Whereas the statement has every aspect of a final completion and solemn deposit of the lawgiver's whole writings. (4) The common meaning of "the book of the law," in the Old Testament, is the Pentateuch. Davidson fully admits that this and similar expressions throughout Ezra and Nehemiah, "allude to the Pentateuch as it now

¹ Horne's Introduction, Vol. III. p. 616.

² Ibid. p. 615.

exists"; also that "from the time when the books of Chronicles were written, we have little hesitation in affirming that the *Pentateuch* is the most likely sense of the *book of the law*."¹ But we ask: where is there any indication of a change in the meaning of the phrase?" Kurtz, as we understand him, even concedes that the expression סֵפֶר הַחֹרֶה is always employed to denote the entire Pentateuch in the books succeeding Deuteronomy, e.g. in Josh. i. 8; viii. 31, 34; xxiv. 26; 2 Kings xiv. 6, etc.² Then why not so in Deuteronomy? Kurtz finds one fatal objection—the use of the word "this," in the passages of Deuteronomy, which, as he thinks, compels us to limit the statement to the thorale of Deuteronomy. Delitzsch advances the same argument. Kurtz even says that this is "the point on which the whole question depends." If so, his position is a failure; for how else could or would a writer naturally designate a work in the composition of which he was engaged, and known to be engaged, and in which his words now uttered were to be recorded, than "this book of the law"? Does not the designation more naturally and properly describe a book in process of writing and soon to be finished, than something not yet written at all.

It may be admitted that the phrase "this law" is in some instances limited by some restricting clause, as in the expression (Deut. i. 5; iv. 8, 44) "this law which I command you this day." The limitation, however, lies, not in the word "this," but in the attendant specification. "This law" denotes primarily the one code revealed from God.

(iii.) A still further and highly satisfactory class of evidence that the contents of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers claim to have been written by Moses, has been wholly overlooked by these writers. It is the implication abundantly contained in the books themselves. While not saying in so many words that they were throughout committed to writ-

¹ Horne's Introduction, Vol. III. p. 618.

² History of the Old Covenant, Vol. III. p. 512.

ing by him, they are pervaded from end to end by indications to that effect, incompatible with any other supposition.

On the one hand, God is represented as giving special instructions to Moses to deposit his future communications (written, of course) in the ark. The statement is found in Ex. xxv. 16, 21, 22. It occurs after the declaration that Moses wrote down the first portions of the divine legislation,—the passage extending from Ex. xx. 22 to xxiii. 33. God says, twice over: “thou shalt put into the ark the testimony that I shall give thee”; adding in the same connection (vs. 22): “I will commune with thee of *all things which I will give thee in commandment* unto the children of Israel.” Here there is an unrestricted direction to deposit all the remainder of the divine communications in the ark of the testimony. Those communications occupy much of the remaining portion of Exodus, all of Leviticus, and most of Numbers—some fifty chapters. There is here no question in regard to the translation. Our version corresponds to that of De Wette; and Knobel specifically defends it. It respects God’s further communications without limitation. Here, then, was the arrangement for sacredly preserving an exact record of all God’s utterances.

On the other hand, answering to this direction is the additional fact that the books claim throughout, and in a vast number of passages, to be an exact record of God’s utterances to Moses in the minutest detail. We have not only such general announcements as the closing verse of Leviticus (xxvii. 34): “These are the commandments which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel in Sinai”; and the closing verse of Numbers: “These are the commandments and the judgments which the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses unto the children of Israel in the plains of Moab, by Jordan near Jericho.” Similar assertions are scattered through the books. Thus the single statement, “The Lord spake unto Moses, saying,” or, “The Lord said unto Moses,” occurs in connection with various groups of commandments in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, more

than one hundred times; besides other forms, e. g., the declarations of Moses: "These are the words which the Lord hath commanded" (Ex. xxxv. 1), "This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded" (Num. xxx. 1), or, "and Moses told the children of Israel according to all that the Lord commanded Moses" (Num. xxix. 40). And again, in asserting the compliance with many of these commandments, we are informed some fifty times in these books, that it took place "as the Lord commanded Moses, or, "according to the commandment of the Lord by the hand of Moses."

Let it be remembered, now, not only how voluminous were these instructions,—some fifty chapters,—but how minute and complicated; the directions for the ark and tabernacle, for example, containing some thirty different measurements, besides abundant other details equally difficult of retention in the memory, and a similar minuteness of specification extending through much of the legislation. When, therefore, we lay these constant claims to be *an exact statement* of God's utterances to Moses by the side of the alleged command to deposit in the ark the testimony which God should give him, it is impossible to understand these assertions to be less than a reiterated and emphatic claim of all these passages to have been put on record by Moses. It is virtually the clearest testimony of all, inasmuch as it so pervades the record. It thus falls in with the declaration (Ex. xxiv. 4) that the first instalment of the law was written down by Moses, and with the closing statement (Deut. xxxi. 24–26), that "when Moses had made an end of writing the words of this law in a book, until they were finished, Moses commanded the Levites which bare the ark of the covenant of the Lord, saying, Take this book of the law and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God"; and just fills up the completeness of the claim.¹

¹ It will be observed that the testimony in reference to the book of Genesis is less explicit, except as gathered up in this concluding statement and the general testimony in regard to the "book of the law." It is covered, however, by

e. Furthermore, the particular portions of the Pentateuch which are admitted, by Davidson and others, to claim Mosaic authorship, include and fully endorse the main portions of the whole Pentateuch. Little, therefore, is gained in the attempt to restrict the authorship to particular portions of the volume. Moses *makes himself responsible* for the bulk of the previous narrative in detail, and particularly from the times of Abraham.

Let us now confine our attention to these restricted portions, viz. Deuteronomy, as far as ch. xxxi. 24, and the song of Moses, ch. xxxii; Exodus, ch. xx. 22 – xxiii. 33, and xvii. 8 – 16; Numbers xxxiii.¹ From these portions we can construct a somewhat circumstantial narrative corresponding to and vouching for the main history contained in the previous books of the Pentateuch. Some of the statements are many times reiterated, and they are, for the most part, reaffirmed in the manner of references to transactions well known and more fully described elsewhere. Still they are complete as far as they extend.

The following outline of the previous narrative is thus reaffirmed: the dispersion of the human race by the Creator, and the particular choice of Israel as the object of his favor (Deut. xxxii. 8, 9); the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah (xxix. 23); the assignment of Moab to Lot and his descendants (ii. 9); and of the region of Mount Seir to Esau and his descendants (ii. 5); Esau being the “brother” of the Israelites (xxiii. 7; ii. 4); the oath of God to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (ix. 5; xvi. 5; xxix. 13, etc.), promising them a vast increase, and possession of the land flowing with milk and honey (vi. 3, etc.); and promising also the subjugation

the remaining evidence which will be adduced, especially the direct testimony and the linguistic traits, which, as will be shown, segregate the Pentateuch and mark it as a distinct whole. The direct and essential connection of Genesis with the unity of the narrative, as previously exhibited, bears on this point.

¹ De Wette, Davidson, Delitzsch, and Kurtz all speak of the whole of Deuteronomy, except the appendix. Knobel apparently would begin at ch. iv. 44. We quote the whole book to the appendix. The omission of the first four chapters would leave all the essential facts remaining.

of the resident nations of Canaan (vii. 2), who were rejected and to be cast out for their wickedness (ix. 4); the descent of the fathers of the Hebrew nation, seventy persons, into Egypt (x. 22), where they became a "nation, great and mighty and populous" (xxvi. 6; x. 22); the evil treatment and hard bondage in Egypt (xxvi. 6, 7; vi. 21, etc.); the cry of the people unto God, and his hearkening to the cry (xxvi. 7); the deliverance by God "with a mighty hand and with a stretched-out arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs and wonders" (xxvi. 8); his chastisement inflicted both upon the land and its king (xi. 2, 3), and upon the king's household (vi. 22); "the evil diseases of Egypt" (vii. 15); the destruction of the first-born (Num. xxxiii. 4); the departure from Egypt in haste (Deut. xvi. 3) on the fifteenth day of the month Abib (xvi. 1), on the day after the passover (Num. xxxiii. 3); the passage of the Israelites through the sea (Num. xxxiii. 8); the pursuit by Pharaoh, with horses and chariots, and his destruction in the waters of the Red sea (Deut. xi. 4); the journey of forty years in the wilderness (xxix. 5, etc.); the halting places on the journey (Num. xxxiii); the palm-trees and fountains which they found at Elim (xxxiii. 9); the want of water at Rephidim (xxxiii. 14); the feeding with manna (Deut. viii. 3); the circumstances of the law-giving on Sinai, amidst fire and cloud, and attended with great fear on the part of the Israelites (v. 5, 22-27); the two tables of stone written by the finger of God (ix. 10); the forty days spent by Moses fasting on the mountain (ix. 9); his hasty descent (vs. 12); the golden calf (vs. 16); the broken tables of the law (vs. 17); God's anger with Aaron (vs. 20); the destruction of the image (vs. 21); the successful intercession of Moses for the people and for Aaron (vs. 19, 20); the renewal of the tables, construction of the ark, and deposit of the tables in the ark (x. 1-5); the selection of the tribe of Levi for sacred services (x. 8, 9); the leprosy of Miriam (xxiv. 8, 9); the appointment of officers to aid Moses (i. 9-17); the sending of twelve spies from Kadesh-Barnea (i. 21); their

report (vs. 24, 25); the rebellion of the people (ix. 23; i. 27) from fear of the Anakims (ix. 2; i. 28); and the sentence of God to exclude that generation, except Joshua and Caleb, from the promised land (i. 35, 36); the destruction of Dathan and Abiram with their households and effects, by the opening of the earth (xi. 6); the opposition of Moab, the hiring of Balaam, and the conversion of Balaam's attempted curse into a blessing (xxiii. 3-5); the battles with Sihon and Og, and the assignment of their territory to the tribes of Reuben, Ephraim, and the half-tribe of Manasseh (xxix. 7, 8); the death of Aaron on Mount Hor at the age of a hundred and twenty years, in the fortieth year of the journey (Num. xxxiii. 38, 39); the announcement to Moses that he should not go over the Jordan but should die on Pisgah (xxxi. 2; iii. 23-27); his expectation of a speedy death at the age of a hundred and twenty years (xxxi. 2), and his appointment of Joshua as his successor in authority (xxxi. 3).

These things constitute the main outline of the whole narrative of the Pentateuch, from the time of the dispersion of the nations, including many of the supernatural events. Moreover the leading features of the whole law contained in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, including the three great national festivals and the whole civil and ecclesiastical polity of the nation, are repeated and endorsed in Deuteronomy. It is done, too, largely by way of allusion to those fuller narratives, and therefore presupposes them.

Thus, then, after all possible paring down of the testimony of the volume, we can still stand on the platform yielded us by the objectors, and find Moses, according to the testimony of the volume, making himself responsible for the main contents of the Pentateuch. Even these portions of the volume thus fully accord with the other proofs that Moses was the author of the whole.

The variations of the history and modifications of the laws which are found in Deuteronomy, instead of being an objection to the unity of authorship, are an argument in favor of it; being made with such entire freedom of manner,

yet such close adhesion of fact and thorough unity of aim and plan, as the author alone would exhibit. In all these respects we see the working of the one authoritative mind.

The hortatory manner of Deuteronomy, which has sometimes been urged as a proof of a different origin, simply shows the natural, almost unavoidable influence of his present position,—addressing for the last time, within a few weeks of his decease, the people whom he had led for forty years. The mind which would find ground for cavil here, might as well deny the genuineness of Washington's Inaugural and Annual Messages, because his Farewell Address was so diverse from them.

We shall then continue to hold that the Pentateuch itself — be its testimony better or worse — most distinctly claims Moses as the author of the chief part of it, and, by strong implication, of the whole. And the man who denies the validity of this testimony we shall hold bound to show powerful reasons for treating the volume in a manner so entirely peculiar; and furthermore to show very clearly and very specifically how such claims could have been set up and continued for hundreds of years in the presence of the nation whose history they include, without one breath of opposition or questioning ever having been awakened.¹

¹ It is due to Delitzsch and Kurtz to say that they both ascribe to Moses the virtual responsibility for the whole Pentateuch. The former holds that he actually wrote Deuteronomy and the smaller sections referred to, and left the completion of the whole work to some of his contemporaries and assistants; that the Elohistie portion was written by some such man as Eleazer the son of Aaron, and the Jehovistic afterwards, by some such man as Joshua or one of the elders, and that the history was finished soon after entering the Holy Land. Kurtz adopts a similar view, viz. that the work was completed by the assistants of Moses; but he thinks that larger portions of the law must have been written at the time of reception, and sees no reason why the whole history, down to the departure from Sinai, may not have been written down at that time, and later events added as they occurred.

It is encouraging to see how very close these writers come to the common view, especially as they make the whole Pentateuch to be of Mosaic authority, though not throughout of Mosaic composition. It is a long stride for Germany in the right direction.

2. The later books of the Old Testament refer the Pentateuch to Moses.

This point may be briefly presented. Various attempts have been made to confute and divert this testimony, but the following proposition we think no one will venture to deny: the Pentateuch, either in whole or in part, is repeatedly referred to in the remaining books of the Old Testament; when so referred to, it is often ascribed to Moses, and is never, either in whole or in part, directly or by implication, ascribed to any other author.

The phrases "the book of the law," "the book of Moses," "the law of Moses," "the book of the law of Moses," "the law which Moses commanded," occur in various passages, and in the same general sense.¹ They refer to the Pentateuch, or something contained in it. In very many of these instances the reference contains a quotation from some portion of the Pentateuch, or alludes to some act prescribed in it, and thus identifies it with the book or law of Moses. Thus in Josh. viii. 31 we are informed that Moses did as it is written in the law of Moses; and the transaction so performed was one which was prescribed in Deut. xxvii. So 1 Kings ii. 3, in referring to what is written in the law of Moses, contains a quotation from Deut. xxix. 9.

Here we meet with an evasion. A considerable proportion of the references, though by no means all, are naturally made to the later solemn warnings and final admonitions of the great lawgiver. Dr. Davidson would deny that the phrases in question commonly mean the whole Pentateuch; affirming that most of them do not bear that sense; or, at least, "it is matter of doubtful disputation whether they do or not."² The expression, he suggests, may have received a gradual extension of meaning, as new

¹ Instances of these several phrases are found in Josh. i. 7, 8; viii. 31-35; xxiii. 6; xxiv. 26; 2 Kings xiv. 6; xxii. 8, 11; Neh. viii. 1, 3, 14; x. 34, 36; xiii. 1; 2 Chron. xvii. 9; xxv. 4; xxxiv. 14; xxxv. 12; Ez. iii. 2; vi. 18; 1 Kings ii. 3; 1 Chron. xvi. 40; 2 Chron. xxiii. 18; xxxi. 4; Dan. ix. 11, 13.

² Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 615.

writings were added. He does not undertake to show by historic evidence that this was so; but he advances it somewhat as if it were not incumbent on him to prove, but on us to disprove. Meanwhile he is obliged to admit that in some instances the phrase does signify the Pentateuch; but he would apparently maintain that for the most part it designates no more than the one book of Deuteronomy.

All the strength of his objection lies in the fact that, from the nature of the case, a citation is not a whole volume, but is made from some definite part of the volume. And the argument is, apparently, that where a book is named and one part of it cited, the name of the book covers only the one section of the book cited, notwithstanding that the name is elsewhere used as the general name of the volume.

Now we say in reply to this captious criticism, that the phrases in question, from their frequent occurrence and formulaary aspect, bear every mark of being a settled appellation, as much so as in the New Testament. The man who claims that they were used with a fluctuating signification, is bound to bring evidence of it; he cannot be permitted to assume it unproved, in order to carry a point.

On the other hand, we maintain, (1) that there is no evidence that the phrases were used to designate a book or section of the Pentateuch to the exclusion of the remainder. The only passage which can be cited as offering any appearance of positive proof to that effect, is found in the eighth chapter of Joshua, where Joshua wrote upon the plastered stones "a copy (נִסְחָה) of the law of Moses." It is said to be entirely out of the question that the whole Pentateuch should have been so inscribed. We reply, first, it is almost equally improbable that the whole of Deuteronomy was so inscribed; indeed Kurtz, who strongly urges the objection, scarcely ventures to suppose it. He insists only on "the legal portions of that book."¹ Furthermore, it is apparent from the method employed — writing in plas-

¹ History of the Old Covenant, Vol. I. p. 57.

ter — that the object in view was not to make a permanent record of the whole contents of the law, so much as the performance of a symbolic transaction connected with the blessing and the cursing. The immediate purpose was answered, as Maurer, Hengstenberg, and Keil have maintained, when the act itself was performed; it related to posterity only so far as the record of the transaction would be handed down in the book of Joshua. The external inscription was a symbol of the internal.¹ For the evident purpose in view, all that was required to be written was the law representatively, rather than in detail. Accordingly in view of the whole aspect of the transaction, commentators almost with one consent have understood it to designate rather the essential features of the law, in some form, than either its whole contents or any principal section of it entire — the law representatively. Michaelis supposes everything in the books of Moses that has the character of law; Knobel, “the Mosaic law generally, but only the commandments proper”; Keil, the bare commandments of Deuteronomy; Maurer, Rosenmüller, and many others, the blessings and curses of Deut. xxvii. In our judgment quite as probable as any other is the supposition of Gerlach, Kennicott, Grotius, and Henry, that the copy of the law, or if any one insist upon it, “the words of this law” which were to be so written, were “the ten words,” the Decalogue (הַדְּבָרִים עֲשֶׂרֶת, Deut. iv. 13; x. 4; Ex. xxxiv. 28), as the essence or abridgment of the whole law.² By general consent, then, the phrase in Joshua does not designate a

¹ Hengstenberg's *Genuineness of the Pentateuch*, Vol. I. p. 431, Eng. trans. Keil on Josh. viii. 33–35.

² Hengstenberg and Vater almost alone speak of the section of Deuteronomy extending from iv. 44 to xxvi. 19. Some of the Rabbins supposed that the whole law was thus written: some even that it was written in seventy languages, to be read by all the nations of the earth. See Kiel on Joshua viii. 32, from whom several of the statements of the text are derived.

It will be observed that the sacred writer speaks only of a copy of the law as written on the stones: when he afterwards says that “he read all the words of the law, the blessings and the curses,” and “there was not a word of all that Moses commanded which Joshua read not,” he adds, “according to all that is

section of the Pentateuch, such as one entire book of it. It denotes not a *fragment*, but the *substance* of it — the law in miniature. It cannot, therefore, be quoted as conflicting with the view here advocated. It refers to the law in its entirety of substance, much as in the remark of the Saviour: "This is the law and the prophets" (Matt. vii. 12).

On the other hand, (2) there is positive evidence that the phrases in question were employed to include other books of the Pentateuch equally with Deuteronomy. Perfectly decisive is Neh. viii. 1, 3, 8, 14; the ceremonials of the feast of tabernacles therein mentioned (vs. 16) as written in "the book of the law of Moses," are found only in Lev. xxiii. 40. The command to "dwell in booths," which is also referred to as written in the law, is contained only in the same chapter of Leviticus (vs. 42). Other references in the same narrative connect either with Leviticus, Numbers, or Deuteronomy; some of them perhaps more naturally with the latter, e.g. verses 10, 12, 17 with Deut. xvi. 14. Davidson is constrained to admit the reference to the Pentateuch as a whole.¹ In Neh. x. 29, 34, 36, "the law" of Moses refers unmistakably to Exodus, Numbers, and Leviticus, as well as Deuteronomy; the seventh year of verse 31st being prescribed in Ex. xxiii. and Lev. xxv.; the showbread of verse 33 only in Lev. xxiv. 5, 6 and Ex. xxv. 30; the "tithe of tithes," in verse 38, only in Num. xviii. 26. So, the law of "burnt offering, as it is written in the law of Moses the man of God" (Ez. iii.), is found in full Lev. i. and Num. xxvii; in Deuteronomy it is barely alluded to without description (xii. 5). In 1 Chron. xvi. 40 the reference to "what is in the law of the Lord" concerning the morning and evening sacrifice, is satisfied only by Ex. xxix. 38 and Num. xxviii. 3, 4. Again, in 2 Chron. xxx. 16 it is

written *in the book of the law*," not on the plastered stones. We see nothing unnatural in the supposition that — the essence of the law, its representative expression, being thus set up in the presence of the people — Joshua then took the written volume and read the details. The narrative accords with this supposition.

¹ Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 615.

recorded that the priests kept the passover "according to the law of Moses the man of God"; but we find (vs. 3) that the time was deferred from the first to the second month, according to a special provision of the law which is found only in Num. ix. 10, 11.

In this manner do the later books of the Old Testament ascribe the authorship of the Pentateuch without limitation to Moses, specially citing four of the five books in their statements, and nowhere even hinting at any other authorship of any portion of the volume. To all appearance the phrase bears precisely the same meaning in the books of the Old Testament as in the New; and this "book of the law" is everywhere ascribed to Moses.

3. It was the undisputed testimony of the Jewish nation, at and before the time of Christ, that the Pentateuch as a whole was written by Moses.

On this point we have testimony both from Jerusalem and from Alexandria. Philo, who represents the Alexandrian Jews, in his life of Moses, after bestowing abundant praises on him as a lawgiver, and distinctly ascribing the Jewish laws to him, proceeds thus: "But there is another high praise contained in these most holy books, and to them we must now turn to exhibit the virtue of him who composed them. Of these books, then, the first part is the historical part; and the second is occupied with commands and prohibitions. Of the historical part, one portion relates to the creation of the world, another is genealogical; and the genealogical portion is subdivided into accounts of the punishment of the wicked and of the reward of the righteous. We must explain why he began his law-giving from this starting-point and placed the commands and prohibitions second in order. For he was not like an ordinary compiler of history, intent on leaving records of ancient deeds for the idle amusement of posterity, but he traced back the most ancient events to their origin, beginning with the creation of the universe in order to make known two most necessary principles: first, that the same father and

creator of the world was also the lawgiver of the truth,"¹ etc. Again, in his treatise on Rewards and Punishments, he says: "It appears, then, that in the oracles delivered by the prophet Moses, there are three species: one concerning the creation of the world; the second, historical; the third, legislative. Now the creation of the world is related throughout with exceeding beauty and a manner worthy of God, beginning with the creation of heaven and ending with the formation of man. The historical part is a record of the lives of wicked and of good men, and of the penalties and prerogatives determined for each class in each generation. Of the legislative portion, one part contains the comprehensive basis; the other, prescriptions of particular usages. The general heads are ten."²

This testimony of Philo broadly covers the whole Pentateuch. Equally clear is the testimony of Josephus. We have not only the well-known assertion that "of these [twenty-two books], five are the books of Moses, which contain the laws and the traditions of the origin of mankind till his death. This interval of time was little short of three thousand years."³ He speaks of the various portions in detail, ascribing all indiscriminately to Moses. The several portions of the law are what "Moses forbade," "Moses prescribed," "precepts which Moses gave," "a constitution of laws which Moses learned of God and delivered in writing to the Hebrews";⁴ and the legislation as a whole, existing in the time of Josephus, was "the writings left by Moses."⁵ He also uses the phrase "books of the law" apparently as synonymous with "the writings of our legislator";⁶ describes how Moses prepared the way for his legislation among his countrymen "by raising their minds upward to regard God and the creation of the world";⁷

¹ Philonis Opera (Mangey's ed.), Vol. II. p. 141.

² Ibid. Vol. II. p. 409.

³ Joseph. contra Apionem, I. 8, Bekker's ed.

⁴ Ibid. Antiq. III. ii. 5; III. xii., etc.

⁵ Ibid. III. xv. 3.

⁶ Ibid. Preface, § 3.

⁷ Ibid. § 4.

and repeatedly pronounces the account of creation and the garden of Eden, in its several portions, to be the work of Moses.¹

These explicit testimonies of representative men are fully sustained by the references of the New Testament, which, whatever further force may be conceded or denied, are valid proof of the current view when they ascribe a passage from the narrative of Exodus (Luke xx. 37), from Leviticus (Rom. x. 5), or from Deuteronomy (Matt. xix. 7), alike to Moses; when they declare both that Moses gave the law (John vii. 19), and that he wrote it (John i. 45); when they speak of tracing downward all the scripture declarations concerning Christ, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets" (Luke xxiv. 27); and when they recognize the well-known three-fold Jewish division of the scriptures into "the law of Moses, the prophets, and the psalms (*hagiographa*, Luke xxiv. 44).² The fact that such was the undivided testimony of the Jews at and before the time of Christ, is conceded. Thus Dr. Davidson remarks: "The Jews have uniformly ascribed the Pentateuch to Moses, and from them the tradition passed over to Christians and became universal consent till the time of historical criticism."³

Now this undivided testimony in such a case is of the weightiest description. It is the unanimous, unhesitating testimony of a nation concerning the relation of the man

¹ Joseph. *Antiq.* I. 1, 2, 3.

² This division can be traced upward through the Talmud in the 5th or 6th century, where it is called "the law, the prophets, and the *Kethuvim*," (See Stuart on the Canon p. 251); through Jerome (*Prologus Galeatus*), who speaks of the five books of Moses, the prophets and the *hagiographa*; Josephus (*contra Apion.* i. 8), who divides into "the five books of Moses, the prophets and the remaining books, containing hymns to God, and precepts concerning the conduct of human life;" Philo. who speaks of "the laws and oracles uttered by the prophets, and the hymns and other writings"; to the translator and grandson of the son of Sirach, who, in his brief Preface of five sentences (written not later than B. C. 130), three times mentions this division, which he gives as "the Law, the Prophets, and the other books of the forefathers," — or "the rest of the books," — or, "the others that follow in accordance with them" (*κατ' αὐτοὺς*).

³ Horne's *Introduction* (10th ed.), Vol. II. p. 673.

who certainly founded their institutions to the documents in which those institutions were certainly embodied. It must not be undervalued by calling it a tradition. It is the kind of evidence on which the genuineness of other ancient documents rests—the same in kind, though here uncommonly strong in degree. In speaking of the principles of municipal law in their relations to a similar case, viz. the writings of the New Testament, Professor Greenleaf of the Cambridge Law School declares: “the genuineness of these writings really admits of as little doubt, and is susceptible of as ready proof as that of any ancient writings whatever. . . . The first inquiry, when an ancient document is offered in evidence in our courts, is, whether it comes from the proper repository; that is, whether it is found in the place where, and under the care of the person with whom, such writings might naturally and reasonably be expected to be found; for *it is this custody* which gives authenticity to documents found within it.” He concludes that, for the Christian scriptures the natural custodians were the Christian churches, and that the writings “challenge our reception of them as genuine writings, precisely as the Domesday Book, the ancient statutes of Wales, or any other of the ancient documents which have recently been published under the British Record Commission are received. He also says: “If it is objected that the originals are lost, and that copies alone are now produced, the principles of the municipal law here also afford a satisfactory answer. The multiplication of copies was a public fact, in which the faithfulness of all the Christian community had an interest. . . . The persons who multiplied these copies may be regarded, in some manner, as the agents of the Christian public, for whose use and benefit the copies were made; and on the ground of the credit due to such agents, and of the public nature of the facts themselves, the copies thus made are entitled to an extraordinary degree of confidence; and as in the case of official registers and other public books, it is not necessary that they should be confirmed and sanctioned by the ordinary tests of truth.

If any ancient document concerning our public rights were lost, copies which had been as universally received and acted upon as the four Gospels have been, would have been received in evidence in any of our courts of justice without the slightest testation."

These principles apply quite as strongly to the Pentateuch. The Jewish nation were the proper custodians of their own fundamental laws, civil and religious. They produce at the time of Christ copies of a volume containing those laws, that had been handed down with most sacred reverence; that was copied with a superstitious care, was read every Sabbath day in all their synagogues, and was appealed to as the final authority in all cases that could be connected with it; and side by side with this venerated volume comes down the firm declaration, uttered with one voice, that it was written by their equally venerated lawgiver himself—and upon this very belief rests their veneration for the book. Now what amount of infinitesimal "criticism" shall overturn such testimony as this?—especially if all the questions raised by that criticism are solvable without such a resort.

Most productions of the Greek and Latin writers are received unquestioned, chiefly on evidence of this kind, vastly weaker in degree. In many cases the work itself puts forth no statement of authorship. Nor is it endorsed by the concurrent consent of multitudes of men whose lives are moulded by its statements. It was originally known to a limited circle as matter of literary curiosity alone; it has been quoted occasionally in the lapse of centuries, and has passed through other centuries without an allusion. And yet, though coming down with this vague endorsement, in the entire absence of opposing testimony and of insuperable internal difficulties, it is rightly and unhesitatingly received as genuine.

Nearly the same length of time has now elapsed from the date of the Koran as it was from Moses to the Christian era. Now the Koran nowhere (so far as we can find) claims

¹ Greenleaf's *Testimony of the Evangelists*, pp. 27, 28.

in so many words to have been written by Mohammed. His name, even (if we mistake not), is not to be found in it.¹ The enemies of the false prophet from the beginning raised questions about his sole authorship.² The exact relation of Abu Bekr to the manuscript after the decease of Mohammed, is a matter of question.³ And yet that the false prophet was really the responsible author of the Koran as a whole, is not a matter of the slightest doubt, whatever assistance he may have received, and notwithstanding any editorial revisions which Abu Bekr may have seen fit to make. If we were to omit all the other evidence in regard to the Pentateuch, and consider only this portion in which it runs parallel with the Koran, even here it has greatly the advantage, inasmuch as it came down without a shade of doubt or dispute.

4. Christ and the writers of the New Testament endorse the ascription of the Pentateuch to Moses. The testimony of inspired men is really the judgment of the only genuine experts in such a case. The Pentateuch as a whole, and its books and its contents, are by them constantly referred to him. The law as such is the law of Moses (John vii. 23; Acts xv. 5; Heb. x. 28), or it is simply Moses (Acts xxi. 21). Moses is declared to have given the law (John i. 17; vii. 19). The position of lawgiver is Moses's seat (Matt. xxiii. 2). The statements of individual books of the Pentateuch are mentioned as the statements made by Moses: thus Exodus, Luke xx. 37; Leviticus, Rom. x. 5; Deuteronomy, Acts iii. 22; Matt. xix. 8. The total utterances concerning the priesthood, contained in four books of the Pentateuch, are what "Moses spake concerning the priesthood" (Heb. vii. 14). That Moses "wrote," and left "writings" which were extant in the time of Christ, is the Saviour's positive declaration (John v. 46, 47). That these writings constituted the beginning of the Old Testament is fully implied in Luke xxiv. 27, where,

¹ It is in repeated instances supplied in Sale's Translation.

² Vide Koran, Chaps. xvi. and xxv.

³ Sale's Koran, Preliminary Discourse, p. 47.

when Christ expounded "in all the scriptures the things concerning himself," it was by "beginning at Moses and all the prophets"; i.e. (as De Wette, Winer, and Meyer explain) he began with Moses and proceeded to the prophets. The prophetic declarations of the Pentateuch generally are "what Moses did say should come" (Acts xxvi. 22). Paul reasoned concerning the kingdom of God "both out of the law of Moses and out of the prophets" (Acts xxviii. 23). The Sabbath reading of the Pentateuch in the synagogues was the reading of "Moses" (Acts xv. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 15). The Saviour twice in one conversation makes use of the same expression, when he declares the possession of Moses and the prophets to be sufficient light for the rich man's five brethren (Luke xvi. 29, 31).

It cannot well be denied that the New Testament writers spoke in full accordance with the universal view of the nation. To this fact De Wette deigns only the characteristic answer, "that such a prejudice should have no weight at all in criticism."¹ Three more distinct replies have been made:

(1) It is said in substance that the Saviour and his apostles, though making the assertion, may have been mistaken—erred through ignorance. Such seems to be the substance of Colenso's final position.² To this we have here no answer to make. It is simply the infidel position of Theodore Parker, "I do not accept it on his authority."³ We have for the present no common ground of argument with one holding such a position. With us Jesus Christ is a final authority, whenever he pronounces a distinct decision. We shall not pause here to vindicate his character.

(2) It is admitted by Davidson that the testimony would be decisive if it covered the case; but it reaches only the law proper, the centre and substance of the Pentateuch.⁴

¹ Introduction, Parker's trans., Vol. II. p. 160.

² Colenso on the Pentateuch, Part I. p. 32.

³ Parker's "Two Sermons," p. 14.

⁴ Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 617.

We have shown, however, that these references are explicitly made to all four books of the Pentateuch, including the *narrative* of Exodus (Luke xx. 37) and the *prophecies* of Deuteronomy (Acts iii. 22); to which may be added that some of the most important prophecies concerning himself which he must have expounded when he began "at Moses," must have been those of Genesis. Indeed we do not understand any writer to deny that the expression employed, "the law of Moses," was used in the same sense in which the Jews employed it, viz. to designate the Pentateuch as a whole.

(3) It is said that the New Testament writers simply accommodated themselves to the Jewish modes of speech, and by so doing expressed no opinion in the case; for "Christ and the apostles did not come into the world to teach the Jews lessons in criticism." This is the position of Kurtz and others, and is the most plausible reply. But we ask: does this really satisfy the conditions of the case? Does not their mode of freely and constantly ascribing these writings to Moses convey the strong impression that they shared that opinion? It will be remembered, too, that Christ does not confine himself to negative allusions. He advances the positive declaration: "Had ye believed Moses ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings how shall ye believe my words?" John v. 46, 47. It certainly is hard to escape the direct statement, "he wrote of me"; and equally hard to escape the obvious fact that the "writings" here referred to are what they must inevitably have been understood to mean — the Pentateuch. If we begin to accommodate such an utterance as that, where do we stop? Is the declared *subject* of these writings, as well as the authorship, an adaptation to Jewish notions? Are we also to give up such utterances as when Christ declares of the 110th Psalm, that "David himself saith by the Holy Ghost"; and when Paul says of Isaiah vi. 9, "Well spake the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Esaias" (Acts xxviii. 25); and when Peter says in

general (2 Pet. i. 21), that "*holy men* of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"? The practice of yielding the declarations of the New Testament as accommodations to Jewish notions has proved to be a sufficiently bottomless pit; and Hupfeld still finds what he calls the obsolete dogma of inspiration to be a necessary sacrifice to the freedom of the higher criticism.¹ Nothing will justify the surrender of so direct a statement as that of John v. 46, 47, but necessities which the higher criticism has not yet proved. We must for the present hold, with Alford, that here is an important testimony by the Lord to the subject of the Pentateuch, and to the fact of Moses having written those books which were then, and still are, known by his name.²

5. A consideration of most important bearing in this connection, is the fact that the positive testimony lies wholly on one side. There is no other claimant to the authorship of the Pentateuch, or of any principal portion of it. Here is a perfect unanimity of testimony found in the Jewish nation, the natural and legitimate custodians of the record, in all ages of their history, — so complete that even heathen nations caught the echo, and writers like Manetho, Hecataeus, Strabo, Tacitus, learned to refer the Jewish legislation and institutions to Moses alone.³ Meanwhile, not a hint can be found in any historic quarter that any person later than Moses composed either the volume or any integral part of it. A stronger case of testimony lying exclusively on one side cannot well be imagined. It surely would have been a marvellous skill that could achieve a forgery so complicated, so entwined with the entire life and customs of the nation, and gathered round its most public personage, and yet could do it so adroitly that every particle of evidence concerning the real authorship should be

¹ Die Quellen der Genesis, p. 12.

² Alford's Greek Testament, *in loco*.

³ See Manetho in Josephus Cont. Apionem, I. 26; Hecataeus in Diodorus Siculus, XI.; Tacitus, Hist. V. 3, 4; Strabo, XVI. 2.

concealed from the world, and every suspicion precluded for three thousand years.

III. The positive testimony is corroborated by various collateral indications and circumstantial evidence :

1. The manner of the volume, especially of the last four books, accords with the testimony. These books consist almost wholly of transactions and utterances in which Moses was primarily concerned, and frequently of which he alone was personally cognizant. These things are everywhere delivered with the minuteness of a personal witness and participator. Exact utterances to Moses and by Moses constitute the chief portion of the writings, as a glance at any part of them will show. Now one of these suppositions must be admitted : either this minute exactness is unfounded, or the facts were supernaturally revealed, or Moses personally describes what he alone so fully knew. The first supposition needlessly charges the books with more or less imposture. The second is a gratuitous introduction of supernatural aid in a case fully accounted for otherwise. The third is the natural and legitimate conclusion.

2. The existence of the Pentateuch can be traced almost up to the time of Moses, in the allusions and references of the subsequent books of the Old Testament. It was in existence earlier than the earliest of them. The details are too numerous to be mentioned in an Article like the present ; nor can it be necessary to cite them.¹ They consist of quotations and allusions, and of transactions which show the existence and observance of the Mosaic law. They are found abundantly in the books of Joshua (which claims to have been written in the life-time of Rahab, Josh. vi. 25), and extend through Judges, Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Chronicles, the Psalms, Obadiah, Amos, Jeremiah, Hosea, Eze-

¹ Hengstenberg discusses a part of them at length in his *Genuineness of the Pentateuch*, in more than a hundred pages (Clark's Eng. ed.). Hävernich gives them more briefly in his *Introduction* (Clarke's ed.), and Keil still more completely in his *Einleitung*, § 34. McDonald gives a good selection in his *Introduction*, Vol. I. pp 233, 266.

kiel, Nahum, Joel, Micah, Habakkuk, Zephaniah. Tuch finds, in the prophets of Hosea's time, about eight hundred traces of the previous existence of the Pentateuch in its present form.¹

To this important fact Dr. Davidson makes several rejoinders. First he says that the number of allusions have been unnecessarily augmented. No matter. The force of the argument does not depend on the number, but on the *reality*, of the references; and this he does not presume to deny. Secondly he says that we must use due discrimination in separating these references; distinguishing traditional knowledge from allusions to written documents, and references to constituent parts of the volume from references to the book in its present form. We answer that many of these quotations prove, by the exactness of phraseology, that they are made from written documents; and that to "consider the Pentateuch in its present condition, apart from what it was before the editor finally adjusted and combined the parts," is simply to beg the question and to *assume* against the testimony what therefore he is first bound to prove—that it ever existed, since Joshua, in a fragmentary condition. Thirdly, we should remember the comparative ignorance of the people, who, "if they had generally known written records, could not have derived more benefit from them than from oral tradition and teaching;"—a consideration, the force of which as evidence concerning the fact in question Dr. Davidson may perceive, but we do not. Fourthly, "attention should be given to the possible explanation of references to the Pentateuch in the books of Joshua, Judges, etc., viz. that the writer or compiler [of the latter], living long after the events described by him occurred has associated them with phenomena taken from records belonging to the interval between!" This, if we understand it, is simply an attempt to bring down the age of the Pentateuch by reducing the antiquity of the other historical books—sustaining one assumption by another of the same kind. Fifthly, though

¹ Kommentar, p. 90.

the allusions in the book of Joshua would "go far to prove" the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch on Keil's view of the time when the former was written, viz. by some of the elders who survived Joshua, they are "irrelevant on the assumption of its correct date." Here again we are met by another of these literary juggles. Instead of frankly admitting that ch. v. 1, 6 implies the personal participation of the writer of the book, and that ch. vi. 25 shows it to have been written during the life-time of Rahab, he finds in the book another of those literary conglomerates compounded by a late editor out of Jehovistic and Elohist records, of which the Jehovist in turn had before him "written documents proceeding from eye-witnesses of the transactions"; and thus out of these documents at the third remove, together "with others," the compiler put together his mosaic. Davidson well remarks: "his interpolations and general method of procedure cannot now be detected"! If a man may resort to such methods of literary criticism, and thus piling assumption upon assumption, may call it argument, there is an end to all proof of authorship. There seems to us no good reason to place the date of Joshua later than does Keil; and its allusions are valid proof of the very early date of the Pentateuch.

3. The early origin of the Pentateuch is indicated by various archaisms which occur somewhat abundantly in its several books, and are wholly or in great measure wanting in the other books of the Bible. Gesenius, Ewald, De Wette, and Delitzsch agree in regard to this peculiarity of the volume,—the two latter distinctly admitting that in this respect it is separated even from the book of Joshua.¹ Thus the pronoun *היא* is used throughout the Pentateuch in the feminine gender, as well as in the masculine. It occurs here as a feminine one hundred and ninety-five times (thirty-six of which are in Deuteronomy), and scarcely anywhere else in the Old Testament.² The later feminine *היא* occurs but

¹ De Wette's Introduction, sect. 157; Delitzsch on Genesis, p. 26; Gesenius's Grammar (Rodiger's) sect. 2, rem. 4; Ewald's Grammatik, sect. 2.

² Mr. Theodore Parker in his translation of De Wette's Introduction, cites

word עִמִּית (*neighbor*) is found nine times in Leviticus and only in Zechariah once besides; נִקְבָּה (*female*), twenty-one times in the Pentateuch, and only again Jer. xxxi. 22, where there is a manifest reference to Numbers vi. 30. Still another mark of antiquity is the prevalence of the rough and harder consonants in certain classes of words which were afterwards softened by commutation: צָחַק (*to laugh*) is a specimen, being found thirteen times in the Pentateuch, and twice only out of it (Judges xvi. 25; Ez. xxiii. 32), though the softer form שָׂחַק is found some thirty-six times in the later books of the Bible. There are also several forms of phraseology (e. g. נִצָּסְתָּ אֶל־עַמּוֹ) which never are found out of the Pentateuch.

Such are some of the manifest archaisms that pervade the five books of Moses, indicating as well their unity of authorship as their distinction from, and priority to, other portions of the Old Testaments.¹

4. Another concurrent indication of the origin of these five books at the time alleged, is found in the Egyptian words and other traces of Egyptian residence which are found in them. We will not occupy our limited space with a citation of the numerous and minute references to Egyptian customs, many of which have been brought to light within half a century; but will refer to the pages of Hengstenberg and others who have gathered them up.

We would call attention to traces of Egyptian phraseology less commonly known. The three common words of

¹ A writer in the April number of the *Edinburg Review* on "The Bible and the Church" who has the rare faculty of adjusting the whole subject in nine pages (*Am. Reprint*), remarks on the authority of Dr. Donaldson — "no mean authority — that the Hebrew of the old Testament is, with trifling exceptions, one and uniform; and there is no trace of those archaisms by which the ancient writer is invariably distinguished from those who wrote the same language many centuries later." If this is a correct quotation, we would suggest that a proposition concerning Hebrew usage, on which Dr. Donaldson stands on one side and such names as Gesenius, De Wette, Ewald, Delitzsch, and the like on the other, at least invites a personal examination before making it the basis of an argument. And we would also suggest that on such a subject Fürst's Hebrew Concordance, is "no mean authority."

measurement in dry, liquid, and long measure respectively, employed in the Pentateuch, are unquestionably (according to Gesenius and Rödiger) of Egyptian origin : אֵיפָה, Egyptian *oipi*, ephah ; הֵיץ, Egyptian *hn*, *hno*, hin ; אַמָּה, Egyptian *mahi*, cubit.¹ The word תָּבָה (ark, chest) has long been known to have its Egyptian synonyms *tba* (chest) and *tbt* (boat or hull). It is noticeable that the Egyptian *markabuta* (chariot), and *ssm*, mare (objects made familiar to the Israelites first in Egypt) are represented by the Mosaic מֶרְכָבָה and סוּס (horse).² The רָאם (oriental buffalo) has its counterpart if not predecessor in the Egyptian *ramah* ; אֵיִל (deer), in the Egyptian *ar* (gazelle), one liquid giving way to another (Ethiopic חֵיל). The Hebrew זֵית (olive) has its kindred Egyptian word *tat* ; יָם (sea), *iuma* ; בַּיִת (house), *baita* ; מַיִם (water), *muau*. Bunsen, from whose glossary³ these examples are mostly derived, suggests other correspondences. Several of the cases given admit of no reasonable doubt, though exhibiting some of the ordinary phonetic changes ; and some of them have this peculiar weight in the argument, that while they are terms belonging to such an advanced stage of civilization as that of the Egyptians, they were clearly incorporated into Hebrew usage from the origin of the *national* existence.

The case is further strengthened by the subsequent disappearance of some of these words. Thus the word הֵיץ, found twenty-one times in the Pentateuch, never occurs again except twice in Ezekiel, who, as has been already remarked, copies the language of the Pentateuch. The Egyptian word אֶבְרָה, which was cried by the heralds before Joseph's chariot (Gen. xli. 43), is never used elsewhere. The Mosaic name of the larger grain measure הֶאָר, which also had Ethiopic and apparently Egyptian affinities,⁴ grad-

¹ Gesenius's *Thesaurus*, *sub vocibus*, and Appendix, p. 90.

² In the first of these two words one link of connection is wanting, inasmuch as the Hebrew מֶרְכָבָה is connected with רָכַב, to ride, in the Hebrew. The Egyptian verb corresponding is not known, so far as we are aware.

³ Bunsen's *Egypt*, Vol. I p. 453.

⁴ Gesenius's *Thesaurus*, Appendix, p. 90.

ually went into disuse; though found some four times in the poetical writings, it was in later days replaced by the term כֶּרֶם, denoting the same amount.

Such facts as these are among the strong indications (because so wholly incidental) both that the early life of the Jewish nation was spent in contact with Egyptian civilization, and that the books of Moses were written while fresh from under that influence.

4. Another consideration of weight confirming the alleged date of the composition consists in the traces of the wandering in the wilderness, which appear in these writings.

We do not refer to the known conformity of the narrative of their march to the physical peculiarities of the region. We have in mind rather some of those rules and arrangements which imply that their institutions were formed while the nation was in a migratory condition. Here belong the continual references of their legislation to tents and camps (Ex. xix. 17, etc.), and regulations for marching and halting (Num. ii. etc.); also the absence of all allusions to permanent dwellings, except prospectively in the promised land.

Here belong also the minute and elaborate directions for the construction and transportation of the tabernacle for the ark of the covenant. Such particulars as these must unquestionably have been committed to writing at the time when the occasion called them forth; since no conceivable object existed for their being recorded at full length after the settlement in Canaan. The date of these instructions would carry with it the date of the written legislation and record, of which they form an integral part.

The wood of the tabernacle and of its furniture, the אֲזֵיכֵיט, was the product of the desert; while קֶרֶשׁ (the cypress), the natural product of Palestine, never appears in the Pentateuch. Macdonald (after Eichhorn) errs in adding that the Pentateuch contains no mention whatever of the cedar (אֲרֶז), the product of Palestine and Syria.¹ It is mentioned, but

¹ Macdonald's Introduction, Vol. I. p. 305.

in a manner more remarkable than the entire omission,—in such a mode as to be a joint reminiscence both of Egypt and of the wilderness. It is nowhere made a part of the structure of the tabernacle, or mentioned as employed for any building purpose; but only to be used in slight quantities on two occasions—in the cleansing of leprosy (Lev. xiv.), and in forming the water of purification for the unclean (Num. xix. 6). Now what are the facts in the case? Cedar was imported into Egypt *from Syria*, for furniture, small boxes, coffins, and various objects connected with the dead.¹ It was also used in Egypt, according to Pliny and Dioscorides, in ointments for elephantiasis, ulcers, and some other complaints.² In the uses designated we find a trace of Egypt; in the quantities implied, a trace of the wilderness, which admitted its transportation in such quantities and such only. It might have been with them in the form of small manufactured articles, or otherwise. In contrast with this mode of mention is the fact that the later books of the Bible abound in allusions to the cedar as the noblest of trees, and the choicest of building materials. It is mentioned about seventy times in the later books.

There are instances of regulations made for the wilderness, but subsequently relaxed or repealed at the close of the Mosaic legislation, to accommodate the changed circumstances about to exist in the dispersion over Palestine. The requisition (Lev. xvii. 3, 4) to bring animals that are to be slaughtered for food, to the door of the tabernacle, was abrogated (Deut. xii. 15, 20, 21) just before the entrance into Canaan, naturally on account of the inconvenience then attending.³ The law concerning leprosy (Lev. xiv.) seems to contemplate both the present state of the people in the wilderness, and their future settled condition in Canaan. Other regulations, especially those concerning uncleanness,

¹ Wilkinson's *Anc. Egyptians*, Vol. II. p. 38.

² Knobel on Levit. xiv. 4.

³ See Rosenmüller, Knobel, Gerlach, who agree as to the meaning of Levit. xvii. 3, 4.

were evidently framed when the people were all in the vicinity of the tabernacle, as they require the *personal* coming of the individual to that place. Some of them were continued in later times (e. g. in the case of childbirth, Lev. xii. 6); and it has been well suggested that they would have been deemed oppressive in Palestine, but for the sanction of ancient usage.¹

In the distinction of clean and unclean animals, at least as to the form it assumed, Stanley traces, as he thinks, a clear connexion with the circumstances in the wilderness. Without pretending thus to account for the *grounds* of the distinction, he remarks that "the animals which they might freely eat, were those which belonged especially to their pastoral state—the ox, the sheep, the goat, to which were added the various classes of chamois and gazelle. As we read the detailed permission to eat of every class of what may be called the game of the wilderness—the wild goat, and the roe, and the red deer, and the ibex, and the antelope, and the chamois,—a new aspect is suddenly presented to us of a large part of the life of the Israelites in the desert. It reveals them to us as a nation of hunters; it shows them to us, clambering over the smooth rocks, scaling the rugged pinnacles of Sinai, as the Arab hunters of the present day, with bows and arrows instead of guns. Such pursuits they could only in a limited degree have followed in their own country. The permission, the perplexity, could only have arisen in a place where the animals in question abounded. High up in the cliffs of Sinai the traveller still sees the herds of gazelles standing out against the sky; and no image was more constantly before the pilgrims, of whatsoever age they may be, who wrote the mysterious inscriptions in the wady Mukatteb and on the rock Herimat Haggag, than the long-horned ibex."²

The same writer calls attention to the fact that the consecration of the whole tribe of Levi to the priestly work,

¹ Hävernick's Introduction to the Pentateuch, p. 296, Eng. Translation.

² Stanley's Jewish Church, p. 189.

sprang out of a transaction in the wilderness, where with fierce zeal they rallied round Moses at the time of the golden calf, and "slew every man his brother and his companion, and every man his neighbor." At no later period did the leading spirits of the nation come from that tribe; and their consecration is a special memorial of that early period, as the probable time of the legislation — viewed simply as a question of probability.¹

The provision for future cities of refuge from the avenger of blood strikingly reminds us of that nomadic life wherein the nation was enveloped, and perhaps penetrated, by the morals of the desert. It was a merciful restriction upon the law of blood-revenge to the fourth generation, which from the most ancient times has prevailed among the Bedouins of the desert, and undoubtedly then pressed upon the Israelites.² The cities of refuge are not alluded to in the Old Testament later than the book of Joshua.

Coincident with these things, and deserving at least of being mentioned, are the consistent explanations of various cases of supplementary legislation, furnished by events referred to the wilderness. The ordinance for the passover was first given with prospective reference to the residence in Palestine (Ex. xii. 25). Then came the rebellion during the first few months, and the doom of forty years' wandering. In the second year Jehovah specially commands the nation to keep the passover, though in the wilderness (Num. ix. 1-3). But meanwhile a law was made requiring the removal from the camp of persons defiled by a dead body (Num. v. 2). The question necessarily rose, how this would affect the universal observance of the passover. Accordingly this case is provided for (Num. ix. 3-11) by an arrangement permitting the passover in such cases to be kept on the following month. Again, the law of inheritance at first provided only for the transmission of land to sons. The

¹ Stanley's *Jewish Church*, p. 188. It will be remembered that Knobel yields the point.

² *Ibid.* p. 191.

case of Zelophehad's daughters brought up the subject for additional legislation. So, too, the general laws against Sabbath-breaking and blasphemy were supplemented, on account of circumstances arising in the wilderness, by the assignment of special penalties (Lev. xxiv. 12 – 16 ; Num. xv. 32 – 36).

Such facts as these are among the not unimportant indications that the composition took place at the time and under the circumstances which the witnesses allege. And we close this section with the unanswerable question of Delitzsch: "How comes it that the post-Mosaic history presents no trace of what in other national histories is called the *growth* of law and legislation? In the history of Israel from the time of the Judges, we everywhere find an existing law, which without contradiction prescribes human conduct, and by which the divine retributions are determined."

6. To this may be added the remark of the same acute scholar, that there is no period in the post-Mosaic times out of whose characteristics the Torah (or law) could have sprung. And we cannot do better here than to quote his language. "It could have originated in the times of the Judges, as little, perhaps, as the New Testament scriptures in the Middle Ages. That period is one of barbarism, of the disintegration of Israel into separate and alienated clans, and even of manifest mingling of Israelitish and heathen-Canaanitish customs. There were no considerable prophets; the priesthood lay prostrate, and the last of its incumbents knew how to wield the sword, but not the pen. Samuel alone at the end of that period, the founder of the prophets' schools, might possibly be thought of in connection with the origin of the Torah; but the untenableness of the supposition appears in this, that Samuel, so far from adhering rigidly to the law which he had reduced to the documentary form, is on the contrary a personage exempting himself from the law in troublous times. [He was no priest, nor of the priestly tribe, yet statedly offered sacrifices

no doubt with the divine sanction; the sacrifices were not offered at the altar of the tabernacle, but at Mizpeh, Gilgal, Bethlehem, and Ramah, the place of his residence. The *anointing* of kings was no part of the Mosaic prescription, and the monarchy itself an innovation.] The time of Saul does come into the question, since its only significance in the history of Israel's religion and literature lies in its being the time of David's birth. The times of David and Solomon, however, exhibit so lively an activity in organization and literature that the law of Moses might far sooner than have been recorded and set in its historic frame-work; and many glancings of the *Thorah* into the future of that golden royal era, offer to that hypothesis some foundation. But over precisely this period the fountains of history flow forth to us most richly, yet without affording anywhere, even in the *Psalms*, a ground for the supposition that the *Thorah* became then reduced to writing; and moreover the great deviation, in the structure of the temple from that of the Mosaic tabernacle, is on that assumption hard to explain. If we descend to the separation of Israel into two kingdoms, the hypothesis that the *Thorah* first received its documentary form after that separation, is improbable for this reason, that in the kingdom of Israel there never arose any opposition against the force of the law that bound Israel in the same manner as Judah. Had not the letter of the *Thorah* been already fixed, it is not easy to comprehend how there could have been that objective unity of the severed body, and the common ground of the prophetic function, and the conscience of Israel ever breaking forth in all times of apostasy, and the ever uniform law of religious renovation in Israel after long secularization. Shall we then assume that the *Pentateuch* first originated in the exile, or that Ezra wrote it as it lies before us? How can it have originated in the exile, since the people on their return from the exile remind themselves of the *Thorah* as the divine basis of their commonwealth, long destitute of practical effect, but now demanding a true realization? [See the whole strain of the prophets of

the captivity and the restoration.] Were the Thorah a compilation of laws, like the Codex Justinianus, it might indeed be conceived of as the work of an exile. But it carries us into the midst of the historic process of the law-giving, and is a pragmatic history of it; and how could such careful and definite recollections have remained in an oral, unrecorded state till that time? And as to Ezra, he is a Luther, who, in a time when the masses had sunk into heathenish barbarism and religious ignorance, as a scribe, brings back the written word to honor and efficiency; his activity in reference to national life and literature is throughout only restorative, for even the uncertain tradition goes no further than to ascribe to him the transfer of the scriptures from the Hebrew to the Assyrian text or the restoration of lost books from memory. [In other words, history and tradition fully concur to show that any assumption of his authorship in the case would be gratuitous and baseless.] So does the whole post-Mosaic history of Israel send us back to the Siniatic law-giving and a written record of the same."¹

Here, too, rises another inquiry which, so far as we know, the objectors have never yet pretended distinctly to answer: How and when was it possible, at any time subsequent to the life-time of Moses, to reconstruct the whole social, civil, and religious life of the nation, and impose upon it so complicated a set of ordinances, many of them commemorative, in the name of Moses, crowning the imposture, too, with a set of writings also in the name of Moses, then first produced; and to do it so effectually that never a breath of denial arose, never a hint of the time of reconstruction came down, never a glimpse of the machinery and of the magician that effected it has come to light? This is a question which is not to be evaded; it must be met. We proceed to say that,

7. A corroborative circumstance of great weight is found in the inability of the deniers of the Mosaic authorship to suggest even a plausible substitute.

¹ Die Genesis, pp. 9, 10.

They certainly avail themselves of every advantage. It is surely taking the largest liberty to decompose the Pentateuch into any number of parts, from two to ten or more, even cutting out at pleasure here and there a refractory verse or clause, as they all do; and to assign these fragments to any date or any writer they may see fit. With such an unrestricted range, such entire independence of all embarrassing restraint, it might be supposed that all the wants of "criticism" might be met. But it is of no avail. These theorists are good witnesses against each other. None of them, not even De Wette, Ewald, or Knobel, with all their acuteness, can devise a theory that commands the suffrage of their coadjutors. They can unite only in destruction. Some of them, like Ewald and De Wette, have been unable long to agree with themselves, and have widely changed their positions. We have a document hypothesis, a fragment hypothesis, a complement hypothesis, a crystallization hypothesis, so called, with several subdivisions. We have now an Elohist and a Jehovist; or an Elohist and two successive Jehovists; or three documents, Elohistie and Jehovistic, with an editor; or an Elohist, a Jehovist, a Deuteronomist, with a War-book and a Law-book to draw upon; or an Elohist, one or more Jehovists, and a Deuteronomist; and so on up to the ten or twelve writers of Ewald, to each of whom he is able precisely to assign his portion; and the multitudinous fragments of Vater and of Hartmann.

As to the probable dates and writers, the confusion is greater still. Lengerke places an Elohist in the time of Solomon, and a supplementer in the time of Hezekiah; Tuch, in the time of Saul and Solomon respectively; Bleek, in the time of Saul or the Judges, and the beginning of David's reign; Stähelin, in the time of the Judges and of Saul; Delitzsch, in the time of Moses and of Joshua; De Wette, after various fluctuations, in his fifth edition, refers the Elohist to the time of Samuel or Saul, the Jehovist to the earlier part of Hezekiah's reign; the Deuteronomist per-

haps to the exile. Knobel refers the Elohist to the time of Saul or David; the Jehovist, to the last of Hezekiah's reign; the law-book, compiled from various sources, to some period prior to Jeroboam; the war-book to the time of Jehoshaphat; and the Deuteronomist, to the time of Josiah. Ewald's marvellous patch-work stretches all the way from before the time of Samson till subsequent to that of Jeremiah, with a somewhat indefinite expansion each way. The bishop of Natal finds the Elohist in Samuel, "one or more writers" in the latter days of David and the early days of Solomon, and a Deuteronomist in the time of Josiah (perhaps Jeremiah), who wrote the book of Deuteronomy, and thrust his interpolations into all the previous books.

Behold chaos. These writers have it all their own way, yet each a different way. And behold the proof, if not that truth is one and error manifold, yet that in this case, *testimony* is clear, uniform, and coherent, and *theory* against testimony is multitudinous, conflicting, worthless. These diverse and clashing theories are a good *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole attempt to withdraw the Pentateuch from Moses. The objectors to Moses are in the same predicament with the witnesses against Christ: "their witness agreed not together."

Such is the nature of the evidence, positive and negative, direct and circumstantial, cumulative and convergent, that Moses is the responsible author of the Pentateuch; that the work was composed by him, or under his provision and direction, in some such mode that it is substantially his work. It is evidence of the strongest description, and of precisely the right character. Let the objector produce, if he can, any other ancient document (outside of the holy scriptures), in favor of which anything like this amount of evidence can be exhibited.

Against testimony so express *lying wholly on one side*, and concurrent evidence so various, no objections can stand but such as are insuperable, no difficulties can weigh unless they are absolutely insolvable. And that mental, not to say

moral, obliquity which can spurn all such proofs, and spin its webs of theory just as though no such evidence existed, is an astounding phenomenon. It is a repudiation of the first principles of judicial investigation. All proof, except mathematical demonstration — which is but a building upon postulates involved in its definitions — admits of degrees, and is exposed to objections; but when the evidence is strong and the objections admit of ready solution, the latter count for nothing. The judge that should rule out such evidence as is here offered, or the jury who should avowedly disregard it, only to listen, not to counter *testimony*, but to objections that are not in themselves decisive, would be pronounced unworthy of their position.

Are there internal difficulties so thoroughly insuperable as to prevent us from admitting the varied and concurrent testimony that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch? We proceed, then, to show that

IV. The concurrent evidence that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch is exposed to no decisive or even formidable objection.

The examination of this part of the subject must be deferred to another Number of this Periodical.

NOTE. It is the writer's purpose to meet the chief objections that have been advanced against the authority of the Pentateuch, in such order as best comports with the plan of his discussion; and to pursue the discussion as rapidly as circumstances will permit. A few typographical errors, which crept into his criticism on Colenso in the July Number, affecting rather the style and the orthography of certain proper names and Hebrew words than the merits of the argument, are not thought to require special attention.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL
CHURCH.BY THE RIGHT REV. GEORGE BURGESS, D.D., BISHOP OF THE DIOCESE OF
MAINE.*This Church Historically, not Doctrinally Distinguished.*

THE position of the Protestant Episcopal Church is not the result of any peculiarity of doctrine. It is simply historical. That church in the United States, as in the British provinces, is the continuance and expansion of the Church of England. The Church of England is, in its complete doctrine and symbols, the same body which it became at the Reformation under Edward the Sixth and Elizabeth. In its ritual, some small changes have since been introduced; but nothing, either in the British or in the American revisions, has at all varied the substance of its instructions or of its forms of worship.

Its Two Distinctive Features.

The position of the Episcopal Church is not even that of a body which, after careful deliberation, has seen fit to adopt the episcopal regimen or order, and the use of a prescribed liturgy. Many of its members in our country have become such through an act of choice, resting on simple conviction that these features of its system are both strictly primitive and eminently expedient. But the church itself has not *adopted* these features, but only *retained* them from its earliest ages. The old Saxon Church and the older British Church were both Episcopal; the former, from its beginning with Austin, the latter from its first clear appearance in the third century. No period is known in the history of ancient British Christianity when its worship was not liturgical. It was only by continuance, not by any action, that the

English Church at the Reformation was what it still is in these two great principles, by which it is now distinguished from so many other Protestant communions — the principles of an episcopal government, transmitted by the imposition of hands, in unbroken succession, and of a fixed form of common prayer.

Its Doctrine that of the Reformation.

At the Reformation, the ancient ritual was revised, reformed, greatly modified in all respects, and, so far as any portions of the previous liturgies were retained, they were, as a first step, translated into the English language. The doctrine of the Church of England became, from necessity, the same in substance with that of all the other churches which shared in the Reformation, and which appealed to the supreme authority of the holy scriptures with entire submission. From these scriptures, thus consulted, only one doctrinal system could proceed; that which was thence transcribed into all the Protestant confessions. Where they differed, pious and learned men, obedient students of the word of God, could differ.

The doctrine of the Church of England took the form of the Thirty-nine Articles, in addition to the three Creeds, — the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. If the American Episcopal Church has dropped the last of the three, it is not because any of its definitions are rejected, but only because the harshness of its denunciations required constant explanation, which would not always satisfy. The Articles are unlike the other Reformed confessions, only in being more guarded and less decisive in those points which have been popularly designated from the name and authority of Calvin. When, in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, an attempt was made to introduce a strict system of Calvinistic doctrine on these points, through the "Lambeth Articles," it had the highest prelatie sanction, but it fell to the ground. A similar attempt in the Church of Ireland, under the guidance of Usher, had no permanent

result. When the Arminian controversy arose, early in the seventeenth century, delegates from the Church of England, sent by royal authority, were present at the Council of Dort, and concurred in its predestinarian decisions; but it was quite in vain. The original largeness of the English confession and liturgy refused all new limitations; the literal and grammatical sense to which the clergy were bound by injunction, permitted the more Arminian construction; and it became the predominating, but never the exclusive, type of episcopalian divinity. Both the Calvinism and the Arminianism of the Anglican Church, too, have always been necessarily modified by the influence and requisitions of a ritual and catechism which recognized the sacraments as pledges and means of spiritual grace, in language so decisive and so large; which are filled with the conception of "one Catholic and Apostolic Church;" and which assert, without qualification, the universality of the atonement.

Breadth of its Doctrinal Basis.

From this view of the Episcopal Church, it results that it could very well embrace, as it has done, a considerable diversity of sentiment, up to a certain line; while at that line it would be found strictly and uniformly rigorous. Recognizing itself as historically the church of the Anglican or British race, it must make room within its fold for all classes of men who hold the faith of Christ. It is not at liberty to bid any of them go and join some body of Christians whose principles may give them better satisfaction. It must have room for such diversities as are consistent with the maintenance of the faith of Christ in substantial purity.

With such a statement it may seem at variance that the use of a prescribed form of prayer should be required from all ministers and all congregations. That form was thus settled for a national church, which must have some rules of some kind for its worship. The Church of England adopted these; for which it never claimed any other authority than that which every such church must possess and may ex-

ercise. It does undoubtedly assert the principle of forms as sanctioned by the highest authority—that of scripture and of the Son of God; but it does not denounce all other modes of worship; nor does it expect or seek for its own liturgy an universal acceptance or an unalterable uniformity. The common prayer can be changed as far as at any time the church may hold expedient; and the church, without any violation of its principles, could allow any congregations to adopt other forms, written or extemporaneous. Whether a different administration in this respect might, in the seventeenth century, have prevented any part of the great separation of the Nonconformists may be much doubted; but it would not have involved any relinquishment of any necessary part of the episcopal system.

The very confession of the necessity of diocesan episcopacy, or of a ministerial succession from the apostles, is no positive requisition, either from clergymen or from laymen. While the church preserves its own succession with care, and practically yields to its episcopate the ancient authority, it simply asserts that this order, like the two others, has been in the church of Christ from the days of the apostles, and declares that therefore none but an episcopally ordained ministry shall be premitted within its fold. It is no article of faith imposed upon the conscience, but only the statement of a historical fact and of a rule for self-preservation. Very various degrees and kinds of conviction may be united under the one acknowledgment that since the days when the Epistles to Timothy and Titus were written, there have been not only elders in the churches, but also those who were to ordain elders.

Its Actual Comprehensiveness.

Accordingly, the large roof of the Anglican Church has sheltered classes of thinkers and modes of ecclesiastical activity differing more widely than some sects differ from each other, who have never met in council or communion. It covered all the Puritan clergy up to a certain time in the

career of each ; and the point at which they went out was not marked by any clear and sudden change of belief. The Methodists of both schools found no cause for withdrawal in the doctrines or the worship under which they had originated their movements ; never in fact renouncing either, and never cut off by any act of direct exclusion. The Romanizers of our generation went out, one by one, at the limit at which their conscience and the general opinion pointed to the impossibility of honest union with a Protestant church ; and not till then. The recent band of Neologists, who flaunted to the breeze the “*Essays and Reviews*” as the standard of their revolt, still contest the ground, though sure to yield to a like necessity, more than to the slow and stinted decisions of law.

Would it have been better that separation should have been more obvious, or more immediately compulsory ? The Episcopal Church holds separation to be a greater evil than any variety of interpretation or doctrine which does not unsettle the foundations of the faith. If it be wrong in this, there is a grandeur in the error, and it saves from a multitude of disasters. But in such a communion there must be schools which are broadly distinct ; and there must also be, in the nature of things, a scale which no one can graduate, along which all varieties and approximations and unicons of thought and view possible between the utmost limits that are allowable, shall actually be found to exist together. The logical thinker strives to classify ; but the diversities of minds, often governed by other causes than strict consistency of reasoning, refuse to be thus arranged. So far, too, as the difference may be one of degree, all classification, except the most vague, must be deceitful. Who shall divide an army into the tall and the short and the men of middle stature ? The extremes are clear enough ; but as you approach the centre, where shall the line be drawn ? This difficulty is much to be pondered when we attempt to speak of different currents of opinion which have presided in the Episcopal Church of Britain and America. It is met

everywhere, more or less, in inquiries of such a kind; but evidently the tendency to fall into clear and well-defined parties is much diminished where one strong bond of outward unity is acknowledged, along with the right to great freedom of judgment and action.

Condition at the Reformation.

The Reformation found the English Church devoted to the whole mass of mediaeval religion. Full forty years, an entire generation, were interposed between the beginning and the consummation of the revolution in the mind of the people. The process was gradual and was interrupted, though thorough in the end. At every step some hearts could pause and linger; but the immense majority were borne on, while some remained from the beginning unmoved. Among a large body of clergy, participating in a change which was so much under the guidance of the civil government, and so much opposed to the impulse of the popular feeling, there must have been those who never very heartily abandoned all the errors which they had early been taught to receive. Very few of the clergy who had said mass under Mary retired under Elizabeth, if we except the bishops. But these clergy were generally men of little learning, and not of great elevation of character; and if they entered not warmly into the change, they were silent. No controversy was left within the church between Romanists and Protestants; the expulsion of Popery was complete.

Influence of Puritanism.

From the beginning, however, the elements of the Puritan discussion were in existence. It involved, on one side or the other, not only the degree in which ecclesiastical arrangements might be subordinated to the civil authority, the principle of exacting a special direction from the text of scripture for every usage, and the predisposition to simplicity in worship and austerity of manners, but also the deference due to the early church; the preservation of the word and sacra-

ments, not without power, in all ages of the church; the basis of the episcopate; and the sterner features of the doctrinal system of Augustine or Calvin. On all these topics there were two parties throughout the half century of the reign of Elizabeth; and the Puritan side, had it been at full liberty to declare itself, would very probably have rejected Episcopacy, or have reduced it nearly to Presbyterianism, and would gradually have left the Common Prayer behind. The more advanced Puritans were, in fact, no representatives of the Episcopal Church, with which they were only connected by the necessity of their birth and citizenship.

But they had a double influence on its doctrine. They prevented the slightest appearance of any backward tendency towards Rome, which they would have been so eager to denounce and to stifle. They called forth, however, a spirit of unavoidable opposition to their own encroachments, and compelled the advocates of the church as it was to lay well their foundations. Thus a race of divines arose, like Hooker, Andrews, Bilson, Field, and Jackson, who, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, brought all the support of patristic learning to the cause of the Anglican episcopacy, alike against the Pope and against the Genevan system of church organization. The labors of these men may be regarded as the commencement of what may be termed distinctively "Church of England Divinity," as separated from that which the Church of England has in common with the Lutherans, with the Reformed churches of the Continent or of Scotland, and with the Nonconformists.

Development of Arminianism.

A step onward brings us to the school of Laud. It was not distinguished by any peculiarity of doctrine, but only by a marked stress on the external solemnities of religion, and a determination to enforce all rules of ecclesiastical order. In the result of this effort, prosecuted as it was in connection with the unfortunate struggle of Charles the First against the Commons of England, the Puritan ele-

ment went forth; but, like Samson, carrying with it the gates of the city. The civil war sealed the separation. Thenceforward, whatever discussions might arise within the church were all its own, and must be held to modify fairly its actual teaching and character.

As soon, therefore, as it was once more established, with its episcopacy and its liturgy, we begin to discover the germs of new controversies. The Arminian opinions had already found much acceptance. Although the Church of England had been represented at the Synod of Dort, its clergy acquiesced not at all in the determination of that assembly; and the bishops who were there were among the last of their order who have written upon the side which was there triumphant. The Calvinism of the church grew fainter till it scarcely struggled. It was not so much overcome by direct assaults, as supplanted through the more ecclesiastical spirit which predominated at the restoration. For a century after, its voice was almost unheard, except along with the irregularities of Whitefield, and then it was much more than overbalanced by the Arminianism of Wesley. Within the last century it has been revived in the writings of many pious men, but can scarcely be viewed as having very largely affected the prevalent teaching of Episcopalians, either in Great Britain or in America.

High and Low Church.

The necessity for those differences which made the names of High and Low Church historical, lies partly in the essential diversities of human temperaments. There are high and low men on all questions. Some push all principles to their logical results; others endeavor to combine truths which seem to move in opposite directions. In the hands of one, all doctrine becomes denunciatory; in the hands of another, all becomes comprehensive and conciliatory. It is not that either tendency is purely good or evil; strictness and gentleness are alike duties; but in Christian men here below they will never be perfectly harmonized.

The stronger development of one or the other will under certain circumstances, constitute schools, and then even parties. Around these men will cluster, impelled not always by simple choice, nor always marked by the same character from which the diversity began; but ruled by education, prejudice, necessity, or any accident of position. Other questions become associated with those of the first separation; all having usually some bond of internal alliance, but not always that which is most readily supposed.

The stress, or want of stress, on the constitution of the church and its ministry; on the episcopate; on the episcopal succession; on the necessity of the sacraments; on their efficacy; on the authority of the primitive church and its councils; on catholic consent; on ritual observances; on the superior fitness of forms of prayer, on the importance of order in the minuter matters of worship; and on ecclesiastical obedience everywhere, is the distinctive character of High and Low Church worship. It is a thing of degree, rather than a contradiction. As over against most of the non-episcopal churches of our land, all Churchmen are High Churchmen. As over against the Papal system, all are Low Churchmen.

Moderation of the Church Itself.

The Protestant Episcopal Church, in its collective character has never assumed the highest ground on any of these questions. It has legislated for itself without denouncing or condemning those who claimed for themselves like liberty. It cannot be otherwise than episcopal; it cannot recognize within itself any other ordination; for this it received from the apostolic days. But it makes no new rule; it only maintains its own universal practice. It insists that the sacraments are not mere signs without effect, or mere acts of profession; but it declares this effect to be spiritual, and limited to those who receive them with faith, and worthily. It has never made the validity of the sacraments depend on the hands by which they were administered. It founds its

doctrine simply on the holy scriptures; receives the creeds because they accord with the scriptures; and, over and over again, binds its ministers to teach nothing as the necessary faith which may not be proved by the scriptures. It imposes its fixed forms of prayer for the sake of uniformity and solemnity and right teaching, in its public services; but denounces not the use of variable forms, or of extemporaneous devotions, elsewhere. Its ritualistic order, beyond the most general features, is matter of usage rather than of rule and prescription. Its government, in both countries, has exposed itself, ever since the days of Laud, at least, if not even then, much more to the imputation of forbearance carried to the verge of remissness than of anything like high-handed assumption, met by servile submission. Both in its laws and in its practice, the church has ever borne itself with a moderation which might bring reproach, but could not well be denied.

The Latitudinarian Tendency.

The Latitudinarian current of opinion in the Church of England, which is not to be confounded with the simply Low Church opinions, began with the reaction against the rigor, both of the school of Laud on one side, and on the other of the Puritans. It has embraced great names, Chillingworth, Tillotson, Clarke, Watson, Paley, Arnold, Milman, Whately; but they have always been exceptional, and, from the nature of the case, have but the authority of individual thinkers. In our day, this type of doctrine and sentiment, has been invested with the title of Broad Church, which in our English form still expresses its tendency to give, in all directions, a certain latitude to opinion, doctrinal, speculative, ecclesiastical, and practical. It has not been accustomed to advance specific tenets, but has, in one instance and another, approached too often towards the borders of perilous error, and then recoiled. It is not much known in America.

The Evangelical School.

The Evangelical movement had its beginning when Methodism undertook the revival of the doctrine and spirit of the Reformers. Those who shared the ardent wish for such a return to a warmer and more masculine religion, and at the same time could not abandon the order and sobriety of the church, were known only as persons claiming to preach with emphasis and zeal the distinctive truths of the gospel. Insisting thus on these, they called themselves, and were called, Evangelical. But they had no new or peculiar principle. They appealed back to the Articles, and to the writings of the great martyrs of their church, and identified their gospel with that of the Reformation.

The Tractarian Movement.

The Tractarian movement had nearly the same relation to the theology of the church in the early centuries after the apostles. Its standard was there; the interpretation and the practice, as well as the faith, of the ages of the great councils. It was a reaction, in part from the somewhat narrowed and unstudious spirit which increasing prosperity had nourished in the Evangelical school; and in part from the worldly temper which saw in the church a mere "establishment." It gathered up the relics of the most patristical divinity which had at any time been found in the Church of England. It formed a system not without attractiveness for minds of a deeper cast, as well as for such as delighted in a minute ritual and much symbolism. But it was only too clear that the arguments for such a system could not proceed beyond the attempt to display it as an intended development of the apostolic gospel, and not that original gospel itself. The transition from the writings of the apostles to those of this school was as if one stepped from the open sunlight, bathing the hills and fields, into a Gothic porch, with windows "richly dight," but shutting out the day.

Unity amidst Diversity.

All these movements and controversies, and many of a subordinate character, have been able to exist, and to exist together, in the English Episcopal Church, without rending it asunder; not because it is a strong establishment, but because its historical foundation, its identity with the apostolic church first planted in the land, is, for those who believe it, an almost inseparable bond. It is not merely the episcopate, nor merely the three orders of the ministry, which could constitute this. It is, that along with these the apostolic religion, the works, the sacraments, the fellowship of the saints, the creed, the great liturgical offices, the whole frame of Christianity, — personal, social, civil, ecclesiastical, — all have come down, and that the church is regarded by its members as an actual institution of the Saviour, which they have no right to dismember. In it they may differ for a time; but in it they must remain; and all healing and humanizing influences will have room and opportunity.

The Episcopate.

The Episcopal Church holds fast its episcopate, and the regular succession by which it has been received from the first ages, and so from the apostles, as the natural, the providential, the ordained means of an orderly, external union and communion, extending throughout the church of all generations. It remembers that this was the tie in those days when the Catholic Church was most united, before the rise of the Papacy, before the division of the East and West, before Constantine or any general council. It sees no prospect of future union except as this tie is preserved. Its scholars, not the least distinguished in Christendom, have seen no cause to suspect that this thread of succession has ever been broken. The general preservation of such an episcopate, its primitive antiquity, its universality in the early days, its hold on the very lifetime of the apostles, are not to be questioned; and the objection which is urged

to any imparity among ministers runs equally against the office of the apostles, whom the Lord set over all the churches. Even while they were of such a spirit as to discuss with warmth which of them should be the greatest, he who knew what was in man still gave them their pre-eminence; nor did they, in their turn, leave the churches without men who should "have the rule over them." Elders and bishops are apostolic names; and if undistinguished from each other in the New Testament, yet received their distinctive allotment among those whose heads had bowed under the ordaining hands of the twelve and of the apostle Paul.

The Liturgy.

The Episcopal Church adheres to the ancient forms of prayer, and from time to time enlarges the store by essential and well-weighed accretions. That a preference should be given to forms of prayer, would seem to be sufficiently settled by the mode in which our Saviour, when he was desired by his disciples, "taught them to pray." The prayers of the church maintain, in the judgment of mankind, an almost undisputed supremacy, not only for their venerable antiquity in general, but also as models of doctrinal simplicity, majesty, and fervor. There is in them, confessedly, but the very smallest proportion of matter which any believer could hesitate to adopt; and the objections of the Puritan writers amaze the present generation. But these forms of worship are by no means essential to the existence of that unity which the episcopate perpetuates. It is perfectly conceivable that the usages of different communions, their extemporaneous devotions, prayer-meetings, classes, and whatsoever might have been held conducive to edification, should all be found in churches administered under one episcopal system.

Summary of the Position of the Church.

In the preparation of this Article, at the courteous request of the editors, it was impracticable or unprofitable to present a

summary of the *doctrines* of the Episcopal Church, because it has no distinctive scheme of doctrine dividing it from other communions of Protestants who adhere to the Nicene creed and to the baptism of infants. We could but end as we began : the position of the church is simply a history, rooted as deep as the first Christianity of Britain. If it ever seem inconsistent with that liberality of temper which merges denominational distinctions in its own all-reconciling desire for fellowship, let it be remembered that the church has forsaken none, has excluded none, that it is older than all, and that from it all are derived. Even where its numbers are small, its position is one which no reflecting man could wish to see abandoned or otherwise vacated ; and it is not arrogance if it still claims to be the ancient homestead and hearthstone of all Christians of English blood, and the only abode which is large enough, in its plan, to embrace them all.

Actual Teaching of Ministers.

But it may still be urged that in the actual teaching of the ministers of the church, and in the practical views of its members, there is material for more definite comment. It is desired to know what is indeed taught and thought concerning regeneration, concerning the qualifications for admission to the holy communion, concerning the state between death and the resurrection, and concerning the actual operations of the Holy Spirit in conversion and sanctification. These are the subjects on which the doctrine of the church is often, both by friends and objectors, placed over against that of many other Christians.

Regeneration.

“ Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” The Episcopal Church, with all antiquity, as well as with the whole current of modern interpretation, sees in these words a declaration of the necessity of a new inward life from heaven, and an

allusion to the rite of baptism. In the same manner, it is accustomed to read of the "washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." This divine connection between the sacrament which begins all ecclesiastical life and the doctrine of the spiritual birth, is not to be obliterated. Regeneration is simply the gift of God. It is the commencement of the new state, not through the act of him by whom it is received, but through the mere bestowal of life from above. Much may have preceded, and much may follow, in which the free action of the human being is indispensable; but the spiritual birth itself is no more to be attributed to his will than the natural. The comparison points only to the heavenly gift, and suggests nothing of the nature of repentance and conversion, in which he must be active.

In the fruits of the new life are found the evidences of the new birth. Without it that life could not have been realized. But those evidences will not determine the time of its commencement. Life may long exist, without attracting notice; and even in the case of natural birth, it is its full individuality, not its absolute origination, which is signified by the event of birth. Another human being is in the world; so much we see. Another Christian is in the church; of this also we take cognizance. If we must fix the point of time at which the man became man, it must be at his birth; and if we would fix in like manner the point of time at which the new man became alive there is no other but that which the Saviour instituted — the time of his baptism.

Regeneration is the bestowal of that grace through which the child of man becomes the child of God, by adoption into his spiritual family. When baptism is rightly received by one who repents and believes, this act of adoption is surely consummated and sealed; and without hesitation we say that it has taken place, and thank God for his grace. It is the only visible point with which the transition can be definitely connected; and the connection is one which is

authorized by more than human phraseology. The ordinance of baptism is, of course, not then viewed by itself, and as the mere "putting away of the filth of the flesh," but along with the inward change which has preceded it, and the new life by which it is to be followed, and as embracing "the answer of a good conscience." This is the normal, apostolic baptism of adult converts; and this would be termed regeneration with the consent of all intelligent Christians. It is the old, ecclesiastical use of terms from the beginning. Should it be the baptism of a hypocrite, or of any man destitute of real faith, the whole transaction would be but the outward part without the soul; and although it could never be repeated, it would be wholly unavailing to any new birth, except as afterwards the inward state of heart might be supplied, through which alone he could be prepared to receive any blessing from a sacrament.

Thus far no serious difference would betray itself in the views of Episcopalians on this subject; nor, if we except the preference for another use of the term regeneration, would the views of other Christians differ much from these. It is only when the subjects of the ordinance are infants that apprehensions begin to be felt, lest a vital truth should be sacrificed by the rash application of a sacred word. That children are welcomed by Christ, that all children who may be brought, are welcomed to his arms and blessing; that "of such is the kingdom of heaven;" that therefore they may rightly be baptized, whoever their parents may be, is the conviction of all churchmen. The baptism of a child must import, in substance, the same thing with the baptism of an adult, but certainly with a most important distinction. It is equally an admission into the sacramental fold of the church visible. It is equally the seal of all the promises of the new covenant. It is equally attended by the promise of the Holy Spirit; without this, it would be, not a sacrament, nor even a sacred ordinance, but a blank, unavailing ceremony. The difference is, and must be, that the unconscious child can only be understood as engaged to that as a

result which with the adult was a qualification; in other words, that the condition expressed or implied is in one case past, in the other future.

Can, then, the baptized infant be termed regenerate? The Episcopal Church thanks God that "he has been pleased to regenerate this infant with his Holy Spirit, to receive him for his own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into his holy church." It teaches the child, too, that in baptism he was "made a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." This language is, of course, employed by all in a sacramental sense which imposes some qualification. But these qualifications are by different classes of divines more limited or extended, according to their sentiments on other questions in divinity.

By one class it is interpreted as the language of anticipation, of hypothesis, and of charity. In anticipation of the repentance and faith which in adult candidates for baptism are presupposed, and on the hypothesis that the child is indeed represented by the sponsors according to his future character and purposes, and in the charitable trust that he will be all which is promised in his behalf, he is pronounced already regenerate. As the promises, it is said, are necessarily hypothetical, so is the corresponding grace. To a second class this view of the transaction seems too dramatic and unreal, and they say, without hesitation, that every child received into the church of Christ through this ordinance is made partaker of some measure of divine grace, which is not only pledged, but given, and that this may justly and scripturally be termed regenerating grace, though not to the necessary exclusion of every other use of that term, and certainly not as if spiritual regeneration were a change not only begun but consummated then and there. This is probably, with some shades of variation, the prevailing sentiment. But a third class, the least numerous of the three, ascribe to the sacrament, as the ordinance of Christ, and through his grace, the conveyance of regenera-

ting grace, in its fullest extent, and without qualification ; so that the baptized child is indeed a new creature.

The celebrated case of Mr. Gorham, in England, seems to have owed its origin to the doctrines of personal election and of perseverance, as held by Mr. Gorham. He could not admit that any who would not finally be saved had ever been partakers, in any real way, of the gift of the Holy Ghost. The legal question, of course, was not at all whether his view was true or false, but only whether it was allowed to be held in the Church of England without molestation. Of the many who rejoiced at the decision in his favor, there were probably few who acquiesced entirely in his opinion. He did not deny regeneration in baptism, but limited it to the elect. With all except the strictest Calvinists it was quite as easy to believe that it took place always where the will opposed no obstacle, and therefore in all infants, as that it took place in any one instance. If one infant could receive the blessing, so might all, unless the way were barred by some secret decree.

Preparation for the Sacraments.

Whatever differences may exist in the interpretation, either of the doctrine of baptismal grace or of the language of the baptismal services, all teachers in the Episcopal Church teach, with one voice, that the nature of man since the fall is corrupt, and must be regenerated and renewed by the Holy Spirit. It is a truth so conspicuous throughout the Book of Common Prayer, that it enters into the inward life of all whose devotion is guided by the pages of that book, not as a mere proposition in divinity, but as the vital breath of all religion.

Repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ are distinctly impressed on the mind of every child trained up in the Episcopal Church, as required of every candidate for baptism in mature years, or for confirmation. A special and thankful remembrance of the death of our Saviour, and a charity without exception towards men, are

named besides, when access to the holy communion is the subject of instruction. It has often been said, in the use of a phrase more popular and expressive than strictly scriptural, that the ministers of the church, with whom it rests to receive any to these ordinances, demand no evidence of a "change of heart." They certainly demand none of any other change than that which is included in the existence of repentance, faith, and love. For the evidence of this they have no specific standard. The uncontradicted profession of the candidate, his desire to assume the baptismal engagements, after due instruction and conference, is sufficient to throw a heavy responsibility on any by whom he might be repelled. A considerable difference may doubtless be observed in the tone of the instruction which defines the qualifications implied or expressed in the reception of the sacraments; and in England, the custom of seeking confirmation early in life is far more general than in the American Episcopal Church, and is by no means so uniformly attended by the conception of a spiritual consecration and a distinct personal profession of intelligent and cordial faith. There, it is very often followed by only a single communion, or else by an approach to the holy table at long intervals only; while here very few are confirmed who do not at once appear at the sacrament, and constantly afterwards at its monthly celebration. Rejection is the penalty of immorality and scandal. A more quiet method of private counsel is usually sufficient where the unfitness is evident, but where there is no palpable offence.

Efficacy of the Sacraments.

The sacraments are unquestionably regarded in the Episcopal Church with a firmer reliance on their obligation and effect than is altogether general in the Protestant bodies throughout our country. No ministers of that church represent them, and few Episcopalians regard them, as chiefly acts of profession. They are held to be not only signs of grace, but pledges and means, and means of a most peculiar

character and consecration. In them alone has a material element been set apart for a sacred and significant use, by the express command and example of our Saviour. The words which he employed, when he spake of each, and of that which each was to signify, were so emphatic, and the sign and the thing signified are so associated in his language, and can there with such difficulty be held altogether distinct, that it is not strange if many pious men, in their reverence, adopt very *realistic* views of the sacraments. By no school in the Episcopal Church could anything like the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation be taught in the face of the Articles by which it is directly condemned. There is a school, however, who love to press the reality of the presence of Christ in the sacrament to the very utmost point which can be reconciled with the denial of transubstantiation. They insist on a presence which is to be worshipped. They mount as far as to the old Lutheran belief, though still preferring not to define, but only to bow in silent reverence, as before an ineffable mystery. These, however, are few; and the only prominent theologians who have written in this spirit are such as were the avowed followers or friends of Pusey and of Newman. In the Church of England authors have also been found, whose sacramental doctrine was quite as low as that of Zuingli; such authors as the school of Hoadly. But the general current has ever been modest, reverential, unexplaining, but not exaggerating; nor has the belief of Calvin, as to the eucharist, been often exceeded by Episcopalian divines.

. . . *State of the Dead.*

The idea that any difference of doctrine exists between the Episcopal Church and any orthodox communion of Protestants, concerning the state of the dead, can only have proceeded from unguarded expressions on either side. Certainly, the church itself teaches nothing on this subject more express than that the soul of our Lord "descended into hades," "went into the place of departed spirits," between

his death and his resurrection; and that "the spirits of those who depart hence in the Lord do live with God in joy and felicity, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh." It looks and prays for the great consummation when the Lord shall come to judge the quick and dead, and "shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." But in all this, the Episcopal Church receives and teaches nothing that is peculiar to itself. The doctrine of "an intermediate state" between death and the resurrection is that of all intelligent and scriptural teachers of religious truth, because it is the necessary result from the belief, on the one side, in the continuous life of the soul, and on the other, in the resurrection of the body. That common phraseology which makes no distinction between the state before and after the resurrection, cannot be intended to bear all the stress of which it is capable: it is but imaginative or inconsiderate. On the other hand, the anxious care of some Episcopalians never to speak of just men made perfect as now "in heaven," but only in paradise, is neither sustained by the language of the Bible, nor by that of their own great theologians. In speaking dogmatically, divines of every school must recognize the vast increase which the resurrection of the body and the results of the final judgment must add to the joys of the righteous and the woes of the lost. But in ordinary speech, or in the language of the pulpit or of prayers, the bosom of Abraham, the apocalyptic vision of the saints, and the torments of Dives, suggest as much as the human imagination can well sustain; and no scriptural image of the world beyond the resurrection supplies much more. By some interpreters in the Episcopal Church, our Lord is supposed to have "gone and preached to the spirits in prison," between the time of his own death and that of his resurrection. But so have multitudes of others supposed; so Calvin, and so Bengel. It is not in the Episcopal Church the prevailing interpretation, and can hardly be called frequent. The practice of remembering the pious dead in prayer has found, now and then, a theoretical advocate, either because

it was rooted in the earliest antiquity of the church, or because it satisfied a tender and imaginative sentiment. It has never been, in practice, more than the secret solace, possibly of a few individuals, and has no sanction from the liturgy, from which every appearance of such a custom, ancient as it was, has been faithfully weeded away. Prayer for the *ungodly* dead was not known to the early church, and even among the Romanists comes only from the ultimate results, rather than the original form, of their dream of purgatory.

Operations of the Holy Ghost.

In preaching and teaching on the natural operations of the Holy Spirit, the clergy of the Episcopal Church have ever been accustomed to dwell much on the readiness of the Most High to answer prayer, and to meet every effort with increase of grace, and on the diligent and faithful use of all the appointed means of grace, as channels through which all may confidently look for spiritual blessing. They have never discussed with special interest the limits of the freedom of the will, or the august mysteries of the divine sovereignty over all destinies. They are not generally anxious to analyze the mental process of conversion. Without venturing to question the blessing of God on extraordinary means and occasions, they look with greater certainty of confidence to the more regular administrations of his word and ordinance, to the settled order of his church, and to the services of his commissioned ministry. The idea of revivals, as seasons when the work of the Spirit may be manifested in unusual power, as so often in apostolic days, is one which nothing in the services or the belief or the prevailing sentiment of the Episcopal Church would exclude. The idea of revivals as seasons which are to constitute the normal state of the Church, and between which the Spirit is withdrawn, and the word and sacraments are powerless, and piety must stagnate and languish, and the world be left to itself, is one which all the customs and the tone of the Episcopal Church

tend to hold aloof from its own courts and ministrations. The fervor of real zeal, the glow of healthful excitement, the animation of sacred sympathies, the eagerness of earnest inquiry, the irrepressible tears of freshly awakened penitence, the cordial amens of actual prayer, it seeks not to repress, but welcomes and cherishes with all respect and tenderness. But it has no place for a system of machinery which plays with all the most sacred emotions and their demonstrations as institutions for achieving results which are beforehand known and expected to be largely earthly, transient, deceitful, and therefore pernicious.

Relative Position of the Episcopal Church in America.

The position of the Episcopal Church, at least in many parts of our country, may seem, if its numerical strength alone be regarded, to be somewhat in contrast with what an antagonist might term its "assumptions." If the contrast should be a little alleviated by the consideration of social or literary culture among the members of its communion, it still remains true that its attitude is more marked by the dignity of firmness than by the consciousness of such strength of broad foundations in the heart of a great people as that which marks the old and ever expanding Church of England. But, after all, no thoughtful man can confound this position with that of any sect, however numerous, which began with the separation of individuals, on the ground of opinions or of modes of worship or of plans for doing good.

ARTICLE VII.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRAVEL.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

IN the Bibliotheca Sacra for October 1862, some account was given of Dr. Henri Brugsch's *Recueil de Monuments Egyptiens*, with special mention of a new confirmation of Herodotus by the discovery of a Phœnician *Astoreth* worshipped at Memphis. The second volume of this work contains a still more remarkable confirmation of Galen, through the discovery at Memphis of a portion of the medical library, which the Greek father of therapeutics describes as contained in the temple of Ptah, in that city. It has long been known to savans that a papyrus discovered at Memphis some thirty years ago, by Mr. Passalacqua, and now among the treasures of the Royal Museum of Berlin, was a treatise on *Materia Medica*, and in 1853, Dr. Brugsch published, in the *Allgemeine Monatschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur*, a memoir based upon this manuscript, and treating of the knowledge of medicine in ancient Egypt. Mons. F. Chabas of Chalon-sur-Saône, an eminent Egyptologist, published a dissertation upon the same manuscript, in his *Mélanges Egyptologiques* of 1862.¹ And now, at the instance of many European scholars, Dr. Brugsch publishes the entire manuscript in *fac simile*, with copious annotations.²

It covers twenty-three large quarto pages, and is in a remarkably perfect state. In the original, two of these pages are written upon the reverse. The manuscript is divided by M. Chabas into three parts, and these again, according to Brugsch, are subdivided into sections, each indicated by a brief title in red ink. Chabas estimates that it contains not less than a hundred and seventy distinct medical prescriptions, applicable to a great variety of diseases, and though these may not put us in possession of many forgotten remedies, they will serve to enrich the vocabulary of medicine with a variety of technical terms.

According to Diodorus Siculus, the Egyptian physician was bound to follow the code prescribed in these books, under severe penalties if a case should terminate fatally through some adventurous treatment of his own. "Medici enim annonam ex publico accipiunt, et medicinam ex lege scripta, per multos ab antiquo medicos illustres concinnatam, applicant. Si leges, quas sacri codicis lectio tradit, secuti aegroto sanitatem reddere nequeant, culpa vacant, et indemnes abeunt; sin contra præscriptum agant, capitis

¹ *Mélanges Egyptologiques*, onze Dissertations; Paris: M. Benj. Duprat, 1862.

² *Recueil de Monuments Egyptiens*, par Doctor Henri Brugsch. Deuxième Partie. Leipzig: 1862.

judicium subeunt. Nam medendi rationem longi temporis usu observatam et ab optimis artificibus ordinatam paucos ingenio et sollertia superaturos legislator censuit.”¹

The remarkable papyrus now published by Dr. Brugsch is probably one of the books to which Diodorus refers. The date is assigned to the fourteenth century before our era; but in the course of the manuscript are citations from previous documents dating from the age of the pyramids, so that we have here the medical science of Egypt from the most remote antiquity. Dr. Brugsch has availed himself of the collaboration of Dr. Emmerich of Berlin, in determining the names and the properties of the remedies prescribed in this unique materia medica; but of course many of these are obscure, their equivalents not being found in the Coptic. A great variety of herbs are identified, nine different species of trees, such as the cedar and the sycamore-fig; nearly twenty-five salts and alkaline substances — common salt, nitre, etc; and of liquids — which are indicated by a vase or by undulating lines — wine, honey, oil, milk (human milk as well as that of the cow and of the goat), vinegar, and urine, besides some twenty others not clearly distinguished. Animal excrements are an important item in these prescriptions, and are classified as the excrement of the ass, the cat, the lion, the goose, the crocodile.

This will seem less offensive if we consider how extensively the same article is used for fuel in the East. There are traces of this in the Old Testament (2 Kings vi. 25, and Ezekiel iv. 15). The Egyptians also used for medicament various parts of the animal, the blood, the raw-flesh, the fat, the horn, and in some cases the whole creature, as the lizard and certain kinds of fish. These compoundings remind one of the witches' cauldron in Macbeth.

The tables of diseases and their remedies are of interest chiefly to physicians, and therefore belong appropriately to a journal of medicine. But a few examples may be given here, to illustrate the sanitary condition of ancient Egypt, and the manners of her people. Diseases of the chest, dropsy, inflammation, etc, appear to have been common; also a disease whose symptoms suggest neuralgia, for which the specific is an ointment compounded of beef-tallow and the excrement of the bird *Tef*. An unknown disease named *serj* figures largely in the papyrus, and commands several pages of prescriptions. It appears to have been a frequent and violent malady. Tumors and diseases of the skin seem to have been prevalent, and ointments, liniments, cataplasms, friction, laving, etc., were common specifics.

The subject of generation is treated with a freeness and vulgarity quite shocking to occidental tastes; and the most absurd and disgusting devices of charlatanism are gravely recorded as medical tests. Indeed both Dr. Brugsch and Mons. Chabas declare that decency forbids the translation of some of the instructions given for such cases. “Le Latin ne braverait pas

¹ Dio, B. I. sec. 82.

assez l'honnêteté pour rendre ce que je comprends dans la première phrase."¹

Pliny² informs us that the Egyptians in their medical practice imitated the ibis in the use of its hooked beak as a syringe; and this ancient papyrus makes frequent mention of the clyster in its prescriptions. A common beverage in sickness was a sweet, light beer, brewed from two kinds of grain, which was used also as an offering to the gods.

Even more curious than this medical papyrus is the *Warrant for the Arrest of Fugitive Slaves*, of which Mons. Chabas furnishes a *fac simile*, with a translation and a commentary.³ Six slaves belonging to prince Atefamen, a son of Rameses II, had run away, and had taken refuge in in Sutennen. A functionary named Afner, was sent to capture them and this papyrus contains the report of his proceedings.

"My master having ordered me to go in quest of six slaves of prince Atefamen which were at Sutennen, I first interrogated their companions, and charged Neferho, the charioteer, to bring them. Then I reported myself at Sutennen, and there found Piai, a slave of the military chief, — also one Kenbikhopeschef slave of prince Atefamen [probably men sent in advance to aid in the capture of the runaways], these brought with them six men taken in the workshop of the son of the intendant of the royal treasure [probably runaways from another master]; they have returned to fetch the others, and I write to inform my master, requesting him to send before the judge those who ought to be arraigned, together with the witnesses. The slaves have been registered at Memphis, and there also those belonging to Mer-en-Ptah, son of the military chief, will be taken for trial, unless my master shall order him to send them back to their work."

From this document and from collateral sources, Mons. Chabas infers that the proprietors of slaves were obliged to register them in a list kept by the government, and disputes with regard to such ownership must be brought before the judges. The right of masters was not absolute. It was not by virtue of orders from the owner of the slaves that search was made for them; but by the authority of a high functionary, to whom the result is reported, and from whom instructions are sought for further proceedings.

The silence of Egyptian monuments and records with regard to the Hebrews and their exodus has been a perplexity to Biblical scholars, and a ground of caviling to unbelievers. No attempt to identify the Hyksos or shepherds of Manetho with the Israelites has yet satisfied all the conditions of both the Hebrew and the Egyptian historians. But M. Chabas is of opinion that this silence is at length broken; and that he has discovered a distinct mention of the Hebrews in official Egyptian records. He first argues, with reason, that in the monumental inscriptions, which are but official bulletins of the triumphs and splendors of the Pharaohs, it is vain to look for any mention of checks sustained by the arms or the pol-

¹ Chabas, p. 70.

² Pliny, B. VIII. c. 41.

³ *Mélanges Egyptologiques.*

icy of Egypt; but that the records on papyrus, now so abundantly in our possession, may furnish some clue to the Hebrews, since these consist of both official and private correspondence, military reports, surveys of public works, accounts, inspections, legends, in short, of details the most various and familiar with regard to the organization and the manners of Egypt under the Pharaohs. It is to be presumed that a productive colony held by force upon the soil of Egypt, and employed upon various public works, would find some mention in these records. Assuming that Rameses II. was the Pharaoh who elevated Moses, the most of the hieratic papyri now known were written at about the epoch of the Exodus; and M. Chabas arrives at the conclusion that a sound criticism of Manetho, as illustrated from the monuments, requires us to place the wonderful increase of the Hebrews, the systematic oppression and violence pursued toward them, and finally their illustrious deliverance, in the reign of the earlier Rameses.

Under what form, then, should we look for a designation of the Israelites in the papyri of this period? The term "children of Israel" was not an ethnic but a religious designation, like "the seed of Abraham," the "sons of Jacob." The name *Israelite* does not occur in either Genesis or Exodus,¹ while the name *Jew* belongs of course to a much later period.² But the name *Hebrew* appears quite early, and must have been regarded by the Egyptians as the proper ethnic designation of the oriental race held as captives in the Delta. And since the Egyptian scribes represented Semitic words with great fidelity, we may look with a good degree of confidence for some trace of the Israelites under this name.

Of course it is not to be supposed that Egyptian traditions concerning this people would at all correspond with the miraculous events recounted in Exodus. But in the scriptural account are purely historical facts which accord perfectly with what we know of Egyptian usages. They were employed in building the cities of Pithom and Rameses, in making brick and cement, and in the most exacting labors of the field. That this was the use to which the Egyptians put their prisoners of war, is evident from the many texts in which their kings make it a merit before the gods, that they had secured so many captives to labor upon the temples. Now, there are three documents which mention a foreign race under the hieroglyphic title *APERI-U*, who were employed upon such works; and two of these belong precisely to the reign of Rameses II.

Upon principles of comparative philology which he discusses at length, M. Chabas makes this hieroglyphic group, *Aperi-u*, a transcription of *עֲבָרִים* *HIBERI-M*, excepting only the final plural, which the Egyptians never imitated. In the first of these documents the scribe Kauisar makes a return to his superior, the scribe Bek-en-Ptah, in these words: "I have obeyed the command which my master gave me, to provide subsistence for the soldiers, and also for the *Aperiu* who carry stone for the great Bekhen of king Rameses. I have given them rations every month, according to the excellent instructions of my master."

¹ It first occurs in Lev. xxiv. 10.

² After Jeroboam's schism.

The second is addressed by a scribe named Keniamen, to his master Kadjena Hui of the court of Rameses II., and is as follows: "I have obeyed the command of my master, and have furnished rations to the soldiers and also to the Aperiu who carry stone for the sun of the sun, Rameses Meriamen, to the south of Memphis."

The term "Bekben" denotes every kind of building, temple, palace, or common house. But the use of the term in another papyrus may point to its meaning here; "His majesty has built a Bekhen, whose name is illustrious, which in its sumptuous arrangements resembles Heliopolis, and in the delights of life is like unto Memphis." This answers with the Biblical representation that "they built for Pharaoh treasure cities." The phrase "sun of the sun," Chabas regards as a metaphorical expression, or as a slip of the pen, for "the temple of the sun." Thus we find the Aperiu, Hebrews, employed under Egyptian officers, in severe labors, building cities and temples south of Memphis. If this reading of M. Chabas shall be accepted by Egyptologists, it must be placed among the most remarkable confirmations of the Bible from contemporary sources.

Had Belzoni never written, Mr. A. H. Rhind F. S. A. would be the hero of Egyptian archaeology. His account of the discovery of the unrifled tomb of a Theban dignitary is as exciting to the antiquarian as was Belzoni's narrative to the popular mind; while the accessories of his story, incidents, sketches, descriptions, plates, and the beautiful mechanical execution of the volume, impart to it a real charm in spite of the author's involved and cumbrous style.¹ But the field of exploration among the monuments of Egypt has been so thoroughly canvassed, that the novelty of a discovery gives place at once to its value as an addition to our knowledge. After many fruitless attempts in the rock cemetery of el-Goornah at Thebes, Mr. Rhind's patience and ingenuity were rewarded by the discovery of a tomb dating probably from the fourteenth century before Christ. Its entrance is a chamber about eight feet high and as many broad, which penetrates the hill to a distance of fifty-five feet; at various points small lateral chambers diverge from this; but at its further extremity is "a tunnel, six feet high, which winds and slopes downward through the rock for about seventy feet, terminating at the edge of a shaft ten feet by six." Over this shaft are the beams and the ropes of palm fibres by which, ages ago, the dead were here lowered to their rest; and at the depth of twenty feet are four sepulchral chambers. All the other chambers in the tomb, though carefully closed and sealed, had been rifled, apparently by the Romans, since in one of them was found a common Roman lamp of terra cotta, with half-exhausted wick, as if left by the spoiler. It was evident also that the original occupants of these lower crypts had been dis-

¹ Thebes, its Tombs and their Tenants. By A. Henry Rhind, F. S. A. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts.

placed for later comers, and that the perfect granite sarcophagus found in one of them did not contain the body for which it was originally made. The hieroglyphic groups show that this sepulchre belonged to the period of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties. But the mummy found in the sarcophagus dates back only to the first century before Christ. The scroll accompanying the body describes the person as one Sebau, a dignitary of the royal household, who was born in the thirteenth year of the reign of Ptolemy Philopater III., and died in the twenty-first year of Augustus Caesar. The mummy is in a perfect state of preservation, and affords one of the best illustrations of the funeral rites of that age. The head was crowned with a chaplet of copper, thickly gilt, with bay leaves of thin gold attached to it by pliant stalks. In the upper chamber was a canopy of wood, brightly painted and in perfect preservation. This was probably used to cover the body on the way to the tomb. These curious relics have been deposited by Mr. Rhind in the Royal Museum at Edinburgh; and we have the promise of a memoir upon the mummy from Mr. Birch of the British Museum.

Mr. Rhind also promises, at a future day, to favor us with his own conclusions upon the sepulchral rites of Egypt in their connection with general archaeology. His estimate of the labor of others in this field is given in the following ambiguous sentence: "Worker after worker has built a pharos on the great quicksands of oblivion which lies between it and us, but the solvent influence of advancing inquiry has deprived each in turn of cohesive power, causing it to sink down and leave no trace, unless its residuum containing substantial elements could make some addition to the accumulating foundations." But notwithstanding this vicious style, Mr. Rhind has succeeded in giving a distinct summary of the theories explanatory of Egyptian sepulture, and in convincing the reader that as yet too little is known to warrant very specific inferences in regard to the theology of the Egyptians from their sepulchral rites. He has also furnished some valuable data for the discussion of the subject, and by far the best description of the necropolis of Thebes with which we are acquainted.

ARTICLE VIII.

SCHELER'S DICTIONARY OF FRENCH ETYMOLOGY.¹

BY REV. B. SEARS, PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

WHAT Bopp and his school have done for etymology in the Sanscrit, the Grimms in the German, and Diez in the Romance languages, has given a new impulse to etymological studies, and led to many new discoveries and exploded many traditional errors. The older etymologists were so fanciful that no wonder a lively French writer said that in etymology *les consonens sont peu de choses et les voyales rien du tout*. By the older English and French writers on the subject, stories to explain the origin of words were fabricated with a facility equalled only by the credulity with which they were received. Of those tales of pure fiction in regard to the origin of English words it has been ascertained that, in nearly nine-tenths of the cases mentioned, the word was in use long before the occasion which is said to have given origin to it. The great majority of these anecdotes which even now disgrace our English literature are so clumsy that we can hardly account for the currency they have gained.

It is a fact to which even so good a scholar as Marsh has given too little attention, while he has studied the history of individual words so carefully, that there are well established laws by which words undergo certain changes in passing from one language to another, so that an etymology is no longer to be adopted on account of any external resemblances, but on account of changes which can be proved to be organic by referring to whole classes of words in which the same letters are represented by certain corresponding letters in another language. Thus the initial *f* in Latin is represented by *h* in Spanish, as in *faba*, *haba*; *facere*, *hacer*; *filius*, *hijo*; *forma*, *horma*; *fumus*, *humo*. The *c* before *a* in Latin, passes into *ch* in French, as in *caballus*, *cheval*; *camera*, *chambre*; *canis*, *chien*; *causa*, *chose*; *castellum*, *chateau*. The English and French insert the letter *b* after *m*, as in *numerus*, *number*; *camera*, *chambre*; *Schlummer* (German), *slumber*; *Daum*, *thumb*; *Lamm*, *lamb*. The diphthong *oi* in French takes the place of short *i* before a single consonant in Latin, as in *bibere*, *boir*, *digitus*, *doigt*; *fides*, *foi*; *minus*, *moins*; *niger*, *noir*; *via*, *voie*. The *o* of the Latin is changed into the diphthong *eu* (*oeu*) in French, as in *hora*, *heure*; *nodus*, *noeud*; *solus*, *seul*; *ploro*, *pleure*; *nepotem*, *neveu*; *ovum*, *oeuf*; *bovem*, *boeuf*; *populus*, *peuple*; *cor*, *coeur*. The *l* in Latin words is represented by *u* in French as in *collum*, *cou*; *bellus* (*beal*) *beau* (*bealté*, *beauté*);

¹ Dictionnaire d'Etymologie Française d'après les Résultats de la Science Moderne, par Auguste Scheler, Doct. en Philosophie et Lettres, Bibliothèqueire du Roi des Belges. Bruxelles et Paris: 1862.

castellum, chateau; falco, faucon; delphinus, dauphin; talpa, taupe; alba, aube; alter, autre; altus, haut; psalmus, psaume; saltus, saut. Now while appearances in single words are no safe guide in etymology, and while an exact history of each word, if it could be traced, would be the most satisfactory, general analogies, supported by whole classes of words, are quite sufficient to establish a derivation, even without historical proof, which must of necessity be limited to a few cases. It is this new method which has rendered the study of etymology in recent times so prolific and trustworthy.

On this account the grammars of Bopp, Grimm, and Diez, which give the laws of the changes which cognate letters undergo in passing from one language to another, are more instructive by far than etymological dictionaries can be. In the former, words and constituent parts of words are classified; in the latter they cannot be, neither can etymological principles be discussed. Still it is a great convenience to find the results of etymological investigations briefly presented in an alphabetical order. For such reference the new edition of Schwenck's *Wörterbuch in Beziehung auf Abstammung* for the German, Scheler for the French, and Wedgewood for the English are highly valuable. There is, however, in them and in all similar books, one feature that is unsatisfactory. The greater part of the book, that is, nearly every long article, is taken up with dissertations on words of unknown or very doubtful etymology. The writers tell what they know of words of clear etymology in a few lines, but are very diffuse where they know little or nothing. This evil arises from the supposed necessity of inserting nearly the whole vocabulary of a language. Such a vocabulary is made up of four classes of words: 1st, those whose etymology is obvious and certain,—fortunately a large class of words; 2d, those which can be traced with great clearness through organic changes to their originals in other languages, and this is the most instructive part of all works on the subject; 3d, those whose derivation is highly probable, though not certain, which furnish a pleasant and useful entertainment for literary men; 4th, those whose origin is unknown. It is this last class, which by opening an illimitable field of conjecture, has made many etymologists run mad, and drawn down upon themselves and the subject of their studies the ridicule of the world.

To the first of these classes in French belong such words as *bon, mal, nom, livre, mer, clair, faim, pain, mère, frère, tout, ami, pas, ris, cerf, digne, fenêtre, ciel, fils, couronne*, whose Latin origin is recognized at once. The changes of form are nearly all subject to rule. A word always retains its accented syllable. Of unaccented syllables, the final syllable is the one most commonly dropped. If the vowel *a* of the Latin is changed, it usually becomes *e* or *ai* in French; *e* and *i* are changed into *oi*; *ae* into *ie*; *u* into *ou*; *b* into *v*; *v* into *f*.

The second class contains words whose derivation is just as certain as the first, though not so obvious, owing to the various disguises under which they appear. Thus, at first sight it might not appear that *poindre* comes from

pungere; but when we observe that joindre comes from jungere; oindre, from ungere; ceindre, from cingere; peindre, from pingere; astreindre from as tringere; feindre, from fingere; plaindre, from plangere, we perceive that there is a law by which *d* takes the place of *g*. So taire might not at once be recognized as coming from tacere, on account of the *i* in the one and the *c* in the other, till the uniformity should be observed which appears in noire, nocere; luire, lucere: conduire, conducere; reduire, reducirere; traduire, transducere; plaire, placere; faire, facere; dire, dicere; cuire, coquere.

The omission of the *c* is observable also in the following words, influenced by the same regard to euphony, viz. point, punctus; saint, sanctus; plaint, planctus; fait, factum; teint, tinctus, toit, tectum; lit, lectus; conduit, conductus; confit, confectus; conflit, conflictus. For a similar reason the *g* is often dropped, as in froid, frigidus; doit, digitus; roide, rigidus; frêle (frail), fragilis; reine, regina, seine, segina. On the other hand the letter *g* is introduced into several words in place of *v* and some other letters, as in sauge, salvia; deluge, diluvium; cage, cavea; niege, nivem (nix); rage, rabies, serge, serica; manger, manducare; venger, vindicare; piège, pedica; voyage, viaticum: sauvage, silvaticum; rouge, rubeus; tige, tibia; sergent, serviens.

To facilitate the utterance of words beginning with *sp*, *sc*, *st*, the vowel *e* is prefixed to the following words, all from the Old French; scribere, écrire (O. F. escrire); scala, échelle (O. F. eschelle); species, espece; sperare, esperer; spiritus, esprit; stomachus, estomac; stabulum, étable (O. F. estable); strictus, étroit (O. F. estroit, compare districtus, detroit); sponsus, epoux, (O. F. espoux); speculum, espiegle; spissus, epais (O. F. espais); sponsia, éponge (O. F. esponge); scafoldus (Low Latin), échafaud; schola, école (O. F. escole); scutum, écu, (O. F. escu); scutella, écuelle (O. F. escuelle); sparsus, épars; spatula, epaule (O. F. espaulle); spatha, épée (O. F. espee); spicus, épi (O. F. espi); spiculum, épice (O. F. espice); spinula, (diminutive of spina), épingle, (O. F. espingle); spatium, espace; stabilire, établir; stagium (Low Latin), étage; stannum, étain; stagnum, étang (O. F. estang); status, état (O. F. estat); aestas, été (O. F. esté); standardum? (Low Latin), étendard (O. F. estandard); scriptorium, écritoire.

In many French words *v* takes the place of *b* and *p* of the corresponding Latin words, as in devoir, debere; féve, faba; prouver, probare; avoir, habere; cheval and cavale, caballus; fièvre, faber; livrer, liberare; couvrir, cubare; livre, liber; levre, lebrum; recevoir, recipere; recouvrer, recuperare; pauvre, pauper; poivre, piper; savoir, sapere; saveur, sapor; savon, sapo; cuivre, cuprum; chevre, capillus; lievre, lepus (leporis); oeuvre, opus, operis; rave, rapa; rive, ripa.

Examples enough have been given, we trust, to show that etymologies supported by such extensive analogies, even when the words have nearly lost their resemblance in form, are by no means conjectural, but, on the contrary, have an authority which nothing can resist. Even in those cases

in which but slight vestiges of the original word are preserved, there are means of tracing the connection that remove all reasonable grounds of doubt. If words were corrupted first in oral intercourse, the accented syllables and the principal consonants were generally retained, while both the vowels and the consonants of unaccented syllables were more frequently dropped or changed. When letters were changed, it was under the influence of phonetic laws, limiting the change to cognate sounds. By means of the Romanic languages, which are descended from the Latin, namely, the Romance, the Wallachian, the Italian, French (Old French in this case), Spanish and Portuguese, we can generally fill the chasm between the Latin and the present French, or restore the links which connect the old form and the new one, however dissimilar they may now appear. We will present a few examples, placing these connecting links in a parenthesis: *eleemosyna* (*almosna, almosne*), *aumone*; *avunculus* (*eoncle*), *oncle*; *consobrinus* (*cusdrin, coustrin*), *cousin*; *asinus* (*asne*), *âne*; *angelus* (*angele*), *ange*; *episcopus* (*vescovo, evesque*), *évêque*; *anima* (*anime, anme*), *âme*; *civitas* (*civitatem, ciptat*), *cité*; *apostolus* (*apostole, apostle*), *apôtre*; *insula* (*isola, isla, isle*), *île*; *laxus* (*lasc, lasche*), *lâche*; *tepidus* (*tepde, tede*), *tiède*; *supra* (*supr*), *sûr*; *vitellus* (*vedel, veel*), *veau*; *ecclesia* (*iglesia*), *eglise*; *catena* (*chaêne*), *chaîne*; *vivenda* (*vivanda, vianda*), *viande*; *hibernum* (*hivern*), *hiver*; *cingula* (*singla, cengle*), *sangle*; *cadentia* (*cadenza, cheance*), *chance*; *causa* (*cosa*), *chose*; *fatuus* (*fado*), *fade*; *dorsum* (*dos*), *dos*; *antecessores* (*ancessors, ancestres*), *ancêtres*; *bracchium* (*braccio brazo*), *bras*. In these cases also, where the intermediate forms can be traced, the etymologist stands on solid ground. It is the great merit of Diez, in his *Grammar of the Romanic Languages*, to have cleared up this matter in a masterly manner.

We now come to the part which anecdotes play in etymology. We are glad to see that the old story about the word "*cabal*," from the initials of Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale, is not even mentioned by Wedgewood in his new *Dictionary of English Etymology*. Scheler quotes the dictionary of Minot as containing the French word *cabale* many years before this alleged origin of it in English.

In like manner the old and untenable derivation of the word "*diaper*," from *d'Ypres*, in Flanders, as being the original place of the manufacture, is abandoned both by Scheler and Wedgewood, and is traced to a much earlier date than to the flourishing period of Flemish manufactures.

Of the origin of *fiacre* it is said by Scheler that the person who introduced this kind of coach lived at the sign of *St. Fiacre*, in Paris and hence the name.

Filigraane (*filigree*) is so called from *filum* a thread, and *granum*, grain, because the Italians who first brought the fabric to France, wove in rounded and flattened grains with the threads of gold and silver in the ornamental work.

Lombards, money-lenders from Italy, were known in Paris as early as

1200. Matthew Paris says that usury was a vice introduced from Italy, referring to the Lombards who were publicly licensed, for which they paid a tax. Lombard-houses are well known in England, as is Lombard street in London.

Silhouette was not the inventor of the dark profile which bears his name; but he was a very unsuccessful minister of finance, which made him a subject of contempt and raillery in Paris, and he was hence the emblem of what was sad or unsuccessful, and thus gave name to this kind of portrait. So says Sismondi.

Renard did not originally mean a fox, for which *volpit* was the proper word in old French, but was a personal poetical name, from Reginhart, used in that satirical work "*Reynard the Fox*."

The derivation of *baionnette* from Bayonne is allowed to stand, although some doubt is intimated about its originating at the siege in 1665.

For the word *bonnet*, *boneta* is found in the Romance language, and *bonete* in Spanish and Portuguese. Caseneuve is quoted as saying: "It was a kind of cloth used in making hats and head-dresses, and has given its name to the article made from it, just as the word *castor*, has done." Wedgewood does not notice this etymology, and gives one even more doubtful.

Isabelle, meaning a yellow dun color, is said to have originated thus: a princess of this name, a daughter of Philip II. of Spain, say some, made a vow, when her husband was besieging a town, that she would not change her garment till the town surrendered. The siege lasted three months, and the garment received the tint in question. Our grave critic says: *En attendant les preuves diplomatiques de cette etymologie, je rapporte l'historiette pour ce qu'elle vaut; "si non è vero, è ben trovato"!*

Lambin, a tedious person, is said to be derived from the celebrated philologist of that name (*Lambinus*) who lived in the sixteenth century, on account of the tediousness of his commentaries. It is to be feared that the lively Parisians take the justice of this application upon trust. Without denying the truth of the etymology, our author humanely says: *J'aime à douter de la justesse de cette hypothèse.*

Under the word *laquais* we have, among other things, the following: "Menage thinks hé has found a recipe for this word by prolonging the Latin *verna* into *vernula*, then into *vernulacus*, then into *vernulacaius*. Here he stops to take breath. Then, with courage, he takes hold of *vernulacaius* and divides it into two parts; the first is put in abeyance, and the second is made a *laquais*!" This is about equal to Wedgewood's article on the word "to abet."

ARTICLE IX.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE OF GERMANY.

We have received the following communication from Prof. W. F. Warren of Bremen.

Perhaps none of the German works published during the last twelve-month will find a wider circulation, and be more eagerly read than Dr. Karl Hase's "Manual of Protestant Polemics against the Roman Catholic Church" (*Handbuch der protestantischen Polemik gegen die römisch-katholische Kirche*. 8vo. pp. xxii and 665. Leipsic : 1862. 3 thalers). It is well known that Dr. Doellinger's recent work : "The Church and the Churches ; Papacy and Church-State," has produced a sensation in this country not unlike that called forth by the first appearance of Moehler's *Symbolik* some years ago. As that work set the ablest pens of the German Protestant church in motion, associating a Nitzsch with a Baur in the defence of Protestant principles, so Doellinger seems likely to be honored with the attention of the foremost champions of the different tendencies and schools of Protestantism now prevailing in the Fatherland. As a kind of first-fruit of the renewed controversy on the Protestant side, we may specify Professor Schenkel's work : "The Ecclesiastical Question and its Protestant Solution," published at Elberfeld a few months ago (8vo. pp. vii and 386. Price, 1 $\frac{2}{3}$ thaler). The voice from Heidelberg is now followed up by one from Jena. But while Dr. Hase's work is a substantial reply to Doellinger, it is much more. It does not owe its origin to the provocation from Munich, and without doubt would have appeared had Doellinger's never seen the light. The genial Professor's "Manual of Church History," "Hutterus Redivivus," and "Dogmatik," are so well known to the readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, that any nearer characterization of his elegant style, and matured and tasteful scholarship, is unnecessary. His broad liberality towards the Roman Catholic church is also well known (Comp. the latter part of the Preface to the Third Edition of his *Church History*, American Ed. pp. xx, xxi). There is a kind of humor lurking in the very dating of the preface of the new production : "Rome, May, 1862," as if he took a kind of mischievous pleasure in launching his missile from the seven-hilled city itself. A foretaste of the coming work was given the public last year, in his pamphlet : "The Pope and Italy." The work itself would have been called, by most German theologians, merely "Comparative Dogmatics," or some such milder name ; but the author, with all his refinement of taste, believes in calling things by their right names. It is divided into three books : the first stating and criticising the Catholic doctrine of the church ; the second, the Catholic soteriology ; the third, subordinate matters : 1st, cultus and art ; 2d, science and literature ; 3d, politics and nationality. He

has written in more popular style than that in which his previous works are composed, addressing himself to the cultivated public at large. Although it will scarcely go as far, and be translated into so many languages as Doellinger's work has been, it will nevertheless be extensively sought and read. In the absence of Protestant apologies based upon the true ground — *experimental* religion, such works possess for the cause of truth in this country great value.

Appropos to this controversy comes the Fourth Instalment of Neander's Lectures: "Protestantism and Catholicism" (pp. 234), edited by Professor Herman Messner of Berlin. It would perhaps be difficult to find another work in which the great antagonisms between the two great systems of Christian doctrine and life are presented so clearly and criticised so judiciously in so small a space as here. Although appearing quite too late, and referring much more to the Moehler controversy than to the present, it will, nevertheless, be welcomed by thousands of its sainted author's admirers. In style, plan, etc., it strongly resembles Neander's Lectures on the History of Doctrines, edited by Professor Jacobi of Halle.

The controversy in question, the High Lutheran reaction, and various other circumstances combine to render the study of Luther's personal views of peculiar interest at the present juncture. The past quarter has brought us two works of great research illustrating these views, and the history of their development from two independent points of view. The first is from the pen of Professor Köstlin of Breslau (*Luther's Theologie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 388 and 588. Stuttgart: 1863). As its title indicates, it traces the *historical development* of the Reformer's views. It is divided into four books, the first tracing his "Inner Life and Doctrine" up to the year 1517, the year of the nailing up of the ninety-five theses; the second continues the delineation up to the Diet of Worms, 1521; the third sets forth his progress from the time of his residence in the Wartburg onward; while the fourth is devoted to an extended exposition of his maturest theological opinions. This book extends from page 230 to 567 of the second volume. The whole work was evidently written *con amore*, and is a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of the inner life and growth of the greatest man of his age. It is singular that such a work should have been left so long unwritten.

The second of the two works referred to is less historical — more of a strictly doctrinal study. It is entitled "Luther's Theology, with especial Reference to his Doctrine of Atonement and Redemption" (*Luther's Theologie mit besonderer Beziehung auf seine Versöhnungs- und Erlösungslehre*. By Professor Theo. Harnack. In two Parts. Part I. Luther's Fundamental Theological Views. 8vo. pp. viii and 599. Erlangen. Price, 2½ thalers). We may take occasion to speak of its merits hereafter, when the second part shall have made its appearance.

In the last number of this Review we noticed, as nearly complete, Professor Gass's History of Protestant Theology; we now have the first instal-

ment of a new work in the same field. The author, a new aspirant for literary distinction, is a *Privat-Dozent* (at Jena, if we mistake not), by the name of Gustav Frank. The part before us extends from Luther to John Gerhard (8vo. pp. xii and 428 Price, 1 thaler. Leipsic). Two more parts will quickly follow, and complete the work.

A new work on the "History of the Apologetical and Polemical Literature of Christian Theology" (*Geschichte der apologetischen und polemischen Literatur der Christlichen Theologie*; von Dr. Karl Werner, Professor in the Episcopal Seminary at St. Poelten. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 693. Schaffhausen) deserves notice on many accounts, not the least of which is that it is a thorough work, in its way, in a field where works of the kind are much needed. Although the author is a Roman Catholic, he has produced a work which has the look of genuine Tuebingen thoroughness about it. It probably owes its composition to the arbitrary and irreverent proceedings of Baur and his associates, whose representations of the parties and party strifes in the early Catholic church are known to be anything but complimentary to Roman Christianity. Large as is the volume already issued, it only brings the history down to the time of Hincmar and the predestinarian controversy with Gottschalk.

Speaking of Catholic literature brings to mind a little work, just issued at Munich, which will be of very great value to all interested in studying the various "scientific tendencies lately prevalent, and now prevailing, in the domain of Catholicism" (*Wissenschaftliche Richtungen auf dem Gebiet des Katholicismus in neuer und neuester Zeit*. Von Dr. A. Schmid, Professor of Philosophy in the Lyceum at Dillingen. 8vo. pp. 292. Price, 1 thaler, 18 gr.) The work aims to set before the reader a clear and exhaustive view of the different scientific currents setting through the Catholic world, and to refer each back to its real origin in the affirmation or negation of some great philosophical problem. To this end it is divided into two parts. In the first the author describes the following tendencies: first, the Hermesian; second, the Gunther tendency; third, the traditional; fourth, the theosophic (Baader's); fifth, Catholic-Tuebingen school (Standenmaier and Kuhn); sixth, the new scholastic; the fourth and fifth being expounded at great length. In the second part the great philosophical problems underlying these tendencies are thus designated: 1 The problem of the Hermesian tendency is that of mediate or immediate knowledge. 2. The second problem is that of "essential or non-essential knowing." 3. Freedom or unfreedom of science in theoretical respects. 4. Freedom or unfreedom of science in practical respects. 5 Relation of apologetical knowledge to theological faith. 6. Compatibility of exact science with theological faith. 7. Conditional or unconditional necessity of tradition. The value of such a survey of the whole domain of current Catholic thinking is evident to every student. It would well repay translation into English.

The old problem respecting the origin and mutual relationship of the

three synoptical gospels is undergoing renewed discussion. It is thought that the astounding labor which has been concentrated for the last ten years upon the earliest history of the church, puts the biblical critic in a position to resume the discussion with advantages not possessed by the champions of the last great battle in this field. One thing is at any rate evident, the old theory of Griesbach, so long dominant in one form or another, at least so far as this feature was concerned, to wit Mark's compilation of his gospel out of Matthew's and Luke's, is rapidly giving way to the view, so ably defended against the Griesbach party as long ago as 1838 by Wilke, according to which the priority is accorded to Mark. Although, Baur held to the old view, several of his school are abandoning it, as for instance Volkmar and Dr. Freitag (*Die Heiligen Schriften des Neuen Test. etc.* Berlin, 1861). The new theory is now maintained by Meyer, Ewald, Ritschl, Plitt, Weiss of Königsberg, and last year received in a review article the suffrage of Dr. H. J. Holtzmann of Heidelberg. A few weeks ago the last named gentleman issued a very learned and able work reviewing the whole ground from the point of view of to-day. In point of erudition it stands, perhaps, at the head of all the publications of the quarter. Its history of the problem and of the various attempts to solve it is exceedingly valuable. The title is *Die Synoptischen Evangelien, ihr Ursprung und Verwandtschafts-verhältniss* (8vo. pp. 514).. It is published as Part I. of an extended Introduction to the New Testament scriptures.

Like Neander, Dr. Friedrich Bleek, though dead, still speaketh. Every few months brings us a new volume of his posthumous works. His Introduction to the Old Testament appeared as long ago as 1860. The second part, containing an Introduction to the New Testament followed early in the present year. Both are very highly spoken of. Dr. Nitzsch introduces the former with a very eulogistic estimate of the work, in which he styles the author "Bleek, the reliable," etc. Since then we have had his Synoptical Exposition of the First Three Gospels (2 Vols. pp. 500 and 524. Leipsic. Price, 5 thalers) ; and last of all his Lectures on the Apocalypse (8vo. pp. vii and 369. Price, 1½ thaler. Berlin).

We have an additional volume, the second, of Keil and Delitzsch's excellent Commentary on the Old Testament. This volume is, like the first, by Dr. Keil, and embraces Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy (8vo pp. 590. Price, 2 thalers, 21ngr. Leipsic). Two more parts of Lange's *Bibelwerk* have appeared, the thirteenth, on the Epistle of James, elaborated by Prof. Lange and Dr. Van Oosterzee (pp. vi and 117. Price, 14 ngr.) ; and the ninth, embracing the Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians, elaborated by Dr. Daniel Schenkel (pp. 218. Price, 24 sgr). Olshausen's Commentary, continued by Drs. Ebrard and Wiesingen, is at last completed by the publication of the last part of Vol. VI, and the price of the whole work (seven vols.) reduced from 22 thalers, 48 grote, to 12 thalers, 46 grote. Dr. Ebrard's mild Philippistic *Dogmatik* has just reached a second edition.

Several important works in Systematic Theology have been completed within the past twelvemonth. For example, Thomasius's *Christi Person und Werk. Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkt der Christologie aus.* (Three Parts, 8vo. 4 Vols. pp. 524, 555, 479, 505. Price, 10 thalers, 6 sgr. Erlangen). It is becoming quite common to elaborate the whole body of divinity from the Christological point of view, instead of from the old theological one. This attempt is by far the most successful we have yet seen. All the former parts of the work have already passed to the second edition. The position of the author as one of the most distinguished and progressive of the new school of Lutheran orthodoxy, and champion of the *Kenosis* is well known. Philippi, of a more strict and old-fashioned orthodoxy, gave us Part IV. of his Dogmatics a few months earlier. The first volume appeared in 1854. Wuttke's Manual of Christian Ethics (*Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre.* 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. viii and 583, and x and 655. Price, 5½ thalers. Berlin) was recently completed by the issue of the second volume, and is rightly regarded as the ablest treatise in the department for many years. It even throws into the shade the excellent work of the late Dr. Chr. F. Schmid of Tuebingen, posthumously published last year by Dr. A. Heller (Stuttgart. Price, 3½ thalers). The last volume of Dr. C. H. Weisse's Philosophical Dogmatics, or Philosophy of Christianity, has likewise appeared (*Die Heilslehre des Christenthums.* 8vo. pp. xxiii and 737. Price of the 3 Vols., 10 thalers. Leipsic). The first volume was published in 1855. The work is one of the most important in its department.

The Roman Catholics of Austria have commenced the publication of a new Quarterly Review at Vienna, but if its succeeding numbers prove to be as heavy as the first, it will soon follow its numerous predecessors. It is entitled *Oestreichische Vierteljahresschrift für Katholische Theologie*, and is to be conducted by Drs. Ehrlich, Scheiner, Ginzl, and Werner.

The third and last part of a valuable work on the Theology of the Concordienformel by Professor F. H. R. Frank is in press. Hagenbach's *Lives and Select Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church*, has reached its conclusion. The collection consists of ten volumes, costing complete fifteen thalers. The last volume contains the biography of Knox by F. Brandis.

In conclusion it may not be amiss to mention a new prize work on the Abolition of Serfdom in Europe. It will possess for all American patriots no little interest at the present crisis. It will probably find its way into English sooner or later. It is Sugenheim's *Geschichte der Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft und Horigkeit in Europa bis um die Mitte des 19 Jahrhunderts* (8vo. pp. viii and 544. Price, 2½ thalers. St. Petersburg and Leipsic). We know of no work covering the whole ground which is brought down to our own day.

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